in Kane v. Hamilton, and by Lord Thurlow(w) in Bateman v. Murray, caused great alarm to persons holding under renewable leases, but it has been observed by Lord Redesdale(x), that the ultimate decisions in those causes were perfectly correct, being founded on the fraudulent conduct of the tenants, and were by no means inconsistent with the principle of affording relief against mere neglect.

The reversal of the decree in Murray v. Bateman, occasioned the passing of the Tenantry Act, whereby (y), after reciting that great parts of the lands in Ireland were held under leases for lives, with covenants for perpetual renewals, upon payment of certain fines at the times therein respectively mentioned for each renewal: and that from various accidents and causes such tenants, and those deriving under them, have frequently neglected to pay or tender such fines within the times prescribed by such covenants, after the fall of such lives respectively; and that many such leases were settled to make provision for families and creditors, most of whom must be utterly ruined if advantage should be taken of such neglects, which would occasion much confusion and distress in the kingdom; and that it had been for a long time a received opinion in this kingdom, to which some decisions in Courts of Equity, and declarations of Judges had given countenance, that Courts of Equity would, in such cases, relieve against the lapse of time, upon giving an adequate compensation to the persons to whom such fines were payable, or their representatives : and to the end that such interests might not be defeated by a mere neglect, where no fraud appeared to have been intended, upon making full satisfaction to the lessors, or those deriving under them, it was declared and enacted, that Courts of Equity, upon an adequate compensation being made, should relieve such tenants and their assigns against such lapse of time, if no circumstance of fraud were proved against such tenants or their assigns: unless it should be proved to the satisfaction of such Courts, that the landlords or lessors, or persons entitled to receive such fines, had demanded such fines from such tenants or their assigns, and that the same had been refused or neglected to be paid within a reasonable time after such demand.

The object of the legislature was to declare and enforce what had been the old equity of Ireland, before the passing of the Act: and although cautiously framed, so as to avoid giving offence(2) to Lord

(w) Bateman v. Murray, 1 Ridg. Parl. Ca. 187; Murray v. Bateman, Wall. Rep. 181.

(r) Lennon v. Napper, 2 Sch. & Lef.682.

(y) 19 & 20 Geo. III. c. 30, Irish. (2) Magrath v. Ld. Muskerry, 1 Ridg Parl. Ca. 505, by Lord Pery.

Thurlow, who pronounced the judgement of the House of Lords in Bateman v. Murray(a), yet it has always been considered as merely declaratory (b) of the old equity of this kingdom, and not as introductory of any new law on the subject. The Statute does not take away any right which a tenant had prior to its enactment, for it is clear that if a demand of renewal fines had been made before the Act passed, and was not complied with, the tenant would have been deprived of relief. Hence, though the Statute only refers to leases for lives, it has been determined (c), that all leases with covenants of renewal for ever, whether granted for years determinable upon lives, or for a term of years absolutely, renewable for successive terms of years for ever, were within the operation of the old equity, and are now entitled to the protection of the Statute.

14. Leases for lives renewable for ever still continue to be frequently granted in Ireland, and are preferable to grants in fee-farm, because the lessor retains a reversion, and payment of the reserved rent may be enforced, or the interest may be evicted by ejectment, grounded on the statutes for non-payment of rent: besides, a renewal of the lease, with an express covenant for payment of rent, affords facilities for its recovery, where great difficulties might be found in maintaining an action for breach of the corresponding covenant, either in the original lease, or in a fee-farm grant.

The meaning of the parties in these contracts is to secure(d) a continuance of the tenure and rent, as well as payment of the fines, and to prevent a conversion of the tenure, by enjoyment without renewal, into a fee-farm; for notwithstanding the payment of rent, if there were to be no renewal from time to time, the presumption of a fee-farm would arise.

(a) Bateman v. Murray, 1 Ridg. Parl. Ca. 187.

(b) Barrett v. Burke, 5 Dow's Parl. Ca. 15, by Lord Redesdale; Lennon v. Napper, 2 Sch. & Lef. 682; and see Butler v. Lord Portarlington, 1 Dru. & Warr. 51; 4 Irish Eq. Rep. 18.

