to promote whatever might tend to overthrow the ancient oppressive government, to conciliate the affections of the natives, to smooth our way to their esteem, and to secure a firm and indissoluble connection of friendship and commerce between the two nations. Such was my plan. It was termed revolutionary, and so it was; but what then? I appeal to the aching hearts and eyes of every Briton, after all that has passed before us during the last two years, and more especially after the late deplorable calamity we have sustained in South America, whether, if some such plan had been pursued, the lives of multitudes of brave fellows would not have been saved?-Whether the meditated injury of our forced exclusion from the ports of Europe would not have recoiled upon the continental tyrant, and our commerce have taken a direction which, as I stated in the printed article alluded to, "might change entirely the fate of the world?" I never pretended to deny that the project was a revolutionary one on the contrary, I explained its necessity, and justified it. When we capture an island, is not the act in itself revolutionary?-Do we not transfer the whole power of the former government into our own hands, and treat the conquered people as our own subjects? True, but then it is said, we always resign such conquests into the hands of their former masters, so that they must be regarded as a mere exercise of the rights of war, occasioning a temporary derangement; besides, when, under our dominion, the conquered are always allowed the exercise of their own religion, laws, and customs. To this I answer, that I acknowledge, with regret, that it has too long been our favourite system to conquer islands, in order to give them up, in an improved state, at the termination of our wars; but though the term revolution be offensive, on account of the horrible excesses and abuses perpetrated under its name, yet I feel no difficulty in stating, that a revolution in South America, upon, the plan which I have submitted, would bear no analogy to that which has so justly provoked the horror of every feeling mind. In the first place, every one must admit, that by the laws of war, we had the right, if we possessed the power, to conquer South America, and to retain it as a component part of the British dominions. If such an event had taken place, the old government would have been removed, and a British one substituted in its stead: the people would certainly have been allowed the same unmolested exercise of their religion, and the same enjoyment of their institutions and property, as the inhabitants of the conquered province of Canada, and the colonists of Trinidad. In short, every thing would have remained upon its original footing, with the exception of the supreme government, and such modifications of the ancient system as the exercise of British government might have required. Although such a change might have been qualified by the name of a conquest, justifiable by the laws of nations, I maintain that it would have been, in effect, as complete a revolution in principle as any brought about by France, though the means, the effects, and the object, would have been essentially different. For such a conquest would have gone, in the first instance, to demolish the grand fundamental principle of allegiance on which all government is upholden, and, secondly, it would have compelled a vast population to acknowledge their subjection to a race of heretics, whom they would rather devote to hell flames than even their former oppressive masters of their own religious faith. I am aware of the distinction which has been ingeniously, and, according to the old honest code of ethics, justly drawn, between the duty of allegiance, and the power of protection. Public moralists have said, that these are correlative terms, and that, when the protective power is incapable of resisting a foreign enemy, the obligation or allegiance may be legitimately withdrawn, and transferred to the conqueror. If they had said, that the obligation was suspended by an insurmountable necessity, and not abrogated altogether, they would have come nearer to the truth; for patriotism itself would cease to be the first of public virtues, if its generative principle were to be thus rendered dependent upon chance. This doctrine should therefore be received with great modifica tions. Hence it is obvious, that if our arms had effected the conquest of South America, a revolution must have been effected, of the most important nature, though it would not have been accompanied by those profanations of justice which have disgraced the French, and debased human nature whithersoever they have gone. But, if the effects of such a change would have been as extensive as those I have mentioned, surely it will be allowed, that the plan of rendering Spanish America independent of the Spanish government in Europe, would be much more innocent and laudable in its principle, and less repugnant to the feelings of the people whose cause we should have espoused. For, in such a case, the obligatory principle of allegiance would not have been transferred to s rangers, nor would any religious prejudice have been affected by subjection to a government professing a different religion. We should have gone to South America, with a thorough understanding of the dispositions of its inhabitants, which would have been previously obtained by means of the penetrating emissaries whom we should have sent to explore the country; we should have committed no violence on public or private property, and the collected public treasures which had been destined for the use of the mother country, should have been generously secured for the new government under our protection, to furnish itself with the means of creating the elements of government, of consolidating its power, and of making itself respected