Mr. FERGUSON. I agree with that contention in its entirety. It is a more hazardous occupation. Mr. BAILEY. I think, Mr. Chairman, before the hearings are closed, I would like to produce that data and have it inserted in the record. Mr. KELLEY. Without objection, the material will be inserted in the record. Mr. BAILEY. I will be glad to furnish it to the clerk. (The information referred to was subsequently supplied by Mr. Bailey, and is as follows:) Here are some of the startling facts : First. From the year 1935 to 1945, inclusive, while our State was producing a total of 1,433,000,000 tons of coal there was a total of 3,515 fatalities and 183,797 were injured. Second. For the months of February and March 1946, the last 2 months before the stalemate began, there was a total of 50 fatalities and 4.237 injured. Third. Between the attack on Pearl Harbor and VJ-day, a period slightly less than 4 years, there were approximately 170,000 West Virginians serving in all branches of the armed services. There was in this same period of time a peak load of employment in the mines in our State of 104,000. The fatalities in the armed services were 3,718 and the wounded and missing were 14,423. Among the miners the fatalities were 1,307 and the injured 73,778. Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Perkins? Mr. PERKINS. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask a few questions. How long have you been with the United Mine Workers? Mr. PERKINS. I notice that several years ago there was a great mine disaster in Pennsylvania, an explosion wherein 495 lost their lives; am I correct in that? Mr. FERGUSON. That is correct. Mr. PERKINS. And that at Benwood, W. Va., there was an explosion several years ago where 119 men lost their lives. Mr. FERGUSON. I agree that there was an explosion. I cannot remember the exact number of men who were killed. But I know there were explosions at those two particular places during that period. Mr. PERKINS. And at Castlegate, Utah, in 1924, there was an explosion where 171 men lost their lives. Mr. FERGUSON. Yes. Mr. PERKINS. And at Hastings, Colo., there was an explosion where 121 men also lost their lives several years ago. Mr. FERGUSON. That is right. Mr. PERKINS. And back in 1915 we had an explosion in the Leland, W. Va., mine, where there were 121 men who lost their lives on one occasion. Mr. FERGUSON. Yes. Mr. PERKINS. And also on April 28, 1914, there was another mine in West Virginia wherein an explosion occurred, and 181 men lost their lives. And in 1913 there was an explosion in New Mexico that killed instantly 263 men. Those figures are correct? Mr. FERGUSON. They are statistics not compiled by our organization, but we accept them as being correct. Mr. PERKINS And in Alabama in 1911 there was an explosion that killed 129 men. And at Cherry, Ill., in 1909, there was a mine fire that killed 259 men. Those figures are correct, I believe. Mr. FERGUSON. Yes. Mr. PERKINS. And in 1909, at Murrayana, Pa., we had another explosion wherein 154 men were killed. Mr. FERGUSON. That is correct. Mr. PERKINS. And in 1907 another explosion in Pennsylvania at Jacobs Creek resulted in the deaths of 239 men. Mr. FERGUSON. That is also true. Mr. PERKINS. In 1907, there was a great explosion at Monongah, W. Va., that killed 361 men. Mr. FERGUSON. That is correct. Mr. PERKINS. Now, I just mention these figures for the record for the purpose of showing that we have had down through the years many explosions that could have been prevented if we had on the statute books the proper Federal mine safety law; am I correct in that? Mr. FERGUSON. I agree with you entirely. Mr. PERKINS. And these figures I mention are only a few of the larger explosions. Mr. BAILEY. Would the gentleman check 1946 in McDowell County, W. Va.? I believe at Gary or War, there was an explosion in 1946. Will you check that? Do you see the figures on that? Mr. PERKINS. I do not have those figures, because I think that was where less than 100 men were killed. I mentioned only the explosions that included deaths in excess of 100. Mr. BAILEY. My thought, Mr. Perkins, in interrupting you there and asking you for that information was that that occurred just about the time that this scrap came over increased appropriations in the Seventy-eighth Congress. I was told, Mr. Chairman, at the time that the investigation disclosed that not too long prior to the actual explosion a Federal mineinspection report indicated the danger in the mine, and had attention been paid to it by the coal operators and by the mine department of the State of West Virginia that explosion could evidently have been prevented. It was not too many days before the actual explosion took place that the Federal inspection showed the danger in the mine, and through failure of the operators and the State mine department of West Virginia to correct it, the explosion occurred. Mr. FERGUSON. I