thereon within four months from the time it is received by the general assembly, it shall be submitted by the secretary of state to the electors for their approval or rejection at the next regular or general election, if such submission shall be demanded by supplementary petition verified as herein provided and signed by not less than three per centum of the electors in addition to those signing the original petition, which supplementary petition must be signed and filed with the secretary of state within ninety days after the proposed law shall have been rejected by the general assembly or after the expiration of such term of four mouths, if no action has been taken thereon, or after the law as passed by the general assembly shall have been filed by the governor in the office of the secretary of state. The proposed law shall be submitted in the form demanded by such supplementary petition, which form shall be either as first petitioned for or with any amendment or amendments which may have been incorporated therein by either branch or by both branches of the general assembly. If proposed law so submitted is approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon, it shall be the law and shall go into effect as herein provided in lieu of any amended form of said law which may have been passed by the general assembly, and such amended law passed by the general assembly shall not go into effect until and unless the law proposed by supplementary petition shall have been rejected by the electors. Al such initiative petitions, last above described, shall have printed across the top thereof, in case of proposed laws: "Law Proposed by Initiative Petition First to be Submitted to the General Assembly." Ballots shall be so printed as to permit an affirmative or negative vote upon each measure submitted to the electors. Any proposed law or amendment to the constitution submitted to the electors as provided in section 1a and section 1b, if approved by a majority. of the electors voting thereon, shall take effect thirty days after the election at which it was approved and shall be published by the secretary of state. If conflicting proposed laws or conflicting proposed. amendments to the constitution shall be approved at the same election by a majority of the total number of votes cast for and against the same, the one receiving the highest number of affirmative votes shall be the law, or in the case of amendments to the constitution shall be the amendment to the constitution. No law proposed by initiative. petition and approved by the electors shall be subject to the veto of the governor. (Adopted Sept. 3, 1912.)

The courts can not enjoin a referendum proceeding under this section on the ground that the proposed law which is to be submitted to the electors will be unconstitutional if enacted: Pfeifer v. Graves, 88 O. S. 473.

An initiated law, which has been introduced into the house of representatives, in compliance with this section, and referred to the proper committee, which reported it back with amendments which were agreed to by the house, which took no further action upon it, may be submitted as thus amended to the electors of the state in due time after a supplementary petition properly signed and verified has been filed with the secretary of state demanding its submission in its amended form. Amendments to the proposed law, thus reported and agreed to, are thereby incorporated in it as required by said section: Pfeifer v. Graves, 88 O. S. 473.

Article II, § 21, of the constitution of Ohio, confers upon the general assembly the authority to determine by law by whom the trial of contested elections shall be conducted, and how it shall be conducted. The courts have no power to determine such questions: State ex rel. v. Graves, 91 O. S. 113.

The provision of Art. II, § 1b, of the Ohio constitution to the effect that

the amendment receiving the highest number of votes shall be declared adopted, applies to amendments submitted by the general assembly, although it refers to those initiated under Art. II, § la, of the Ohio constitution: State ex rel. v. Fulton, 99 O. S. 168.

If the heading of the ballot does not fairly show the scope and extent of an amendment to the constitution, such defect renders such amendment void, even if adopted by the majority of the votes cast: State ex rel. v. Fulton, 99 O. S. 168.

The term "amendment" in Art. II, §b, of the Ohio constitution means the section of the constitution as amended; and two amendments submitted at the same time, one of which is inconsistent with the original constitution as amended by the other amendment must be regarded as inconsistent although the two amending clauses are in themselves consistent with each other: State ex rel. v. Fulton, 99 O. S. 168.

The amendment to Art. XII, § 2, of the Ohio constitution, submitted under authority of house joint resolution number thirty-four, adopted by the general assembly March 12th, 1917. received a larger number of votes than the amendment to such section, which was proposed by petition; and the former amendment was therefore adopted although both amendments received a majority of the votes cast: State ex rel. v. Fulton, 99 O. S. 168.

The supreme court has no authority to pronounce an opinion, a judgment or a decree upon a mere moot question as to whether a proposed law will conflict with the constitution if it shall be enacted by the general assembly, or be adopted by the people: Pfeifer v. Graves, 88 O. S. 473.

