select such instrumentalities as they may prefer for transportation uses is unimpaired. And apart from the enactments to secure justice and equality in transportation the numerous matters that precede and attend the business of engaging in commerce among the States, including the creation of the carriers, their corporate powers, the character of their cars, the precautions for safety, their depots for receiving and discharging traffic, and their business arrangements for continuous shipments of traffic, are left to the jurisdictions under which they have their origin.

The cautious legislation of Congress applies to the movements of commerce by the agencies described in the law, when the movement is not wholly within a State. The public concern is in the freedom and expedition of the movement and the reasonableness and equality of cost, and not in any particular agency over which the movement takes place. The act takes cognizance of carriers in their relations to the interstate business they engage in, and its great purpose is that the business shall be conducted justly and impartially, and that reasonable accommodations may at all times be afforded to the public. As was said, in substance, by the Supreme Court in the Express cases: The public interest is in the transportation, and not in the agencies by which it is secured, provided they are such as to insure reasonable promptitude and safety. (117 U. S. 24; 2 Morawetz on Car., sec. 1118.)

The duties of interstate carriers toward each other relate to the important public purposes the law has in view. The questions presented are properly considered, therefore, on the theory that the public interests are of primary concern, and that the private interests of carriers, or auxiliary agencies, are only important in the sense that the public may be reasonably and adequately served. The petitioner should show that the complaint involves more than a mere contention about a mode of establishing a through route or rate, and that the public interests are in some manner affected by, or concerned in the controversy.

Railroad carriers are, with few exceptions, creatures of State laws defining their powers and duties, and in the ab

sence of other authority, their sphere is within the State by which they are created. By congressional legislation many years ago State roads were authorized to connect with the roads of other States, and form continuous lines of transportation at through rates. The creation of such lines, and the basis on which they might be formed in respect to rates and interchanges of traffic, were left to the discretion of connecting roads. They might enter into arrangements with other lines or roads, and with such roads as they might deem expedient, or they were at liberty to decline. The continuous shipment and through rate were voluntary and not compulsory. A State road, however, when it engages in commerce among the States enters a field over which the General Government has jurisdiction, and must conform to the lawfully prescribed regulations for conducting that business. The Act to regulate commerce applies to common carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property by railroad, or by railroad and water when under a common control, management or arrangement, for a continuous carriage or shipment from one State or Territory to another, and such carriers are required according to their respective powers to afford all reasonable, proper and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines, and for the receiving, forwarding and delivering of passengers and property to and from their several lines to those connecting therewith, and are forbidden to discriminate in their rates and charges between such connecting lines.

The statute assumes the existence of connecting lines and of arrangements for continuous carriage or shipment, and directs its enactments to business of that character.

By act of Congress of June 15, 1866, incorporated in section 5258 of the United States Revised Statutes, it is enacted that "every railroad company in the United States whose road is operated by steam, its successors and assigns, is hereby authorized to carry upon and over its road, boats, bridges and ferries, all passengers, troops, Government supplies, mails, freight and property on their way from any State to another State, and to receive compensation therefor, and to connect with roads of other States so as to form continuous

lines for the transportation of the same to the place of destination." It was further enacted that this section shall not "be construed to authorize any railroad company to build any new road, or any connection with another road, without authority from the State in which such railroad or connection shall be proposed." The effect of this statute is to enable business connections between railroads of different States for interstate transportation, to be lawfully made, subject to the condition, however, that such connections should be formed by authority from the State in which they might be proposed to be made.

The statute referred to authorizes railroads of one State "to connect with roads of other States so as to form continuous lines for transportation" purposes. The Act to regulate commerce, as its title indicates, applies to the business of such lines when formed. It prescribes what was not contained in the former act, the rules and principles by which the business is to be governed and the public served. So much of these as apply to this case have been cited.

