been the proverbial seats of confusion, discord, and misery. I believe, also, that it would be impossible to alter the arrangements which have been established for the regulation of the affairs of the Polygars, without occasioning the utmost degree of public injury, and private distress; and without reviving those scenes of bloodshed which depopulated the country, and produced such miserable effects, as, in the language of one of the Company's public officers, to make "nature shudder." Neither do I feel any degree of anxiety for the restoration of a system which enabled the Polygars to entail ruin and famine upon the cultivators of the land, to amputate the limbs of defenceless inhabitants, to cut the banks of reservoirs, to shut up watercourses, to destroy the crops, and, in one day, to massacre above four hundred persons!” My sole object in this place is, to shew that the Polygar question is one for which the court of directors, and none but the court of directors, are responsible. Here we have no differences of "the honourable court," and of "the secret committee:" It is the court, all the court, and nothing but the court.

In the month of June, 1795, "they resolved to empower the government of India, upon the sole authority of the Company, to take such measures as should be deemed expedient, from time to time, for DISARMING the Polygars, for punishing the refractory, for adjusting their disputed claims, and for the introduction of such an internal arrangement as shall have a tendency to restore those distressed provinces, from their actual state of anarchy and misery, to a state of subordination and prosperity.""

"It were to be wished," said these newly-converted advocates for the nabob's rights, "that upon your representation of the absolute necessity they were under of prescribing this line of conduct for the Polygar tributaries, the nabob's acquiescence could be obtained herein; but from the tenour of some of his late letters upon record, this acquiescence is more to be desired than expected. They can only, therefore, in case of his refusal, direct you to take the most effectual means to counteract his endeavours to thwart the execution of these orders, which could not be considered as disinterested on their part, as highly essential to the happiness of thousands, as contributing to the peace and prosperity of the country, and, therefore, as ultimately beneficial to the real and permanent interests of the nabob."

The government of India, under lord Wellesley, did execute these orders; and on the 31st of August, 1801, it was informed, by the court, that " they entirely approved the measures which had been pursued, and that they entertained a sanguine expectation that little difficulty would attend the bringing the rest of the Polygars to a similar state of order and subordination." They therefore again direct, that "the necessary measures be vigorously pursued, for the accomplishment of so desirable a purpose." No man in his senses could expect, that "this desirable purpose" could be attained without bloodshed, or that the Polygars would tamely submit to be deprived of privileges, which enabled them, as the court of directors have observed, in their orders of June 10, 1795, to " keep up a military force, to make war or commit depredations, and acts of cruelty and oppression on the inhabitants, as their local interests or passions might lead them." Accordingly we find, that it required the employment of a large military force, at one time amounting to ten thousand men, to accomplish the purpose," which the court of directors considered to be "so desirable." Many lives were lost, and several brave officers and soldiers were killed. But what has all this to do with the government in India? They were ordered by their legal superiours to disarm these Polygars, whatever might be the sacrifices attendant on it, and they received the thanks of those superiours, for the manner in which " they had accomplished this desirable object."

The utmost tranquillity has since prevailed, at least as long as lord Wellesley remained in India; and a complete stop was put to those scenes of misery which had excited such general distress. The Polygar countries have enjoyed more quiet for the last six or seven years than ever has been known in the history of India; and yet shall it be endured, that a loquacious, unemployed barrister, shall attempt to overturn an arrangement which has been productive of such practical benefits, and all, forsooth, because he has a windy popularity to acquire, and wants to be made an Indian judge? Without possessing either talents, consequence, or knowledge, to

* Vide printed Carnatic papers, No. 1.

1

manage any question nearer home, whereby his ignorance may be detected by his own constituents, he is endeavouring, at the risk of producing the severest calamities in India, to acquire fame by agitating a subject on which there is little information; and to place himself on a level with the Perth taylor, the jew doctor and attorney, the M.D. of St. Andrews, and every other modern patriot, who has striven, from similar motives, from equal ignorance, and with the same views, to raise themselves into notice, at the expense, (I mean expense in its absolute, literal signification) of three Indian chiefs and princes, and with the utter contempt of every man who had an heart to feel or an head to understand; the interests and honour of his country.