(c) Boyle v. Lysaght, 1 Ridg. Parl.

Ca. 384, 415; Vern. & Scr. 135, 153; Freeman v. Boyle, 2 Ridg. P. Ca. 6977; Austen v. Cavendish, Lyne on Leases, 118, in the note.

(d) Lennon v. Napper, 2 Sch. & Lef. 685; Doe dem. Whittick v. Johnson, Gow's N. P. C. 173.

CHAPTER V.

NATURE AND EXTENT OF LEASEHOLD INTERESTS-
RENEWABLE LEASES.

15. Frauds which disentitle a Tenant to Renewal.

16. Disobedience of Tenant to interlocutory Orders for Payment of Money.

17. Breaches of express Covenants, no Forfeiture of Right of Renewal. 18. Nor Encroachments by Tenant on the adjoining Estate of Lessor. 19. Whether Forfeiture avoided by Tender of Fines, without paying Arrear of Rent.

20. Forfeiture of Right of Renewal by Tenant's Dereliction.

21. Nature of Demand required by Tenantry Act.

22. From whom the Fines are to be
demanded.

23. Peppercorn Renewal Fine.
24. Reasonable Time for Payment of
Fines after Demand.

25. Delay excused when occasioned by
Lessor's Misconduct.

15. WHERE a lease with covenant of renewal for ever has been fairly obtained from a person competent to grant such an interest, a renewal will be specifically enforced against the reversioner, unless some circumstance of fraud shall be established, or unless the acts or defaults of the tenant shall amount to dereliction, but the mere passive negligence(a) of both parties, however protracted, will not defeat the tenant's right of renewal.

The description of fraud contemplated by the Tenantry Act, must either consist in a fraudulent suppression, or concealment of the fall of the cestuique vies, or in a violation of, or infringement on, the duties of a tenant to his landlord. In Pendred v. Griffith(b), which was decided prior to the Tenantry Act, a renewal was refused, because the tenant had fraudulently suppressed from his landlord the fall of the cestuique vies named in the lease, and had actually procured renewal fines, and executed renewals to his own undertenants upon the fall of the cestuique vies whose deaths had been concealed from the landlord. So a lessee for lives renewable for ever, having made a similar lease renewable on payment of the same fine to an undertenant, Lord Redesdale(c) held, that the receipt of renewal fines by the mesne landlord from his own undertenant, without paying them over to the head landlord, was such a fraud as should disentitle the intermediate lessor to a renewal at his own suit.

(a) Jackson v. Saunders, 2 Dow's Parl. Ca. 444; Shenton v. Corbally, 1 Hogan, 420; M'Donnell v. Burnett, 4 Irish Eq. Rep. 216-228.

(b) Pendred v. Griffith, 1 Bro. Parl. Ca. 314.

(c) Barrett v. Burke, 5 Dow's Parl. Ca. 1-18.

16. A tenant seeking the aid of a Court of Equity to obtain specific performance of a covenant for renewal, and to restrain the lessor or reversioner from recovering at law possession of the demised premises, must be prepared to comply with such interlocutory orders(d) as shall be made for the attainment of justice between the parties; and therefore if the tenant has suffered an arrear of rent to become due prior to the institution of the suit, and neglects complying with an order of the Court, either to pay or to secure the amount, together with the accruing rent, such conduct(e) will be deemed fraudulent, and will disentitle the party to relief.

If a tenant holding lands for lives renewable for ever, suffer a large arrear of rent to accrue due, and after all the cestuique vies have fallen, and after being called upon to renew, defend an ejectment brought against him for recovery of the possession(ƒ), such litigious resistance will be deemed fraudulent, because the reversioner, in consequence of the tenant's default(g) in renewing, is deprived of any remedy for his rent by action of covenant, and no more than six years' rent can be recovered in an action for use and occupation.

