Lords. It is for the interest of the People that the Corporation monopoly should be destroyed. The power of the close corporations is a power by which a certain small number of persons were able to live at the expence of the community generally; and further, to influence the return of members to the Commons. Now, this power of the corporations is really in the hands of the Lords, and has been employed for their benefit.

The Lords, as I have already shewn, have a direct interest in fleecing the People-in other words, in bad government. All persons who have a similar interest, naturally rally round the Lords, and act with them, and for this reason: the House of Peers is the most powerful of the sinister interests of all those now existing in this country. Being a portion of the Legislature, it is efficient in supporting and strengthening the other sinister interests. The next sinister interest in point of power are the combined close corporations. The corporations are, many of them, directly the property of certain Lords-and all of these act with the House of Lords. In the same way, and for the same reason, every other sinister interest joins the Lords.

But the Lords see well that if the corporations are changed and made subservient to the People, they (the Lords) will lose very useful instruments. My Lord A. has power in the corporation of B. This corporation returns a member to the House of Commons, who is, in fact, the mouth-piece of Lord A. Thus Lord A. has control over the Commons, and doubly influences the destinies of the People:first in his own person as a Peer, and secondly by his nominee, who is returned by the borough or corporation of which Lord A. is patron.

But Lord A., in order to keep the members of the corporation in his interest, has hitherto been accustomed to

get for them various good things. Now, the loss of all these good things, together with the loss of corporation peculation, is what the corporations, that is, the members of the close corporations, fear; and the loss of influence over the House of Commons is what the Lords fear. Hence the Lords hate any measure by which the character of these corporations would be changed, and aid the corporations in preventing any change.

The Lords, therefore, have been acting in accordance with their interests in opposing the wishes of the People respecting the Corporations Reform Bill.

It is idle for us to fly into a passion with such persons as the Duke of NEWCASTLE, and others who have opposed this bill, and to rail at them because they have acted after the custom of human beings-that is, according to their own view of their own interests. It is not the part of wise men to expect miraculous virtue, and it would be miraculous virtue for the House of Lords willingly to favour good government. If a thoroughly good government were to exist, their condition would be very different from what it now is. They would have to support themselves and their families out of their own estates, and would not, as now, be able to quarter themselves and their children upon the nation. In other words, they would have to labour, whereas now they live in idleness. Moreover, their overgrown estates would then quickly be divided. For if the younger children could not get places paid by the People, their parents would have to provide for them, and the eldest son could not have the lion's share. But were their estates divided, their political power would further decrease. So that we have every reason to expect that they will always oppose useful reforms, while left in their present position. To abuse individuals, and say nothing

about the system in such a case, is unjust as well as unwise. If the system be approved, its consequences must be approved also. In other words, if you like the House of Lords, you have no just cause for abusing any of the Peers who desire to throw out the Corporation Reform Bill.

There is a mode of addressing the House of Peers on occasions like the present, which has always appeared to me singularly inconsistent; not to say at the same time, exceedingly foolish. It is a mode adopted very generally by persons who call themselves LiberalsConstitutional Liberals, I think, is the name and is now universally employed by the supporters of the present Ministry. It is an address, in fact, to the fears of the Lords. "You are," say these persons, speaking to the Peers, "risking the very existence of your order. If you thus resist the wishes of the People, when the People are right, the People will rise up against you, and demand of what use is your institution; and judging you by your acts, they will decide that you are mischievous, and incontinently dismiss you." Lord MELBOURNE'S address to his order not long since, was something after this fashion.

What is the precise meaning of this fearful prophecy? You say to the Lords," Yield to the People." You said so in the case of the Reform Bill. You meant by that, give up to the People the power which you have hitherto enjoyed of constituting the House of Commons. "The People are," said you, "tired of bad Government; they are determined to reform the abuses of the State, and to put down all unnecessary expense." The Lords, in this case, yielded. They yielded lest, as you said, the People should rise up against them, and take away the whole of their power;-so, according to your advice, they gave up some to save the remainder. No sooner

were the People possessed of this Reform in Parliament than they began to turn it to its proper purpose-viz., to remedy abuses. One of the first abuses they encounter is that of the Corporations and their representatives frame a Bill to put down bad Corporations. And now it is again said to the Lords, "Give up another slice of your power -be careful lest the People rise upon you and discharge you altogether." The Lords very naturally say, in answer, "Suppose they do rise upon us, and discharge us altogether; what greater mischief can arise to us than the evil threatened by this Bill? It is not playing at Lords we care about-it is the solid pudding respecting which we are solicitous; and you come, day by day, and take one large slice after another, and you all the while preach to us prudence and moderation! Once give to the People a House of Commons wholly bent on good Government, and what quantity of the public money do you suppose will fall to us ?—Not a farthing, be assured, unless we earn it. And where is the difference? If we are to lose our all, between one mode or the other, destruction is the same whether it come at two blows or one. Suppose we yield these Reforms :-the consequence will be, that we shall lose all those pleasures and profits of power which have hitherto belonged to us ;you, in short, persuade us to our ruin by threatening us with it." This is exceedingly reasonable language, and has, in fact, been used by the more candid supporters of the Peerage.