The reader will observe, that in adverting to the assumption of the Carnatic, I have stated, that it was "contrary to treaty." Notwithstanding the powerful reasoning with which the Declaration abounds, I am of opinion, that this assumption was contrary to the strict letter of the existing treaty; but I most clearly agree with the Declaration, that it was fully justified by the spirit of that engagement, and still more by the spirit of our general connection with the nabobs of Arcot, and, above all, by the circumstances of the moment. I am also fully aware, that when I asserted that lord Cornwallis's assumption was contrary to the strict letter of the treaty, I differ in opinion with the highest authorities by whom this question was discussed at the period of the assumption. This is one of those questions upon which there must always be a difference of opinion relative to the strict literal interpretation of our rights. But I am decidedly of opinion, that lord Cornwallis's conduct, on the occasion to which I allude, was perfectly justified by every principle of fair public law, under the circumstances of the case, and of our connection with Arcot, and was fully entitled to the public approbation which it received when his lordship was compelled to exercise the Company's rights for the mutual good of the common cause.

DECLARATION OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL OF

FORT ST. GEORGE BY AND WITH THE AUTHORITY OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE MOST NOBLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL OF ALL THE BRITISH POSSESSIONS IN THE EAST INDIES.

An alliance of the most intimate union and friendship has long subsisted between the honourable the English East India Company, and the family of their highnesses Mohammed Ally and Omdut ul Omrah, the late nabobs of the Carnatic Payen Ghaut; by the aid of that alliance, his late highness Mohammed Ally was enabled, under Providence, to support his pretentions to the possession of the Carnatic, at the death of his illustrious father, to defeat the power of his enemies in arms; and, finally, to establish his authority in the government of Arcot, and of its dependencies, on the foundations of the British power.

For the defence and protection of the valuable possessions thus acquired, by the united arms of the English company, and of the nabob of Arcot, various treaties and obligations have been established, by which it was intended that the interests, security, and power of both parties, in the Carnatic Payen Ghaut, should be cemented and indentified. In conformity to the faith and spirit of these engagements, the honourable company has invariably applied, not only the resources derived from that alliance, but the whole power of the British empire in India, to maintain the government of the late nabobs of the Carnatic, against all their enemies; and has caused them to be acknowledged by foreign states, as the allies of the British nation. By these means, and by the unabated exertion of its whole power, the English nation was enabled, during the war, which continued from the year 1780, to the year 1783, to support the pretentions of the nabob Mohammed Ally, and to rescue his dominions from the violence of Hyder Ally Khan, and of his successor, Tippoo Sultaun, who, by the assistance of the French nation, had been enabled to conquer a considerable part of the Carnatic, and to establish their authority over the greatest portion of the territorial possessions of

the said nabob.

To support the authority of the nabob Mohammed Ally, and to secure the British interests in the Carnatic, it became expedient for the contracting parties to enter into specific engagements, for the maintenance of an adequate military establishment. The English company, accordingly, bound itself by a treaty, bearing date, in the

month of February, 1787, to maintain the whole military force, required for the protection of the territories of the allies; in consideration of which engagement, the nabob Mohammed Ally agreed, among other conditions, and under certain penalties therein specified, to pay an annual subsidy, amounting to fifteen lacks of star pagodas,

According to the further stipulations of that engagement, rendered necessary by experience, for the mutual safety of the contracting parties, the English company, in the year 1790, charged itself with the administration of the civil government, in . addition to the military defence of the Carnatic, in a critical juncture of affairs, when the ambition, and implacable enmity of the late Tippoo Sultaun, compelled the British government in India to resort to arms for the support of its rights, and for the protection of its allies.

At the conclusion of the war, in the year 1792, (the successful and glorious termination of which tended, in the most direct manner, to secure the safety and prosperity of the possessions of his highness the nabob of the Carnatic,) the British government restored the civil government of the Carnatic to his highness, thereby manifesting the strictest adherence to the stipulations of the existing engagements of 1787 but the British government did not confine itself to the mere discharge of the stipulations of its existing engagements; its views were extended to an enlarged, and liberal consideration of the principles of the alliance subsisting between the Company and the nabobs of the Carnatic.

At that period of time the nabob Mohammed Ally, relying on the friendly dis position of the British government, represented, in the most urgent manner, to the marquis Cornwallis, the inadequacy of his highness's resources to discharge the pecuniary engagements of the treaty of 1787; and the Governor-general, acting in conformity to the spirit of the alliance and friendship so long subsisting between the nabobs of the Carnatic, and the English company, relieved his highness from the burthensome terms of that engagement; thereby surrendering the pecuniary rights acquired by the Company, under the treaty of 1787, for the purpose of promoting the tranquillity, comfort, and interests of the nabob Mohammed Ally.

