The eighth section of the act on which these prisoners were indicted is in these words: "And be it enacted, that if any person or persons shall commit, upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, murder or robbery, or any other offense, which, if committed within the body of a county, would, by the laws of the United States, be punishable with death; or if any captain or mariner of any ship or other vessel shall piratically and feloniously run away with such ship or vessel, or any goods or merchandize to the value of $50, or yield up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate; or if any seaman shall lay violent hands upon his commander, thereby to hinder and prevent his fighting in defence of his ship, or goods committed to his trust, or shall make a revolt in the ship, every such offender shall be deemed, taken and adjudged to be a pirate and felon, and being thereof convicted, shall suffer death; and the trial of crimes committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, shall be in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may first be brought." Robbery committed on land, not being punishable by the laws of the United States with death, it is doubted whether it is made piracy by this act, when committed on the high seas. The argument is understood to be that Congress did not intend to make that a capital offense on the high seas which is not a capital offense on land. That only such murder, and such robbery, and such other offense as, if committed within the body of a county, would, by the laws of the United States, be punishable with death, is made piracy. That the word "other" is without use or meaning, if this construction be rejected. That it so connects murder and robbery with the following member of the sentence as to limit the words murder and robbery to that description of those offenses which might be made punishable with death, if committed on land. That in consequence of this word the relative "which" has for its antecedent the whole preceding part of the sentence, and not the words "other offenses." That section consists of three distinct classes of piracy. The first, of offenses which, if committed within the body of a county, would be punishable with death. The second and third, of particular offenses which are enumerated. This argument is entitled to great respect, on every account; and to the more, because in expounding a law which inflicts capital punishment, no over rigid construction ought to be admitted. But the court can not assent to its correctness. The Legislature having specified murder and robbery particularly are understood to indicate clearly the intention that those offenses shall amount to piracy; there could be no other motive for specifying them. The subsequent words do not appear to be employed for the purpose of limiting piratical murder and robbery to that description of those of fenses which is punishable with death, if committed on land, but for the purpose of adding other offenses, should there be any, which were not particularly recited, and which were rendered capital by the laws of the United States, if committed within the body of a county. Had the intention of Congress been to render the crime of piracy dependent on the punishment affixed to the same offense, if committed on land, this intention must have been expressed in very different terms from those which have been selected. Instead of enumerating murder and robbery as crimes which should constitute piracy, and then proceeding to use a general term, comprehending other offenses, the langnage of the legislature would have been, that "any offense "committed on the high seas, which, if committed in the body of a county, would be punishable with death, should amount to piracy. The particular crimes enumerated were undoubtedly first in the mind of Congress. No other motive for the enumeration can be assigned. Yet, on the construction contended for, robbery on the high seas would escape unpunished. It is not pretended that the words of the Legislature ought to be strained beyond their natural meaning, for the purpose of embracing a crime which would otherwise escape with impunity; but when the words of a statute, in their most obvious sense, comprehend an offense, which offense is apparently placed by the Legislature in the highest class of crimes, it furnishes an additional motive for rejecting a construction narrowing the plain meaning of the words, that such construction would leave the crime entirely unpunished. The correctness of this exposition of the eighth section is confirmed by those which follow. The ninth punishes those citizens of the United States who commit the offenses described in the eighth, under color of a commission or authority derived from a foreign state. Here robbery is again particularly specified. The tenth section extends the punishment of death to accessories before the fact. They are described to be those who aid, assist, advise, etc., etc., any person to "commit any murder, robbery, or other piracy aforesaid." If the word "aforesaid " be connected with "murder" and " robbery" as well as with "other piracy," yet it seems difficult to resist the conviction that the legislature considered murder and robbery as acts of piracy. The eleventh section punishes accessories after the fact. They are those who," after any murder, felony, robbery, or other piracy whatsoever aforesaid," shall have been committed, shall furnish aid to those by whom the crime has been perpetrated. Can it be doubted that the legislature considered murder, felony and robbery committed on the high seas as piracies? If it be answered that, although this opinion be entertained, yet if the legislature was mistaken, those whose duty it is to construe the law, must not yield to that mistake, we say, that when the legislature manifests this clear understanding of its own intention, which intention consists with its words, courts are bound by it. Of the meaning of the term robbery, as used in the statute, we think no doubt can be entertained. It must be understood in the sense in which it is recognized and defined at common law. The question whether this act extends further than to American citizens, or to persons on board American vessels or to offenses committed against citizens of the United States, is not without its difficulties. The constitution having conferred on Congress the power of defining and punishing piracy, there can be no doubt of the right of the legislature to enact laws punishing pirates, although they may be foreigners, and may have committed no particular offense against the United States. The only question is, has the legislature enacted such a law? Do the words of the act authorize the courts of the Union to inflict its penalties on persons who