were particularly valuable; he made a circuitous march, and arrived in rear of the batteries by dawn of day; be captured and completely destroyed them, and fired several rounds into the town from their own guns; he then sent the guns, with twelve camels, and a considerable number of tents, across the river. The enemy receiving reinforcements, the major retired, and effected this service in equally good style, although under fire from the enemy, he re-embarked the whole of his detachment in the best order, and had only four men wounded. I have particularly to state, that much of the good fortune which attended this enterprize may be attributed to captain Hallowell; by his exertions a sufficiency of small craft were discovered under water, were raised, and, during the dark of the night of the 15th, were so well prepared, that nearly the whole of the detachment was conveyed from shore to shore at one turn. Twenty-five armed fellahs, who formed part of a large body detached against us from Cairo, were yesterday captured near El Hamet. They had killed their own chief, and were wandering near our post, more with a view to plunder than of hostility. Nothing of moment has this day occurred. The general report of the approach of the mamelukes, with which I have been favoured by you, and which I find confirmed by the emissaries that I send out, (some of whom state that they are at Jerrana, and others, that they are at Algam) induce me to persevere in my present system of attack. We have done great damage to the town, and have not thrown less than three hundred shells from mortars alone. The indifference, however, of the enemy to the miseries which are unavoidably caused to the inhabitants, is manifest. Although his force be not said to exceed three hundred cavalry, eight hundred Albanians, and one thousand armed inhabitants, yet, from the extent, and the peculiar nature of his lines of defence, to attempt an assault is decidedly not an adviseable measure. Our success will depend on the arrival of the mamelukes; in conjunction with whom, a force may be immediately thrown on the opposite side of the Nile; the doing this at present is impossible. Our enemy is strong in cavalry, we have none; and the Delta is peculiarly calculated for that force. In the mean time the post of Hamet becomes of greater value, as our friends are expected to approach; every effort shall be made to retain it. I have the honour to inclose a list of the killed, wounded, and missing to this day, inclusive; and I have the satisfaction to add, that the greater number of those who are wounded are only slight cases. I have the honour to be, &c. To Major General Fraser, c. (Signed) W. STEWART, Brig. Gen. Return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the army serving against Rosetta, from the 6th to the 18th of April, inclusive, 1807. Staff-1 brigadier-general, 1 brigade-major, wounded. Light Infantry Battalion -2 rank and file killed; 1 lieutenant, 2 serjeants, 11 rank and file wounded, 35th regiment-1 rank and file killed; 1 captain, 3 serjeants, 25 rank and file wounded. 78th regiment-1 rank and file killed; 17 rank and file wounded. De Rolle's regiment-1 serjeant, 1 rank and file killed; 7 serjeants, 4 rank and file, wounded. 20th Dragoons-2 rank and file, 5 horses, wounded. Total-1 serjeant, 5 rank and file, killed; 1 brigadier-general, 1 brigade-major, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 6 serjeants, 60 rank and file, 5 horses, wounded.-Name of officers wounded-Brigadier-general the hon. William Stewart, commanding; lieutenant Richard Cust, of the 1st battalion 35th regiment, brigade major; captain Judderel, of the 2d battalion 35 regiment, since dead, lieutenant Hemsworth, of the 31st light infantry battalion. SIR, (Signed) J. STEWART, capt and major of brigade. Camp, Eastern Heights, Alexandria, April 15, 1807. I have the honour of reporting to you, that I yesterday returned to this position with the remains of the army lately under my command. The events which have attended the service on which that army has been engaged, have been of a peculiar nature, and the result has been as peculiarly unfortunate. I feel it therefore to be incumbent upon me, in justification of my own conduct, and in justice to those brave men who have been my companions in arms, to intrude upon your attention a more than or dinary detail of our proceedings. I had the honour of stating in my last, that the expectation of the junction of the stipulations of that engagement, and under the acknowledged interpretation of the law of nations. Under these circumstances, the British government might justly have required from the house of Mohammed Ally, not merely the exact and rigid observation of the treaty of 1792, but a zealous and cordial attachment to the spirit of an engage ment, under which the nabobs of the Carnatic had found the most ample protection, accompanied by the most indulgent and liberal construction of every stipulation favourable to their separate interests, and by the most lenient relaxation of those penal articles, the obligation of which their highnesses had respectively incurred, by violating the article of the treaty of 1792, respecting the grant of tuncaws, or assignments of revenue, on the districts pledged to the Company. It is with the deepest concern, that the governor in council is compelled to declare, that those ancient allies of the Company, the nabobs Mohammed Ally and Omdut ul Omrah, have heen found not only deficient in every active duty of the alliance, but unfaithful to its fundamental principles, and untrue to its vital spirit. In the full enjoyment of the most abundant proofs of the moderation, indulgence, and good faith of the honourable Company, the nabob Mohammed Ally, and the