augmented; that his military reputation is rendered more formidable by them, which I do. not attempt to deny; and that there is a probability that our late magnanimous allies will speedily be transformed into our litterest enemies-are these reasons sufficient to justify Britons to bend the knee, to truckle to a blood-stained bully, to fawn upon, and lick the gory hands of a crowned assassin? There is a being in this country (for I will not employ the term man or Englishman) there is a thing, who sits in the parlament of this country, which has had the baseness to advise a peace with our enemy, at the very moment when he is flushed with victory, and bloated ith pride; and when Great Britain, with untarnished laurels, is in a condition to redeem the one and o humble the other. This thing brews poison and mischief: it is right, thereore, to assign substantial reasons why we should turn aside with disgust from the 1oxious draughts which it presents to us.

I have already stated that, from the manner in which lord Castlereagh's plan for he increase of the public force has been discussed, the world might be led to think we were actually without any competent means of defence, and that we are really apprehensive of becoming soon a conquered people. All the daily papers that I have ead, announce their reports of the debates upon the subject under the following head, "Defence of the Country." Persons who are thus capable of misrepresenting he fact, and who do not blush at being instrumental in circulating such an infanous falsehood, ought to be tied to a whipping post, and severely chastised. I maintin, even according to the wretched reports of the parliamentary debates, that lord Castlereagh's plan is not intended as a defence of the country; on the contrary, its origin, means, and end, are all directed to OFFENSIVE MEASURES against the enemy. We have already more men under arms, for the purposes of defence, than we know what to do with; a truth which I pledge myself speedily to demonstrate. If the whole British army of regulars were at this moment out of the kingdom, the force remaining would, under proper management, be more than sufficient to destroy, utterly, the greatest force that can by any human possibility be landed upon our coasts. To assert, therefore, that the measures proposed by government, have in view the mere defence of the country, is as much as to say that the country was without adequate defence before, and that we are appalled at the menaces of the enemy. For this reason I have given the only proper title to the subject which I am about to discuss, reserving to another occasion, the observations which I have long since made upon the discipline and efficacious disposal of the defensive force which we already possess. Before we decide upon the merits of lord Castlereagh's bill, there are two points which we ought thoroughly to weigh in our minds :-first, whether it be our best policy, under our present relative circumstances, to act wholly upon the defensive? Or, secondly, whether it be prudent for us to prepare for offensive operations also? Since the French revolution, the only instance of a war, purely defensive, against the aggressions of the enemy, and which is entitled to the character of a war between two independent nations, was the struggle of the Hevetic confederacy for its independence. In the 19th number of my first volume, I presented my readers with an ample detail of the battles which were fought by the Swiss volunteers against the French regulars; and I pointed out the causes of the defeats and final overthrow of the former, and of the subsequent subversion of their independence as a people. There were several moral and political causes which led to that tearful and most distressing calamity. The moral consisted, principally, in the unguarded benevolence of the Swiss towards the French, who had taken refuge in the country-and who, carrying with them, out of their native hell, all the characteristic vices, intrigues, perfidy, ingratitude, and cupidity, inherent in the breast of every Frenchman, effectually undermined the simplicity, and corrupted the manners of Swisserland. These villains were the pioneers of revolution there, as they have shewn themselves to be in every country where they have obtained a footing. I do not want to be told, that the Swiss had degenerated from the sturdy virtues of their fathers: I have been twice in that country, and have lived long enough in it, each time, to have observed a very great alteration for the worse among the inhabitants. But, I maintain, that the introduction of so many French refugees, and refugee pretenders, accelerated and completed that depravity of morals to which I allude. The political causes consisted in those internal feuds and jealousies, which were the natural effects of this corrupted state. My po

sition refers to their military operations; and as they carried on a mere harmless de fensive war, the contest, though sanguinary, was short-lived, and Swisserland was harnessed to the yoke of France. But, had the governments and people of that country cordially coalesced, and had they acted with due precaution and spirit, when the French took possession of Erguel and the Munster-thal, their militia might have descended the Jura, and, penetrating without interruption into the department of Doubs, it might have carried havock, blood, and slaughter, in every part-have set Pontarlier in flames, and raised a perpetual barrier of desolation between Swisserland and France. By such a measure, the evils of a defensive war would, in some degree, have been mitigated, and Swisserland would have been free.

