Opinion of the Court.

deprived of one of those fundamental rights, the observance of which is indispensable to the liberty of the citizen, to justify our interference.

We cannot say that the dismissal of a writ of error is not justified by the abandonment of his case by the plaintiff in the writ. By escaping from legal custody he has, by the laws of most, if not all, of the States, committed a distinct criminal offence; and it seems but a light punishment for such offence to hold that he has thereby abandoned his right to prosecute a writ of error, sued out to review his conviction. Otherwise he is put in a position of saying to the court: "Sustain my writ and I will surrender myself, and take my chances upon a second trial; deny me a new trial and I will leave the State, or forever remain in hiding." We consider this as practically a declaration of the terms upon which he is willing to surrender, and a contempt of its authority, to which no court is bound to submit. It is much more becoming to its dignity that the court should prescribe the conditions upon which an escaped convict should be permitted to appear and prosecute his writ, than that the latter should dictate the terms upon which he will consent to surrender himself to its custody.

The course pursued in this case is approved by the ruling of many courts in different States, and notably in the case of Commonwealth v. Andrews, 97 Mass. 543, where the defendant escaped during the pendency of his case in the Supreme Court. It was held that, not being present in person, he could not be heard by attorney; that if a new trial were ordered, he was not there to answer further, and that if the exceptions were overruled, a sentence could not be pronounced or executed upon him, p. 544. "So far as the defendant had any right to be heard under the constitution, he must be deemed to have waived it by escaping from custody, and the failing to appear and prosecute his exceptions in person, according to the order of court under which he was committed." In Sherman v. Commonwealth, 14 Gratt. 677, upon a similar state of facts, the court ordered that the writ of error be dismissed, unless the defendant should appear before a certain day. This judgment was afterwards approved in

Opinion of the Court.

Leftwich v. Commonwealth, 20 Gratt. 716. In the case of Genet, 59 N. Y. 80, the defendant escaped, pending the settlement of a bill of exceptions, and the court declining to proceed with the settlement of the proposed bill, the case was carried before the Court of Appeals, and the action of the Court of Oyer and Terminer affirmed. See also People v. Redinger, 55 California, 290; Wilson v. Commonwealth, 10 Bush, 526; Gresham v. State, 1 Texas App. 458; McGowan v. People, 104 Illinois, 100; Warwick v. State, 73 Alabama, 486; State v. Conners, 20 W. Va. 1; State v. Wright, 32 La. Ann. 1017; Woodson v. State, 19 Florida, 549; Sargent v. State, 96 Indiana, 63; Moore v. State, 44 Texas, 595; State v. Craighead, 44 La. Ann. 968; Zardenta v. State, 23 S. W. Rep. 684; Gatliff v. State, 28 S. W. Rep. 466.

The course pursued in this case has also received the approval of the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia in several prior cases. Madden v. The State, 70 Georgia, 383; Osborn v. The State, 70 Georgia, 731; Gentry v. The State, 91 Georgia, 669.

The constitution of the State of Georgia, Art. 6, Sec. 2, Par. 6, requires the Supreme Court to dispose of every case at the first term, unless prevented by providential causes; and, by section 4271 of the Code, this enactment is repeated, with a further provision that no continuance shall be allowed except for providential cause. Indeed, it is admitted that it would be useless to ask the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia to reinstate this case, or to grant to the plaintiff in error any relief whatever, because under the rules and decisions of that court, and under the statutes of the State of Georgia, as construed by that court, such relief would be denied. Whether the court should give the plaintiff sixty days, or until the last day of the term, to appear and surrender himself to custody, was a matter for the court to determine, and even if there were error in that particular, it would not constitute a denial of due process of law.

The order of the Supreme Court dismissing the writ of error must, therefore, be

Affirmed.

Statement of the Case.

GRAND LODGE F. AND A. MASONS OF LOUISI-. ANA v. NEW ORLEANS.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA.

No. 111. Argued January 19, 1897. — Decided March 15, 1897.

Act No. 225 of the legislature of Louisiana of March 15, 1855, exempting the hall of the Grand Lodge from state and parish taxation, "so long as it is occupied as a Grand Lodge of the F. & A. Masons," did not constitute a contract between the State and the complainant, but was a mere continuing gratuity which the legislature was at liberty to terminate or withdraw at any time.