nabob Omdat ul Omrah, actually commenced and maintained, a secret intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun, the determined enemy of the British name, founded on prin ciples, and directed to objects utterly subversive of the alliance between the nabob of the Carnatic, and the Company; and equally incompatible with the security of the British power in the peninsula of India. After the fall of Seringapatam, the British government obtained possession of the original records of Tippoo Sultaun: the correspondence of that prince's embassadors, during their residence at Fort St. George, in attendance on his sons, the hostage princes, in the years 1792 and 1793, established sufficient ground of apprehension, that their highnesses, the late nabob Mohammed Ally, and the late nabob Omdut ul Omrah, had entered into a secret intercourse with the late Tippoo Sultaun, of a nature hostile to the British interests in India. The enquiries of the British govern ment have been since directed to ascertain a fact so intimately connected with the security of its interests in the Carnatic. The result has established the following propositions, by a series of connected written and oral testimony. First. At the very period of time when the nabob Mohammed Ally appealed to the generosity of the British government, for an indulgent modification of the treaty of 1787, his highness had already commenced a secret negociation for the establishment of an intimate intercourse with the nabob Tippoo Sultaun, without the knowledge of the British government, and for purposes evidently repugnant to its security and honour. Second. The nabob Omdat ul Omrah, (who was empowered by the nabob Mohammed Ally to negociate the treaty of 1792, with the British government, and who actually negociated that treaty for himself, and for his father) was actually, employed at the same period of time, under his father's authority, in negociating for himself, and for his father, the terms of the said separate and secret intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun. Third. The tendency of the said intercourse was directed to the support of Tippoo Sultaun, in victory and triumph over all his enemies. Fourth. In the month of December, 1792, the Nabob Mohammed Ally imparted. secret imformation to Tippoo Sultaun, regarding the sentiments and intentions of the British government in India, with relation to the hostile views and negociations of Tippoo Sultaun, with the courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, and on the first intelligence of the war between Great Britain and France, in the year 1793, the nabob Mohammed Ally imparted secret information to Tippoo Sultaun, respecting the views and power of France in India, and in Europe, and respecting the intended operations of the British forces, against the French possessions in the Carnatic. And the nabob. Mohammed Ally conveyed to Tippoo Sultaun secret admonitions and friendly advice, respecting the most favourable season, and the most propitious state of circumstances, iolation of Tippoo Sultaun's engagements with the honourable Company. nabob Omdut ul Omrah was employed by his father, as one of the convey secret intelligence, friendly admonition, and seasonable advice to Sultaun, through the confidential agents of Tippoo Sultaun, who were fur nished with instructions from the said Sultaun of Mysore, to receive such communica→ tions from the said nabob of the Carnatic, and from the nabob Omdut ul Omrah. Sixth. A cypher was composed, and actually introduced into the separate and secret correspondence between the nabobs Mohammed Ally and Tippoo Sultaun. The original key of the said cypher, discovered among the records of Seringapatam, is in the hand-writing of the confidential moonshee, (or secretary) of the nabob Mohammed Ally, and of the nabob Cmdut ul Omiah; and the said cypher was delivered, by a confidential agent of the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, to the ambassador of Tippoo Sultaun, for the express purpose of being transmitted to Tippoo Sultaun. Seventh. The terms employed in the said cypher, particularly those intended to designate the British government, and its allies, the Nizam, and the Mahratta state, united in a defensive league against Tippoo Sultaun, contain the most powerful internal evidence that the communications proposed to be disguised by the said cypher were of the most hostile tendency to the interest and objects of the said alliance, and calculated to promote the cause of Tippoo Sultaun, in opposition to that of the said allies. Eighth. The nabob Omdut ul Omrah, under his own hand-writing, in the month of August, 1794, corroborated the evidence of his intention to complete the purposes herein described, of the secret intercourse, which he had negociated with Tippoo Sultaun, and the continuance of the same intention is manifested by a letter from the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, and from his confidential agent, addressed to the supposed agent of Tippoo Sultaun, in the year 1796, sul sequently to the nabob Omdut ul Omrah's accession to the government of the Carnatic, under the treaty of 1792. Ninth. At the commencement, and during the progress of the late just, necessary, and glorious war with the late Tippoo Sultaun, the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, to the utmost extent of his means and power, pursued the objects of his secret intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun, by a systematic course of deception, with respect to the provision of the funds necessary to enable the British troops to march into Mysore, as well as by a systematic and active opposition to the supply and movement of the állied army, through different parts of the