By employment groups the average compliance in underground bituminouscoal and lignite mines during the year the law was in effect was reported by Federal coal-mine inspectors as follows:

1 These 40 items represent the more important sections of the Federal Mine Safety Code identified in Public Law 328. They apply particularly to the prevention of roof-fall injuries and to the prevention of mine explosions and mine fires.

Based on the number of men employed, the record indicates that the larger the mine the better the compliance with Federal recommendations to correct unsafe conditions and practices. In other words, the smaller mines were more hazardous than the larger mines, which in general is borne out by the accident records.

The investigation, covered by Public Law 328, discloses that some progress was made in reducing hazardous conditions and practices in the Nation's underground bituminous-coal and lignite mines, but it also indicates much room for improvement in reducing the principal causes of accidents in underground mining operations.

ACCIDENT STATISTICS

The effectiveness of Federal inspection of coal mines under Public Law 49 is reflected in the mine accident experience since Federal inspections began. Accident data covering coal mines are included in appendix B. The first full year of Federal coal-mine inspection was 1942. Based on man-hours of exposure, some improvement is indicated in the fatal and nonfatal injury rates since that year. Comparative average accident rates on a million man-hours of exposure basis for the 9-year period immediately preceding Federal coal-mine inspections and the 7-year period of such inspection are as follows:

Combining the fatal with the nonfatal injuries the comparative average accident rates for the same periods as above are as follows:

The rates manifestly are still too high and indicate that too many mine workmen are killed or injured.

The number of men killed in major gas and dust explosions in coal mines during the 7-year period preceding the institution of Federal inspection was 593,

whereas 611 were killed in similar disasters during the 7 complete years of Federal inspection. One of the reasons for this regrettable loss of life may be found in Federal inspection reports which indicate that in some instances little if anything is done to correct unsafe conditions and practices that may result in widespread disaster. Federal investigations of mine disasters that occurred since 1942 indicate that most of them could have been prevented if recommendations of the Federal coal-mine inspectors had been complied with. It should be mentioned that many coal-mining companies have instituted all possible safeguards to prevent these deplorable occurrences.

The disaster at Centralia, Ill., on March 25, 1947, resulted in the deaths of 111 men, and the one in the Smith mine at Washoe, Mont., on February 27, 1943, killed 74 men. Prior to the Smith mine disaster Federal inspectors had recommended the elimination of hazards that resulted in the explosion, namely, use of open lights in this gassy mine and failure to rock-dust the dry and dusty surfaces of the mine; and they had repeatedly warned the officials of the Centralia mine that the blasting practices wer unsafe and that the applications of rock dust were inadequate to prevent propagation of the coal-dust explosion that eventually occurred.

VIOLATIONS OF STATE MINING LAWS

A record was kept of the violations of State mining laws, indicated in reports covering Federal coal-mine inspections made during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1948. This record by States is included in this statement as appendix C, and indicates that a grand total of 23,386 violations of State mining laws relating to timbering, explosives and blasting, ventilation, coal dust and rock dust, transportation, electricity, mechanical equipment, fire prevention, surface, and miscellaneous were observed during the year. In West Virginia mines 6,472 violations were reported, 4,562 in Pennsylvania mines, and 2,825 in Kentucky mines.

The largest number of violations of State mining laws related to ventilation, 5,218 separate items being reported. These violations are important, because defective ventilation results in a large number of mine explosions. The second largest number of violations, 4,336, involved timbering. Inasmuch as more than half of the coal-mine fatalities and more than one-fourth of the nonfatal injuries are caused by falls of roof and coal, the need for adequate roof support is selfevident. Inadequate rock dusting and control of coal dust is essential in the prevention of bituminous-coal-mine explosions. Nevertheless, 2,829 violations of State laws relating to the presence of coal dust and the lack of rock dust were observed. The large loss of life in the Centralia disaster was due primarily to the fact that rock dust had not been maintained adequately near the working faces. In Illinois 209 violations relating to rock dusting were reported. State regulations pertaining to electricity were violated in 3,078 instances. Electricity is the foremost cause of gas and dust ignition; currently almost half (44 percent) of the coal-mine explosions are of electrical origin. Explosives rank third in sources of ignition, and during the fiscal year 1948, 1,893 State violations relating to explosives and blasting were observed. The four classes of violations that may contribute directly to explosions represented 13,018 of the 23,386 State violations recorded.

Transportation ranks second in causes of coal-mine accidents, and this high rate is reflected in the 2,576 State violations reported.

