UNDOUBTEDLY, Mr Canning, in his celebrated letter to Mr Gallatin, the American minister, placed the Colonial Question upon its proper basis. The attempt, on the part of the American Government, to have the colonies considered in the light of portions of the United Kingdom, and to claim the same privileges in trading to the West Indies, that they enjoyed by treaty in the ports of this country, was dextrously conceived. It was, however, as clearly seen through, indeed, it was impossible to put forward the pretension with out, at the same time, suggesting the recollection of the fact, that the colonies have, from the date of their plantation, been indebted to the mother-country, and that all the produce which they remit to her, is but in payment of the interest of the debt, or in reduction of the debt itself. To have opened, therefore, the trade with them without an equivalent to indemnify the mother-country for the risk she run of that remittance going into other channels, would have been inexpedient, and most unwise. At least, this is the view which many have taken of the subject, and it is not unsound. For if the West India trade be so desirable to the Americans, surely it is worth their while to pay for the use of the privilege.

But another tale besides this hangs to the question, and of far more importance to the general interests of the empire than the value of any equivalent in the power, or likely to be long in the power of the United States, to give. We shall not raise any argument on this head, but simply state two facts.

The first is, that the United States, within their own territories, are rapidly cultivating all sorts of West Indian productions; and probably not many years will elapse until they have an abundance of every thing within themselves, which at present they require from the West Indies. The "boon," therefore, which may be granted to them, under existing circumstances, will assuredly be no longer considered as such, than until the period we anticipate arrive.

The second fact is,-that the question, as now stated by the American Government, with reference to some concession which may be made in their tariff, is one in which the West India interest has very little concern. It is a question that much more affects the manufacturing interests at home, and we must be insensible to the relative condition in which our manufactures stand with those of the United States, if we can flatter ourselves that any advantage which may be obtained by an alteration in their tariff, will be otherwise than temporary. It will not be felt longer in Glasgow and Manchester, and their neighbours, than until the Floridas, Louisiana, and the other southern states, are able to undersell the importers from the West Indies in the American markets, for about that time their own manufacturers will be able to supply all their wants.

Under this impression, we should regret exceedingly to see any treaty framed on the principle of equivalents, with reference to the tariff.

It may be said, that as every treaty which can be formed with relation to the Colonial Question, must, of necessity, be temporary, seeing that, sooner or later, the Americans will be independent of us, both as to manufactures and West Indian produce, the matter at issue is really but of minor importance. This is not, however, a just estimate. For, by opening the West India trade to the Americans, we open a competition against our own North American colonies.

Under the existing state of things, these colonies can supply the West Indies with every thing they would take from the United States; and to bring a competition against them, would be to inflict permanent damage on a great and growing interest of our own, without any advantage to the West India interest. And for what? Some transient advantage which our manufacturers might derive from a modification of the American tariff.

We are therefore persuaded that our proper way of viewing the Colonial Question, now in negociation

between this country and the United States, is not with relation to reciprocal benefits, but by considering it primarily, with reference to British interests exclusively. Let us

first obtain a clear idea of the interests we have at stake, and then we will be better able to judge whether the proposal of the Americans is one which should be the subject of negociation, or should even be entertained at all.

To revert to the simple form of reasoning by statement, we claim it to be received as a fact, that our North American provinces are capable of furnishing every article to the West India market which the United States can furnish; and therefore the only point which can create any difference of opinion as to the expediency of letting the Americans share the trade with them, must relate simply to the price of the articles; for, except with relation to price, the additional length of voyage, upon which so much stress is laid as an ingredient of price, is deserving of no consideration. We have no disposition to conceal that the Americans at present, by being more accustomed to the trade, are able to embark their lumber, &c., for the West Indies, at perhaps a cheaper shipping price than our own colonists; but, be the fact recollected, that every day the inhabitants of our American provinces are becoming more expert in their forest labours, are extending their agricultural improvements, and are increasing in population,-in a word, are treading closer and closer on the heels of those who are before them in the business. At the same time, also, let it be recollected, that it is no less true that the Americans are becoming less and less able, owing to their agricultural improvements, to compete with their British rivals. Lumber is becoming scarcer amongst them; and had it not been for their recently-formed canals, and other facilities in their inland navigation, it would perhaps have been a question at this very time, whether, with all the advantages of the shorter voyage, and their superior dexterity, they could have competed with our North American colonists in any one article which they can supply to the West Indies.

