Opinion of the Court.

prosecution under the latter, but that their provisions are cumulative, and attention is called to the case of State v. Veres, 75 Ohio St., 138, where it was held that the pendency of a bastardy proceeding instituted against the father of an illegitimate child is neither a bar to, nor ground for the abatement of, a prosecution under Section 13008 above. If the only purpose of this legislation were to declare the offense a crime and to punish the guilty father, there would be force in the contention that there could be no such bar to the criminal prosecution as is claimed herein. But it is provided by Section 13010, General Code, that a person convicted under Section 13008 may appear before the court in which the conviction took place, and enter into a bond to the State of Ohio in a sum fixed by the court not less than five hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, with approved sureties, conditioned that he will furnish the necessary and proper support for his child, and that sentence may thereupon be suspended. In the bastardy proceeding, when a compromise is effected, the accused must furnish a bond to the approval of the justice, under Section 12114, or when he is convicted upon trial in the common pleas court he must give security to the approval of the court, under Section 12123, both conditioned for the maintenance of his child. The law has thus expressly provided practically the same remedy to accomplish the same purpose under both acts.

Having established these two concurrent and identical means of protecting the state and the unfortunate child, by the authority and upon the

Opinion of the Court.

deliberate judgment of tribunals especially designated under the law for the particular purpose, we can see no reason why the exercise of one remedy, with its complete satisfaction, should not operate as a bar to the exercise of the other, or why a defendant under such such conditions should be harassed, and possibly persecuted, by the requirement of a double security, when he has fulfilled his obligation in the one instance and may be unable to do so in the other.

The view of the law which we have here taken was clearly foreshadowed by this court in its opinion in the recent case above cited. After discussing the provisions of the bastardy act and of Section 3140-2, Revised Statutes, now Section 13008, General Code, and the nature of the proceeding thereunder, Judge Crew draws a parallel between the purposes of the two acts, and states that they each provide a remedy for the enforcement of the same natural duty, that is, the support by the father of his illegitimate child. He then uses the following language: "And the remedies they afford for the enforcement of this duty being entirely consistent with each other, the rule is well settled that the satisfaction of one is the only bar to the prosecution of the other." State v. Veres, 75 Ohio St., 138, at page 143.

In the case at bar the record clearly shows that all the requirements of the bastardy act were complied with in the former proceeding, and that full and complete satisfaction thereof was made by the plaintiff in error. It follows, therefore, that this was a bar to the present proceeding, and that

Opinion of the Court.

plaintiff in error was entitled to be discharged. For this reason, also, the judgment of the common pleas court should be affirmed and that of the circuit court reversed.

Although this proceeding has been treated throughout as having been brought under Section 13008, General Code, there is a suggestion in the record that it was also brought under Section 12970, which provides a punishment for wilfully abandoning a minor child, or wilfully, unlawfully or negligently failing to furnish it necessary and proper food, clothing and shelter, jurisdiction of which offense is given to justices of the peace by Section 13423, General Code. Upon the assumption that the proceeding was and could properly be so brought, which is controverted by the plaintiff in error however, we are of the opinion that the settlement and satisfaction in the bastardy case above referred to, would also be a complete bar to a prosecution under said Section 12970, for the reasons hereinbefore given.

As the matters above decided finally dispose of the case, the other errors alleged are not considered.

The judgment of the circuit court will therefore be reversed and that of the common pleas affirmed, and it is so ordered.

Judgment reversed.

Davis, C. J., SHAUCK, JOHNSON and DONAHUE, JJ., concur.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

THE STATE, EX REL. WEINBERGER, A TAXPAYER, v. MILLER ET AL.

THE STATE, EX REL. FRITCH, V. THE Board of DEPUTY STATE SUPERVISORS OF ELECTIONS.

Election of judicial officers-By separate ballot-Act of general assembly, passed February 17, 1911—Is valid exercise of legislative power.

The act of the general assembly of the state of Ohio passed February 17, 1911 (102 Ohio Laws, 5), entitled: "An act to provide for the election of judicial officers by separate ballot," is a valid exercise of legislative power and not repugnant to the constitution of this state.

(No. 13666 and No. 13820-Decided October 3, 1912.)

ERROR to the Circuit Court of Cuyahoga county.

IN MANDAMUS.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

THE STATE, Ex rel. Wein BERGER, V. MILLER

ET AL.

Messrs. Hidy, Klein & Harris, for plaintiff in

error.

1. Said act is in violation of Section 2, Article V, Constitution of Ohio, requiring that all elections shall be by ballot.

The meaning of the word "ballot" as used in Section 2 of Article V, is not vague or uncertain. More than one hundred years of legislation and judicial interpretation have served to impart to the term both fixity and definiteness.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

In the Constitution of 1802 the provision was identical with that used in 1851. Section 2, Article IV, Constitution of 1802. Even at that early date the method of voting had been established. In proof of this see the act of December 9, 1800 (2 Laws N. W. Terr., 90), from which act it will be seen that prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1802, the operation of voting consisted in handing a single ticket to the judge of elections.

Immediately following the adoption of the constitution, the general assembly adopted the act of April 15, 1803 (Revised Laws of 1805, 334).

Section 13 thereof was re-enacted with slight changes in the various election laws passed by the general assembly from 1803 to 1851. Following the adoption of the Constitution of 1851 the general assembly passed an act regulating the election of city and county officers, being the act of May 3, 1852 (50 O. L., 313). Section 9 of that act reanpears as Section 2949, Revised Statutes of 1880, and Giauque's Revised Statutes.

From this legislation it is clearly apparent that during the entire period from the adoption of the Constitution of 1802 until the adoption of the Australian ballot law in 1891, the word "ballot" in its primary signification as used in the constitution meant a single ticket upon which appeared the names of all the officers for which the elector was entitled to vote, and that this primary meaning was placed beyond doubt by the action of the general assembly in applying the modifying adjective "single" so as to exclude the possibility of using a multiplicity of ballots.