by the people governed, as well as feared, by its enemies. The application of this property to such a purpose, through our recommendation and agency, would have been compensated to us an hundred fold by the cordiality with which the new state would have opened its ports to our commerce and manufactures. Whatever form of government this South American community might have adopted, whether the republican or the monarchial, would have been a matter of perfect indifference to us, so long as religion, social order, and property, were protected by its new government, and its policy wholly severed from French and Spanish influence. That such a change in the condition of the people would have been acceptable to them, and easily effected through our co-operation, no one can doubt, who has at all reflected upon the terrible revolts which have frequently broken out in South America, against the extortion and tyranny of the Spanish agents, and upon the natural feelings of mixed races of people, bowed down with the sense of their common bondage. How gloriously sublime would such a beneficial dispensation of public felicity have appeared, when contrasted with the ill-shapen and haggard phantoms of nations which crawl and hiss with hellish yells around the monstrous circumference of France. How would such a change, or revolution, have impressed the world with an awe for the invigorating principles of wisdom over the discipline of selfishness! Then, in the plenitude of national glory and goodness, mankind would have been convinced which of the two great conflicting powers was most worthy to be the protector of communities too weak to defend themselves-France, whose inordinate lust of power, marches with terror in its van, and desolation in its rear, inbruting, wherever it moves, the moral energies and comforts of human nature, and casting a darksome and indiscriminate shade over every salutary institution which has been the work and adiniration of ages; or Great Britain, which incessantly invokes a trembling world to assert its freedom, to beat its chains over the head of its oppressor, and to emancipate the wretched wherever her victorious banner is triumphant over the arms of despotism. If we revert to the conduct of France towards every nation which she has conquered or cajoled, we shall find her always maintaining the same tons of affected humanity, but persevering in the same undeviating career of iniquity: yet, it is on her character for moderation, mildness, and justice, that she builds her pretensions to direct the affairs of Europe. Within the short space of twelve years, her government has inflicted greater calamities on mankind than can be traced through the whole course of her previous history. Wherever she has gone, her protection has been mercenary, and she hath converted finance into a system of calamity: she hath raised her glory on vice; she hath illustrated it by falling on the innocent and defenceless, without a pretext of self-preservation, and while the idle, the profligate, and the abandoned, have conspired to promote her cause, her unblushing villanies have united against her every honest man in every country upon the face of the habi table globe. We have striven to evoke the spirit of resistance from the corrupt cell in which it had been entombed, against the brutal intrepidity of one man, who sacrifices the interests of millions of human beings to his personal ambition; and having failed, more than once, in our virtuous motive, we ought, long ago, before he had it in his power to approach our shores with a storm of war, in which the fragments of Europe were gathered and pointed against us, to have resorted to the boldest measures, and to have omitted no means to circumscribe a power so perniciously exerted. For this purpose, no blow could have fallen upon him with greater severity than the emancipation of Spanish America, which, while under the yoke of Spain, enabled him to squeeze from his unwarlike ally, a perennial supply of the sinews of war. But the blow should have been struck at the government whose remote subjects we meant to estrange from it, and not at the people themselves, whom we meant to rescue from the yoke of oppression, and whose lasting friendship we ought to have cultivated. : I trust that I have thus sufficiently vindicated the principle of that revolution which I proposed, and shewn its dissimilarity from those revolutions which have been accomplished by France, amidst scenes of anarchy and bloodshed: whence I hope to be exempted from the imputation of being a revolutionist, in the modern acceptation of the word. I have also stated the plan which I submitted to the govern ment in the year 1803, the main points of which I afterwards published. In that tract, I observed, after having animadverted on the boasted scheme of excluding us from the continent, that "if it be tamely permitted by the powers of Europe, who have the means of preventing it, our conmerce must take another direction; and if we be shut out from the continent, we must shut him (Buonaparte) out from the rest of the world. The means are assuredly in our power the same bold spirit of commercial adventure which transported our merchants to the remotest regions, in search of new sources of industry; the same patient and steady habits of enterprize which wafted us to glory and prosperity, will yet explore mines hitherto unknown, or little known by the modern world. This consideration upon which we have already ven tured an opinion, is as worthy of philosophical thought, as of mercantile calculation. At present, it will suffice to observe, that if Great Britain lost an empire in North America, she may gain a more productive one in the South, without burthening herself with the charge, anxiety, and expense of a government. In furnishing to the wants of the people of those Southern