Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Reported below: 154 Colo. 535, 392 P. 2d 467. E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., for appellant. Louis Johnson, Charles S. Rhyne, Brice W. Rhyne and Alfred J. Tighe, Jr., for appellee. PER CURIAM. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. SHERIDAN v. GARDNER ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS, SUFFOLK COUNTY. No. 612. Decided January 18, 1965. Appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Morris M. Goldings, Francis X. McLaughlin and Thomas J. O'Toole for appellant. Edward W. Brooke, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Warren K. Kaplan, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Brooke, and Marshall Simonds for Gardner et al., appellees. PER CURIAM. The motions to dismiss are granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. VOORHES ET AL. v. DEMPSEY, GOVERNOR APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT. No. 600. Decided January 18, 1965. 231 F. Supp. 975, affirmed. Colin C. Tait for appellants. Harold M. Mulvey, Attorney General of Connecticut, and Raymond J. Cannon, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees. PER CURIAM. The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed. LYLES v. BETO, CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. No. 263, Misc. Decided January 18, 1965. Certiorari granted; judgment vacated; and case remanded. E. D. Vickery for petitioner. Waggoner Carr, Attorney General of Texas, and Sam R. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent. PER CURIAM. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201. MORRISON-KNUDSEN CO., INC., ET AL., DOING BUSINESS AS MORRISON-KAISER-PUGET SOUNDGENERAL v. WASHINGTON. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON. No. 566. Decided January 18, 1965. Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 Wash. 2d 86, 390 P. 2d 712. Stuart G. Oles and Seth W. Morrison for appellants. John W. Riley, Special Assistant Attorney General of Washington, and James A. Furber and Henry W. Wager, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. Opinion of the Court. 379 U.S. REPUBLIC STEEL CORP. v. MADDOX. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA. No. 43. Argued November 18, 1964.-Decided January 25, 1965. Respondent employee sued his employer for severance pay under a collective bargaining agreement existing between his union and employer, which was subject to the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). Judgment for respondent was affirmed in the state courts on the ground that the state law did not require him to exhaust contract grievance procedures before suit, which he had not done. Held: Under federal policy reflected in the LMRA, contract grievance procedures, which apply to severance as well as other types of claims, must, unless specified as nonexclusive, be exhausted before direct legal redress is sought. Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630, and Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U. S. 653, distinguished. Pp. 652-659. 275 Ala. 685, 158 So. 2d 492, reversed. Samuel H. Burr argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Andrew J. Thomas and James R. Forman, Jr. Richard L. Jones argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were John D. Prince, Jr., and Edwin L. Brobston. J. Albert Woll, Robert C. Mayer, Theodore J. St. Antoine and Thomas E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent Maddox brought suit in an Alabama state court against his employer, the Republic Steel Corporation, for severance pay amounting to $694.08, allegedly owed him under the terms of the collective bargaining 650 Opinion of the Court. agreement existing between Republic and Maddox' union. Maddox had been laid off in December 1953. The collective bargaining agreement called for severance pay if the layoff was the result of a decision to close the mine, at which Maddox worked, "permanently." " The agreement also contained a three-step grievance procedure to be followed by binding arbitration, but Maddox made no effort to utilize this mode of redress. Instead, in August 1956, he sued for breach of the contract. At all times material to his claim, Republic was engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act, and Republic's industrial relations with Maddox and his union were subject to the provisions of that Act. The case was tried on stipulated facts without a jury. Judgment was awarded in favor of Maddox, and the appellate courts of Alabama affirmed on the theory that state law applies to suits for severance pay since, with the employment relationship necessarily ended, no further danger of industrial strife exists warranting the application of federal labor law Moore v. Illinois Cen 1 The section of the contract dealing with severance allowance provided in relevant part: "When, in the sole judgment of the Company, it decides to close permanently a plant or discontinue permanently a department of a mine or plant, or substantial portion thereof and terminate the employment of individuals, an Employee whose employment is terminated either directly as a result thereof because he was not entitled to other employment with the Company under the provisions of Section 9 of this Agreement-Seniority and Subsection C of this Section 14, shall be entitled to a severance allowance in accordance with and subject to the provisions hereinafter set forth in this Section 14." 2 See infra, p. 658. 361 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 141 et seq. (1958 ed.). +275 Ala. 685, 158 So. 2d 492. |