Attention is invited to the fact that the violations of State laws covered only those that were violations of the Federal Mine Safety Code or anthracite standards. The heads of some State mining agencies, when they noted violations of State laws in Federal reports, promptly ordered their district mine inspectors to investigate the reported violations and to take appropriate action. The foregoing indicates that Federal coal-mine inspection is a service to the State inspection agencies in finding and reporting violations of State mining laws during Federal inspections. The violations of State laws may be found in Federal inspection reports, copies of which are sent to the State agency having jurisdiction over the respective mines.

The Coal Mine Inspections and Investigations Act of 1941, Public Law 49, requires the Bureau of Mines to cooperate with the official mine inspection or safety agencies of the several States to promote sound and effective coordination of Federal and local activities within the field covered by the act. In addition to the reporting of violations of State mining laws, such cooperation includes (1) calling to the attention of State inspection agencies the hazards that are 92725 49-10

observed during Federal inspections of the mines; (2) investigations of mine disasters; (3) recovery operations following mine disasters; (4) collaboration with State agencies in improving State mining laws; (5) collaboration with State agencies on the solution of unusual mine safety problems; (6) assisting in the organization and maintenance of safety groups, such as mining and electrical institutes; and (7) assisting in the development and execution of State-sponsored first-aid and mine-rescue contests.

RECORD OF COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Since the beginning of Federal coal-mine inspections the inspectors of the Bureau of Mines could not require compliance with their recommendations except during the period March 25 to June 30, 1947, when they were authorized to order the resident official of the operating company to withdraw all men from any mine in Government possession or section thereof where imminent, serious, or immediate danger existed.

The extent of compliance with Bureau of Mines recommendations since December 1, 1941 (when Federal inspection began), to June 30, 1948, is as follows:

Period:

Percentage compliance

Dec. 1, 1941, to May 31, 1946: Under Bureau of Mines safety standards-- 25 June 1, 1946, to Mar. 24, 1947: Under Coal Mines Administration and anthracite standards (before Centralia disaster) ---Mar. 25 to June 30, 1917: Under Coal Mines Administration and anthracite standards (after Centralia disaster) --

25

July 1, 1947, to June 30, 1948: Under Federal Mine Safety Code, Public Law 328, and anthracite standards____.

45

41

The record of compliance with recommendations of the Federal coal-mine inspections from June 1, 1946, to June 30, 1948, is shown by States in appendix D.

It is noteworthy that public indignation aroused by the Centralia disaster on March 25, 1947, resulted in a favorable change in attitude toward compliance with Bureau of Mines safety recommendations.

After the Centralia disaster the mandatory aspects of certain provisions of the Federal Mine Safety Code were rigorously enforced by the Coal Mines Administrator so that when imminent, immediate, or serious danger was found in a bituminous-coal or lignite mine in Government possession, the mine was forced to cease operations until the danger was eliminated. Such imminent dangers included insufficient rock dust, use of open lights or smoking in a gassy mine, presence of only one escapeway, accumulations of explosive gas, blasting on shift with black blasting powder in a gassy mine or in a dry, dusty mine, an unsealed fire in a mine, bad roof conditions along travelways where men travel in groups, etc. The closed mines were not permitted to reopen until Federal reinspection disclosed that the dangers had been eliminated.

After the Coal Mine Administrator relinquished control of the bituminous-coal mines the Federal Mine Safety Code and safety standards for anthracite mines were accepted by the United Mine Workers of America and operators of mines so affiliated, and compliance with recommendations of the Federal coal mine inpectors were agreed to by contract. However, the fact that only 41 percent of all recommendations made by Federal inspectors under Public Law 49 were complied with during the year ending June 30, 1948, when the wage agreements were in effect, indicates that more incentive is needed to eliminate unsafe conditions and practices existing in coal mines.

The Bureau of Mines has repeatedly requested mine operators, mine workers, and State mining departments to cooperate with it in its efforts to reduce the accidents in coal mines by eliminating unsafe conditions and practices, particularly those called to attention by Federal coal-mine inspectors.

COMMENTS ON H. R. 3023, EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

The effect of the proposed amendment in H. R. 3023 on the safety of mining operations depends to a large extent upon the definition of the word "imminent" as applied to danger in a coal mine. The proposed amendment places upon the Federal coal-mine inspector the responsibility of determining when and where an imminent danger exists, and prescribes appropriate action. Such responsibility would call for the exercise of sound judgment on the part of an inspector because dangers in coal mines exist in varying degrees. Certain hazards in coal mining are of such magnitude as to warrant the withdrawal of men from the

affected area, and such hazards constitute imminent dangers. For example, the accumulation of explosive gas in a working place is generally regarded by mine officials and inspectors as an imminent danger, and it is common practice to withdraw the workmen from such places until the accumulations are removed. The detection of loose, unsupported roof in a working place or along a haulage road often has resulted in the withdrawal of men until the condition has been corrected. In recent years, and particularly since the Centralia disaster, the lack of adequate rock dusting in dry and dusty mines is generally recognized as imminent danger.