are not citizens of the United States, nor sailing under their flag, nor offending particularly against them? The words of the section are in terms of unlimited extent. The words" any person or persons" are broad enough to comprehend every human being. But general words must not only be limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the State, but also to those objects to which the Legislature intended to apply them. Did the Legislature intend to apply these words to the subjects of a foreign power, who in a foreign ship may commit murder or robbery on the high seas? The title of an act can not control its words, but may furnish some aid in showing what was in the mind of the Legislature. The title of this act is, “An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States." It would seem that offenses against the United States, not offenses against the human race, were the crimes which the Legislature intended by this law to punish. The act proceeds upon this idea, and uses general terms in this limited sense. In describing those who may commit misprision of treason or felony, the words used are any person or persons; " yet these words are necessarily confined to any person or persons owing permanent or temporary allegiance to the United States. any person or The eighth section also commences with the words " persons.” But these words must be limited in some degree, and the intent of the Legislature will determine the extent of this limitation. For this intent we must examine the law. The succeeding member of the sentence commences with these words: "If any captain or mariner of any ship or other vessel shall piratically run away with such ship or vessel, or any goods or merchandise to the value of $50, or yield up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate." The words, "any captain, or mariner of any ship or other vessel," comprehend all captains and mariners, as entirely as the words "any person or persons comprehend the whole human race. Yet it would be difficult to believe that the Legislature intended to punish the captain or mariner of a foreign ship, who should run away with such ship, and dispose of her in a foreign port, or who should steal any goods from such ship to the value of $50, or who should deliver her up to a pirate when he might have defended her, or even according to the previous arrangement. The third member of the sentence also begins with the general words “ any seaman." But it can not be supposed that the Legislature intended to punish a seaman on board a ship sailing under a foreign flag, under the jurisdiction of a foreign government, who should lay violent hands upon his commander, or make a revolt in the ship. These are offenses against the nation under whose flag the vessel sails and within whose particular jurisdiction all on board the vessel are. Every nation provides for such offenses the punishment its own policy may dictate; and no general words of a statute ought to be construed to embrace them when committed by foreigners against a foreign government. That the general words of the two latter members of this sentence are to be restricted to offenses committed on board the vessels of the United States furnishes strong reason for believing that the Legislature intended to impose the same restriction on the general words used in the first member of that sentence. This construction derives aid from the tenth section of the act. This section declares that "" The court is of opinion that the crime of robbery, committed by a person on the high seas, on board of any ship or vessel belonging exclu sively to subjects of a foreign State, on persons within a vessel belonging exclusively to subjects of a foreign State, is not a piracy within the true intent and meaning of the act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States. This opinion will probably decide the case 41 to which it is intended to apply. Those questions which respect the rights of a part of a foreign empire, which asserts, and is contending for, its independence, and the conduct which must be observed by the courts of the Union towards the subjects of such section of an empire who may be brought before the tribunals of this country, are equally delicate and difficult. As it is understood that the construction which has been given to the act of Congress will render a particular answer to them necessary, the court will only observe that such questions are generally rather political than legal in their character. They belong more properly to those who can declare what the law shall be; who can place the nation in such a position with respect to foreign powers as to their own judgment shall appear wise; to whom are intrusted all its foreign relations; than to that tribunal whose power, as well as duty, is confined to the application of the rule which the Legislature may prescribe for it. In such contests, a nation may engage itself with the one party or the other; may observe absolute neutrality; may recognize the new State absolutely; or may make a limited recognition of it. The proceeding in courts must depend so entirely on the course of the government that it is difficult to give a precise answer to questions which do not refer to a particular nation. It may be said, generally, that if the government remains neutral, and recognizes the existence of a civil war, its courts can not consider as criminal those acts of hostility which war authorizes, and which the new government may direct against its enemy. To decide otherwise would be to determine that the war prosecuted by one of the parties was unlawful, and would be to arraign the nation to which the court belongs against that party. This would transcend the limit prescribed to the judicial department. It follows, as a consequence, from this view of the subject, that persons or vessels, employed in the service of a self-declared government, thus acknowledged to be maintaining its separate existence by war, must be permitted to prove the fact of their being actually employed in such service, by the same testimony which would be sufficient to prove that such vessel or person was employed in the service of an acknowledged state. The seal of such unacknowledged government can not be permitted to prove itself; but it may be proved by such testimony as the nature of the case admits; and the fact that such vessel or person is so employed may be proved without proving the seal. Mr. Justice JOHNSON. The first of these questions arises on the construction of the first division of the eighth section of the act for the punishment of certain crimes. That act comprises two classes of cases, the second of which may again be subdivided into two divisions. In the second class of cases, each crime is specifically described in the ordi |