tions almost too much for human nature to bear. Their effective force throughout the winter was little more than five thousand men, though their numbers on paper exceeded seventeen thousand. It was well for them that the British made no attempt to disturb them while in this destitute condition. In that case the Americans could not have kept their camp for want of provisions; nor could they have retreated from it without the certain loss of some thousands who were barefooted and otherwise almost naked. Neither could they have risked an action with any probable hope of success, or without hazarding the most serious consequences.

The historians of the American revolution will detail the particulars of a treaty entered into about this time between France and the United States, and also that thereupon the government of Great Britain offered terms to the Americans equal to all they had asked anterior to their declaration of independence. The first certain intelligence of these offers was received by Gen. Washington in a letter from Major General Tryon, the British Governor of New York, enclosing the conciliatory proposals, and recommending "that they should be circulated by Gen. Washington among the officers and privates of his army." Instead of com- . plying with this extraordinary request, he forwarded the whole to Congress. The offers of Great Britain, which, if made in due time, would have prevented the dismemberment of the empire, were promptly rejected. The day after their rejection a resolution formerly recommended by Washington was adopted by Congress, in which they urged

upon the different states "to pardon, under certain limitations, such of their misguided citizens as had levied war against the United States." Copies of this were struck off in English and German, and Gen. Washington was directed to take measures for circulating them among the American levies in the British army. He immediately enclosed them in a letter to Tryon, in which he acknowledged the receipt of his late letter covering the British conciliatory bills, and requesting their circulation in the American army; and in the way of retort requested the instrumentality of Tryon in making the resolves of Congress, known to the Americans in the. British army, on whom they were intended to operate.

About this time Sir William Howe resigned the command of the British army, and returned to Great Britain. His successor, Sir Henry Clinton, had scarcely entered on the duties of his office, when he received orders to evacuate Philadelphia. This was deemed expedient from an apprehension that it, would be a dangerous position in case a French fleet, as was expected, should arrive in the Delaware to co-operate with the 'Americans.

The design of evacuating Philadelphia was soon discovered by Washington; but the object or course of the enemy could not be precisely ascer tained. Their preparations equally denoted an expedition to the south; an embarkation of their whole army for New York; or a march to that city through New Jersey. In the two first cases Washington had not the means of annoyance; but as the probability of the last daily increased, he directed his chief attention to that point. Gen.

Maxwell, with the Jersey brigade, was ordered over the Delaware to take post about Mount Hol.. ly, and to co-operate with Gen. Dickinson at the head of the Jersey militia, in obstructing the progress of the royal army till time should be gained for Washington to overtake them. The British crossed the Delaware to Gloucester Point, on the 18th. of June, 1778; the Americans in four days after, at Corryel's ferry. The general officers of the latter, on being asked what line of conduct they deemed most advisable, had previously, and with one consent, agreed to attempt nothing till the evacuation of Philadelphia was completed; but after the Delaware was crossed, there was a diversity of sentiment respecting the measures proper to be pursued. Gen. Lee, who, having been exchanged, joined the army, was of opinion that the United States, in consequence of their late foreign connexions, were secure of their independence, unless their army was defeated; and that under such circumstances it would be criminal to hazard an action, unless they had some decided advantage. Though the numbers in both armies were nearly equal, and about ten thousand effective men in each, he attributed so much to the superiority of British discipline, as made him apprehensive of the issue of an engagement on equal ground. These sentiments were sanctioned by the voice of a great majority of the general officers. Washington was nevertheless strongly inclined to risk an action. Though cautious, he was enterprising, and could not readily believe that the ohances of war were so much against him as to threaten conscquences of the alarming magnitude

which had been announced. There was a general concurrence in a proposal for strengthening the corps on the left flank of the enemy with fifteen hundred men, to improve any partial advantages that might offer, and that the main body should preserve a relative position for acting as circumstances might require.

When Sir Henry Clinton had advanced to Allentown, he determined, instead of keeping the direct course toward Staten Island, to draw toward the sea coast, and to push on toward Sandy Hook. Washington, on receiving intelligence that Sir Henry was proceeding in, that direction toward Monmouth courthouse, despatched one thousand men under Gen. Wayne, and sent the Marquis de la Fayette to take command of the whole, with orders to seize the first fair opportunity of attacking the enemy's rear. The command of this advanced corps was offered to Gen. Lee, but he declined it. The whole army followed at a proper distance for supporting the advanced corps, and reached Cranberry the next morning. Sir Henry Clinton, sensible of the approach of the Americans, placed his grenadiers, light infantry, and chasseurs, in his rear, and his baggage in his front. Washington increased his advanced corps with two brigades, and sent Gen. Lee, who now wished for the command, to take charge of the whole, and fol. lowed with the main army to give it support. On the next morning orders were sent to Lee to move on and attack, unless there should be powerful reasons to the contrary. When -Washington had marched about five miles to support the advanced corps, he found the whole of it retreating by Lee's

orders, and without having made any opposition of consequence. Washington rode up to Lee and proposed certain questions. Lee answered with warmth, and unsuitable language. The commander in chief ordered Col. Stewart's, and Lieut. Col. Ramsay's battalions, to form on a piece of ground which he judged suitable for giving a check to the advancing enemy. Lee was then asked if he would command on that ground, to which hè consented, and was ordered to take proper measures for checking the enemy; to which he replied, " your orders shall be obeyed, and I will not. be the first to leave the field." Washington then rode to the main army, which was formed with the utmost expedition. A warm cannonade immediately commenced between the British and Amer ican artillery, and a heavy firing between the advanced troops of the British army and the two battalions which Washington had halted. These stood their ground till they were intermixed with a part of the British army. Gen. Lee continued till the last on the field of battle, and brought off the rear of the retreating troops.

The check the British received gave time to make a disposition of the left wing and second line of the American army, in the wood and on the eminence to which Lee was retreating: On this some cannon were placed by lord Stirling, who commanded the left wing, which, with the co-operation of some parties of infantry, effectually stopped the advance of the British in that quarter. Gen. Greene took a very advantageous position on the right of lord Stirling. The British attempted to turn the left flank of the Americans, but were