it to be counterfeit. Proof of reasonable cause of belief may warrant a jury to find knowledge, but it is not the legal equivalent of knowledge. It was proved that the defendant made an oath to the statement set out in the second count; but it does not expressly appear by the paper itself that he professed to have personal knowledge of the fact. If he only intended to state his belief, there were some circumstances sworn to which, whether satisfactory to the jury or not, were proper to be considered by them on the question of belief. There was some evidence that the fragment of the note was picked up in the street on St. Patrick's Day, and that the father of the boy who found it gave it to the defendant, and suggested to him that perhaps the note had been torn up in a riot or street fight that took place then and there. In the case of United States v. Atkins,1 the false oath was that a certain shipping paper was the original agreement with the crew; and the evidence tended to show that the defendant knew nothing whatever about it personally. The form of the oath, as in this case, was positive, without saying anything about knowledge, or means of knowledge or belief. Judge Sprague, in charging the jury, said: "Did the defendant, by swearing positively, mean to swear that he had personal knowledge that it was the original agreement? The defendant could not swear that it was the original agreement, unless he was present when it was made. All else would be information and hearsay. The question is, Did he mean to make the collector understand that he had knowledge it was the original contract; or did he merely mean to swear that it was such to the best of his knowledge and belief? The matter for you to decide, gentlemen, is, whether, you are satisfied that the defendant, in order to deceive the collector, willfully and intentionally swore to what he knew was false, either as to the agreement being genuine, when he knew it was not, or to his knowledge. of the fact, when he was conscious he had no such knowledge.” 2 Now, this ruling is undoubtedly sound in the abstract, and it is what I told the jury; but the difficulty in my mind is, that there was no sufficient evidence in the case from which they could infer that the defendant did state the destruction of the note to be within his personal knowledge; and therefore I should not have brought that secondary fact to their notice at all. And here I differ from the charge in Atkin's Case. The ruling in that case, with all the limitations and qualifications which it appears that Judge Sprague put about it, would probably do no harm; but I must say that in my opinion the learned judge should have ruled, on an affidavit wholly in writing, that it did or did not, as matter of law, import a statement of personal knowledge, and not have left that question to the jury. In that case the jury were unable to 1 Ubi supra: 2 19 Law Rep. 98. agree. In the similar case of United States v. Smith1 they acquitted the defendant. The court and jury in those cases agreed that an affidavit to a fact does not necessarily include an affirmation that the affiant has personal knowledge of the fact; and my own observation of the conduct and opinion of men in general in this matter agrees with that view. I consider the affidavit in this case ought not to be held to import such a statment, none such being expressed, and the fact not being one which was personal to him. The true question, therefore, for the jury was the one which the indictment points out. Did the defendant swear to this fact, knowing it to be false? I do not mean to say that there was not evidence from which the jury might have answered this question in the affirmative; but, as I can not say how they would have answered it, I feel it my duty to grant a new trial. New trial ordered. PERJURY-CORROBORATION REQUIRED. [2 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 445.] In the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department, February, 1884. Upon the Trial of Defendant for Perjury, in that he had falsely sworn in an action brought against him by one B., that he had paid to B. certain moneys, the non-payment was proved by B. To corroborate B. it was proven that certain receipts of B. produced on the trial of the main action by defendant to prove payment to B. were forgeries. Held, that the evidence as to the receipts did not sufficiently corroborate the single witness as to the perjury, to justify a conviction of that offense. APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Sessions of Queens County convicting the defendant Daniel H. Stone of perjury. Upon the trial of an action brought by one Candace E. V. B. Booraem against defendant to recover certain money, defendant swore that he had paid the money to Mrs. Booraem, and produced certain receipts for the money purporting to be signed by Mrs. Booraem. For having falsely sworn as to the payment of the money he was indicted. Horace Graves, for defendant, appellant. B. W. Downing, and Chauncey Shaffer, for the People, respondent. DYKMAN, J. It is an ancient and salutary rule of law that a conviction for the crime of willful and corrupt perjury can not be secured and sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of one witness. The under 1 19 Law Rep. 91. lying principle of this rule is that if there be but one witness to prove the allegation of falsity, then oath is placed against oath and it remains doubtful where the truth lies, the oath of the accused which is alleged to be false being sufficient to counterpoise the testimony of a single witness. Formerly the testimony of two witnesses was requisite to a conviction, but the rule has been relaxed. Now, what is required is evidence sufficient to counterbalance the oath of the defendant, and the legal presumption of his innocence. The testimony of the single witness for the prosecution must be corroborated by material and independent facts or circumstances sufficient to destroy the equilibrium produced by the two oaths. Tested by these fundamental and material rules, the testimony in this case is insufficient to sustain the conviction of the defendant. The perjury set up in the indictment is false swearing to the payment of money to Mrs. Booraem, and she testified to its falsity. There was much testimony adduced on the trial respecting a receipt which Stone had produced on the main trial, but he is not indicted for false swearing in reference to the receipt or the signature it bears. That testimony is not therefore corroborative for the prosecution here. If all the exhibits produced by the defendant on the trial were forged it is quite immaterial here. The