Record of first-aid and mine-rescue training May 1949 and fiscal year

Bureau of Mines memorandum for all supervising engineers and engineers in charge

[Attention: Instructors of accident-prevention course for mine officials. Subject: Record of trainingaccident-prevention course for mine officials, May 1949]

Number of instructors, 21; number of classes, 146; number in training, 2,511; number completed this month, 348; number completed this year, 2,134; number completed to date, 2,964.

Mr. ANKENY. In addition to this, we have, as has been indicated in previous testimony, increased our accident-prevention training tremendously, both among mine officials and mine workers.

Mr. Maize stated:

House bill 3023 also assumes that no person violates the law except the coal operator and the mine official. If either of these bills is passed and becomes a law, what is to be done with the mine worker who frequently violates the law and creates an unsafe and hazardous condition?

Now, the proposed legislation as I read it assumes no such thing. The law makes no reference to violations of State law or to the Federal Mine Safety Code. It merely gives the Federal inspector authority to withdraw men in the event of imminent danger, and it is not directed against the operator; it is not directed against the mine worker. It simply authorizes the Federal inspector to act in cases of imminent danger.

Mr. Maize says:

There are many things in the present Federal codes which weaken both the Pennsylvania anthracite and bituminous mining laws, and if the present Federal codes were enforced in their entirety, without any regard to our State laws, mines would not be as safe as they are under the present State mining laws. For example, the Federal code only requires that rock dusting be done to within 80 feet of the face. The Pennsylvania mining laws require that rock dusting be done up to the face.

It is with regard to this statement about the enforcement of the code in its entirety that I wish to comment.

During 1948, we have a record of 13 mines in the United States that were absolutely free of code violations. The inspectors were unable to find any violations of the Federal Mine Safety Code at these 13 mines.

Mr. KELLEY. Let me ask you, how were those mines distributed in the United States?

Mr. ANKENY. I am unable to answer that. I do not have a breakdown of the figures, but I can supply it to the committee.

Mr. KELLEY. I think it would be interesting to have them.

Mr. ANKENY. The interesting thing about these mines is the fact that the fatality rate in those 13 mines was 0.45 men killed per 1,000,000 man-hours worked, whereas the fatality rate for the United States during that same period was 1.29.

The conclusion is that the maintenance of the reasonable standards as provided by the Federal Mine Safety Code contributed materially to the lower accident rate in the mines.

(Mr. Ankeny subsequently supplied the above-requested information, as follows:)

Pennsylvania (bituminous), 1; Colorado, 2; West Virginia, 2; Alabama, 2; Montana, 1; Illinois, 1; and Utah, 1.

Mr. Maize says:

House bill 3023 and House Joint Resolution 165 are predicated on the theory that all men look at the same conditions through the same eyes. One man may go to a mine and say the mine is unsafe. Another man may go to another mine where the conditions are similar, and he would overlook these conditions without shutting the mine down, or prosecuting the operator, or he may not even request that the men be withdrawn from that portion of the mine.

Secretary Maize is correct in that. The establishment of imminent danger in a mine is a matter of judgment. It cannot be circumscribed by law, because imminent danger is a matter of degree. You can have defective ventilation in a mine, but imminent danger may not exist. But that ventilation may become defective to the point where there is no air at all, or where there is not sufficient air to dilute and render harmless and carry away dangerous and noxious gases, and you have an imminent danger. It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to circumscribe the matter of imminent danger with specific regulations, because in those regulations it is impossible to define the degree to which the danger has to exist before it becomes imminent.

Secretary Maize's inspectors have this discretion, and they exercise this discretion in their work.

Secretary Maize says:

If House bill 3023 is passed, it will make each individual Federal inspector a lawmaker unto himself.

The answer to that is that it would no more make a Federal inspector a lawmaker unto himself than the present State laws now make State inspectors lawmakers unto themselves. Most State inspectors now have that authority to close mines, and quite frequently they exercise it when it is necessary.

Mr. Maize objects to the passage of this act on the ground that

If they are given police powers, that will be a bureaucracy writing its own rules and trying to enforce them in the courts of the various coal-producing States of this Nation.

The proposed law as it has been presented does not contemplate the writing of regulations or the prescribing of rules to be followed by the industry.

He said:

The policing of the coal mines in Pennsylvania is vested in the State mine inspectors and the Pennsylvania Department of Mines through legislative action, not by directives or rules written by any inspector or the head of the department of mines.

Mr. Maize made a great point of the fact this morning that he did not prescribe regulations for the coal-mining industry in Pennsylvania. There has been a controversy in Pennsylvania for some time regarding multiple blasting. The only practical way that some of the operators in Pennsylvania can comply with a certain section of the Federal Mine Safety Code is to blast their coal in multiple, that is, fire all their shots at one time in a given working place.

There is nothing in the Pennsylvania law that prohibits multiple blasting in coal mines, but the secretary of mines of Pennsylvania does not permit multiple blasting. Therefore, the operators are unable to comply with that section of the code, because of a ruling of the department of mines.