This circumstance, relative to Swisserland, is here recounted merely to serve as an argument against a defensive war; let us now examine the question as it applies to this country. If our condition be indeed so reduced as to render any attempt to make an impression upon the enemy a matter of risk and danger, then I am ready to admit, that lord Castlereagh's plan is inexpedient; because, as I have already observed, we have, at this time, a larger defensive force than is required for our internal safety. But, if it be granted that Great Britain has not yet put forth 1 twentieth part of her strength, that her resources qualify her to maintain, unimpaired, her power and independence; then it cannot be denied, that the plan in contempla tion is the best adapted to our circumstances. I should certainly have entertained a different opinion in the event of a war wholly defensive; but, as the evils attendant upon the defensive plan are generally admitted, and as it is evident that the present government intend to carry the war against the enemy with the greatest vigour, lord Castlereagh's plan appears to be the only expedient to which ministers could resort, without adopting the system of conscription. It is not built upon any whim. sical theories, or metaphysical abstractions, but upon practical expediency; and, therefore, it may justly be considered as the return of good sense and patriotic exer. tion to his majesty's councils. The bill was introduced by a manly disavowal of any wish to destroy the plans of the late administration from a principle of opposition; and it presents to us a simple and well-arranged military system, well calculated to preserve our national importance, and to secure the great objects for which we are at war. By the measure proposed, we shall, at once, introduce into the regular army 28,000 well-disciplined men, and by the ballot, the militia will always be maintained in the same flourishing state that we find it in at present. It is also highly gratifying to find, that lord, Castlereagh's plan is so advantageous, that it experienced scarcely any opposition in parliament. Even Mr. Windham, in his reply, did not attempt to oppose it, but confined himself to the defence of his own production, the training act. The precise object of the bill is, to allow 21,000 men to enlist from the English militia, and 7,000 from the Irish, to enlist into the regulars. In order to supply this reduction of the strength of these two bodies, as well as to provide for casualties; Ireland is to raise 8,000 fresh militia men, according to the usual method practised in that country, and Great Britain is to raise, by ballot, 36,000 men; so that the whole militia to be raised will amount to 44,000 men, leaving a surplus of 16,000 men to cover any deficiences, and to prevent the speedy recurrence to the ballot, besides filling up the draft of 28,000, from the militia of both countries.

By this measure, the ministry have not departed from the habitual usages of the country; nor have they introduced a scheme devoid of the advantages of experiment. There is an evident respect shewn to the principles of the constitution in this plan, though I cannot avoid observing, that, according to those principles, the government would have been warranted in resorting to a general conscription. To this system we may have occasion to recur at last; and they who are offended at the idea, because of its similarity to the military policy of France, do not reflect that the successes of France are, in a great degree, attributable to the enforcement of it. The difference, however, between the conscription in France, and a similar measure in England would be this: in France, the population are called out for the purposes of havock and depredation, and to promote the views of unjust ambition; In England, its object would be directed to the defence of laws, religion, property, and civil order. It is the duty of every member of society to take up arms in its defence whenever he may be called upon by the sovereign; and unrepealed acts of the British legislature autho

rise the practice. Besides, it is an obligation which he owes to his country for the protection which it affords to him: the pressing of seamen amounts, in its operation, to a conscription; and why the principle ought not to be extended to the military service I have not been able to obtain any satisfactory explanation. However, lord Castle reagh's bill will, unquestionably, answer the immediate object of augmenting our disposeable force, as well as of continuing the militia upon its present most respectable footing; and if the measure be followed up by a practical and simple method of discipline for the volunteers, the tempest of war may blow against this country from every quarter of the world, but, like a rock standing in the midst of a troubled sea, Great Britain will survive the storm, and enjoy a long and prosperous futurity.

DISPUTE WITH AMERICA.

A considerable sensation has been excited, in consequence of an engagement between the Leopard and the Chesapeak, an American frigate. The history of this transaction is not yet exactly known, but, from the different accounts, it appears that several British seamen having deserted from our service, and having been ineffectually reclaimed by our officers, admiral Berkeley issued an order, authorizing any of his majesty's ships of war to search the particular vessel, on board of which the deserters had taken refuge. When the intelligence of this affair first reached England, it afforded the Moining Chronicle with abundant scope for several learned dissertations relative to the right of searching ships of war, which that paper strongly condemned, and, of course, it pronounced a heavy censure upon the British captain who executed the orders of his commanding officer. The American newspapers had a priority of information over the British journals, and, as might be expected from the Trans-Atlantic politicians, their details were a mere collection of falsehoods, circu-* lated expressly to provoke the resentment of their fellow-citizens against this country. All the English journalists, in the interest of the American merchants, re-echoed the complaints of their brethren in America; and it is only within a few days that light has been thrown upon the whole business. If my readers will refer to the order of admiral Berkeley, commander in chief upon the N. American station, which will be found amongst the state papers, in my next, he will perceive that this affair originated in principles directly the reverse of those stated in the Morning Chronicle. I have subjoined to that order the resolutions passed at New York, to shew the contrast between British temperance and American phrenzy. According to admiral Berkeley's order, the deserters from our ships were openly paraded in the streets of Norfolk, in sight of their officers, under the American flag protected by the magistrates of the town, and the recruiting officer belonging to the Chesapeak frigate, who refused to give them up, although demanded by his majesty's consul, as well as the captains of the ships from which the men had deserted.

Now I should be glad to be informed by the learned civilian, who is the author of the articles in the Morning Chronicle, in defence of the conduct of the Americans, what violation of public law appears upon the face of this transaction? The permission to search for deserters was reciprocat; and our admiral authorized the captains of his squadron to accede to any demand which might be made by the Americans to search our vessels for deserters from their service. There is nothing imperious of novel in this understanding; as it is the usage with nations on terms of amity with each other. With respect of all the resolutions and invectives showered upon this nation by the inhabitants of some of the towns in America, they scarcely deserve our notice, as every one knows the blustering and inflammable character of the politicians of the United States. In their representations of the conduct of the British comman der, they employ every abusive epithet, and paint him as an assassin and a pirate. Nevertheless, from the testimony of one of their own papers, the Charlestown Courier, of the 3d of July, the circumstance which led to the attack upon the Ameri◄ can vessel is described in such terms as to justify the conduct of the British officer, and to place the agents of the American government in a situation of the most weighty responsibility; for to them alone ought to be imputed the blood that has been spilt upon the occasion. It says, "In the month of March, the Halifax sloop of war, commanded by lord Townshend, was lying in Hampton roads, and one of her boats, with four men and a petty officer, was sent on some duty. Being out of the

reach of the guns of the Halifax, or being unobserved, the men rose upon the officer, and once threatened to throw him overboard; this, however, they did not do, but pulled for the shore, which they reached, and proceeded for this place, where they entered with an officer then engaged in the enlistment of men for the Chesapeak. A formal demand was made to have them delivered up. The civil authority refused to interfere, and the officer who had enlisted them did not think himself authorized to beliver them without orders from his superiours. The case was represented, we believe, at Washington, but what passed there on the subject we know not. The men were not delivered up, and were believed to be on board the Chesapeak. We are confident that a representation of the case was made to the British government, whose orders, we apprehend, were to take the men wherever they were to be found. Qur readers will be informed that the Leopard arrived here only a few days since, and brought the orders of the admiral at Halifax, to take the men atal! events, and under any circumstancs.

" It may be objected, that there has not been time to hear from England since the circumstance respecting the Halifax occurred, which we think was about the 9th or 10th of March, but we know that answers to letters written to London as late as the 20th of March have been received here."

From this statement it is clear, that not only the civil but the military authorities of the United States treated the moderate and just demands of our officers in the most contemptuous manner; and left no other alternative to the British admiral than the employment of force, to assert our national rights. The officers of the two nations having acted in conformity with instructions which they had previously received, they are not in the least implicated in the propriety or impropriety of the transaction. It is a point which the respective governments must settle between themselves. But, it will not be difficult to justify the conduct of our officers upon the broad principles. of the law of nations. Though the case was not strictly foreseen by the writers upon public law, yet the general maxims which they have promulgated for the intercourse of nations in amity, warrant the inference, that no nation has a right to detain the subjects of another, engaged in the service of the state, when actually reclaimed by the agents of the power from whom they deserted. Grotius and Vattel admit, that persons may quit their native country, and settle in another; but they argue strongly against the propriety of such a measure, when their country is engaged in hostilities, and requires the service of all its members. The reasoning, therefore, applies with tenfold force, when we consider that the men, who took refuge on board of the Chesapeak, did not relinquish their country in a civil capacity, but actually deserted their duty as military servants, who had received the pay of the public for the express purpose of defending its interests. Their desertion could not affect the right of Great Britain to reclaim them and as the principle was admitted by the American government itself, it became its duty to comply with the request of our officers, and its refusal was a violation of that friendship which subsisted between the two countries. Upon the whole, justice is on our side; and I entertain no doubt that the legislature of the United States, when they come to investigate the whole merits of the proceeding, will be sensible of the truth. At all events, Great Britain must not swerve from her principles. The Americans will bluster, but they will not fight. War would be as obviously their ruin, as the continuance of peace with Great Britain would tend to the promotion of their prosperity. We ought not, therefore, to be intimidated, or even discouraged, by the menaces of tumultuary bodies, whose hasty resolutions have been framed in a passion, and carried by acclamation; but we should make up our minds, that a nation which resigns a particle of its just rights, at the urgent request of a power which desires to take advantage of its ap parent difficulties, must soon expect, and, indeed, it will deserve, to forfeit them."