The language of this provision is to be interpreted fairly and reasonably so as to carry out the purposes of the people who adopted the dual form of direct and indirect legislation prescribed therein: Pfeiffer v. Graves, 88 O. S. 473..

In a proceeding against the secretary of state to enjoin the submission of an initiated law which has been introduced into the house of representatives in compliance with this section, and referred to the proper committee, which reported it back with amendments which were agreed to by the house, which took no action upon it, the section will not be rigidly construed so as to exclude the submission for the reason that the bill as amended was not enacted by the house: Pfeifer v. Graves, 88 O. S. 473.

Sec. 1c. Per Centum Required to Refer a Law, Etc., to the Electors; Filing Petition. The second aforestated power reserved by the people is designated the referendum, and the signatures of six per centum of the electors shall be required upon a petition to order the submission to the electors of the state for their approval or rejection, of any law, section of any law or any item in any law appropriating money passed by the general assembly. No law passed by the general assembly shall go into effect until ninety days after it shall have been filed by the governor in the office of the secretary of state, except as herein provided. When a petition, signed by six per centum of the electors of the state and verified as herein provided, shall have been filed with the secretary of state within ninety days after any law shall have been filed by the governor in the office of the secretary of state, ordering that such law, section of such law or any item in such law appropriating money be submitted to the electors of the state for their approval or rejection, the secretary of state shall submit to the electors of the state for their approval or rejection such law, section or item, in the manner herein provided, at the next succeeding regular or general election in any year occurring subsequent to sixty days after the filing of such petition, and no such law, section or item shall go into effect until and unless approved by a majority of those voting upon the same. If, however, a referendum petition is filed against any such section or item, the remainder of the law shall not thereby be prevented or delayed from going into effect. (Adopted Sept. 3, 1912.)

The term "legislature" in Art. I, Sec. 4, of the United States constitution, comprehends the entire legislative power of the state; and, as so used, includes not only the two branches of the general assembly, but the popular will as expressed in the referendum provided for in this section and in Art. II, Sec. 1: State ex rel. v. Hildebrandt, 94 O. S.

The referendum constitutes a part of the state constitution and laws. Accordingly, under the federal statute (C. 5, 37 Stats. at Large, p. 13, Sec. 4, U. S. Compiled Stats. (1913), Sec. 18; Act of August 8, 1911), which provides that the redistricting shall be made by each state "in the manner provided by the laws thereof," a statutory provision such as G. C. Sec. 4828-1 (106 v. 474) may be defeated by a referendum election under the provisions of Art. II, Sec. 1, et seq., of the constitution of Ohio, as amended September 3, 1912; and in such case the prior statute which fixes the districts for the election of members of the house of representatives of the congress of the United States remains in action: State ex rel. v. Hildebrandt, 241 U. S. 565.

Referendum petition must be filed in the office of the secretary of state within ninety (90) days after the law to be voted on has been filed in that office by the governor.

Referendum to an amendment to a former law does not affect the former law except insofar as former law may be affected by provisions of amendment becoming effective through its approval by the electors on referendum vote. Op. Atty. Gen. (1915), p. 1522.

If a congressional redistricting act, passed by the general assembly and lawfully submitted to a referendum for popular vote under the foregoing provisions, fails of approval by a majority of those voting upon the same, such act is invalid and inoperative: State ex rel. v. Hildebrant, 94 O. S. 154 [affirmed, State ex rel. v. Hildebrandt, 241 O. S. 565].

An amendment to the constitution of the United States can not be submitted to referendum: Hawke v. Smith, 253 U. S. 221 [reversing Hawke v. Smith, 100 O. S. 385]; Hawke v. Smith, 253 U. S. 231 [reversing Hawke v. Smith, 100 O. S. 540].

If the statute, such as G. C. § 1637, is amended so as to deprive a court from having jurisdiction over certain classes of cases at a time in the future long after the period within which a referendum petition may be filed, the question of the jurisdiction of such court over proceedings which were pending on the date at which such jurisdiction was withdrawn by such statute, does not depend on whether the petition in such case was filed before the referendum period had expired, or after the referendum period had expired: Kelley v. State ex rel., 94 O. S. 331 [reversing State ex rel. v. Kelley, 25 O. C. C. (N. S.) 1].