If such a law be a mere offer of bounty it may be withdrawn at any time, although the recipients may have incurred expense on the faith of the offer.

THIS was a petition originally filed in the Civil District Court for the parish of Orleans by the Grand Lodge of the F. & A. Masons of the State of Louisiana, to enjoin the city of New Orleans from proceeding to sell, for the taxes of 1888, 1889 and 1890, certain property owned by the petitioner, and claimed to be exempt from taxation.

The petition set forth that the Grand Lodge was incorporated by a perpetual charter, granted by the legislature in 1816; that petitioner was the owner of a lot of ground, with buildings and improvements thereon, at the corner of St. Charles and Perdido streets, known as the hall of the Grand Lodge, etc., which property it had purchased in 1853 by a notarial act, in which was incorporated a resolution of the Grand Lodge, which, in substance, devoted the entire net revenues of such property "to the relief of worthy distressed members of the order, their wives, children and families, and as a permanent charitable fund"; that such resolution was in strict accord with the objects of the institution, of which the Grand Lodge is the superintending body or organization, "the principles of which are charity and universal benevolence," and "to the end thereof, that charitable insti

Statement of the Case.

tutions may be promoted," the act of incorporation was enacted; that further to promote this object the legislature, by an act (No. 255), approved March 15, 1855, acts of 1855, p. 270, exempted said hall from city and parish taxation, so long as it was occupied by the Grand Lodge of F. & A. Masons, which exemption was claimed to have become a contract between the State and the Grand Lodge so long as the property was owned and occupied by it. The petitioner alleged that the principles and objects of Free Masonry are still unchanged, and that the net revenues arising from the property have not been diverted; that the city now claims that the property is subject to taxation, and threatens to enforce the collection of the taxes.

The answer of the city was simply a general denial.

Upon the trial it appeared that the Grand Lodge was incorporated by act of March 18, 1816, with full power and authority to take, hold and enjoy real and personal property, etc.; that the hall was erected in the year 1845 for a commercial exchange, and was purchased by the Grand Lodge for a hall in 1853; that on March 15, 1855, the general assembly enacted that the building, whose location and name were given in the act, should be exempt from state and parish taxation so long as it was occupied as the Grand Lodge of the F. & A. Masons. It further appeared that the objects proposed by the institution were charity and universal benevolence; that contributions were exacted from each member of the order for the ordinary expenses of the lodge and as a fund for the purposes of charity, to be distributed as occasion required, and that from 1853 to the present time the whole of the revenue, except that used for insurance, repairs and current expenses, has been exclusively devoted to charitable purposes as stated in the charter and act of sale. These revenues averaged over $3000 per year.

It further appeared that in 1879 a new constitution was adopted by the State, of which article 207 was as follows: "The following property shall be exempt from taxation and no other, viz.: All public property, places of religious worship or burial, all charitable institutions; provided, the

Opinion of the Court.

property so exempted be not used or leased for purposes of private or corporate profit or income."

Upon the hearing in the District Court, the property was held to be exempt from taxation, and an injunction granted. The city appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the decree of the District Court and dissolved the injunction. Upon a rehearing, the decree was amended by recognizing the exemption of that part of the property occupied by the grand and subordinate lodges of Masons, and in other respects the demand was rejected, and the case remanded to the court below with directions to hear evidence and ascertain what property was thus occupied, and what property was rented or used for private or corporate profit or income, and to pass upon and decide the relative values of that part of the property thus occupied by said Masons to that leased or used as aforesaid, that is, "from the assessed value of the property, viz., $60,000, must be deducted the value of the property exempted aforesaid."

The case having been remanded and reheard in the District Court, a new judgment was rendered in favor of the city for the city taxes of 1888, on an assessment of $20,000; of the year 1889, on an assessment of $10,000, and for the year 1890, on an assessment of $6200. The case was then appealed and reheard in the Supreme Court, and the judgment of the District Court affirmed. Whereupon petitioner sued out this writ of error.

Mr. Charles F. Buck for plaintiff in error. Mr. J. Q. A.

Fellows was on his brief.

Mr. Samuel L. Gilmore for defendant in error. Mr. W. R. Sommerville was on his brief.

Mr. M. J. Cunningham, Attorney General of the State of Louisiana, Mr. F. C. Zacharie and Mr. Alexander Porter Morse filed a brief on behalf of the State.

MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the court.

VOL. CLXVI-10