INFLUENCE OF FAVORITISM SUBDUED.

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state who are found capable of managing the affairs of his government with the two Houses of Parliament. Which consideration imposes such a necessity upon the Crown as hath in a great measure subdued the influence of favoritism; insomuch that it is become no uncommon spectacle in this country to see men promoted by the King to the highest offices and richest preferments which he has in his power to bestow, who have been distinguished by their opposition to his personal inclinations."

In speaking of plans for "an equal or a reformed representation," he says (pp. 215, 216): "One conse quence, however, may be expected from these projects, namely, less flexibility to the influence of the Crown.' And since the diminution of this influence is the declared and perhaps the sole design of the various schemes that have been produced, whether for regu lating the elections, contracting the duration, or for purifying the constitution of Parliament by the exclusion of placemen and pensioners, it is obvious to remark that the more apt and natural as well as the more safe and quiet way of attaining the same end would be by a direct reduction of the patronage of the Crown, which might be effected to a certain extent without hazarding further consequences. Superfluous and exorbitant emoluments of office may not only be suppressed for the present, but provisions of law be devised which should for the future restrain within certain limits the number and value of the offices in the donation of the King. * * * It is the nature of power always to press upon the boundaries which confine it."*

* It is noteworthy that so profound a thinker as Dr. Paley should favor woman suffrage. Speaking of the right of representation, he says (p. 214): "We waive a controversy with those writers who insist upon

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PATRONAGE THE BOX OF PANDORA.

James Wilson, LL.D., one of the framers of the national Constitution,* and afterward an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, in the course of a lecture entitled a "Comparison of the Constitution of the United States with that of Great Britain," thus expatiates concerning the evils of patronage ("Lectures on Law," i, 446): "We are now arrived, in our progress, at another fountain, from which, in Great Brit ain, the waters of bitterness have plentifully flowedI mean the fountain of office. * * * Offices of trust and profit are scattered, with a lavish hand, among those by whom a return, very dangerous to the liberties of the nation, may be made, and from whom such a return is but too often expected. This is the box of Pandora, which has been opened on Britain. To its poisonous emanations have been owing the contaminated and contaminating scenes of venality, of prostitution, and corruption which have crowded and disgraced her political theater. To the same efficacy have been owing the indiscriminate profligacy and universal de- . generacy which have been diffused through every channel into which the treasures of the public have procured admission."

*

*

*

representation as a 'natural' right. We consider it so far only, as a right at all, as it conduces to public utility; that is, as it contributes to the establishment of good laws, or as it secures to the people the just administration of these laws. These effects depend upon the disposition and abilities of the national counselors. If this right be 'natural,' no doubt it must be equal, and the right, we may add, of one sex as well as of the other. Whereas every plan of representation that we have heard of begins by excluding the votes of women, thus cutting off, at a single stroke, one-half the public from a right which is asserted to be inherent in all; a right too, as some represent it, not only universal, but inalienable, and indefeasible, and imprescriptible.”

* Washington called Mr. Wilson "as able, candid, and honest a member as was in the Convention." (Bancroft's His. of the Const., ii, 241.)

JUSTICE WILSON'S CIVIL SERVICE RULES.

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In another lecture, entitled "Of Government" (i, 401-2), Justice Wilson lays down fundamental rules for guidance in appointments to office: "The appointment to offices is an important part of the executive authority. Much of the ease, much of the reputation, much of the energy, and much of the safety of the nation depends on judicious and impartial appointments. But are impartiality and fine discernment likely to predominate in a numerous executive body? In proportion to their own number will be the number of their friends, favorites, and dependents. An office is to be filled. A person nearly connected by some of the foregoing ties with one of those who are to vote in filling it, is named as a candidate. His patron is under no necessity to take any part, particularly responsible, in his appointment. He may appear even cold and indifferent on the occasion. But he possesses an advantage, the value of which is well understood in bodies of this kind. Every member who gives, on his account, a vote for his friend, will expect the return of a similar favor on the first convenient opportunity. In this manner a reciprocal intercourse of partiality, of interestedness, of favoritism, perhaps of venality, is established; and in no particular instance is there a practicability of tracing the poison to its source. Ignorant, vicious, and prostituted characters are introduced into office; and some of those who voted, and procured others to vote for them, are the first and loudest in expressing their astonishment that the door of admission was ever opened to men of their infamous description. *** Those who possess talents and virtues, which would reflect honor on office, will be reluctant to appear as candidates for appointments. If they should be brought into view, what weight will virtue, merit, and talents for office have in a balance held and poised by partiality, intrigue, and chicane?