If some parts of an entire statute are subject to the provisions of this section and other sections are not thus subject, since they impose taxes, the entire law becomes in force and valid after the expiration of ninety days: State ex rel. v. Edmondson, 89 O. S. 93.

Sec. 1d. Laws Not Subject to the Referendum. Laws providing for tax levies, appropriations for the current expenses of the state government and state institutions, and emergency laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, shall go into immediate effect. Such emergency laws upon a yea and nay vote must receive the vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each branch of the general assembly, and the reasons for such necessity shall be set forth in one section of the law, which section shall be passed only upon a yea and nay vote, upon a separate roll call thereon. The laws mentioned in this section shall not be subject to the referendum. (Adopted Sept. 3, 1912.)

If two bills upon the same subject-matter are passed by the legislature at different times, and if the governor affixes his signature first to the bill which was passed last, and then to the bill which was passed first, it is said that the bill which was passed last and which was signed by the governor first is in force and repeals the bill which was passed first and was signed by the gov

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ernor last. In any event, if the statute does not provide for a tax levy or an appropriation, and is not an emergency measure under the provisions of this section, as adopted September 3, 1912, it takes effect according to the terms of Art. II, Sec. 1c, of the constitution of Ohio, as adopted September 3, 1912, ninety days after it has been filed with the secretary of state, without regard to the order in which the governor signed the two bills; and if the act which was approved first was filed with the secretary of state a day after the other act, the act which was filed last with the secretary of state supersedes the prior statute: State v. Lathrop, 93 O. S. 79.

The language of section 1d, article II, of the constitution expressly enumerating certain exceptions to the people's right of referendum upon acts of the general assembly must be construed and applied with reference to this rule. The express language, "laws providing for tax levies," is limited to an actual self-executing levy of taxes, and is not synonymous with laws "relating" to tax levies, or "pertaining" to tax levies, or "concerning" tax levies, or any agency or method provided for a tax levy by any local subdivision or authority: The State ex rel. Keller v. Forney et al., Tax Commission of Ohio, 108 O. S. 463. (Decided September 28, 1923.)

Emergency laws must receive a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each branch of the general assembly and the reason for such necessity shall be set forth in one section of the law, which section shall be voted upon by separate roll call and shall receive a two-thirds vote. Op. Atty. Gen. (1915), p. 300.

An emergency act of the legislature becomes a law on the day it is signed by the governor. Op. Atty. Gen. (1915), p. 18.

An appropriation made to satisfy claims of the owners of animals destroyed by the agricultural commission in the eradication of contagious diseases among animals is not exempt from the referendum and does not become effective until after ninety days after the law making it is filed with the governor in the office of the secretary of state. The general assembly is without power to make such an appropriation immediately effective by declaring it to be an emergency law. Op. Atty. Gen. (1915), 740.

Act providing for rebuilding of school house destroyed by casualty or condemned by chief inspector of workshops and factories is properly declared an emergency measure and takes effect immediately. Op. Atty. Gen. (1913), p. 1300.

The constitution and the statutes of Ohio provide ample and adequate legal machinery for the initiation, submission, and adoption or rejection of any proposed amendment to the constitution of Ohio by what is known as the referendum vote: Hockett v. Liquor License Board, 16 O. N. P. (N. S.) 417, 25 O. D. (N. P.) 117.

An act of the general assembly, purporting to be an emergency act but which failed to receive the two-thirds majority in one branch of the general assembly, as required by the constitution for an emergency act, becomes at the end of the ninety-day referendum period a valid act of the general assembly if otherwise constitutional: Miami County v. Dayton, 92 O. S. 215.

Construing this section with Art. II, § 16, of the constitution of Ohio, in so far as both sections relate to the time from which an act of the general assembly shall operate, laws providing for tax levies, appropriation for current expenses, of the state government and state institution, and emergency laws, as defined in Art. II, § 1d, of the constitution of Ohio, go into immediate effect when approved by the governor. All other acts go into effect ninety days after the same have been filed with the secretary of state, regardless of the date of approval by the governor: State v. Lathrop, 93 O. S. 79.

