A As the positive hostility in every part of his territories through which the British troops manner: I. That in violation of the 10th article of the treaty of 1792, the nabob Mahommed Ali Khaun, by the agency, and with the concurrence of his eldest son Omdut ul Omrah, maintained a secret intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun, through the medium of Gholam Ali Khaun, and Ali Reza, vakeels, or ambassadors of that prince, for purposes hostile to the interests of the company, and consequently subversive of the fundamental principles of his alliance with them. II. That the nabobs Mahommed Ali Khaun, and Omdut ul Omrah, had made communications to Tippoo Sultaun, on political and military subjects, of á nature calculated to promote the interests of that prince, and consequently, to injure those of the company. They communicated to Tippoo intelligence relative to the intended attack upon Pondicherry in 1793-to the jealousy which had been excited by Tippoo's negociations at Poonah, cautioning him, at the same time, to be upon his guard-to await until lord Cornwallis left India, and a new governor might arrive from England.† III. That the nabob had, both by communications from himself personally, and through Omdut ul Omrah to Gholam Ali Khaun, and Ali Reza, manifested his marked disapprobation of the triple alliance formed by lord Cornwallis, between the English, the Nizam, and the Marhattas, which had reduced the power of Tippoo in 1792; and that he had stigmatized the Nizam, upon such occasions, for having acted contrary to the dictates of religion, which required, that all true believers should join in the support of that cause, of which he repeatedly stated his opinion, *In May, 1799. It is pretended by the nabob's advocates, that this correspondence with Tippoo was encouraged by lord Cornwallis; but is it within the bounds of human probability, that his lordship encouraged such a correspondence? ་ that Tippoo Sultaun was the chief pillar. IV. That the evidence contained in the communications made to Tippoo Sultaun by his vakeels, of the treacherous intercourse subsisting between the nabobs Wallajah and Omdut ul Omrah and Tippoo Sultaun, was confirmed by the discovery of a cypher, the key to which was found amongst Tippoo's secret records, and which was not only written in the same hand as all the letters of the nabobs Wallajah and Omdut ul Omrah to the English government, but noted at the bottom by Tippoo's principal moonshy or secretary, as a paper from Omdut ul Omrah, and several of the fictitious designations in this cypher were found to have been used in the correspondence. This cypher was imperfect, but it was in its infancy ; however, the absolute existence of a cypher is a sufficient proof of a secret correspondence, and it is a remarkable fact, that there is no proof of the existence of a cypher in any other court in India. If the circumstance of Omdut ul Omrah's having transmitted a cypher to Tippoo Sultaun were not of itself sufficient to establish the perfidious nature of his views, the names which were employed to signify the English and their allies, and which were discovered by the key to the cypher, removed every doubt upon the subject. The English were represented by the terms Taza Wareeds, or new comers; the Nizam by that of Heech, or nothing; and the Marhattas by the term Pooch, or contemptible. V. That Omdut ul Omrah continued this secret correspondence so late as the year 1796, as appears by a letter found amongst Tippoo's records, written by the person who wrote, all the nabob's letters to the British government, and having the name of Gholaum Hussein upon the cover, which it is established by incontrovertible documents, was the fictitious name under which the nabob corresponded in his own hand writing with Gholaum Ali Khaun, in 1794. The authenticity of this letter is also proved from its having been found amongst the records of Tippoo, together with the rest of the correspondence of the nabob of the Carnatic, and its evident connection with that correspondence. These were the principal points that were established by the documents found in Tippoo's palace: they were not only in violation of the spirit of the whole treaty of 1792, but in direct breach of the letter of one of its most important articles, (the tenth) which expressly stipulates that, "the. nabob shall not enter into any negociation, or political correspondence, with any European, or native power, whatever, urithout the consent of the Company.” Here, I cannot refrain from observ ing, that if the correspondence which passed between these princes were of a friendly nature, or rather if it were not of an hostile character, why were not the letters shewn to the Company's government before they were dispatched, as was the constant custom, and as was intended by the spirit and letter of the treaty of 1792 ? In fact, the evidence of the nabob's treachery, which was as positive as ever was obtained in similar cases, added to his general conduct, which, in every act, from the day of his accession, corroborated the truth of that evidence, would certainly have justified lord Wellesley in proceeding immediately against him as an enemy to the state. Though aware of the risk