Looking, then, at the Lords in this light, fairly acknowledging the sinister interests of the class, are there, we ask, any compensating circumstances for the evils which necessarily flow from the institution itself? We are not quarrelling with individuals. Human beings are human beings; and it is the duty of those who frame institutions, to be care

ful so to frame them as not to place any of our fellow-creatures in a position in which they must necessarily become vicious. If any such are so placed, we are not to blame those who are thus rendered the enemies of their race, but reserve our indignation for those who make them so, or who allow them to remain so. Are there, we again ask, any benefits arising from the Lords which counterbalance the mighty evils which result from their Right Honourable House?

Yes, say their admirers, many and great are the benefits which the nation derives from the House of Peers.-Let us learn what their benefits may be.

The House of Lords is supposed to be serviceable to the nation in three several capacities: First, in their capacity of a second House of Legislation; second, in their capacity of Judges; and, lastly, in their capacity of an Aristocracy.-Let us inquire if in any of these they are beneficial to the community.

1. It is very generally believed, and still more generally asserted, that to the due enacting of laws, two separate and independent deliberative bodies are needed. It is argued, that if there were only one body, precipitation in legislation would be the consequence; that the sudden passions of the People would have unlimited sway, and that confusion and anarchy would follow.

Now, then, the end supposed to be attained by this second House of Legislation is tempering and restraining the Commons.

This means, if it mean anything, one of two things-either that the Lords have more discretion and calmness than the Commons,-in other words, more fitness for the business of a Legislature -or it means, that the double deliberation, merely because double, is better than a single one.

If the Lords be wiser and more pru

dent than the Commons, why keep the Commons? We cannot have better than the best. Now, by the supposition, the best-that is, the most fit and worthy deliberative body in the country, is the Lords. If this be so, why encumber them with the Commons ?

If wisdom and forethought had been employed about the formation of a Constitution, and it had been assumed that two deliberative bodies were needed, assuredly there would have been an attempt made to provide a second House of Legislation, which in some degree should derive from the very nature of its constitution, the qualities requisite for deliberation. For example;-we should have seen some attempt to bring into this second House the most grave and enlightened persons of the nation; we should have perceived some endeavours to secure probity, intelligence, and industry among them-for such are the qualities needed in a Legislature.

Now, I fearlessly assert, that, in our Constitution, no such attempt has been made; that, on the other hand, as the institution of the second House-that is, the Lords-now stands, the existence of improbity, ignorance, and idleness has been insured: That, so far from the House of Lords being more worthy, more instructed than the Commons, it is immeasurably inferior to it, in everything that is requisite to constitute an efficient and worthy legislative body. At the same time I cannot but allow that the House of Commons is far inferior to what it ought to be, and to what it would be, were it really responsible to the nation at large.

When an objection is taken to the Lords, in their capacity of a Second Chamber, we are told that the Americans even have a Second Chamber in their Senate. This is correct. That is, the Americans believed, I conceive erroneously, that, for due legislation, two Chambers, or Houses, were requisite.

Did they then leave the composition of either house to hazard? Did they place the Senators in a position which should necessarily bring out all the bad qualities of man's nature, and stifle all the good ones? Far from this was their conduct. The Senate of the United States is a responsible body. Their existence as a Senate, indeed, may incumber the political machine, but it does not render it mischievous. Unnecessary delay may arise in consequence of their deliberations; but wilful and necessary evil is not the result of their existence. It must, however, be allowed that the Americans, carried away by authority, have so constituted the Senate, as to make it less responsible to the public than is the House of Representatives. The nation has reaped the reward. All that is evil in their constitution finds support in the Senate.

If, in England, a Second Chamber should be deemed requisite, in order to perfect our political constitution, let us strive to make one which should have some chance of possessing the qualities which are necessary for an efficient legislature. Let us, in one word, make it responsible to the People. The Lords are not responsible, excepting in the way in which an Eastern Despot was responsible. Insurrection was the only check upon his conduct, and all mischief was unhesitatingly produced which did not reach the point at which insurrection became inevitable. The situation of the Lords being the same as that of the despot, their conduct is similar. They also oppress the People just so long as they are able, and never do what the people desire, till the chance of a rebellion stares them in the face.

Any one who knows the history of this body for the last five years only, must be aware that the statement is

correct.

There are, as respects this subject, two questions. The first-is any Second Legislative Chamber necessary? The second-is the House of Lords the sort of deliberative Chamber best suited for the purpose of legislation?

My answer to the first question is, that, in my opinion, no Second Chamber of any sort is needed; to the second, supposing it proved that I am here in error, and that a Second Chamber is really necessary, that the House of Lords is not in any way the sort of Chamber that ought to be established.

I thus sum up briefly my reasons for both these opinions.

The most efficient Second Chamber would be an elective one, completely responsible to the People. But the House of Commons, if properly constituted, would be filled with the most efficient persons in the country. In this case it would be but foolish policy to have the deliberations of such a House subject to the revision of another, which, by the very statement, would be inferior-that is, second best: for if you had all the best men in the Commons, you could only put secondbest men into the Second Chamber, whatever you might call it. Added to this, a second deliberation would consume valuable time, and not conduce to sound judgment.

But if this be true of a Second Chamber, thus constituted, how much more powerful become the reasons against a body like the House of Lords? They confessedly are not fit for deliberation. Therefore, in addition to the loss of valuable time, we have the mischief of a set of thoroughly incapable legislators revising the decrees of the People's representatives. The consequence is, that the People's most ardent wishes are crossed and delayed. The measures of the Commons are mutilated, and, generally, completely ruined by the labours of the Lords.