EXTORTION— Continued.

Must not be entitled to fees, p. 418.
Fees must be allowed by law, p. 419.
Must be obliged to perform service, p. 419.
Justice of the peace not public officer, p. 419.
Something of value must be received, p. 419.
Act must be done knowingly, p. 419.

"FENCE, BAR, OR OTHER IMPEDIMENT."

Construed, p. 770.

FOOD AND DRINK.

See NUISANCE.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.

Of personal property not indictable, p. 594.
Requisites of offense, p. 594.

FORNICATION.

See, also, ADULTERY; LEWDNESS.

On the trial of an indictment for fornication, it devolves upon the prosecu-
tion to prove that the respondents are unmarried. In the absence of
any evidence on the subject, the law presumes that a man and woman
openly living and cohabiting together are lawfully married. Territory
v. Whitcomb, p. 29.

Fornication defined, p. 94.

What is not fornication, p. 94.

"GAMBLING DEVICES."

Construed, p. 755.

GAME LAWS.

The statute punishing any one who in Massachusetts takes or kills a wood-
cock, etc., between specified days, or buys, sells, offers for sale or has
them in his possession within the same time, does not apply to such
birds lawfully taken or killed in another State. Com. v. Hall, p. 716.

"GAME OF CHANCE."

Construed, p. 756.

"GAME PLAYED WITH DICE."

Construed, p. 758.

GAMING.

See DISORDERLY HOUSE; ELECTIONS.

A single act of play at a gaming-table called "sweat-cloth,” at the races,
or one day's use of it at the race course is not "keeping a common
gaming-table" within the statute. U. S. v. Smith, pp. 624, 628.

GAMING- Continued.

On the trial of an indictment for permitting a minor to play billiards with-
out the consent of his parents or guardian, the burden of proof is on
the State to show that the minor did not have the consent of his parent
or guardian. Conyers v. State, p. 636.

Pool selling is not keeping a "lottery." People v. Reilly, p. 639.

Gaming not an offense at common law, p. 752.

Risk and profit essential, p. 752.

Loser paying for hire of billiard table, p. 752.

Betting on election not, p. 753.

Resale of lottery ticket not, p. 753.

Lottery; chances must be sold or prizes given, p. 753.
Purchaser of lottery ticket not indictable, p. 753.
Publishing proposals to procure lottery tickets, p. 753.
Meaning of "bets," p. 754.

"Common gaming-house," what, p. 754.

"Device or substitute for cards" construed, p. 755.
"Gambling devices; " billiards or ten pins not, p. 755.
Nor horse race, p. 755.

Nor playing cards, 755.

Billiards not a "game of chance,” p. 756.

Nor is a horse race, p. 756.

Nor shuffle board, p. 757.

Nor ten pins, p. 757.

Backgammon not a "game played with dice," p. 758.
Construction of "highway" in statute, p. 759.
Of "house where spirituous liquors are sold," p. 759.
Copper coins are not "instruments of gaming," p. 757.
Meaning of keeper of house of entertainment, p. 759.
Keno is not a "lottery," p. 759.

Nor is a raffle, p. 759.

Meaning of "outhouse where people resort,” p. 759.

Meaning of "professional gambler," p. 759.

Meaning of "public place," pp. 759, 761.

GOVERNMENT PROPERTY.

An indictment for unlawfully purchasing a soldier's arms will not lie where
the arms had been stolen by the soldier. U. S. v. Brown, p. 174.
Taking clothing from an inmate of a National Military Home, is not taking
it from a person "in the military service." U. S. v. Murphy, p. 175.

GUNPOWDER.

See NUISANCE.

"HIGHWAY."

Construed, p. 759.

"HORSE."

Construed, p. 599.

"HORSE, CATTLE OR OTHER BEASTS."

Construed, p. 599.

"HORSE, CATTLE, SHEEP, GOAT, OR SWINE OR ANY OTHER PROP-
ERTY."

Construed, 599.

"HORSE RACE."

See GAMING.

"HOUSE."

Construed, pp. 766, 820.

"HOUSE OF ANOTHER."
Construed, p. 800.

HOUSE OF ILL-FAME.

See DISORDERLY HOUSE; COMMON PROSTitute.

"HOUSE WHERE SPIRITUOUS LIQUORS ARE SOLD.”
Construed, p. 759.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

P. having been convicted of being a disorderly person for neglecting to
support his family, entered into the statutory recognizance. Action
was brought upon the bond, and the breach alleged was a neglect to
support his wife and children. At the time the recognizance was en-
tered into, the husband and wife were living apart. Upon giving the
bond, the husband offered to take the wife and children home with him
to his father's house, and support them there, but the wife refused to
go there, claiming that P.'s father was intemperate and abusive, and
that it was not a proper place for her and the children. The husband
refused to support her anywhere else. Held, that this evidence did
not tend to show any breach of the bond. People v. Pettit, p. 78.
The statute as to abandoning a wife does not apply where a wife capri-
ciously and without cause, refuses to accept reasonable provision for
her support, at the place the husband may have selected, even though
she is liable to become a public burden. People v. Nehr, p. 84.

Though the wife is entitled to reasonable support by the husband, he has
the right to determine the place and style of living, and it is only when
he neglects or refuses to properly provide for, or maltreats her, or is
guilty of infidelity to her that she is justified in refusing her submission
to his reasonable requirements in regard thereto. Id.

Neglect to support wife; test of liability, p. 108.

Husband must have means, p. 108.

"IDLE PERSON."

Construed, p. 797.

"IN PRESENCE OF FAMILY OR FEMALE."

Construed, p. 794.

INCEST.

Assent by both parties is a necessary ingredient of the crime of incest. State v. Thomas, pp. 40, 102..

Cohabitation between a man and his step-daughter is not incest. Chancellor v. State, p. 56.

The relation of step-father and step-daughter, within the meaning of the statute against incest, does not exist after the termination of the marriage relation between the step-father and the step-daughter's mother. Noble v. Staie, p. 58.

On the trial of an indictment for incest against the step-father, it was
shown that the step-daughter's mother had been twice married before
her marriage with the defendant; first, to a man by the name of Nor-
wood, and next, to a man by the name of Hopkins; and there was evi-
dence tending to raise a presumption of the death of one or both of
these former husbands. The court thereupon charged the jury, as
follows: "If the presumption arises that Norwood or Hopkins, or both
of them, are dead, the subsequent marriage with Noble" (the defend-
ant) "would be valid, unless from the testimony you should find that in
fact they, or one of them, are not dead." Held, that in this charge
there was error, for which the judgment should be reversed. Id.
Emissio seminis is an essential ingredient in the crime of incest. Id.
Incest not indictable at common law, p. 102.

Knowledge of relationship essential, p. 103.
Evidence insufficient to convict, p. 103.

"INDECENT.”

Construed, 282.

INDECENT EXPOSURE.

If a man indecently expose his person to one woman only this is not an indictable offense. R. v. Webb, pp. 728, 791.

An indictment for indecent exposure charging the offense to have been committed on a highway, is not sustained by evidence that the offense was committed in a place near the highway, though in full view of it. R. v. Farrell, p. 733.

An indecent exposure seen by one person only and capable of being seen by one person only, is not an offense at common law, secus, if there are other persons in such a situation as that they may be witnesses of the exposure. Id.

Must take place in public place, p. 791.

"INFAMOUS CRIME."

Construed, p. 138.

"INSTRUMENTS OF GAMING."

Construed, p. 759.

INSTRUMENTS TO PREVENT CONCEPTION.

Sale of not indictable at common law, p. 792.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

See LIQUOR LAWS.

JOINT INDICTMENT.

See CONSPIRACY.

KENO.

Is not a lottery, p. 759.

"KEEPER OF HOUSE OF ENTERTAINMENT."

Construed, p. 759.

"KEEPING A COMMON GAMING TABLE."

Construed, pp. 624, 628.

"LAND OF ANOTHER."

Construed, p. 601.

LETTERS.

See POST-OFFICE LAWS.

"LEVYING WAR."

Construed, p. 113.

"LEWDLY AND LASCIVIOUSLY COHABITING.”

Construed, p. 793.

LEWDNESS.

To be indictable must be public, p. 792.

Living together in open state of fornication, p. 792.

"Lewdly and lasciviously cohabiting" construed, p. 793.

"Open and gross lewdness and indecent behavior," construed, p. 793.

LIBEL.

See SLANDER AND LIBEL.

LICENSE.

See LIQUOR LAWS.

LIQUOR LAWS.

A license to keep a tavern includes the privilege of retailing spirituous liquors. State v. Chamblyss, pp. 642, 761.

A single sale of intoxicating liquors does not of itself constitute pursuing or following the occupation of a liquor dealer within the purview of the Penal Code. Sandford v. State, 649.

It is not the sale, but the following of the occupation of selling of intoxicating liquors, without having first obtained license, that is the gravamen of the offense. Id.