which might attend any delay in a case of such delicate and perilous a contexture, and which was rendered more serious by the disturbed state of most of the territories under the government of Fort St. George, lord Wellesley preferred the chance of incurring that risk to the adoption of any measure which might be deemed precipitate, in an affair wherein the honour of the British nation was so deeply cot cerned. Actuated by this noble principle, his lordship contented himself, in the first instance, with writing to the government of Madras, to prosecute their inquiry into the nabob's conduct by a personal examination of the vakeels, Gholaum Ali, and Ali Reza Khaun, and some other officers of the late Tippoo Sultaun; and he transmitted, at the same time, all the documents which had been discovered, with the Persian translator's report, and expressed his opinion, that though the proofs obtained were sufficient to justify the British government in depriving the nabob immediately of the means of abusing the protection of the Company; yet he had judged a moderate proceeding to be more consistent with its character and reputation. In the event, however, of any circumstance requiring the adoption of such a measure, lord Wellesley, with that prudence, foresight, and decision, which pre-eminently marked the whole of his administration, authorized lord Clive to assume the government of the Carnatic, or to take any other step that the nature of things might render expedient, The result of the inquiry instituted by lord Clive in consequence of lord Wellesley's orders, went to establish the principal facts of the treachery, both of Wallajah and Omdut ul Omrah; the evidences examined were, Gholaum Ali Khaun and Ali Reza; and though some parts of the former proofs were invalidated, all the chief points whereon the proof of the nabol's violation of the treaty of 1792 rested, were fully confirmed by their depositions. The whole of these voluminous examinations, accompanied by a report from Colonel Close, and Mr. Webbe the gentlemen who conducted the inquiry, were transmitted to the governor-general by lord Cliye, with a letter from himself, dated May 23, 1800. The impressions which the further prosecution of the inquiry into the conduct of the nabob Omdut ul Omrah made upon lord Clive's mind, will be best conceived from the two following paragraphs which concluded his lordship's official address upon this occasion:-"With this strong evidence of internal treachery, and of open opposition to our interests in the Carnatic, established by treaty, it is my deliberate opinion, that a further adherence to the letter of the treaty of 1792, while the nabob Omdut ul Omrah has been, and now is, perfidiously betraying the spirit and substance of the alliance between him and the Company, would be as inconsistent with the true principles of public faith,, as it would be obviously incompatible with the preservation of our just rights and interests. On these grounds I have no hesitation in recommending to your lordship the immediate assumption of the civil and military government of the Carnatic, under such provisions as your lordship may be pleased to authorize for his highness, the nabob, his highness's family, and the principal officers of his government." Upon the receipt of this dispatch, lord Wellesley resolved to proceed to Fort St, George as soon as the season permitted, for the purpose of settling, in person, an arrangement that should effectually secure the interests of the company in the Carnatic; and in consequence of this determination, he gave no further instructions to lord Clive upon the subject until the month of March, 1901, nearly two years after the discovery of the treacherous correspondence; when, finding that the state of affairs in Oude combined with other circumstances relative to the general government of India, made it impossible for him to leave Fort William, he directed lord Clive to send Mr. Webbe, the chief secretary of the Madras government, to Bengal, in order to have the fullest communications with that officer, previously to issuing his final instructions for the settlement of the Carnatic, and several other important points intimately connected with that arrangement. At this period of time, Lord Wellesley was in possession of every information and of every opinion which could guide or influence his judgement in the decision of this important affair; and sufficient time had elapsed from the first discovery of the original documents, in the palace of Seringapatam, for his lordship to receive answers to the dispatches which he had sent, upon the occasion, to England. In reply to those dispatches, the secret committee, on the 4th of December, 1800, expressed, as I have shewn in my last number, their entire approbation of the. resolution which the governor-general informed them he had taken, of "demanding some more certain pledges of the fidelity of Omdut ul Omrah, than the Company. then possessed." The secret committee distinctly state, in this dispatch, that many other circumstances might, in their opinion, be urged, besides those adduced by Lord Wellesley, to strengthen the doubts of the Nabob's fidelity to the fundamental principles of his engagements with the Company and they particularly instance the mode in which he evacuated the Fort of Chandnagerry, in 1796, on which they remark, that " a more decided instance of disaffection to the Company, can scarcely be ima gined." At this very time, it should be attentively remarked, that the secret com mittee had before them the papers found at Seringapatam, together with Lord Wel lesley's orders to Lord Clive for the examination of the vakeels, in which orders, his lordship expressly observes, that he shall probably be compelled to deprive the Nabob of the government, and to take it for the Company. Here it may be asked, did the secret committee prohibit this?