regions, whose communications with their metropolitan countries would be cut off by their acquisition of a national independence through our means, we are very doubtful whether the demand for our manufactures would not greatly exceed the loss of the balance of trade with all Europe. Such an event would change the face of the world; and while it would give new life and animation to our commerce, it would provide the most ample means for resisting or annoying our natural enemy to the end of time. France, commanding or influencing the greater part of Europe, yet paralyzed in her commercial undertakings, knowing not how to begin, or whither to direct her views, will rot upon her estate, like the proprietor of a vast tract, who wants the skill and industry to cultivate it. Britain, on the other hand, will circumnavigate the globe in triumph, carrying the blessings of arts and civilization, and the comforts of life among unfrequented nations, and return laden with the treasures honourably and fairly acquired, of their native productions. France will tyrannize, in the midst of ruins, over polished communities, which she treats as barbarians; Great Bri tain will fructify the germs of civilization, and make half-civilized nations, the instruments of their own happiness, as well as tributaries of an empire, capable of dispensing liberty and independence to every people worthy to possess them. Such will be the first fruits of commercial exclusion, &c." Then, after having expatiated on the advantages of a vast colonial commerce of this discription, (my readers will not forget that this paper was drawn up and printed at the com mencement of the present war) I proceeded thus: "By this time, it will be seen on what points our eyes should be fixed; and that Spain will afford us some security of her resolution to be neutral, or I trust ministers will strike the first blow. The "nature" of her compact with France, to use the Gallic jargon upon another occasion, ought to make us suspicious of her future conduct. The insinuations of the first Consul, the secret understanding between those two governments, and the official threat that we are to be shut out from the continent, make it extremely probable, that a rupture with Spain, will be one of the conse quences of this war. On a former occasion, the French court persuaded the cabinet of Madrid to involve itself in a war with this country, and * In the year 1762. * added that, "if governed by any principles, his Catholic majesty, consulting only his greatness, would have spoken from himself, and as became bis dignity!" The conduct of lord Chatham, upon that occasion, is worthy of imitation. It did not escape his discernment, that the intentions of Spain were by no means equivocal; he accordingly declared in council, that we ought, from prudence as well as spirit, to secure to ourselves the first blow; that, if any war could provide its resources, it must be a war with Spain; that her supplies lay at a distance, and might be easily intercepted, as we were masters of the sea; that her flota, or American plate fleet, on which she had great dependence, was not yet arrived, and that the taking of it would at once strengthen our hands, and disable hers. "Such a bold, but necessary step," he added, “would be a lesson to all Europe, how dangerous it was to presume to dictate in the affairs of Great Britain. We must not allow them a moment to breathe; self-preservation bids us crush them, before they can combine or recollect themselves." This transcendant dignity of sentiment, so far exceeding the comprehension of ordinary minds, appeared in the form of shocking violence, or wild extravagance, to the majority of the council. The event, however, proved its wisdom, though his lordship had previously carried the seals of office to the king." + ** With respect of my supplementary advice upon the same subject, I beg to refer the readers of this review to the papers I wrote in the year 1804, which excited the fury of factious writers, who falsely imputed them to lord Harrowby, in whose able hands, I am sure, the arguments had they been conformably to his own seutiments, would have appeared in a far more luminous and convincing light; and to the twelfth number of the second volume of this Review, under the title of "sir Home Popham," in which, after fully investigating the circumstances of his trial, and the evidences offered, I recapitulated, and enforced in a few words, the plans which, for the last five years, I had continually recommended to the attention of the British government. I shall here repeat two or three of the principal passages in it, and then proceed to the remaining part of this discussion. "I believe no person ever entertained the romantic idea of bringing the continent of Spanish America under the dominion of the crown of Great Britain; but there is nothing irrational or improbable, in the facility with which an adequate British force might effect an eternal separation between that continent and Old Spain. By an adequate force, I mean a force sufficient to disarm all those who are dependent upon the existence of Spain and her American Settlements, and who may be considered as an entirely distinct race of men from the Spanish creoles. No force that we can send, from this country, will be found equal to the task of subjugating Spanish America; but a comparatively small force would suffice to separate it from the mother country. to guaranty its independence, and to secure to the commercial interests of the British empire, a free, permanent, and uninterrupted communication with it. This was evidently the motive of General Miranda's expedition, and it must be allowed, that no man is more capable of making a just estimate of the disposition of the inhabi tants, and of the best means of effecting this great change in the moral and political state