With this liberal view of the principles of the connection established between the British government, and the nabob of Arcot, an indulgent modification of the treaty of 1787 was framed, and by a subsequent treaty, bearing date in the month of July, 1792, the pecuniary contribution of his highness the nabob of the Carnatic, towards the general defence and protection of the rights and possessions of the allies, was diminished from fifteen to nine lacks of star pagodas. The spirit of moderation, by which the British councils were guided in respect to this alliance, was unequivocally manifested by a farther stipulation for the purpose of securing to the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, the son and presumptive heir of the nabob Mohammed Ally, the succession to the territories of his father, on the terms and conditions of the treaty of 1792.

In return for this relinquishment of a considerable portion of its pecuniary resources, the English company obtained no other advantages than an extended renewal of the territorial security, already provided by the treaty of 1787, for the peformance of the nabob Mohammed Ally's pecuniary engagements, and a repetition of his highness's previous obligation, not to contract alliances, nor to enter into correspondence, with any European, or native power, without the knowledge and concurrence of the British government. Conformably, therefore, to this indulgent modification of the treaty of 1787, the government of the Carnatic was restored to the nabob Mohammed Ally: on the death of his highness the nabob Mohammed Ally, in the year 1795, the nabob Omdat ul Omrah succeeded to the possession of his father's territories, according to the provisions of the treaty of 1792.

The nabob Mohamined Ally, as well as his son and successor, had repeatedly granted tuncaws, or assignments of revenue, on the districts pledged to the Company, in direct violation of the treaty of 1792, and to the manifest injury of the territorial security, provided by the Company for its interests in the Carnatic. The British government, however, continued to extend to their highnesses, the indulgent operation of the beneficial conditions of the treaty of 1792, by abstaining from the exercise of the just rights acquired against their highnesses, under the express Suppliment to VOL. III.—NO, V.

stipulations of that engagement, and under the acknowledged interpretation of the law of nations.

Under these circumstances, the British government might justly have required from the house of Mohammed Ally, not merely the exact and rigid observation of the treaty of 1792, but a zealous and cordial attachment to the spirit of an engage ment, under which the nabobs of the Carnatic had found the most ample protection, accompanied by the most indulgent and liberal construction of every stipulation favourable to their separate interests, and by the most lenient relaxation of those penal articles, the obligation of which their highnesses had respectively incurred, by violating the article of the treaty of 1792, respecting the grant of tuncaws, or assignments of revenue, on the districts pledged to the Company.

It is with the deepest concern, that the governor in council is compelled to declare, that those ancient allies of the Company, the nabobs Mohammed Ally and Omdut ul Omrah, have heen found not only deficient in every active duty of the alliance, but unfaithful to its fundamental principles, and untrue to its vital spirit.

In the full enjoyment of the most abundant proofs of the moderation, indulgence, and good faith of the honourable Company, the nabob Mohammed Ally, and the nabob Omdat ul Omrah, actually commenced and maintained, a secret intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun, the determined enemy of the British name, founded on prin. ciples, and directed to objects utterly subversive of the alliance between the nabob of the Carnatic, and the Company; and equally incompatible with the security of the British power in the peninsula of India.

After the fall of Seringapatam, the British government obtained possession of the original records of Tippoo Sultaun: the correspondence of that prince's embassadors, during their residence at Fort St. George, in attendance on his sons, the hostage princes, in the years 1792 and 1793, established sufficient ground of apprehension, that their highnesses, the late nabob Mohammed Ally, and the late nabob Omdut ul Omrah, had entered into a secret intercourse with the late Tippoo Sultaun, of a nature hostile to the British interests in India. The enquiries of the British government have been since directed to ascertain a fact so intimately connected with the security of its interests in the Carnatic. The result has established the following propositions, by a series of connected written and oral testimony.

First. At the very period of time when the nabob Mohammed Ally appealed to the generosity of the British government, for an indulgent modification of the treaty of 1787, his highness had already commenced a secret negociation for the establishment of an intimate intercourse with the nabob Tippoo Sultaun, without the knowledge of the British government, and for purposes evidently repugnant to its security and honour.

Second. The nabob Omdat ul Omrah, (who was empowered by the nabob Mohammed Ally to negociate the treaty of 1792, with the British government, and who actually negociated that treaty for himself, and for his father) was actually employed at the same period of time, under his father's authority, in negociating for himself, and for his father, the terms of the said separate and secret intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun.

Third. The tendency of the said intercourse was directed to the support of Tippoo Sultaun, in victory and triumph over all his enemies."