-No. They approved, as I have already shewn, all that Lord Wellesley had done, and of course, of his letter to Lord Clive, and they communicated their approbation to the court of directors. Being thus in the full possession of the general sentiments of his superiours, in England, and with improved knowledge of every particular that had attended this impor tant affair, Lord Wellesley sent his final instructions relative to the measures which were to be pursued by Lord Clive. These instructions were dated, May the 28th, 1801, two years after the discovery of the papers, after the most matured deliberation. The treaty of 1792 imposed on the Nabobs of Arcot a perfect obligation; and while Mahommed Ally professed to transmit to his successor, that obligation in the form of a testamentary injunction, he had actually violated the perfect right acquired by the Company under the correspondent provisions of the treaty. In fact, the fundamental principle upon which alone the treaty of 1792 rested, had been destroyed by the treachery of the Nabobs of Arcot, previous to the ostensible conclusion of that instrument." In communicating," as Lord Wellesley justly observed, “the march of the British troops against Pondicherry; in warning Tippoo Sultaun of the'impru dence of displaying any symptoms of attachment to the declining cause of France in India; and in admonishing Tippoo, that his intrigues at the court of Poonah had alarmed the vigilance of the Marquis Cornwallis; the Nabob of the Carnatic expressed no anxiety to frustrate the hostile designs of the Sultaun of Mysore; nor did our ally, according to the duties of alliance, communicate to the British government any intimation of Tippoo's hostile views, or warn, or admonish the Company to take the necessary precautions against their prosecution. In both instances, the Nabob, Mahommed Ally, not only violated the express stipulations of the treaty, but actually promoted the Sultaun's views, by persuading that determined foe of the British name to postpone his exertions to a more favourable season, when a more propitious concurrence of circumstances should facilitate the execution of his vindictive plans." The Nabob, therefore, had been reduced, by his own misconduct, to the condition of a public enemy; he had forfeited every claim to the confidence of the Company; and it was neither conformable with the dictates of justice or policy, to permit him to retain the possession of actual resources greater than were requisite for the support of the rank, which it should be judged proper to allow him to hold in the Carnatic. Lord Clive was, therefore, directed to stipulate, with his highness, for the complete resignation of the civil and military government of that province, and to grant him a stipend, not exceeding three, and under two, lacks of pagodas annually, indepen dently of a provision for his principal officers, which was to be made from the revenues of the Carnatic.* Upon this basis, Lord Clive was authorised to conclude a treaty with the Nabob; for, however clear the Company's rights might be, it was by no means certain, that in the event of exercising those rights to their full extent, the powers of Hindustan would refrain from confounding the abstract principles of the law of nations, with ambitious views of aggrandizement. If, therefore, it were practicable to obtain equal security for the Company, by substituting the more gracious mode of conciliation and indulgence, it was certainly more consistent with the principles of our policy, to adopt the most lenient mode of settling the future government of the Carnatic. In the event, however, of the Nabob's refusal of the proffered treaty, Lord Clive was directed to assume the country, under a proclamation which accompanied the letter of instructions, and which fully developed the causes of that measure. Even under this extremity of assuming the civil and military government of the Carnatic, Lord Clive was instructed to provide for the Nabob's support in a liberal manner, and also to make a suitable provision for the different branches of his family, and the various officers of his state. When Lord Wellesley's instructions, bearing date May 28, 1801, reached Madras, the state of the Nabob's health was so bad as to prevent Lord Clive from taking any immediate measure on the receipt. The Nabob's physician declared, that if they were communicated to the Nabob, they might hasten his dissolution. Lord Wellesley has been blamed, upon this occasion, for his humanity! and by those illiberal and malevolent minds which are accustomed to