suppose that this determination might be manifest in some way which would be a good deal less destructive. But even if a cutting of rates below what it would be reasonable to charge were found to be necessary, there can be no excuse for a carrier making it a first resort; it should manifestly be resorted to only after other means of redress had been tried and had proved ineffectual.

But what is specially inexcusable, is the enlistment of the ticket brokers and of other outsiders in the war which is thus inaugurated. In all that has been said thus far about ticket brokers, only the most responsible portion of them is spoken of; the portion composing the American Ticket Brokers' Association. These persons, as has been said already, repel the appellation "scalper," and apply it themselves to irresponsible parties whom the Association will not receive as members. Whether this is for any other reason than the want of such pecuniary responsibility as will render it safe to do business with them, the Commission is not advised, nor for the purposes of this paper is it at all important. The factwhich is all we care to mention here is that besides the brokers who compose the Association, there are also less repntable scalpers and runners who all find their profit in the fray. Why is it that, when the managers can not come to an agreement by themselves, they enlist and subsidise all these parties, and give them standing and strength which enables them to prey upon the roads at other times, instead of calling in the chairman of some of the railroad associations, or some other party mutually trusted and relied upon, or, if a violation of law is supposed to have been committed, bringing it to the notice of the Commission or of the courts, is a question to which no one has attempted an answer. And why especially the roads should engage in the course of action above described, which is at once harmful to themselves and an evasion of the law, when a strict observance of the law in the making and publishing of rates would to a large extent have protected them, is equally unexplained. These are questions which are becoming of vital interest to the stockholders in the roads. The Commission has failed to obtain satisfactory answer to either of them.

It may be said in this case on behalf of the roads which met the supposed cut of the Wisconsin Central, that if the cut had not been met, it would have established in favor of that company the differential demanded. This excuse is plausible, and is perhaps as good an one as can be suggested for such a case. But it does not answer the objection that the cut is made as the first resort instead of the last, as, if made at all, it should be. Nor does it constitute a defense for resorting to the brokers instead of making the cut rate the open and published rate as it should be.

The Commissioners were not informed by any of the waring roads that they were pushed into the struggle by local interests. How such interests may operate to influence carriers engaged in such a warfare may be understood from the following telegram sent and received on December 10th.

"A. H. HANSON, Illinois Central Railway:

"SIOUX CITY, Dec. 10, 1888.

Reduced passenger rates still continue between Chicago and St. Paul; also between Omaha, Kansas City and Chicago. What is the matter with the Illinois Central? Are you willing to see all favors go to these other cities, and travel and business go to them while Sioux City is neglected? We cannot understand why you stand idly by under these circumstances."

The matter with the Illinois Central was that it was doing exactly what it ought to do when it thus stood "idly by," and declined to take part in a disreputable struggle. It was not responsible for the injury which any town might suffer by reason of the misconduct of others. It is no doubt the case, however, that local appeals like this are sometimes yielded to when they ought not to be. In fact, it requires some considerable firmness to resist them. The Illinois Central is to be commended for its resistance in this instance.

The sale of tickets at reduced rates through brokers while the regular rates are nominally sustained, almost necessarily results in a violation of the spirit, if not of the letter, of the Long and Short Haul Clause of the Act to regulate commerce. For some considerable time it must have been possible to buy tickets from Chicago to Minnesota cities at rates less than the open rates to some of the intermediate stations. If, during that time, there were any purchases of tickets at

the open rates to such intermediate stations, the Act was violated. If there were no such purchases, it must have beenbecause all who had occasion to make use of the tickets knew they could procure the through tickets for a less price, and went to the brokers and procured and used them. But it would be very remarkable if all persons who wanted such tickets were possessed of this knowledge and acted upon it; we may, indeed, fairly consider it incredible. Large classes of people who are steadily employed at regular labor, and who have little time for either reading or gossip, if they had occasion to make a journey would be altogether unlikely to know of these chances to obtain cut rates, and would buy their tickets at the regular offices, thus losing the benefit of the reductions which others, better informed, but also better able to pay, would obtain. This is a common result of rate wars; there is no equalizing the benefits of the reductions while they continue, and the parties who chiefly appropriate them are those having large interests in transportation, and others who habitually are on the lookout for special opportunities and advantages.