The idea of setting up mining safety regulations, aside from regulations enacted by State legislatures or the Federal Congress, is not new. In the State of Utah, the mining regulations of the State are written and put into effect by the industrial labor commission of Utah. The commission form of State regulation is also used in the State of California.

In the State of West Virginia, the chief of the department of West Virginia is authorized by law to make any regulations that he deems necessary, and after the publication of those regulations, they have the force of law.

A number of incorrect statements made by Mr. Maize have already been answered by Mr. G. W. Grove in previous testimony.

There is one other point that I want to make. Some questions came up in connection with the Centralia disaster, and there was a statement made with regard to the disaster that occurred at the No. 8 mine of the Old Ben Coal Corp. in West Frankford, Ill., in 1947. I have those reports here.

Mr. KELLEY. They should be in the record. Without objection, they will be inserted.

Mr. ANKENY. Do you desire to insert them in the record?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANKENY. And also I have all of the reports that were made by the Federal inspector of the Centralia mine prior to the Centralia disaster.

(The documents referred to are as follows:)

FINAL REPORT OF MINE EXPLOSION, NO. 8 MINE, OLD BEN COAL
CORP., WEST FRANKFORT, FRANKLIN COUNTY, ILL., JULY 24, 1947

(By W. A. Gallagher, W. R. Chick, H. C. Brumbaugh, T. C. Higgins)
INTRODUCTION

An explosion, evidently caused when gas was ignited by a spark or are from a gathering locomotive or by smoking, and in which coal dust was involved, occurred in the No. 8 mine, Old Ben Coal Corp., located just south of West Frankfort, Franklin County, Ill., at about 12:35 p. m., July 24, 1947. The explosion resulted in the death of 27 men, of which number 26 were killed by burns, violence, and afterdamp. There were 30 men in the vicinity of the

explosion area, and 4 of these men escaped to the surface with the assistance of other workmen. One of the rescued men later died in the hospital. Two hundred and sixty-four men were in the mine at the time of the explosion, of which number 234 escaped to the surface unaided. No attempt to barricade was made, as the explosion covered only a small section and did not affect any other portion of the mine.

The Vincennes office of the Bureau of Mines was notified about 2 p. m. by Mr. H. C. Brumbaugh, Federal coal-mine inspector, who was informed by Mr. Roy Adams, general mine superintendent, that there was a fire in the 13 east section of the mine, and about 25 men in that section were unaccounted for. Other Federal inspectors were notified by Mr. C. A. Herbert, supervising engineer, district E, and they went to the mine as soon as possible. A total of seven representatives of the Bureau of Mines participated in the recovery operations, the investigation, or both.

GENERAL INFORMATION

LOCATION

The No. 8 mine of the Old Ben Coal Corp. is located just south of West Frankfort, Franklin County, Ill., and is served by the Illinois Central, the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy, and the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroads.

Operating officials.-D. W. Buchanan, president, Chicago, Ill.; George F. Campbell, general manager, Chicago, Ill.; R. L. Adams, general superintendent, West Frankfort, Ill.; Ernest Green, assistant general superintendent, West Frankfort, Ill.; J. W. McDonald, chief engineer, Christopher, Ill.; J. E. Jones, safety engineer, West Frankfort, Ill.; Howard Lewis, superintendent, West Frankfort, Ill.; Don Bowker, mine manager, West Frankfort, Ill.

The company also operated the Nos. 9, 11, 14, and 15 mines in Franklin County, Ill. The main offices of the company are located at 230 South Clark Street, Chicago, Ill.

EMPLOYEES AND PRODUCTION

A total of 495 men was employed, of which number 382 worked underground on two shifts, and the average daily production was 3,500 tons of coal.

OPENINGS AND NATURE OF COAL BED

The No. 8 mine is opened by three shafts, each sunk to a depth of about 464 feet. The coal-hoisting shaft is wooden lined and has two compartments, and is used as one of the upcasts. The other upcast shaft is located 285 feet west of the hoisting shaft and the intake air shaft is located 6,312 feet south of the hoisting shaft. These shafts were wooden lined and were equipped with wooden stairways to be used as escapeways, and they were in good condition.

The mine is operated in the Illinois No. 6 coal bed, which averages 90 inches in thickness in this area and lies flat except for local undulations. The cover over the coal bed ranges from 464 to 500 feet at this property.

The immediate roof is variable but usually consists of from 18 to 20 inches of roof coal and 24 to 30 inches of gray shale.

The outstanding characteristics of the coal bed are numerous sulfur and shale bands, of which the most persistent is the "blue band." Frequent slips, rolls, and faults occur throughout the coal bed.

The floor underlying the coal bed is smooth, medium hard fire clay, which varies in thickness from 12 to 48 inches.

COAL ANALYSES

Samples of coal taken in nearby mines operated in the No. 6 coal bed and analyzed by the United States Bureau of Mines showed approximately the following: