the nation, if a piddling system had not been obtruded into our councils! or if the commanding genius of a Pitt had then presided over our affairs! But, as Mr. Burke has truly remarked, it is not enough, in a situation of trust of the commonwealth, that a man means well to his country; it is not enough, that, in his single person, he never did an evil act, but always voted according to his conscience, and even harangued against every design, which he apprehended to be prejudicial to his country. This innoxious and ineffectual character, that seems formed upon a plan of apology and disculpation, falls miserably short of the mark of public duty: that duty demands and requires that what is right should not only be made known, but made prevalent; that what is evil should not only be detected, but defeated. When the public man omits to put himself in a situation of doing his duty with effect, it is an omission that frustrates the purposes of his trust, almost as much as if he had formally betrayed it. It is surely no very rational account of a man's life that he has always acted right, but has taken special care to act in such a manner that his endeavours could not possibly be productive of any consequence.

Having thus reminded the public of the dangers which they have once escaped, during the short interval of a peace with the present master of France; having proved that we were unable to secure to ourselves the advantages of peace, while the continent presented a barrier against the enterprizes of French ambition, it will be worth our while to consider, in a few words, whether, when this barrier is removed, there be any ground for believing that the enemy would relax in those pretensions which he had now obtained additional means of enforcing?

We hear of no other language, at present, in France, except of the freedom of the seas, while immediate death is sure to overtake the man who dares to whisper a syllable in favour of the freedom of the land. The same pretences are employed by the French government, for the purpose of acquiring the absolute sovereignty by sea, which they have successfully made use of to obtain that ascendancy by land which they now enjoy. Their advances have always been made under the guise of liberty and equality, but as soon as they have established their power, the deluded inhabitants of every subjugated or betrayed country have experienced, that power in the hands of Frenchmen is only another name for the exercise of the most wanton oppression and rapacity. Hence, the maritime states have no reason to expect, that the supreme jurisdiction of France at sea, will be more just and more lenient than the dispensations of her authority on shore. If we suppose for a moment, that Buonaparte should succeed in his attempts to wrest from us, either by force or treaty, our maritime rights, it would then follow as the inevitable consequence of his success, that his despotism over the sea would rival his tyranny over the continental states; and, as there would exist no power capable of controuling, or of disputing his will the whole civilized world would be at his disposal. Notwithstanding, therefore, the jealousies which some of the maritime states entertain respecting our maritime dominion, I do not think, that they will rashly stifle their own sense of self preservation, in order to gratify the ambition of Buonaparte. A short-sighted selfishness, and the temptation of a share in the pillage of feeble states, may mislead the judgment of the greater powers for a while; but their better reason will return, especially when they perceive us clothed in all our national terrors, and resolved to perish rather than to abandon those rights, which are the pillars of our social edifice. Manifestoes and threats in abundance may be drawn from the stores of the imbecile; but no state which regards its own interest and safety will heartily concur in a scheme which would render Buonaparte the absolute lord of the creation. In other times, and und different circumstances, those powers might avail themselves of the difficulties by which we are surrounded, to extort concessions in their own favour; but their own existence is so essentially dependant upon the existence of a power somewhere, which is capable of restricting the ambition of Buonaparte, of occupying his restless ini. d, and of convincing him that he is not yet omnipotent, that we need be under no apprehension of any great increase of his means of annoying us, by the aid of their co-operation. However, it has happened that nations, like individuals, have not understood their true interests, and that, influenced by prejudices and passions, they have embarked in projects, the nature and probable effects of which they have not sufficiently contemplated. What has happened before may happen again; and we may see, in a few months, an hostile confederacy framed for the avowed purpose of resto ring "the freedom of the seas," or, in more comprehensible language, of reducing

the maritime power of Great Britain, and of transferring the trident to France, the only power which ca wield it in our stead. The probability of such an event, while it calls forth the atmost vigour and exertion on our part, ought by no means to inspire us with alarm; for the interests and objects of such a confederacy must be so much at variance, that it will necessarily be short lived; and its dissolution may be productive of consequences which may yet rescue Europe itself from bondage.