think that an investigation of the explosion statistics since the inception of the Federal Mine Inspection Act will prove that that not only held true in that one particular instanceMr. BAILEY. I think it would be interesting to the committee to have information of that kind. Mr. FERGUSON. I think it would. But that would also hold true in the case of any mine that has an explosion, that if the recommendations of the Federal inspector had been followed in their entirety the explosion would have been prevented in practically all cases. Mr. PERKINS. I wish to state for the record that I only mentioned a few of the mine explosions down through the years where more than 100 men lost their lives. We had an accident in Kentucky, I think, at the Straight Creek Mining Co. in 1945. Do you recall how many men. lost their lives there? Mr. FERGUSON. Twenty-some people. I am not just exactly sure how many, But all of the men in the mine were killed, as I understand it. Mr. KELLEY. Twenty-four, I believe. Mr. FERGUSON. Twenty-four, was it? I am not sure of the figures. Mr. PERKINS. Do you have the figures compiled that show the numerous accidents and explosions and fires that have occurred in the mines during the past 5 years throughout the mining sections of the country? Mr. FERGUSON. Those statistics, I believe, are available to the committee through the Bureau of Mines, which does maintain all of those records, and it is from the Bureau of Mines that we get our statistics in those cases. We accept those figures as being those of our organization. Mr. PERKINS. The Bureau of Mines will have a witness here this morning who will give us that data? Mr. FERGUSON. That is right. Mr. PERKINS. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Mr. KELLEY. Mr. McConnell? Mr. McCONNELL. Do you have any break-down of the cause of accidents by carelessness of the workers as well as the neglect on the part of the mine owners to provide proper safeguards. Mr. FERGUSON. No; we do not. However, I will say this, that in my opinion there is no such thing as a careless worker, but it is only the fact that he is improperly supervised and improperly educated by the management. A man does not deliberately injure himself or kill himself in a coal mine. If he is injured or killed, it is because management somewhere along the line has failed to perform its functions. Mr. McCONNELL, I think management should certainly perform its functions, and I think they should take care of the safety of workers. But how do you insure against human frailty, such as carelessness? Mr. FERGUSON. By adequate, competent, and conscientious supervision of the man at all times while he is in the employ of the company performing work under their jurisdiction. Mr. McCONNELL. Do you feel that you would guarantee against accidents by carelessness if you had complete charge of training the men? Mr. FERGUSON. I speak with some personal experience, having been an assistant mine foreman for a few years and during that time handling anywhere from a loading machine crew comprising 10 to 14 men, to as high as 125 men on a hand-loading section. I say to you that my experience was that any accidents that I had were caused because I as a supervisor, or my assistant as a supervisor, failed properly to instruct that man in his duties at the working face or in his duties throughout the mine. Mr. McCONNELL. Would it not be correct that where a man has proven that he is careless in following the rules set forth, he should be removed from the employ in such conditions? He is endangering the lives of other men. Mr. FERGUSON. The management has that right. The right to hire, fire, and discharge is not abridged. Mr. McCONNELL. Would you support such rules if they were made? Mr. FERGUSON. They have been supported many, many times. Mr. McCONNELL. This is new to me. I know very little about safety measures in mines, and I am willing to adopt any measures that seem within reason in order to cut down accidents. I think that is vital. It would seem to me that there is one particular spot here where it is difficult, and that is the human weakness known as carelessness. We have many things occurring throughout the world because of carelessness. Wrecks on railroads and in many other places occur because someone is careless. Mr. FERGUSON. Certainly the human being is not a perfect instru ment. Mr. McCONNELL. That is right. Mr. FERGUSON. We will agree. However, to go to the ultimate, I still reiterate my statement that only the people who hire this man are responsible for his safety. And if he is hurt and we say that he is careless, he is only careless because I as a supervisor or I as his superior failed in my duty to him to stop him from being careless. Mr. McCONNELL. Of course, men know a lot of safety factors in life, but they often take chances, and they do not abide by them. Mr. FERGUSON. That is true. Mr. McCONNELL. They may have the knowledge, but they do not follow the knowledge. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Mr. KELLEY. Take a case of this sort: Suppose that a hand loader at the face is working away some morning, and the fire boss or the assistants come in, and they say, "Now, John, you haven't gaged properly in your posting. There should be a post here," and he marks it off with his chalk, and he says, "Now you set a post here." John is loading a wagon in a mine car, and he has it about half loaded or three-quarters loaded, and he starts to get the post, and so And when the foreman leaves, John decides that he will finish the wagon first, and then he will set the post. A fall comes, and he gets either killed or injured badly. Now, I do not know whether you would call that carelessness or whether you would expect the foreman to stand there until he sets the post. Mr. FERGUSON. I certainly would. That is why I say that supervision in the coal mines is inadequate. Mr. KELLEY. Of course, I do agree with you that the more and better supervision you get the more your accident rate decreases. I think that has been established by statistics of the coal companies that have kept records. Mr. FERGUSON. That is absolutely right. Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Smith? Mr. SMITH. Have you ever served in the Army? Mr. FERGUSON. In the Navy, sir. Mr. SMITH. Have you ever been injured in the Navy, or have you ever seen men injured in the Navy? Mr. FERGUSON. I have; yes. Mr. SMITH. Was that due to a lack of supervision? Mr. FERGUSON. I would say so, and lack of training. Mr. SMITH. What did you do in the Navy? Mr. FERGUSON. I was a third-class ordnance man, attached to the Navy air arm. Mr. SMITH. I disagree wholeheartedly with you on this matter of carelessness. I do not think you can ever take the human element out of men working. Under your theory, you would have a supervisor for about every man that is working. Mr. FERGUSON. If the fact is that we need a supervisor to save a man's life, I am perfectly willing to have a supervisor for every man who is working. Mr. SMITH. Does piecework in mines, and so much per ton, have anythink to do with the accident rate? Mr. FERGUSON. Possibly, and it probably does have, because of the fact that if a man is on a tonnage and production rate, he naturally tries to get as much as he can. I want to say further that I have never been in favor of a tonnage or production rate in the coal mines. Mr. SMITH. Men who are working as pieceworkers are inclined to be careless, and they would not set this post that has been referred to by the chairman. Mr. FERGUSON. I might say again, Congressman, if they did not set it, then the foreman was lax in his responsibility to that employee. Mr. SMITH. In your mine records on safety, what do you call an injury. Anybody that goes to the first-aid station? Mr. FERGUSON. That is something that varies, I believe. I believe most of the statistics are based upon the fact that a man loses a day's employment. I think they base it on a day's employment. Various States have various ways of compiling these statistics. I say that only out of my own mind. I mean, it runs in my mind that that is correct. However, it is nothing that I know officially. I do know that some States do not compile accident statistics for the first week or the first 14 days. Some of them base it on when the compensation becomes operative. I think you will find it varies throughout a great many States. Mr. SMITH. These records you present here on the number of men injured in mires are based upon time lost; is that right? That is, they must have lost a day, or you would not call them an injury? Mr. FERGUSON. I believe that is correct in most cases. In other words, if a man does not leave his employment I do not believe he is charged with a lost-time accident. That was my personal experience, and if a man did not lose any time off, he was not charged with a losttime accident. Mr. SMITH. Of course, they were all instructed to go to the first-aid room for everything, were they not? Mr. FERGUSON. In most of the progressive and larger operations, yes. In far, far too many of these smaller fringe operations, no. Mr. SMITH. Does mechanical operation of mining, such as loaders or cutters or things of that sort, increase the hazards of mining or decrease them? Mr. FERGUSON. It increases the hazards. Mr. SMITH. By reason of dust? Mr. FERGUSON. By reason of many, many things, Congressman, the higher speed of the operation; the concentration of men within a small congested area of work, where you have machinery of different types in and out and on the move. Of course, it makes more dusty atmosphere than mechanical mining. Your electrical hazards are increased. In fact, hazards all down the line are increased because of the speed-up and the speed with which the coal is extracted, the speed with which |