"The person who nominates or makes appointments to office should be known. His own office, his own character, his own fortune should be responsible. He should be alike unfettered and unsheltered by counselors. No constitutional stalking-horse should be provided for him to conceal his turnings and windings, when they are too dark and too crooked to be exposed to public view. Instead of the dishonorable intercourse which I have already mentioned, an intercourse of a very different kind should be established-an intercourse of integrity and discernment on the part of the magistrate who appoints, and of gratitude and confidence on the part of the people who will receive the benefit of his appointments. Appointments made and sanctioned in this highly respectable manner will, like a fragrant and beneficent atmosphere, diffuse sweetness and gladness around those to whom they are given. Modest merit will be beckoned to in order to encourage her to come forward. Bare-faced impudence and unprincipled intrigue will receive repulse and disappointment, deservedly their portion."

CHAPTER VIII.

THE POWER OF REMOVAL.*

A remedy for its Mistakes and Abuses.-The Power discussed in the first Congress (1789).—The Decision then made criticised by Benton, Webster, and others.-The 4-Years' Term Law (note).

THE debate in the first Congress on the power to remove public officials was one of great interest and importance, and was besides very instructive. A bill was introduced in the House creating "The Depart

*On July 27, 1842, a Select Committee of the House, Garrett Davis chairman, reported as to "the cause, manner, and circumstances of the removal of Henry H. Sylvester, late a clerk in the Pension Office." It favored the repeal of the 4-years' law; also the giving of written reasons for removals, that the removed officer might have "an opportunity to arraign his superior for an abuse of power, both before the country and Congress." It denounced secret removals as unjust, impolitic, and immoral." "No removal should ever take place except when the public weal requires it." It further says (H. Repts. No. 945, 27th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. iv, p. 4): "Your committee know no portion of the American population which is more oppressed and enslaved in will aud spirit than the subordinates in the executive departments; none among whom there is more mental suffering, arising from a constant dread of being visited with the petty proscription of some small tyrant, clothed with (sic) a little brief authority,' by which they and their families are to be deprived of their support. It was the duty of Mr. Spencer * * * to have protected such a subordinate as Sylvester."

On page 6 of this powerful and most admirable report the committee says: "The practice of treating all the offices of this great government as 'the spoils of victory,' and, with the rise and fall of contending parties, the ejection of a large multitude of experienced, honest, and capable incumbents, to make room for needy mercenaries, who entered the political conflict without any principle or love of country, but impelled wholly by a hope of plunder, is the greatest and most threatening abuse that has ever invaded our system. It makes the President the great feuda

"AN INVIOLABLE RIGHT."

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ment of Foreign Affairs" (State Department), the Secretary of which was, in the words of the bill, "to be removable by the President of the United States."* The discussion was on striking out the last quoted word. The majority claimed that the President alone had the power of removal, while the minority claimed that the consent of the Senate was necessary; that is, in the case of officers confirmed by the Senate.

Judged by the light of nearly a century of experience, it is plain that both sides were partly right and partly wrong. The forefathers, who were legislating for less than four million of people, were constructing a political chart to guide and protect future generations, and it is not strange that they should have made a few mistakes. While it is clear, as pointed out by the majority, that the President should have tory of the nation, and all offices fiefs, whose tenure is suit and service to him. It is because all those fiefs are at his sovereign will, to be confirmed or granted anew after each presidential election, that the whole country is kept perpetually convulsed by that oft-recurring and allabsorbing event."

The report of the Morehead Committee on Retrenchment, made June 15, 1844, is chiefly devoted to the evils of executive patronage and the abuse of the power of removal. Speaking of the latter subject, the committee proclaims the following incontrovertible truth (S. Docs. No. 399, 28th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. vii, p. 31): "A citizen of the United States who accepts a public trust, however obscure his birth or humble his employment, has an inviolable right to be protected in the faithful discharge of his duties from the violence or the menaces of arbitrary power."

On page 55 the committee recommends the passage of a civil service law (the first of its kind, so far as I know, ever made in Congress), as follows: "That a law ought to be passed, prescribing regulations as regards the qualifications, the appointment of persons to office, *** and declaring the disqualifications or the reasons which will be considered in law sufficient to authorize the President, the heads of departments, and courts of law to suspend. dismiss, or remove persons from office." *The motion to establish the above and other Executive Departments was made originally by Mr. Boudinot, in a speech, on May 19, 1789.