If we do not look manfully at this gathering storm, if we be not resolved to encounter it vigorously with the means we possess of dispersing it, we have no other alternative than to conclude a peace, in which, by way of mitigating the severity of our humiliation, it will be stipulated by Buonaparte that we shall retain, until it suits his convenience, but not one moment longer, a nominal ascendancy at sea. He will permit us, because it is his interest so to do, to exist a little longer: but as soon as he shall be ready to execute upon us the awful and final sentence of extermination, he will again throw down the gauntlet of defiance; and, though we should not be deficient in courage, we should want the ability to take it up. If we make a peace with him at present, we must restore some of his colonies without any equivalent for ourselves; consequently, without obtaining any other security for its faithful observance than the word of a perjured and vindictive hypocrite, by whom we have been before deceived. It is idle to allege, that although we might not acquire for ourselves any security, yet that we should gain its equivalent, by persuading him to relax his authority over the continental states. No doubt he is ready to treat upon these terms; for he knows well, that what he may give to-day, he can take back to-morrow. But the independence of the British empire must not be allowed to totter upon so precarious a basis; nor ought we to consent, or rather to propose, as we did at Amiens, to forego our national interests for the sake of pretended friends, whose counsels are perpetually fluctuating, whose fortitude cannot be depended upon, whose public spirit is venal, and whose politics are low, sordid, and cowardly. Allies we have none. * We have a solitary ally indeed, whose greatness of spirit, whose unbending constancy, and inflexible fidelity to the public cause, appears, in this pusillanimous and degenerate age, so unaccountable, that when I contrast his conduct with that of the other and more powerful sovereigns of Europe, I should be induced to think, if I did not believe that Divine Providence, while chastising a wicked world, raises up occasionally a pattern of human excellence, to render virtue more sublime and inviting, that his exalted public spirit was the result of confirmed insanity. We are bound by every principle of honour and moral obligation to assist in extricating the king of Sweden, from his perilous situation, or in defending him to the last extremity. Besides this sovereign, we have no ally whose safety demands our interference in his behalf. It is evident, therefore, that we are now contending upon British ground, in support of British principles and interests only. Conscious of this truth, we ought to keep unceasingly before our eyes the objects for which we are struggling. Consequently, we ought, upon no account, to embark in any project which does not contribute to the accomplishment of the end, and though the means which the necessity of our circumstances require that we should exert against the enemy, may fall with severity upon those whom we feel no disposition to injure, yet, the motives of self-preservation must predominate over every other feeling. Henceforward, not one British guinea, nor one drop of British blood, should be expended, except for the promotion of British interests; no conquests should be made which will not serve to consolidate those interests; and we should adopt the policy of Buonaparte, never to cede an acre of ground unless the cession of it contributes to strengthen what we retain, or will procure us thrice its value, in point of power and political importance. This is the road that leads to a secure and honourable peace.

OUR RELATIONS WITH AMERICA.

As his majesty's message very prudently abstains from a particular reference to our dispute with America, I do not think it altogether decorous to offer any speculations upon the subject itself; but I shall confine myself to a few general observations, which may serve to exercise our minds until we are called upon to pronounce a definitive judgment upon the question of peace or war, and which have suggested themselves to my mind from the tone and manner with which the discussion has been conducted on this side of the Atlantic.

* Portugal may be considered rather as a dependency than as an ally.

With respect of the fiery paragraphs which appear in the American journals, I' do not think that they ought to be considered as the real voice of the people of the United States. It is to their legislative body we must look for a true expression of the national opinion. The inhabitants of Norfolk, and other sea-port towns, have shewn great irritation, but this appears to be the result more of momentary passion than of sobriety of action, and, therefore, their bravadoes ought not to be received as grounds whereon we should govern our behaviour towards America. By compar ing the proclamation of Mr. Jefferson with admiral Berkeley's order, it appears, that the dispute rests upon the proof of a particular fact, namely, whether the seamen claimed by our officer were bonâ fide deserters from our service? The admiral insists that they were, and that they were also British subjects. Mr. Jefferson, on the other hand, without denying that they were deserters, asserts, that it had been previously ascertained, that the scamen demanded were natives of the United States." Upon this both parties are at issue, and the point to be tried is a matter of fact, and not of law. It is possible, however, that the president may have drawn a distinction without a difference; for these men may have been deserters from our service and yet be natives of America. In this case, our admiral had a right to reclaim them, The only case which will bear Mr. Jefferson through his proclamation is, the possibility that the men, though natives of America, had been pressed into our service. If it should appear that this was the fact, that it had been previously ascertained, and duly communicated to our officer, at the time when he reclaimed them; in such case, I must confess that I cannot discover any authority deducible from the received law of nations, which justifies the attack upon the American ship of war. But, on the other hand, if the men were British subjects, or, if being natives of America, they had voluntarily entered into our service, thereby forfeiting, for a time, their rights, as American citizens, and had afterwards deserted, I feel no hesitation in asserting, that justice is on our side, and that we had a right to enforce it when denied to us.