only question here is whether the defendant committed willful and corrupt perjury when he swore on the trial at special term that he had paid Mrs. Booraem the money. The indictment contains no charge that Stone testified in any way respecting the signatures to the two receipts. The allegations are that the receipts were false and forged and that the defendant produced them; but the indictment is for perjury in making a false oath that he had paid money and not for swearing that the receipts were genuine. The accused was therefore called on to answer the charge of perjury contained in the indictment, and the public prosecutor was called on for proof of that offense, and when he produced one single witness to prove that the money had not been paid, he had taken but one step toward the conviction of the defendant. He had then produced an equilibrium which he was required to destroy, and that destruction could not be accomplished by proof that the defendant had committed the crime of perjury without proof of material and independent facts or circumstances tending directly to corroborate the testimony of the main and and only witness; on the question of payment he could not require a conviction. The argument for the prosecution seems to be that because Stone testified to the payment of the money and produced in corroboration of his testimony a receipt which is shown to be false and fabricated, that makes against his testimony, and is sufficient confirmation of the single witness to justify the conviction. But does that prove any more than the failure of the receipt to corroborate the testimony of Stone? If that be all then it does not assist the prosecution. What the law required was confirmation of the single witness. If Stone provided fabricated receipts, they may fail to support him, but they fail also to corroborate the testimony of the People. On the whole testimony the conclusion is reached that there was not sufficient confirmatory proof in corroboration of the single witness to justify the conviction. The judgment of conviction should be reversed. PERJURY-INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS-PROOF. SCHWARTZ v. COMMONWEALTH. [27 Gratt. (Va). 1025.] In the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. Perjury - Inconsistent Statements. Evidence that a person had at one time sworn to one state of facts, and afterwards changed his testimony, and, admitting that he had sworn fasely, testified in direct contradiction of his first statement, is not sufficient to justify his conviction. The prosecutor must prove which of the two statements is false, and must corroborate the true statement of the prisoner by independent evidence, i.e. by evidence other than his own statements and declarations. This was an indictment for perjury in the Hustings Court of the city of Manchester. On the trial, the jury found the prisoner guilty, and assessed his fine at one dollar, and the court sentenced him to imprisonment in the jail of the city for one year. There were a number of exceptions taken by the prisoner to rulings of the court; but this court only considered the question on the motion for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was not sustained by the evidence. The facts are set out in the opinion of Judge STAPLES. On the application of the prisoner this court awarded him a writ of error. G. Wise, for the prisoner. The Attorney-General, for the Commonwealth. STAPLES, J. The prisoner was indicted for perjury in the Hustings Court, of the city of Manchester, and was convicted and sentenced to confinement in the jail of the city for one year. After the verdict was rendered, he moved the court to grant him a new trial, upon the ground that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the law and the evidence. His motion was overruled, and the prisoner excepted. His bill of exceptions contains all the facts proved on the trial, from which it appears that the prisoner was examined as a witness upon the trial of Joseph Turner, before the mayor of Manchester, upon the charge of rape, and upon the examination, the prisoner testified that he had no conversation or plot with the said Joseph Turner, before they left Manchester, to commit rape upon Pallas Boyd; that he and Turner went to the locality of the alleged offense for the purpose of getting flowers, and that he heard no screams from the girl, Pallas Boyd, whilst Turner had her in the bushes; that the Commonwealth's attorney asked that his testimony be written down; that a pause in his examination of two or three minutes ensued, during which time the prisoner was retired from the witness-stand; that the prisoner, during this interruption, stated to Mr. Fitzgerald, a police officer, to Mr. Redford, a by-stander, and to the Commonwealth's attorney, that he had sworn falsely in his testimony just given; that he had done so to screen Turner, and that when he went back on the stand he would tell the truth; that the prisoner was then put on the stand again as witness, no other witness intervening, and testified that he and Turner had had a bargain and conversation about the girl before they left Manchester, and that he did hear screams from the girl while Turner had her in the bushes; and thereupon the said mayor refused to hear him further. It was further proved that the prisoner was not warned by said mayor that he had the right to refuse to answer questions put to him; that he had no counsel; that he' appeared somewhat confused, but not more so than is usual with witnesses; and that he is in the fifteenth year of his age. And these were all the facts proved on the trial. The charge in the indictment is of perjury in the first statement before the mayor; and the evidence relied on to establish the perjury, is the contradictory statement before the same officer at a subsequent period of the same examination. As will be seen from the bill of exceptions, this contradictory statement was the sole and only proof adduced by the Commonwealth in support of the indictment. The question we are to determine is, was he properly convicted upon that evidence? No rule is, perhaps, better settled than that to authorize a conviction of perjury, there must be two witnesses testifying to the falsity of the statement, or one witness, with strong corroborating circumstances, of such a character as clearly to turn the scale, and overcome the oath of the party and the legal presumption of his innocence. This rule is founded upon the idea that it is unsafe to convict in any case where the oath of one man merely is to be weighed against that of another. Lord Tenterden is reported to have said that corroborating |