and hereditary genius. Formerly, our military establishment was as defective as the establishments whose catastrophe is the theme of our lamentation. Being unable to produce such a prodigious hive of nobles as would suffice to officer our army, we were reduced to the necessity of leaving the door to the military profession open to every one. But that we might not be behind hand with our neighbours, in the introduction of some absurdity into our military establishment, we enacted that MONEY with us should be the substitute for noble descent: so that it became our custom, never to make any inquiries respecting the breed of any of our officers, whether he were the son of a peer, a shoe-black, or a bawd, or the brother of a kept mistress; whether he had a taste for the military life, or were fitted only to be a bricklayer: provided he could raise the cash, he became duly qualified to be a British officer. Hence, our sagacious ancestors invented a scale of military merit, which was so ingeniously contrived, that a boy or a man could tell exactly what rank in the army he was qualified to hold, by the number of bank notes which he had at command. Thus, five thousand pounds was a qualification for a lieutenant-colonelcy, and if you possessed the genius of a Lloyd, a Gibert, or the skill of a Marlborough, you could never be qualified to be a lieutenant Colonel, unless you could produce the five thousand requisites. In this way, we Yomed to supply our defect of nobility by the substitution of money, which * consider among us as the representative of merit. Accordingly, when a rich triplag of three or four and twenty years of age took a flying leap into a majority, over the Loads of a score of captains, grown hoary in the service of their country, the natural inference was, that these veterans had no merit, because they had no moucy, and, therefore, were unfit to have any promotion.

However, it was discovered that our navy officers who, by their skill and prowess, had made themselves the terror of our enemies, never obtained their rank by pur chase; and that their invincibility was ascribable chiefly to this circumstance. It was, therefore, determined, that our army should be placed upon an equally honourable footing, and that in our turn, we should not be backward in the abolition of crying abuses. Whether this goodly resolution has been acted upon, I am not able to inform my readers; but many of my military correspondents will, no doubt, sho.tly enable me to confirm the truth of this salutary work.

Proceeding in the goodly work of needful reform, the king of Prussia, we are told in an article from Berlin, has dismissed thirty generals, among whom are several hero, who knew not how to defend stone walls and strong fortresses, lined with artery, and garrisoned by soldiers with even musquets loaded. But the most important regulation adopted respecting the army, is, the suppression of corporal punishment; an example that ought to be every where followed. The new reforms, as stated in an article from Berlin, arc,

1. Every subject, without distinction or consideration of persons, must begin servingne lowest rank.

2. Every distinction between the nobles and the lower classes of society is suppressed in the army. The latter may obtain promotion as well as the former.

3. Corporal chastisements are suppressed. This method of correction, formerly so much practised, shall henceforth be entirely discontinued. He who has subjected himself to a penalty shall be put into confinement; for the third offence he shall receive a certain number of blows with the flat side of the sabre. It is expected that punishments will be less frequent, and that a trifling fault, such as having a spot on the uniform, will not subject the wearer to chastisement.

CESSATION OF INTERCOURSE WITH RUSSIA.

On Wednesday last, a letter was sent from the secretary of state for foreign affairs to the lord mayor, acquainting him, that the emperor of Russia had published a declaration, in which his Imperial majesty announces his determination to break off all communication with England, to recal his ambassador from this court, and not to permit the British mission to continue at the court of St. Petersburg.

This intelligence occasioned very little surprize, as it was well understood that the mind of the emperor of Russia had been for some time alienated from this country. But it will be interesting to us to be made acquainted with the avowed motives, assigned in the Russian declaration for his present conduct. It is to be presumed, that the autocrat of all the Russias will deign to give some reason for this consum

mation of his magnanimous alliance with us; because, even in Russia, appearances must be kept up, and some regard paid to public opinion. That Alexander is as much under the influence of the court of St. Cloud, as any conquered prince of Europe, was evident, immediately after the peace of Tilsit, when he acceded to conditions which were alike disgraceful and humiliating. His policy, since that event has betrayed the disposition of a semi-barbarian; for he was not content with prescribing such regulations of police as amounted nearly to the prohibition of the entry of foreigners of every description into his dominions; he endeavoured to shut out the light also, by forbidding the introduction of foreign books. With his domestic policy, however, we have no more to do, than as we are naturally affected by the good or evil which predominates any where. It is the foreign system of Russia which deserves our animadversion; and we cannot have a more perfect commentary upon it, than in the bare facts of the reception of Savary, and the mission of Caulincourt to St. Petersburgh. In yielding up the strong out-works of the Russian empire, Wallachia and Moldavia, the emperor evinced the utmost weakness and improvidence; and in the treatment of the French minister, he has proved himself to be an accomplice in the views of France.

