cover physical things which our senses have not revealed to us, any more than we can, "by taking thought, add a cubit to our stature.'

§ 6. The intellect is organically compelled to conceive also, that nothing can exist without a maker; but when we intellectually predicate a maker illimitably, we arrive at a dilemma of the usual character, and must choose between a succession of makers without a beginning, or a beginning without a maker. The same may be repeated, severally, of the intellectual conceptions of a cause, a contriver, a designer; in each case we must choose between the conception of an endless succession of causes, contrivers, designers, without a first; or we must arrest the succession by an intellectually conceived first, that is uncaused, uncontrived, and undesigned, etc. A celebrated European philosopher, in lecturing on the above topics, was in the habit of prefacing his introduction by saying to his class, "Now, gentlemen, we will make God!" The remark was probably a sarcasm, for he belonged to the school which deems words insignificant when they refer to no sensible object; not seeing that intellectually conceived words derive an unverbal subjective meaning from the intellect whose aspirations and organism generally the conceived words manifest: just as the words scarlet, sweet, loud, fragrant, etc., derive an unverbal meaning from only the senses whose perceptions they designate; and just as the words anger, love, and pity, derive an unverbal meaning from only the internal feelings the words refer to.

§ 7. The indestructibility of matter is another conception of the intellect similar to the foregoing; the intellect being organically compelled to admit it, or to admit, ultimately, that something is nothing. The infinite divisibility of matter is another intellectual necessity of the same character; the intellect being organically necessitated to admit it, or to admit, ultimately, that a whole is not greater than a part. But while I endeavour to show that intellectually conceived words result from, and signify unverbally an intellectual organism, I mean not to assert that any verbal cònceptions are innate, even when, like most or all the foregoing, they are found in all ages of the world and among all races of men. I claim only that given verbal conceptions are a result of the organism of the intellect when placed under given objective circumstances; and that the universality of any given verbal conception is a result of only the universality of the excitive objective circumstances; just as you will find language wherever you find human society-apple-eaters, wherever you find apples— climbers, wherever you find hills-swimmers and fishers, wherever you find water—and walkers every where, the earth being co-extensive with man.

LECTURE X.

OF THE UNFALLACIOUS PROSECUTION OF INQUISITION.

CONTENTS.

1. Retrospect of the preceding Lecture.

2. Questions analysed into an inquirer, inquiree, and object.

3. Each of the three is unverbally triform, and only verbally a unit. 4. The error exemplified of seeking sensibly what is only intellectual, and of seeking intellectually what is only sensible.

5. Inquisition is limited by the purview of our sensible, intellectual, and moral organisms.

6. All physical inquisition is unanswerable that is not within the purview of the senses; all intellectual inquisition is unanswerable that is not within the purview of the intellect; and all inquisition that relates to the internal feelings is unanswerable that is not within the purview of our consciousness therein.

7. Knowledge, except of language, is, in its ultimate form, unverbal, not verbal.

8. Conclusion.

Retrospect of the preceding Lecture.

§ 1. The preceding Lecture teaches that when the intellect premises that any thing is a contrivance, the intellect is organically constrained to see in the premises that they include the agency of a contriver; when the intellect premises that any thing is an effect, the intellect is organically constrained to conceive that the effect required a precedent

cause; when the intellect premises that any thing is a whole, the intellect is organically compelled to conceive it is more than a part; when the intellect premises that A and B are severally equal to C, the intellect is constrained to conceive that A is equal to B; when the intellect premises that a mark which exists on a sandy shore is a footprint, the intellect is organically forced to conceive that some foot imprinted it; and when the intellect conceives that any thing is an existence, the intellect is organically compelled to conceive that the existence had a beginning, and must suffer a termination, etc. Wherein the cogency consists of given premises to compel the intellect to conceive therefrom given conclusions, I shall not inquire, for I am not writing a treatise on the intellect. The rationale of the process is, however, I think obvious; and in pages 164 to 206, of a former publication (entitled "A Treatise on Language," etc., published by the Harpers, of New York, for me in 1836), I manifested my views thereon elaborately; but the subject is not properly within my present design, which is limited to the unverbal meaning of words. Conclusions of the intellect, like the foregoing examples, are words, and only as such are they within my purview; and I have shown, in Lecture VIII., that, except what the senses can perceive, the ultimate unverbal meaning of intellectually conceived words is the organism of the intellect; just as the ultimate unverbal physical meaning of paralysis, beyond what is sensible, is the organism of our physical formation.

By means of our intellectual organism, my intellect is compelled to conceive, that what I behold in certain rocks and stones are the fossilized remains of an extinct species of animals that existed anterior to the Deluge; that certain existing ravines are extinct rivers; certain existing rocks, extinct volcanoes; certain distantly separated existing eminences, parts of a former entirety; that the centre of the earth is fire, and the surface of the earth a cool crust of what was originally a mass in fusion. Astronomy presents to my intellect premises which constrain it to conceive that the Asteroids are fragments of a large planet burst asunder by some unknown natural convulsion; though other premises will compel my intellect to conceive that the above is an unreasonable hypothesis, and to supersede it by conceiving that the Asteroids were made in their present form and for just the purposes they now subserve. A sermon will present to my intellect premises from which it will conceive the mode in which the dead are to be re-animated at the last day, and whether friends are to recognize each other, or remain unrecognized. The conclusions are all very reasonable, I may say. They accord with my intellectual organism as satisfactorily as a well prepared omelet accords with my physical organization. The conclusions signify, unverbally, the organism of my intellect, just as ventriloquism, whistling, talking, singing, and screaming, evince the organism of my vocal powers; and just as pain, smart, burn, etc., evince the organism of my physical formation. Now, I admit, that I can but postulate this doc