A mortgagor in possession having granted a lease of the mortgaged premises for lives renewable for ever, the mortgagee purchased the equity of redemption, under a decree in a foreclosure suit, in the name of his trustee a large arrear of rent being due, and two of the cestuique vies in the tenant's lease having died, the landlord(h), availing himself of the legal estate outstanding in his trustee, brought his ejectment on the title, which was defeated by the tenant in consequence of an informality in the notice to quit. The landlord having served another notice to quit, the tenant exhibited his bill in the Exchequer for an injunction and renewal, and the Court being of opinion that the landlord had, by his acts, confirmed the lease, although the tenant had not complied with his undertaking to bring the arrear of rent into Court, and had defeated his landlord in the ejectment, a decree was pronounced for a renewal. It is, however, to be observed, that the renewal fine in this case was only a peppercorn, and the landlord insisted that the lease under which the tenant derived was invalid.

(d) Shenton v. Corbally, 1 Hogan, 403-423; Magrath v. Ld. Muskerry, 1 Ridg. P. C. 469-486; but see Lysaght v. Callanan, Hayes, 141; 4 Law Rec. 140, S. C.

(e) Watkins v. Lloyd, Hayes & Jones,

832.

(f) Fitzsimon v. Burton, Finlay on

Renewals, 284, 314, 322; M'Donnell v.
Burnett, 4 Irish Eq. Rep. 228.

(g) Shenton v. Corbally, 2 Moll. 547; 1 Hogan, 403-430.

(h) Lysaght v. Callanan, Hayes, 141; 4 Law Rec. 140, S. C.; and see Lord Doneraile v. Chartres, 1 Ridg. Parl. Ca. 129.

So a lessee for lives renewable fer ever, after the decease of all the cestuique vies, having disputed his landlord's title in the trial of an ejectment, it was decided in a suit for specific performance, that though such conduct(i) was wrong, yet as the tenant had not been required by notice to renew, he did not by such means forfeit his right of renewal.

17. The right to a renewal is often resisted on the ground that the tenant has acted fraudulently by encroaching upon bogs or commons, part of the lessor's estate, which were not included in the demise, or by committing waste, or by violating some express covenant sounding in damages. If a lease contain a condition of re-entry(j) for breach of covenant in not repairing, or insuring, or for not preserving the boundaries, or for committing waste, and the landlord re-enter for the breach of such covenant, a Court of Equity will not relieve against the forfeiture. The clause of re-entry in renewable leases is usually restricted to non-payment of rent; but as the covenant for renewal sometimes requires the previous observance of all the covenants, it has been contended, if the tenant violate, or disable himself from performing any such covenant, that a Court of Equity should not dispense with, or vary the contract of the parties, by decreeing a renewal.

An executory agreement for a lease will not be specifically executed, if it be shewn that the tenant has violated any express(k) stipulation in the contract under a lease for twenty-one years, with covenant of renewal for fourteen years, at the end of the original term, if not sooner determined by the acts or default of the lessee, and with a clause of re-entry for the non-observance of any of the covenants: upon the expiration of the original term, the lessor(1) brought an ejectment for a forfeiture incurred during the continuance of the term; and a bill for renewal was dismissed with costs, though it did not seek any relief against the forfeiture, but merely a specific performance of the covenant for renewal.

Neither the commission of waste, nor the violation of any express covenant sounding in damages, is treated by Courts of Equity in Ireland as affording sufficient grounds for refusing to compel specific performance of a covenant for renewal for ever. By lease made the 1st of June, 1748, Lord Arran demised premises containing 867 acres, at the yearly rent of £100, with covenant of renewal for ever, on payment of

() Wallace v. Patten, 1 Irish Eq. Rep. 338.

(j) Hill v. Barclay, 16 Ves. 402; 18 Ves. 56; Lovat v. Ld. Ranelagh, 3 Ves. & B. 24; White v. Warner, 2 Meriv. 459; Green v. Bridges, 4 Simons, 96.

(k) Boardman v. Mostyn, 6 Vesey, 467; Buckland v. Hall, 8 Vesey, 92; Gourlay v. The Duke of Somerset, 1 Ves. & B. 68-73; Lovat v. Lord Ranelagh, 3 Ves. & B. 24-29.

(Thompson v. Guyon, 5 Simons, 65.