We also claim attention to the fact, that the resources of our North American provinces for supplying the West Indies, can scarcely be said to be well opened; and therefore, if in this early stage of the trade there is any justness in the opinion, that the difference in the cost to the plantter of lumber, &c., obtained from them, is not of essential consequence, as compared with those from the United States, it should follow, that, by giving a preference to them, we are really ensuring to the planter supplies at a cheaper rate, inasmuch as experience will obviate that difference of price which is at present the only plea against them.

Moreover, it is of importance to the planters to know, that, with respect to the consumption of their produce, our North American provinces draw all their supplies from them unmixed with any article of a similar kind raised within themselves, whilst even already the Americans only take from the West Indies so much produce as supplies the deficiency in their own crops,

It is true, and we believe the fact will surprise the West India interest, that the peasantry of Upper Canada make nearly as much sugar as they consume; but the very fountains from which they draw the material are literally hourly diminishing. The lands on which the sugar maple-tree grows, are those most preferred for the cultivation of what is emphatically called "bread stuffs." A reason why the lumber and flour of the Canadas should be encouraged by the West India interest, as the pregress of agricultural improvement in those provinces will have the effect of bringing new customers for their commodities. These circumstances sufficiently shew that a great British interest exists in our North American provinces, entitled to protection in all its bearings, before any question Now should be entertained as to placing the United States in competition with them.

Moreover, there is another most important correlative circumstance connected with the preference that should be given to our own interests.

The trade between our North Ame

rican provinces and the West Indies is entirely British, and we shall shew how it works exclusively as such.— ·

The colonists engaged in it are, like all colonists, indebted to the mother country; there may be, and we know there are, individuals among them who are not so, but speaking in the comprehensive sense in which the question must be discussed, our North American colonies are indebted to the United Kingdom. By sending their lumber and produce to the West Indies, they obtain an additional market, they dispose of their articles there, either for produce or for bills of exchange, they take cargoes to the United Kingdom, or they return with cargoes back to their own ports. In this operation profit is realized, and they are in consequence in a better condition either to reduce their debts to the mother country, or to extend their colonial improvements, by which their capacity to reduce them is enlarged.

Now, what is the case with the same trade in the hands of the Americans? Is it not the fact, that the United States are so far advanced as a people that they have great masses of opulence amongst them entirely independent of any British connexion? Is it not also the fact, that almost their whole coasting trade, and that which is most immediately connected with their West Indian commerce, belongs almost exclusively to that interest which is independent of British connexion? Of course the profits arising from it are employed to fructify, if the expression may be allowed, that special interest,-these profits, which would otherwise go so directly and entirely into the pockets of our fellow subjects.

But let us look to the manner in which the West India interest, the primary perhaps in the question, is affected by the trade we have described, supposing the Americans to have access to their markets. In doing this we shall again deal only with plain facts. Would not the obvious and natural effect of opening an intercourse between the West Indies and the United States create mercantile connexions between them? Undoubtedly and it is not an invidious remark to make in a general topic of this sort,that the American traders are, above all others in the world, prone to speculation. Is it then not reasonable to expect, that those mercantile connexions would lead on to specu

lations, which, considering the comparative value of American and West India produce would soon have the effect of accumulating a great balance in the hands of the Americans? Assuming, then, the planters to be independent of British creditors, would not such a result have the effect of exposing them to far greater perplexities than those in which they are at present so distressingly involved? It may be said, this is only a possible contingency; but it is so natural-so necessary a consequence of all trade, where the article in return is of greater value than the thing importedthat it cannot be prevented from taking place. No means exist by statute or by treaty to check it, and all the excitements of commerce-the very spirit of trade-are calculated to hasten it into effect. We would, therefore, ask if, in the face of so undoubted a probability, any British statesman, who rightly understands colonial interests as they bear on commerce, could facilitate the inevitable certainty of such a result being brought to pass?