By these provisions a suitable junction of lines, for "the interchange of traffic between their respective lines," for which interchange all reasonable, proper and equal facilities must be afforded, is implied, for it is enacted that "this shall not be construed as requiring any such common carrier to give the use of its tracks or terminal facilities to another carrier engaged in like business." And the facilities required to be afforded must be reasonable and proper, not unreasonable or improper. The act, therefore, specifies certain limitations within which interchanges between different lines may of right be demanded.

The theory of the petitioner seems to be that the right to interchange traffic, and thus establish a continuous line, is unconditional, and that one carrier may approach with its tracks the road of another carrier, and if the facilities for interchanging, in the form of depots, yards, sidings, and employees, do not exist at the point of contact, they must be provided.

The defendant understands its obligation under the statute to be more limited, and these differences present the points of contention between the parties.

The first question that arises upon the merits of the case is whether the petitioner, The Kentucky and Indiana Bridge Company, is a common carrier to which the provisions of the act are made applicable. A bridge company is not per se a common carrier. It no more suggests the duties or functions of a common carrier than a turnpike company. The usual powers of a carrier may undoubtedly be granted to a bridge company, or, in the absence of constitutional restrictions, to a banking association, but they have not yet been conferred upon the petitioner in this case.

It has been decided that the owner of a toll-bridge is not a common carrier. Grigsby v. Chappell, 5 Rich., 443. Mere forwarders of goods, though combining the character of warehousemen, are not common carriers. Persons so employed, if they have no concern in the vehicle by which the goods are sent, and have no interest in the freight, are not liable as common carriers, but only for ordinary diligence. Angell on Cur., 68, 5 Ed.

Courts have held that a railroad which occasionally carries goods or freight in passenger trains is not a common carrier of goods in such trains. Elkins v. Boston and Maine R. R., 3 Fost., 275. And the same rule has been applied to a railroad which occasionally carries passengers in freight trains. Murch v. Concord R. R., 9 Fost., 9.

An individual may become a common carrier by simply engaging in the business and the rights, duties and liabilities. of a common carrier will apply to him by reason of his occupation. But a corporation having an artificial existence. created by law has only such rights and powers as are conferred by law, or necessarily incidental to its granted powers. It cannot lawfully engage in any other business than that authorized by law, and if it does so its acts are ultra vires. "The public are interested in restraining corporations to the enjoyment of the precise franchise granted and the exercise of the powers expressly conferred, and the incidental powers essential to the express power. Shareholders are also interested in keeping their trustees, the governing boards, within the limits of the delegated power with which they are

clothed." First Nat. Bank v. Ocean Nat. Bank, 60 N. Y. R. 294.

The powers of the petitioner conferred by its charter are cited in the statement of facts so far as they relate to the uses and purposes of its bridge and tracks. These powers are appropriate and ample for the legitimate functions of a bridge company, with the necessary approaches and track accommodations for railway connections, an improvement obviously of great importance and utility, but there are no provisions in the charter that indicate an intention to create a common carrier or to regulate its duties as a carrier. Its powers may be fully exercised within the sphere of a bridge company proper, and require apparently unwarranted implications to embrace those of a common carrier. In the articles of association of the bridge company the object and purpose of the company are stated to be to construct, own and operate a bridge from a point in the city of New Albany across the Ohio river to a point in the city of Louisville, for both railway and common roadway purposes, together with a causeway, as an extension of, and connection with, said bridge. It is reasonably clear from the provisions of its charter and its articles of association, that the petitioner was not chartered as a common carrier or railroad company, but to construct and maintain a bridge as a means of transit over the Ohio river, with the approaches thereto, and track connections with the railroads entering Louisville and New Albany, on either side of the river. The charter contains none of the provisions usually incorporated in railroad charters or expressed in general laws defining the duties and powers of a company as a carrier of passengers and property, and regulating its management or business. Consistently with the object of incorporation as a bridge company, with incidental facilities of connections with railways, it has no transportation equipment except five engines used for switching purposes, and ten passenger coaches for local transit over the river, and has leased the use of the bridge to the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company, with the right to haul all cars for through shipments over the bridge, and giving that