of Spanish America. Sir Home Popham's expedition may be considered as the first step towards the accomplishment of Spanish American independence; and if the present ministers (rest assured gentle reader that this was written in the age of torment, during the reign of" All the Talents") " had dispatched a competent force to overawe the agents of the mother country there, and had invited the people to separate themselves from its dominion, we might now have enjoyed the exclusive commerce of Spanish America." After the perusal of these extracts, from opinions which I have promulgated at * These points I marked in italics, because the Plate fleet had not arrived at the time I printed the paper, and therefore I hoped to stimulate the ardour of govern ment. + This historical analogy to our times, I introduced to prove that my proposal was not revolutionary, and was countenanced by one of the greatest patriots of modern ages. But ministers were not so fond of carrying their seals of office to the various times, and while we were under different circumstances, the reader must allow that there is a perfect coincidence between them, that they had been duly considered, and that I have a claim "to something like prophetic strain." The passages have not been introduced here, with a view of triumphing over the public disasters, but merely to prove my right to criticize now with severity, when every salutary measure I had so often recommended, long before the expedition to Buenos Ayres was undertaken, has been avoided. I fear the opportunity of estab-lishing the independence of Spanish America, through our means, is gone for ever: at all events, Great Britain must be now convinced that it cannot be accomplished by force of arms. But as I am not given to despair, I would even now cherish the hope, that by a more conciliatory policy, our tarnished honour may be redeemed. Let the first storm of passion pass away; and then, the present ministers might avail themselves of a favourable opportunity to wipe off the transgressions of their predecessors; and, as they are no participators in the disgrace which has befallen us, they may yet send out peaceful agents to reconcile the Creoles to the British name and character, and to smooth the way to a future mutual, and friendly effort, to cast off from the shoulders of that unhappy race, the tyrannical yoke of a rapacious, ignorant, and besotted government. Having entered largely into the nature, means, and object of our sending an expedition to Spanish America, but little remains to be said, and that must be confined to the last melancholy scene of the drama. I have already exposed, in preceding numbers, the unpardonable conduct of the late ministry, in neglecting to send a competent force to sustain the footing which we had already acquired at Buenos Ayres. To this delay we must ascribe the subsequent misfortunes of our army, since it is certain that the Spaniards, (I mean the agents of Old Spain,) finding that no additional force arrived to co-operate with the body of troops under general Beresford, must have concluded that the expedition was a mere military enterprize, or momentary adventure, I am borne out in this inference, from several passages in the correspondence between the royal Audiencia of Buenos Ayres, and admiral Stirling, and general Auchmuty, which shall appear when we can find room for it. This negligence, therefore, we must consider as the cause of the exertion, which occasioned the surrender of general Beresford, and as one of the causes that led to that resolute resistance which termi nated in the capitulation of general Whitelocke. The delay in sending reinforcements, afforded the Spaniards sufficient time to take their measures, to exert their authority over the natives, to prejudice their minds against us, and to acquire a little discipline; it is therefore another cause of our disasters. The next cause may be traced in the pitiful force which was sent; a force which was compelled to carry Monte Video by storm, for want of powder; which circumstance alone was enough to inspire the Creoles with a distrust of our power being adequate to crown with success any effort they might make to co-operate with us, and to inspire the Spaniards with greater confidence in themselves, and contempt for us. Next, after Monte Video had been taken, no attempt was made to enlighten the Natives respecting our views, no invitations to independence were held out to them, no promises of large reinforcements actually on their passage, no efforts to create and foster divisions between the Spaniards and Creoles, no sort of encouragement whatever were either made or given. Lastly, but the most glaring cause of all, we may ascribe our misfortune at the grand attack upon Buenos Ayres, to the injudicious selection of officers who had been accustomed to treat with levity and derision the efforts of what they termed, "an armed rabble of volunteers." Officers influenced by such a mode of reasoning were the most likely to rush on with an overweening confidence in their military superiority; it was to be expected that they would march without artillery to the assault of a city, every street of which, according to their own account of it, was a fortification, containing ramparts lined with cannon, ditches, and chevaux-de-frize, for in no other way can I interpret the meaning of, "the streets being intersected by deep ditches, in the inside of which," (the outside upon the innermost line of the ditch I presume,) were planted cannon, pouring showers of grape on the advancing columns;" and, "the doors being barricadoed in so strong a manner, as to render them almost impossible to force." It was to be expected that they would advance into a town so fortified, as if they were on their return from a review, and going to their different barracks unloaded, and in co |