said Nabob's dominions. Tenth. The stipulations contained in the fifteenth article of the treaty of 1787, and in the tenth article of the treaty of 1792, by which the Nabob of the Carnatic was bound not to enter into any political negociations or correspondence with any European or native power or state, without the consent of the government of Fort St. George, or of the Company, formed a fundamental condition of the alliance between the said nabob and the Company; and the violation of the said stipulations necessarily involved the entire forfeiture, on the part of the nabob, of all the benefits of the said alliance. Eleventh. The nabob Mohammed Ally, and the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, have violated the said stipulations; and have thereby forfeited all the benefits of the said alliance; and the nabob Mohammed Ally, and the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, having violated the said stipulations, for the express purpose of establishing an union of interests with Tippoo Sultaun, thereby placed themselves in the condition of PUBLIC ENEMIES to the British government in India. It is manifest, therefore, that the intentions of the nabobs Mohammed Ally, and Omdut ul Omrah, have been uniformly, and without interruption, hostile to the British power in India, and that those intentions have been carried into effect to the full extent of the actual power possessed by their highnesses, respectively, at the several periods of time in which they have acted, in pursuance of their system of cooperation with the enemy. By acting on these principles of conduct, the nabobs Mohammed Ally, and Omdut ul Omrah, have not only violated the rights of the Company, but, by uniting their interests with those of the most implacable enemy of the British empire, te nabobs, Mohammed Ally and Omdut ul Omral, have actually placed themselves in the relation of public enemies to the British government, dangerous to the extent of their respective power, and active according to the means and opportunities afforded to them, by the circumstances of the moment, and especially by the most severe exigency and pressure of war. Every principle, therefore, of public law, release the British government from the intended obligations of the treaty of 1702; and every consideration of self-defence and security, authorise the Company to excrtise its power in the manner most expedient for the purpose of frustrating the hostile councils of the late nabob of the Carnatic, modelled upon the artful example, actuated by the faithless spirit, and sanctioned by the testamentary voice of his father. In proceeding to exercise this right, it was painful to the British government to be compelled to expose to the world all these humiliating proofs of the ingratitude and treachery of the nabobs Mahommed Ally and Omdut ul Omrah, towards that power, which has uniformly proved their guardian and protector; and in acting from the impression of this sentiment, the British government was more desirous of consulting its own dignity, than of admitting any claims on the part of those infatuated princes to its generosity and forbearance. In conformity to this spirit of temperance and moderation, it was the intention of the British government to have made a formal communication to the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, of the proofs which had been obtained of his highness's breach of the alliance, with the view of obtaining, by the most lenient means, satisfaction for the injury sustained by the British government, and security against the future operation of the hostile councils of the nabob Omdut ul Omrah. Circumstances of expediency, connected with the general interests and policy of the British government, interrupted the communication of this document to the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, the intermediate illness of his highness protracted the execution of that intention, and his subsequent death frustrated the wish of the British government to obtain from that prince satisfactory security for the rights pledged to the Company in the Carnatic. The death of the nabob Omdut ul Omrah has not affected the rights acquired by the British government under the discovery of his breach of the alliance. Whatever claim the reputed son of the nabob Omdut ul Omrah may be supposed to possess to the Company's support of his pretensions to the government of the Carnatic, on the death of his highness, is founded on the ground of the rights of Omdut ul Omrah himself: the right of Omdut ul Omrah to the assistance of the Company, in securing his succession to the nabob Mohammed Ally in the government of the Carnatic, was founded on the express stipulations of the treaty of 1792. The result of the propositions stated in this declaration has established abundant proof, that the fundamental principles of the alliance between the Company and the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, as well as the express letter of the treaty of 1792, had been absolutely violated and rendered of no effect by the nabobs Mohammed Ally and Omdut ul Omrah, previously to the ostensible conclusion of that instrument. It is manifest, therefore, that the nabob Omdut ul Omrah could derive no rights from the formal ratification of that treaty, the vital spirit of which had already been annihilated by the hostile and faithless conduct of his highness; and, that the nabobs Mohammed Ally and Omdut ul Omrah, by forming an intimate union of interests with Tippoo Sultaun, had actually, placed themselves in the relation of public enemies to the British empire in India. Whatever claim to the Company's protection and support the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah may derive from his