The Bureau of Mines has its own conception as to what constitutes imminent dangers. Whenever coal-mine inspection reports that contain statements indicating imminent danger reach the Washington office a personal letter over the signature of the Chief of the Health and Safety Division is sent to the president of the operating company. This letter calis attention to the imminent danger and other hazards stated in the report and requests the cooperation of the mining company to eliminate such hazards.

The record gives some idea of the magnitude of this problem; during the 12-month period beginning April 8, 1948, when the practice was started, 5,837 Federal coal-mine inspections were made. Reports covering 1,778 (30 percent) of these inspections contained statements of violations of the Federal Mine Safety Code or anthracite standards which appeared to constitute imminent danger, and it was deemed necessary to write personal letters to the presidents of the companies. A break-down of these 1,778 reports by States is included in this report as appendix E. In April 1949, 46 percent of the inspections revealed imminent dangers, and letters calling attention to the dangers were sent to the company presidents. Thus, it is seen that the percentage of reports indicating imminent dangers is not diminishing.

If H. R. 3023 had been in effect at the time the inspections were made, it would have been mandatory that the Federal inspectors require the managements to withdraw the men from the unsafe areas or from the mines, but this does not necessarily mean that a large number of mines would have been closed; in many instances the causes of an imminent danger would have been corrected on the spot before the inspector left the mine or the area involved.

To indicate what the Bureau of Mines considers an imminent danger, excerpts from some letters sent to the presidents of coal-mining companies are quoted in the following paragraphs. The Roman numerals represent the articles of the Federal Mine Safety Code which are violated.

"Article IV: Black blasting powder in pellet form, fired with fuze, was used for blasting coal and rock on shift."

The Bureau believes that the use of black blasting powder in any mine constitutes an imminent danger; the danger becomes all the more acute when open lights and smoking are permitted in the mine.

"Article V: The ventilating current was not sufficient in velocity or volume to adequately ventilate the mine. Methane was detected with a permissible flame safety lamp in each working place in the mine and employees continued to perform their duties. No attempt was made to remove the methane. An air sample collected in No. 2 right room contained 1.92 percent methane by chemical analysis. An air sample collected in the air current immediately returning from the active workings contained 1.88 percent methane by chemical analysis. Methane was also detected with a permissible flame safety lamp in the extensive, unsealed, abandoned workings which were adjacent to the active workings; an air sample collected in the abandoned area contained 2.64 percent methane by chemical analysis. Air from worked-out and abandoned areas was used to ventilate active workings."

Any experienced mining man would agree that the condition described in the foregoing paragraph constitutes an imminent danger.

"Article VI: Excessive accumulations of coal dust were present along the haulageways. The mine was dry and rock dust had not been distributed in any place."

Absence of rock dust or the inadequate application of it so that a coal-dust explosion could propagate is considered an imminent danger. Under H. R. 3023, the inspector would be obliged to order the management to withdraw all men from the mine except those necessary to make the mine safe.

The adoption of H. R. 3023 will not be a cure-all for coal-mine accidents, but it could strengthen the hands of the Federal coal-mine inspectors in their efforts to eliminate hazards from coal mines, particularly those mines in which the managements have disregarded safety recommendations in the past. It should be understood, however, that there are only enough Federal coal-mine inspectors

to inspect each coal mine not more than twice a year, and this does not include all the small mines, of which there are a great number. The proposed amendment in H. R. 3023 would enable the Federal coal-mine inspector to require the correction of any conditions of imminent danger that existed while he is at the mine making his inspection, but it does not provide for the maintenance of hazardfree conditions during the interim between inspections. It is likely that some of the corrections brought about by the inspector would be maintained, but, on the other hand, imminent dangers corrected during an inspection may develop again during the interim between inspections, and accidents will continue to occur as a result, although probably at a lower rate.

It should be understood that enactment into law of the proposed amendment will not give the Federal coal-mine inspectors authority to enforce recommendations other than those covering imminent danger; nor does it require management or labor to correct hazards unless called to their attention by a Federal inspector, and then only if the hazards are imminently dangerous.

The proposed amendment in H. R. 3023 would eliminate a situation that now exists in which the inspector has to helplessly walk away from an imminently dangerous condition in many instances because of the lack of authority to require corrective action.

APPENDIX A.-Schedule for trainees-Coal Mine Inspection Branch, Health and Safety Division, Bureau of Mines, beginning Oct. 18, 1948