From this statement of the case it is evident, that we must first find the fact, and then apply the law: but until the fact be ascertained, we ought not to speculate upon the probable advantages we shall derive from war, lest mankind should be led to infer, that our conduct is influenced more by avarice than by a sense of national injury. No two assertions can be more at variance than those contained in our admiral's order, and the president's proclamation. There is no mystery to be unravelled, no collusion to detect. If the evidence should prove in our favour, the question of right will remain to be settled between the two governments, when the president of the United States will have an opportunity of adducing those other abuses of the laws of hospitality, of which he complains. But, whatever may be the result, should the final arbitration of the difference be vested in the sword, let us, for God's sake, have only to encounter falsehood, injustice, and fraud.

cle

These reflections are not thrown out with the least intention to diminish the force of what has been advanced in a former number, respecting the necessity of upholding the maritime rights of this country, nor can such a construction be given to them. I repeat, once more, that our existence, as a nation, depends upon those rights, and therefore no sacrifices, no exertions, can be too great in their support. But, surely, it will not be affirmed, that we ought to go to war with a state in order to compel it to acknowledge these rights, when, by a dignified mode of conduct, we may secure our object by pacific explanations. Since the publication of my last artiupon this subject, I have discovered that there is a body of men in this country who would gladly see the ravages of war extended to America, solely because they, individually, would be gainers thereby. If the dispute with America did not hinge upon a great principle, I should feel inclined to plead for peace, upon no other account than the wish of such characters to foment a war. I have no reverence for that morality which reduces war to the level of a mercantile staple, and piques itself upon feeding the sordid avarice of a few speculators, at the expense of the inte grity, the justice, and the blood and treasures of a whole people. Neither do I entertain a better opinion of any war which is not strictly national, and which does not originate in just principles for the attainment or security of public good. It is but a poor apology for war to say that it is sure to be successful, and that it must end in the ruin of the commerce of our weaker and unwarlike enemy. What benefit will England

m

the maritime power of Great Britain, and of transferring the trident to France, the only power which ca wield it in our stead. The probability of such an event, while it calls forth the atmost vigour and exertion on our part, ought by no means to inspire us with alarm; for the interests and objects of such a confederacy must be so much at variance, that it will necessarily be short lived; and its dissolution may be productive of consequences which may yet rescue Europe itself from bondage.

*

If we do not look manfully at this gathering storm, if we be not resolved to en counter it vigorously with the means we possess of dispersing it, we have no other alternative than to conclude a peace, in which, by way of mitigating the severity of our humiliation, it will be stipulated by Buonaparte that we shall retain, until it suits his convenience, but not one moment longer, a nominal ascendancy at sea. He will permit us, because it is his interest so to do, to exist a little longer: but as soon as he shall be ready to execute upon us the awful and final sentence of extermination, he will again throw down the gauntlet of defiance; and, though we should not be deficient in courage, we should want the ability to take it up. If we make a peace with him at present, we must restore some of his colonies without any equivalent for ourselves; consequently, without obtaining any other security for its faithful observance than the word of a perjured and vindictive hypocrite, by whom we have been before deceived. It is idle to allege, that although we might not acquire for ourselves any security, yet that we should gain its equivalent, by persuading him to relax his authority over the continental states. No doubt he is ready to treat upon these terms; for he knows well, that what he may give to-day, he can take back to-morrow. But the independence of the British empire must not be allowed to totter upon so precarious a basis; nor ought we to consent, or rather to propose, as we did at Amiens, to forego our national interests for the sake of pretended friends, whose counsels are perpetually fluctuating, whose fortitude cannot be depended upon, whose public spirit is venal, and whose politics are low, sordid, and cowardly. Allies we have none. We have a solitary ally indeed, whose greatness of spirit, whose unbending constancy, and inflexible fidelity to the public cause, appears, in this pusillanimous and degenerate age, so unaccountable, that when I contrast his conduct with that of the other and more powerful sovereigns of Europe, I should be induced to think, if I did not believe that Divine Providence, while chastising a wicked world, raises up occasionally a pattern of human excellence, to render virtue more sublime and inviting, that his exalted public spirit was the result of confirmed insanity. We are bound by every principle of honour and moral obligation to assist in extrica ting the king of Sweden, from his perilous situation, or in defending him to the last extremity. Besides this sovereign, we have no ally whose safety demands our interference in his behalf. It is evident, therefore, that we are now contending upon British ground, in support of British principles and interests only. Conscious of this truth, we ought to keep unceasingly before our eyes the objects for which we are struggling. Consequently, we ought, upon no account, to embark in any project which does not contribute to the accomplishment of the end, and though the means which the necessity of our circumstances require that we should exert against the enemy, may fall with severity upon those whom we feel no disposition to injure, yet, the motives of self-preservation must predominate over every other feeling. Henceforward, not one British guinea, nor one drop of British blood, should be expended, except for the promotion of British interests; no conquests should be made which will not serve to consolidate those interests; and we should adopt the policy of Buonaparte, never to cede an acre of ground unless the cession of it contributes to strengthen what we retain, or will procure us thrice its value, in point of power and political importance. This is the road that leads to a secure and honourable peace.