But there is one point, and a most important one, touching the interests of our manufacturers, which must not be passed unnoticed. It is perfectly evident, that the United States have nothing to offer us as an equivalent for the privilege of allowing them to trade with the West Indies, but some abatement in the tariff, which they have imposed in order to have some thing to offer in compensation. Now, we think it is worthy of being ascer tained, after the fact we have stated, viz. that the American manufacturers are so rapidly coming into competition with the British in the American markets as to render it not likely that any abatement on the tariff can be of much value, or of long duration. Whether for any abatement in the tariff the privilege should be granted -we have shewn that by giving the monopoly of the lumber and provision trade to our own North American provinces, it would have the effect of enriching them, and thereby making them better customers to our manufacturers; so that the whole question as to this point resolves itself briefly into,-Whether for the abatement that may be made on the American tariff our manufacturers would be more benefited by that abatement, than by

the advantage of the increased demand which would arise from our own colonists? At present the question must be answered in the affirmative. But taking into view that the Americans will daily become less and less our customers, and that our colonies will become more and more so, we contend that, in a general estimate of the business, it is better policy to forego the immediate advantage for the remoter.

Altogether we are much inclined to regard any negociation on the Colonial Question with the United States as very idle. LET WELL ALONE, as much as possible in all matters of trade and national intercourse, is a maxim that should never be lost sight of. The Americans have committed an error, and it is not for us to help them out of the scrape. Moreover, in its effects it can only be productive of temporary inconvenience even to them; the prosperity of their Southern States and of their manufactures will soon indemnify them for their present temporary privations; because the very effect of the suspend ed intercourse and prohibitions operates as encouragement to that prosperity, by causing less competition with them in their own markets. In a word, there is more of petulance than wisdom in the pertinacity with which the Americans cling to the desire of having the West India trade again opened, and in this opinion we shall not be surprised to find the enlightened spirit that now pervades their counsels soon concurring.

It is probable that some of the readers of these sketches may say,Would you have no commercial arrangement with the United States? Far from it. We think something of the kind greatly wanted, but we regard the Colonial Question, in its present relations, as obtaining too much

attention.

We see year after year the amazing progress of the United States westward. We are also aware of the progress of our Canadian empire in the same direction: it has already reached a point so far from the natural outlet-the St Lawrence, that the right early secured by treaty to navigate the Mississippi, is fast becoming an object of serious attention. Were the impediments to the navigation between the Lakes and the Mis

sissippi removed-and they are in process of being removed-the voyage from any part of the Canadian territory, on the Erie or the Huron, might be performed to Jamaica in fourteen days. In fact, this voyage, as far as New Orleans, is not greater, considering the current of the Mississippi, than to Quebec. The writer of these sketches has travelled on Lake Erie with persons who have been only thirteen days from New Orleans, against the current of the Mississippi and the Ohio. However, we have said, that the free navigation of the Mississippi is secured to the British by treaty; and as the point is curious, and seems to be none thought of, we shall here quote our authorities.

According to the treaty of peace of 1783, by the eighth article it is stipulated, that "the navigation of the river Mississippi, from its source to the ocean, shall for ever remain free and open to the subjects of Great Britain and the citizens of the United States." It may be alleged against this, that the stipulation was nugatory, in as much as the mouth of the Mississippi was at the time in the hands of other parties, who were not consenting to this specific agreement. But the answer removes all doubts. If one party engages to give to another a certain property of which he is not at the time possessed, but which he afterwards acquires, he is bound by all law to fulfil his engagement. And this is the state of this

matter at this moment.-But that is not all. By the 3d article of the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, concluded between this country and the United States in 1794, when the Americans were probably contemplating the acquisition of New Orleans, the free navigation of the Mississippi was again acknowledged. "The river Mississippi," says that treaty," shall, according to the treaty of peace, be entirely open to both parties."