General Code § 12672, as amended 103 v. 505, which was passed by the general assembly April 17, 1913, and approved by the governor May 2, 1913, repealed such section as amended 103 v. 304 (340), which was passed April 15, 1913, and which was approved May 3, 1913, although by the provisions of Art. II, § 16, of the constitution of Ohio, a bill which is passed by the general assembly and is approved by the governor becomes a law when he signs it. It is said that the governor will not be presumed to possess the power of repealing either bill by choosing which one he will sign first. Furthermore, neither of these bills was an emergency law, nor does it provide for a tax levy or as appropriation within the terms of Art. II, § 1d, of the constitution of Ohio, as adopted September 3, 1912, and, accordingly, by the provision of this section,

as adopted September 3, 1912, such law goes into effect ninety days after it is filed by the governor in the office of secretary of state, without regard to the time at which the governor signed such statute: State v. Lathrop, 93 O. S. 79.

An act to amend G. C. §§ 5649-2 and 5649-3b, and repeal G. C. § 5649-3, relative to the limitation of a tax rate (103 v. 552), passed April 16, 1913, approved May 6, 1913, and filed in the office of the secretary of state May 9, 1913, is not a law providing for tax levies within the meaning of those words as used in this section, and the same can not go into effect until ninety days after it was filed in the office of the secretary of state: State ex rel. v. Milroy, 88 O. S. 301.

Section 1 of the act of April 8, 1913, as amended April 16, 1913 (103 v. 863), is a law providing for a tax levy, and, by the provisions of this section is expressly exempted from the referendum provisions of Art. II, § 1c, of the constitution of Ohio: State ex rel. v. Roose, 90 O. S. 345.

The reasons given in G. C. § 6828-79 for declaring the conservancy act (G. C. §§ 6828-1 to 6828-79) to be an emergency measure, are valid reasons authorizing such declaration within the provisions of this section: Snyder v. Deeds, 91 Ŏ. S. 407; Silvey v. Commissioners of Montgomery County, 273 Fed.

202.

It is said that the judgment of the general assembly as to the emergency character of an act under the constitutional amendment of 1912 is not conclusive, but its judgment in that behalf may be challenged in a proper proceeding at any time within the ninety-day period, either as to the constitutional vote or the emergency character of the act: Miami County v. Dayton, 92 O. S. 215. If two judges of the supreme court hold that the necessity of an emergency clause can not be reviewed by the courts, the court can not declare such clause unconstitutional and order a referendum on petition therefor: State ex rel. v. Smith, 102 O. S. 591.

The emergency clause attached to the administrative code (G. C. §§ 154-1, et seq.; 109 v. 105, et seq.), is a valid exercise of legislative power: State ex rel. v. Smith, 102 O. S. 591 [see, also, State ex rel. v. Smith, 102 O. S. 673].

If the legislature has added an emergency clause to a statute, and has adopted it in the manner prescribed by Art. II, § 1d, of the Ohio constitution, the courts can not review the necessity for making such statute an emergency measure (Jones and Matthias, JJ.): State ex rel. v. Smith, 102 O. S. 591 [see, also, State ex rel. v. Smith, 102 O. S. 673].

This section expressly provides for a referendum not only upon any law but any section of a law. All sections of a law not subject to the referendum provisions of this section of the constitution go into immediate effect when proved and signed by the governor: State ex rel. v. Roose, 90 O. S. 345.

After the time for filing a referendum petition has elapsed and no referendum petition has been filed, it is immaterial whether or not the act or any part thereof could have been subjected to referendum: State ex rel. v. Roose, 90 O. S. 345.

Article II, § 21, of the constitution of Ohio confers upon the general assembly the authority to determine by law by whom the trial of contested elections shall be conducted, and how it shall be conducted. The courts have no power to determine such questions: State ex rel. v. Graves, 91 O. S. 113.

Sec. 1e. I. and R. Shall Not be Used to Classify Property or Levy Single Tax. The powers defined herein as the "initiative" and "referendum" shall not be used to pass a law authorizing any classification of property for the purpose of levying different rates of taxation thereon or of authorizing the levy of any single tax on land or land values or land sites at a higher rate or by a different rule than is or may be applied to improvements thereon or to personal property. (Adopted Sept. 3, 1912.)

For a discussion of the scope and effect of the initiative and referendum provisions, see State ex rel. v. Clendening, 93 O. S. 264 (cited and follows, State ex rel. v. Rose, 93 O. S. 284).

Section le, article II, of the constitution, does not forbid the employment of the initiative in proposing an amendment to the constitution, which author