OUR RELATIONS WITH AMERICA.

As his majesty's message very prudently abstains from a particular reference to our dispute with America, I do not think it altogether decorous to offer any speculations upon the subject itself; but I shall confine myself to a few general observations, which may serve to exercise our minds until we are called upon to pronounce a definitive judgment upon the question of peace or war, and which have suggested themselves to my mind from the tone and manner with which the discussion has been conducted on this side of the Atlantic.

* Portugal may be considered rather as a dependency than as an ally.

With respect of the fiery paragraphs which appear in the American journals, I' do not think that they ought to be considered as the real voice of the people of the United States. It is to their legislative body we must look for a true expression of the national opinion. The inhabitants of Norfolk, and other sea-port towns, have shewn great irritation, but this appears to be the result more of momentary passion than of sobriety of action, and, therefore, their bravadoes ought not to be received as grounds whereon we should govern our behaviour towards America. By compar ing the proclamation of Mr. Jefferson with admiral Berkeley's order, it appears, that the dispute rests upon the proof of a particular fact, namely, whether the seamen claimed by our officer were bonâ fide deserters from our service? The admiral insists that they were, and that they were also British subjects. Mr. Jefferson, on the other hand, without denying that they were deserters, asserts, that "it had been previously ascertained, that the scamen demanded were natives of the United States." Upon this both parties are at issue, and the point to be tried is a matter of fact, and not of law. It is possible, however, that the president may have drawn a distinction without a difference; for these men may have been deserters from our service and yet be natives of America. In this case, our admiral had a right to reclaim them. The only case which will bear Mr. Jefferson through his proclamation is, the possibility that the men, though natives of America, had been pressed into our service. it should appear that this was the fact, that it had been previously ascertained, and duly communicated to our officer, at the time when he reclaimed them; in such case, I must confess that I cannot discover any authority deducible from the received law of nations, which justifies the attack upon the American ship of war. But, on the other hand, if the men were British subjects, or, if being natives of America, they had voluntarily entered into our service, thereby forfeiting, for a time, their rights, as American citizens, and had afterwards deserted, I feel no hesitation in asserting, that justice is on our side, and that we had a right to enforce it when denied to us.

If

From this statement of the case it is evident, that we must first find the fact, and then apply the law: but until the fact be ascertained, we ought not to speculate upon the probable advantages we shall derive from war, lest mankind should be led to infer, that our conduct is influenced more by avarice than by a sense of national injury. No two assertions can be more at variance than those contained in our admiral's order, and the president's proclamation. There is no mystery to be unravelled, no collusion to detect. If the evidence should prove in our favour, the question of right will remain to be settled between the two governments, when the president of the United States will have an opportunity of adducing those other abuses of the laws of hospitality, of which he complains. But, whatever may be the result, should the final arbitration of the difference be vested in the sword, let us, for God's sake, have only to encounter falsehood, injustice, and fraud.

cle

These reflections are not thrown out with the least intention to diminish the force of what has been advanced in a former number, respecting the necessity of upholding the maritime rights of this country, nor can such a construction be given to them. I repeat, once more, that our existence, as a nation, depends upon those rights, and therefore no sacrifices, no exertions, can be too great in their support. But, surely, it will not be affirmed, that we ought to go to war with a state in order to compel it to acknowledge these rights, when, by a dignified mode of conduct, we may secure our object by pacific explanations. Since the publication of my last artiupon this subject, I have discovered that there is a body of men in this country who would gladly see the ravages of war extended to America, solely because they, individually, would be gainers thereby. If the dispute with America did not hinge upon a great principle, I should feel inclined to plead for peace, upon no other account than the wish of such characters to foment a war. I have no reverence for that morality which reduces war to the level of a mercantile staple, and piques itself upon feeding the sordid avarice of a few speculators, at the expense of the inte grity, the justice, and the blood and treasures of a whole people. Neither do I entertain a better opinion of any war which is not strictly national, and which does not origináte in just principles for the attainment or security of public good. It is but a poor' apology for war to say that it is sure to be successful, and that it must end in the ruin of the commerce of our weaker and unwarlike enemy. What benefit will England