Here, then, is a point for negociation between the two countries far more important, as respects their permanent interests, and the welfare of mankind, than any commercial point that has yet been discussed between them. The privilege of the British to navigate the Mississippi, is, at it stands, a dead letter.

Unless communications are made by canals into it, and to its great eastern feeders, it can never be of any value to British interests. Such canals are projected, and are in process of being made. We apprehend, however, that, without the consent of the government of the United States, the permission of the particular States, through which these canals run, could not be given to us to use them. At least, it is our opinion, that the use of them is a question that can only be decided by the supreme government, in agreement with the British government; for the same rule which denies to provinces the power to negociate treaties, applies to the individual States of the Federal Union.But there is no great difficulty in the way of a very admirable accommodation of this important matter.

The Americans have not the privilege of navigating the St Lawrence to the sea; nor have they the right to navigate the Canadian canals. Here, then, we have a valuable equivalent in our power to give for free access to the Mississippi. We have been told, it is true, that an American vessel has passed down the Canadian Welland Canal; and we know that a vessel, bearing the British flag, has sailed on the Erie Canal; but no stress can be laid on these circumstances; as, we presume, they were mere holiday courtesies. It argues, however, but little political discretion in the authorities of Upper Canada, to have permitted it to be held out as inducements to obtain subscribers to the Welland Canal, that their profits would be augmented by the Americans using it.-But to proceed with our own immediate argument.

It may be contended, that the navigation of the St Lawrence, considering how much it is interrupted by rapids, would not be an equivalent for that of the Mississippi. This we allow. But it is not the freedom of the Mississippi that we ask; for we have THAT by treaty already. It is but access to it from the lakes. The Americans, however, are not aware of the power which we possess in the waters of the St Lawrence. They have supposed that they got the main channel of the St Lawrence, when they got Barnhart's Island;

but they are likely to learn another tale. By Barnhart's Island, they have got what they well know the value of great water privileges. As to the main channel, as ancient Pistol would have said, "A fico for't!" The truth is, that the possession of Barnhart's Island is of very little consequence as to the navigation of the river. It lies in that space of the St Lawrence in which the greatest interruptions to the navigation exist, and which have suggested the plan that we do not despair of seeing carried into effect of a canal parallel to the river. This, however, may be made on the American side as well as on ours. The matter to which we allude, however, in speaking so lightly of Barnhart's Island, has reference to the practicability of forming a canal in another direction, and which has only been lately conceived. We shall give some account of it here.

The town of Prescott, in Upper Canada, is some eight or ten miles higher up the St Lawrence than all the rapids. It is at the head of what may be called the drag navigation, and at the bottom of the sailing navigation. About seven miles below this town, immediately above the Galoup rapids, is a small bay in the river called Humphrey's Bay, very near to which the head of a stream called the "Black Creek" rises, a feeder of the Petite Nation river. In wet seasons, there have been instances of canoes passing from Humphrey's Bay, when the waters were high, into the Black Creek, thence down it into the river Petite Nation, and thence into the great Ottawa. This circumstance suggested to a correspondent of ours the practicability of making the Petite Nation river navigable. The original idea went no farther than to open a navigation for boats between the St Lawrence and the Ottawa; but larger views expanded when it came to be considered, that the rapids in the Ottawa were already overcome by a canal recently constructed, called the Grenville Canal, and those immediately above the island of Montreal, by the La Chine Canal; and in consequence it was thought possible to convert the Petite Nation river by lockage into a channel capable of receiving the