Fourth. In the month of December, 1792, the Nabob Mohammed Ally imparted secret imformation to Tippoo Sultaun, regarding the sentiments and intentions of the British government in India, with relation to the hostile views and negociations of Tippoo Sultaun, with the courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, and on the first intelli gence of the war between Great Britain and France, in the year 1793, the nabob Mohammed Ally imparted secret information to Tippoo Sultaun, respecting the views and power of France in India, and in Europe, and respecting the intended operations of the British forces, against the French possessions in the Carnatic. And the nabob Mohammed Ally conveyed to Tippoo Sultaun secret admonitions and friendly advice, respecting the most favourable season, and the most propitious state of circumstances, iolation of Tippoo Sultaun's engagements with the honourable Company. The nabob Omdut ul Omrah was employed by his father, as one of the convey secret intelligence, friendly admonition, and seasonable advice to ultaun, through the confidential agents of Tippoo Sultaun, who were fur

nished with instructions from the said Sultaun of Mysore, to receive such communica tions from the said nabob of the Carnatic, and from the nabob Omdut ul Omrah.

Sixth. A cypher was composed, and actually introduced into the separate and secret correspondence between the nabobs Mohammed Aily and Tippoo Sultaun. The original key of the said cypher, discovered among the records of Seringapatam, is in the hand-writing of the confidential moonshee, (or secretary) of the nabob Mohammed Ally, and of the nabob Omdut ul Omiah; and the said cy pher was delivered, by a confidential agent of the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, to the ambassador of Tippoo Sultaun, for the express purpose of being transmitted to Tippoo Sultaun.

Seventh. The terms employed in the said cypher, particularly those intended to designate the British government, and its allies, the Nizam, and the Mahratta state, united in a defensive league against Tippoo Sultaun, contain the most powerful internal evidence that the communications proposed to be disguised by the said cypher were of the most hostile tendency to the interest and objects of the said alliance, and calculated to promote the cause of Tippoo Sultaun, in opposition to that of the said allies. Eighth. The nabob Omdut ́ul Omrah, under his own hand-writing, in the month of August, 1794, corroborated the evidence of his intention to complete the purposes herein described, of the secret intercourse, which he had negociated with Tippoo Sultaun, and the continuance of the same intention is manifested by a letter from the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, and from his confidential agent, addressed to the supposed agent of Tippoo Sultaun, in the year 1796, sul sequently to the nabob Omdut ul Omrah's accession to the government of the Carnatic, under the treaty of 1792.

Ninth. At the commencement, and during the progress of the late just, necessary, and glorious war with the late Tippoo Sultaun, the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, to the utmost extent of his means and power, pursued the objects of his secret intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun, by a systematic course of deception, with respect to the provision of the funds necessary to enable the British troops to march into Mysore, as well as by a systematic and active opposition to the supply and movement of the állied army, through different parts of the said Nabob's dominions.

Tenth. The stipulations contained in the fifteenth article of the treaty of 1797, and in the tenth article of the treaty of 1792, by which the Nabob of the Carnatic was bound not to enter into any political negociations or correspondence with any European or native power or state, without the consent of the government of Fort St. George, or of the Company, formed a fundamental condition of the alliance between the said nabob and the Company; and the violation of the said stipulations necessarily involved the entire forfeiture, on the part of the nabob, of all the benefits of the said alliance.

Eleventh. The nabob Mohammed Ally, and the nabob Omdut ul Omtah, have violated the sail stipulations; and have thereby forfeited all the benefits of the said alliance; and the nabob Mohammed Ally, and the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, having viohated the said stipulations, for the express purpose of establishing an union of interests with Tippoo Sultaun, thereby placed themselves in the condition of PUBLIC ENEMIES to the British government in India.

It is manifest, therefore, that the intentions of the nabobs Mohammed Ally, and Omdut ul Omrah, have been uniformly, and without interruption, hostile to the British power in India, and that those intentions have been carried into effect to the full catent of the actual power possessed by their highnesses, respectively, at the several periods of time in which they have acted, in pursuance of their system of cooperation with the enemy.

By acting on these principles of conduct, the nabobs Mohammed Ally and Omdut ul Omrah, have not only violated the rights of the Company, but, by uniting their interests with those of the most implacable enemy of the British empire, the nabobs, Mohammed Ally and Omdut ul Omral, have actually placed themselves in the relation of public enemies to the British government, dangerous to the extent of their respective power, and active according to the means and opportunities afforded to them, by the circumstances of the moment, and especially by the most severe exigency and pressure of war. Every principle, therefore, of public law, release the British government from the intended obligations of the treaty of 1702; and every consideration of self-defence and security, authorise the Company to excise