blacken his lordship's characte rwith every epithet, descriptive of tyranny and unfeeling oppression. They blame his humanity, although the physician made an affidavit, that such a com * The net revenue of the Carnatic applicable to the Nabob's personal expenses scarcely ever amounted to three lacks of pagodas, under the treaty of 1792. munication" would tend to aggravate, and inflame the dangerous symptoms which now threaten his highness's life." When the malady had attained an heighth that left no hopes of the Nabob's recovery,' intrigues commenced amongst the different branches of his family, which disturbed the tranquillity of his palace; and a body of armed men were secretly introduced into it by his brother, Hussum ul Mulk, who was loud in asserting his pretensions to the succession. These circumstances obliged Lord Clive to send a detachment of the Company's troops to occupy the chief entrance into the palace, and to preserve order and tranquillity within its walls. This step was taken with a degree of delicacy and precaution which perfectly reconciled it to the Nabob, who was fully satisfied, by the conduct of the troops, that the object of the measure was directed to his personal ease and repose. On the 15th of July, 1801, the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah expired. The dangerous intrigues which had been carried on in the Nabob's palace; the state of several provinces under the government of Fort St. George; and a variety of other cogent reasons, forbade a moment's delay in effecting a settlement of the country. Lord Clive, accordingly, a few hours after he had obtained information of the death of his highness, deputed Mr. Webbe and lieutenant-colonel Close, two most virtuous and distinguished public officers, not less respectable for their characters than for their eminent and acknowledged merits, to confer with the principal officers of the Nabob's government, in order to accomplish an immediate arrangement for the administration of the affairs of the Carnatic. These gentlemen were received by two officers who produced to them an authentic will of the Nabob, appointing his reputed son, Ally Hussein, to be his successor, and nominating thein to be his guardians. Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe explained to the guardians the nature of the documents which had been discovered relative to the breach of the alliance between the Company, and the late Nabobs, Mahommed Ally Khaun and Omdut ul Omrah, in consequence of the hostile conduct of their highnessess; and after having stated to them fully the grounds upon which the company's government had acquired a right to exercise its discretion, in securing its interests in the Carnatic, they proposed to the guardians to enter upon an immediate negociation for the settlement of that country, over which, they informed them, the Company would otherwise proceed to exercise its own rights and power. At first, the guardians denied the existence of any hostile correspondence; but, in a subsequent conference, they admitted that the subject of the evidence, found at Seringapatam, had been agitated by the late Nabob for more than twelve months. The guardians solicited a short delay, for the purpose of attending to the funeral of the Nabob. Notwithstanding the urgency of the case, it was impossible to refuse compliance with such a request; and all further communication was postponed until the ensuing day, when the guardians promised to be ready to give a decisive answer to the proposition which the deputies had made. At the appointed time, July 16, 1801, Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe met the guardians, and a long discussion took place, which terminated in the guardians declining to give any answer to the terms proposed by these gentlemen, under the direction of Lord Wellesley, until they had consulted with the other branches of the family, for which purpose, another day was allowed them. On the 17th the conference was resumed, and, after formally rejecting, on the part of Ally Hussein and every branch of the family, the terms that had been proposed, and every treaty which went to alienate the exercise of the civil and military government of the Carnatic from the family of the Nabob, the guardians brought forward a contre-projet, containing a slight modification of the treaty of 1792: at the same time, they denied the possible authenticity of the proofs of treachery adduced against the Nabobs, Mahommed Ally Khaun and Omdut ul Omrah; and they asserted the right of the Nabob's son and heir to succeed to his father's dominions under that treaty. In answer, colonel Close and Mr.Webbe informed them, that the contre-projet could not be entertained for a moment, as their orders were direct, and founded upon principles from which no departure could possibly be made. Although these gentlemen considered themselves to be fully authorized to break off the negotiations, upon the formal refusal of the guardians to enter into any treaty that was grounded upon the basis of the civil and military government of the Carnatic being vested in the Company; yet, the desire of affecting an amicable adjustment made them desirous of an interview with Ally Hussein, to receive from |