Two facts which the managers engaged in these transactions do not seem to have considered it may be well for them to give some attention to.

The first of these is, that by their conduct they are admitting that the price they consent to receive for their tickets from brokers and others is a fair price and a reasonable compensation for their services. If such transactions continue the Commission may feel obliged to take notice of and act upon this admission; and should the open rate be reduced in consequence, the difficulty in getting back to the old rates might be much more serious than it is when the roads make the reductions themselves.

The second is that they are at the same time creating a public opinion and belief that the regular open rates are higher than they ought to be. If the opinion is erroneous but nevertheless results in legislation injurious to the roads, the owners of stocks have their servants who have been put in charge of the roads to thank for it. It may be quite worth the while of the stockholders to consider whether it would

not be wise to insist that these servants shall give more attention to obeying the law and less to contrivances whereby they may evade it. The Act to regulate commerce is, on the whole, conservative and beneficial, and its most rigorous provisions cannot inflict upon the carriers subject to it so much mischief as the managers voluntarily bring upon them by resorting to the old abuses in these rate wars.

In view of the facts above stated, and of facts somewhat similar coming to the attention of the Commission from other parts of the country, the Commission feels constrained to recommend that the Act to regulate commerce be so amended

as

First, To define what shall be considered excursion and commutation tickets, and to so restrict their issue in interstate commerce as to prevent the abuses now so common.

Second, To prohibit all payment of commissions on the sale of tickets for the transportation of persons by railroad in interstate commerce, and all sale of such tickets except by the regular agents of the carriers.

Third, To require the carriers to provide for the speedy and convenient redemption of the whole or any parts or coupons of any ticket or tickets which they may have sold, as the purchaser for any reason has not used and does not desire to use, at a rate which shall be equal to the difference between the price paid for the whole ticket and the cost of a ticket between the points for which the proportion of said ticket was actually used.

The Commission also deem it proper in this connection to repeat what it has said in its second annual report, that the provision in the Act to regulate commerce against the sudden raising of rates without notice ought to be clearly made applicable to rates jointly made by two or more carriers, and that notice of intention to reduce any rate which any carrier subject to the Act makes or joins in making, ought to be required to be given a specified number of days before the reduction should have effect.

WILLIAM P. REND v. CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

Submitted October 22, 1888. Decided January 26, 1889.

Group rates may be properly made from a large number of mines composing a coal mining district extending across the State of Illinois, to points in Western Wisconsin, Minnesota and Dakota, the distance from each part of the group by some route being substantially a fair equivalent of the distance from other parts, and the commercial necessities being subtantially the same for all.

The group rate so established is properly extended to coal shipped to the same territory locally from Chicago, no lower rate being possible on account of the operation of the fourth section of the Act, some of the lines passing through the mining district en route from Chicago to the points of distribution.

Through rates by way of Chicago to the same territory from mines in the eastern part of the group are necessarily made the same with the group rates established on other routes from the same vicinity, and their discontinuance would simply leave the market open to the product of other Illinois mines at the same transportation charge.

Under the exceptional circumstances requiring such through rates, shippers locally from Chicago of Ohio and Pennsylvania coal cannot justly insist upon rates no higher than the division of such through rate which appertains to the lines running northwest from that city, the circumstances under which the through rate is made being such that it cannot be differently adjusted.

The question of relative injustice must be viewed upon broader grounds than a niere balancing of one rate against another. A reduction which will throw into confusion an adjustment of rates over a large section of country which are not claimed te be unreasonable of themselves, should not be required without a clear right thereto exists under some direct provision of the law.

A reduction of the rates on local shipments from Chicago to the proportion received by the northwestern lines upon the division of the through rates aforesaid, would involve either a general reduction from the entire group under the short haul clause of the law, or an abandonment by defendant of the through rates in question, neither of which would benefit complainant, while both would do great injury to all other interests. Under such circumstances the preference is not undue nor is the advantage complained of unreasonable.

Smith & Pence, for Complainant.

W. C. Goudy, for Defendant.

REPORT AND OPINION OF THE COMMISSION.

WALKER, Commissioner:

The complainant is a coal dealer who resides at Chicago and owns mines of soft coal in Ohio and Pennsylvania. He