supposed father, had been utterly destroyed by the hostile conduct of Omdut ul Omrah; it follows, therefore, that the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah has succeeded to the condition of his father, which condition was that of a public enemy; and, consequently, that at the death of Omdut ul Omrah, the British government remained at liberty to exercise its rights, founded on the faithless policy of its ally, in whatever manner might be deemed most conducive to the immediate safety, and to the general interests of the Company in the Carnatic. Before the British government proceeded to exercise this right, founded on the viola. tion of the alliance, and on the necessity of self-defence, it was desirous of manifest ing its attention to the long-established connection between the Company and the house of Omdut ul Omrah, by sacrificing to the sentiments of national magnanimity and generosity, the resentment created by his highness's flagrant breach of the alliance. In the spirit of those councils, therefore, with which it had been the intention of the British government to demand satisfaction and security from the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, and to avoid the publication of facts so humiliating to the family of that prince, the British government communicated to the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah knowledge of the proofs now existing in the possession of the government at Fort St, George, of the violation of the alliance; at the same time the British government HAL manifested a consistent adherence to the principles of moderation and forbearance, by opening a latitude to the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah to afford, by means of an amicable adjustment, that satisfaction and security, which the hostile and faithless conduct of his supposed father had enütled the British government to demand, and which the dictates of prudence and self-aefence compelled it to require. The reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah, by and with the advice of the persons appointed by his father's will to assist his councils, has persisted in opposing a determined resistance to this demand, thereby exhibiting an unequivocal proof, that the spirit which actuated the hostile councils of the nabobs Mohammed Ally and Omdut ul Omrah, has been transmitted with unabated vigour to the supposed son of Omdut ul Omrah, secured in its operation under he sanctimonious forms of their testamentary injunctions, and preserved with religions attachment by the ostensible descendant of that prince. Frustrated in the hope of obtaining from the reputed son of the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, reparation for its injuries, and security for its rights, the British government is now reluctantly compelled to publish to the world the proofs of this flagrant violation of the most sacred ties of amity and alliance, by the nabobs Mohammed Ally and Omdut ul Omrah, and the hereditary spirit of enmity manifested by the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah to the interests of the British government. The duty and necessity of self-defence require the British government, under the circumstances of this case, to exercise its power in the attainment of an adequate security for its rights; Justice and moderation warrant, that the family of Omdut ul Omrah shall be deprived of the means of completing its systematic course of hostility; wisdom and prudence demand that the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah shall not be permitted to retain possession of resources, dangerous to the tranquillity of the British government in the peninsula of India. Wherefore the British government, still adhering to the principles of moderation, and actuated by its uniform desire of obtaining security for its rights and interests in the Carnatic, by an arrangement founded on the principles of the long-subsisting alliance between the Company and the family of the nabob Mohammed Ally, judged it expedient to enter into a negociation for that purpose with the prince Azeem ul Dowlah Bebauder, the son and heir of Azeem ul Omrah, who was the second son of the nabob Mohammed Ally, and the immediate great grandson, by both his parents, of the nabob Anwer ud Deen Khan of blessed memory. And his highness the prince Azeem ul Dowlah Behauder having entered into engagements for the express purpose of reviving the alliance between the Company and his illustrious ancestors, and of establishing an adequate security for the British interests in the Carnatic, the British government has now resolved to exercise its rights and its power, under Providence, in supporting and establishing the hereditary pretensions of the prince Azeem ul Dowlah Behauder, in the soubahdarry of the territories of Arcot, and of the Carnatic Payen Ghaut. And for the more full explanation of the grounds and motives of this declaration, the right honorable the governor in council, by and with the authority of his excellency the most noble the governor-general in council, has caused attested copies and extracts of several documents * discovered at Seringapatam, to be annexed hereunto, together with an extract from the treaty of 1787 and 1792. By order of the right honourable the governor in council, Fort St. George, 31st July, 1801. (Signed) STATE PAPERS. J. WEBBE, Chief Sec. to Gov. N. B. EDMONSTONE, Persian Sec. to Goy ARMISTICE BETWEEN FRANCE AND RUSSIA. Whereas his majesty the emperor of the French, and his majesty the emperor of Russia, are desirous to put an end to the war which disunites the two nations, and in the mean time to conclude an armistice; they have therefore nominated, and provided * Vide Asiatic Annual Register, for these documents. |