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THEORY OF MONEY, Continued. -OF FREE PAPER MONEY.

By free paper money, is to be understood, that paper money which is issued by individuals, or public bodies, at the request and desire of the people of a country themselves, in order to supply the deficiency of a circulating medium in that country; and for which the issuers receive, at the time, an equal value, not on perishable commodities, or in unconvertible funds, but in funds again convertible into the medium, at a short, distant, and fixed period,"

In former times, when a man became a merchant, he required a capital fully equivalent to the trade he was to carry on, and when he had laid out that capital in the purchase of articles, he had to wait until he met with a person, who not only wanted these articles, but had a capital sufficient to pay for them. When credit was introduced, then a purchaser got three or four months to pay in, but, as he had to give as long a time when he sold, his receipts would not meet his payments any more than formerly, and, consequently, he required capital as much as ever. When sales upon credit, however, became general, to establish the debt, and to prevent any dispute as to the terms, bills were taken for the amount. A bill may be defined, "a written obligation to pay a certain sum, or certain proportion of the standard unit of the country, at a distant period therein specified." Bills were found so useful and necessary, that a summary mode of procedure, in recovering payment of them, was established by law; being thus a legal voucher of debt, and easily transferred, it became usual for the holders of bills, that they might be enabled to go to market again sooner than they otherwise could, to apply to their friends, to advance them the amount in cash, and to take these bills in security: at length, people of capital commenced a regular trade of giving cash for them, upon deducting the discount; for a long time gold coin continued to be given in exchange for these bills, and to be received for them when due, until the demand became, in consequence of the extended trade and commerce of the country, too great for the capitals of the dealers, and they were obliged to refuse many. At length it occurred to them to say: "We will give you, in return for these bills, our own promissory notes for a small proportion of the standard unit of the country, which will pass for a circulating medium, and when the bill shall become due, we will take these promissory notes back in payment." This appears to have been the legitimate foundation of banking, and of the issuing of bank notes as a circulating medium; and it is the only mode that can be followed, to ensure either safety to the public, or advantage to the individual: tried by, the three rules laid down, it will be found perfectly correct, and conform thereto; for it is only at the desire of the public, that the notes are originally issued, the issue alwayɛ receives security for them, which he retains in his hands until the notes are retired; and he is always ready to give that security for them.

The bank notes employed in the circulation of Great Britain, whether they be those of the bank of England, bank of Ireland, Scotch chartered banks, or private banks, rauk indisputably under the head of free paper money, and may be quoted as examps thereof: this must be evident to every one the least acquainted with the mode universally adhered to in the issuing of these notes; but as some objections have been of late years started in regard to bank of England notes, in consequence of that bank having been freed from the absurd bondage of being obliged to give gold for their notes whenever demanded, which gave ignorant people occasion to say, that the public were forced to take the notes of that bank, and had no means of checking the quantity issued, or obliging the bank to withdraw them when once in the circle; it may be necessary to show, that bank of England notes are really free paper money, and that these objections have no solid foundation, but may truly be called frivolous and vexatious. Mr. Wenthrop, deputy governor of the bank of England, in his examination before the select committee of the House of Commons, in March 1804, declared positively, "That that bank Lever issues its paper, but for a valuable consideration, or what it deems to be such, in the way of discounting bills or advancing on exchequer bills;"-that is to say, upon application from a banker or merchant, the bank gives notes for a bill due in London, or for an exchequer bill granted by government; the first payable within two months, the other generally within nine; if, therefore, the bank issue notes only in this way, it must be evident that the quantity issued will depend entirely upon the demand from the holders of these bills, which will never be more than the actual circulation of the country requires; and the notes can only continue out until these bills become due, when they will return back to the bank in payment; so that if the bank were to stop making fresh advances of notes, in two months the greatest part, and by the end of nine the whole, of those in the circle would be returned to the bank. But, say the writers on this subject, the bank makes advances to government, and government forces the creditors of the state to take these notes in payments. That the bank occasionally makes advances to