A question here presents itself: What will be the probable effect of Russian caprice upon the interests of this country? In the first instance, it is certainly an evil to be debarred from those channels of intercourse to which we have been so long habituated; but the degree of the evil is materially diminished when we reflect upon the precarious friendship which must have subsisted between Russia and England, if the emperor had not declared himself. No mercantile man of sense could have placed any great confidence in the stability of the emperor's politics, after the proofs of tergiversation, dishonesty, and meanness, which he manifested at the period of his separating himself from the rest of the allies. We have repeatedly seen that the strides and successes of Buonaparte are always greater in peace than in war; consequently, from the hour that he ceased to be the enemy of the usurper, it was generally expected, upon the arrival of every foreign mail, that it would bring the intelligence of his having become the ally of France. Under this impression, mercantile men became cautious in their proceedings; and thus, when it was notified in the city that there was an end of our political relations with Russia, the effect of the information upon the commercial world was very inconsidérable. The cessation, however, of all intercourse is the signal for the commencement of hostilities; for it would be absurd to suppose that a power will abstain from doing us any further injury, after having excluded us from its society. Indeed, the mere treaty between two such formidable powers as Russia and France, was an hostile manifesto against England. It is truly childish therefore, in the opposition writers, to exclaim, that our hostility with Russia is provoked solely by the expedition against Denmark; for our government had no reason whatever to confide in the friendly disposition of Russia from the hour that Buonaparte and the Russian emperor concluded the treaty of Tilsit. The Morning Chronicle, indeed, has traced the hostile disposition of Alexander, against England, to a more remote chronology: it has now found it convenient to inform its readers, that this temper sprung from the incident of the capture of the Spanish frigates, soon after the commencement of the present war! If this were true, the emperor of Russia would be a greater hypocrite than Buonaparte himself; for he would not only be convicted of treasuring within his philanthropic breast our alleged act of aggression upon Spain, but also of acting in concert with us against the ally of that injured power. He pocketed the affront upon the law of nations, when he pocketed our money; and it is only since his fraternization with Buonaparte, that he has resumed his wonted magnanimity and sense of justice! Such arguments can make no impres.sion upon reasonable minds; more especially when it is recollected that, during the late coalition ministry, every political measure of this country seed to be purposely devised to alienate the favourable opinion which Alexander did once entertain of England. During their short and malignant reign, they strove to convince the em peror, that our arms were as palsied as their brains, by not making the least effort to divert the whole force of the enemy from being directed against the Russian army.

Since writing the above, I have seen the Russian declaration, which I shall endeavour to insert in this day's review, and I shall offer a few observations upon its contents.

The declaration stages, that the emperor has twice taken up arms in a cause, in which the interests of England were most immediately concerned. Surely the present cabluct of St. Petersburgh cannot have so soon forgotten the principles which the empire avowed previous to the commencement of the late campaign; or they have willly perverted the truth, to give a plausible colour to their present versatile Coinct. If the people of Russia are not permitted to read what comes from Eng. land. They are nevertheless expected to read the rescripts of their own sovereign; and they must discover the glaring contradiction between the former and present assertions of their emperor. In the imperial manifesto, September 21, 1806, the emper assigned, as the motives for his engaging in the war, "the daily increase of the French power, the situation of his allies, threatened by its aggrandizement and its unbounded ambition, compelled him to take an active part." Not a syllable is here mentioned of the interference of Russia, because England was most interested in it; but it is positively declared, that Russia came forward as a principal, and consistently with the dignity of a great power, "to preserve the sacred inviolability of treaties, and to restore the general tranquillity." By whom had those treaties been violated? Certainly not by England in its relations with Spain or France, nor by any other power in Europe excepting France, against which the force of Russia was aimed. Thus far then, we have a plain admission, that up to the Autumn of last year, Russia considered herself as acting the part of a principal in the war, on the ground of public safety, and we are further told in this same proclamation, that notwithstanding the misfortunes which attended the arms of the allies had operated against the realiz ation of their views, the principles upon which they were grounded remained unchanged. What were these principles? He tells us himself, they were founded on the necessity of resisting the daily increase of French power and ambition. These principles have not ceased to operate since: on the contrary, the necessity of acting upon them is stronger than ever; consequently, the emperor cannot be entitled to the character of consistency, which he seems so anxious to establish in this last declaration. But, to shew the capriciousness of the Russian cabinet in a fuller light, we need only refer to the imperial Ukase of Nov. 28, 1806, after the overthrow of the Prussian army, which states, that the object for taking up arms, a second time, was to protect the allies of Russia, and to defend her frontiers against the French, who tyrannized over various parts of Germany; and in a subsequeat manifesto, dated Nov. 30, the emperor expatiated, with the utmost vigour of language, upon the necessity of resisting the policy of France. Nay, he even went so far as to call his present imperial ally, an usurper. "The events," said he," which have spread over Europe the horrors of bloodshed and desolation from an insatiable thirst of conquest and aggrandizement in the present usurped government of France, are manifest to the whole world. Our endeavours to set bounds to this evil, and to preserve the tranquillity and integrity of powers in alliance with us by pacific measures, all proved ineffectual. The perfidy with which the common enemy violates the sanctity of treaties and the rights of nations, threatening Europe with universal devastation, incited us at least to take up arms in support of neighbouring kingdoms." Then, after alluding to the disasters of Austria, he proceeds thus, Prussia, vainly attempting to check the mischief by the establishment of a general and solid peace, through the means of negociation, notwithstanding ail her sacrifices for the sake of preserving an alliance with France, notwithstanding all her compliances with the demands of this common enemy, could not long remain exempt from the calamities of war. Lulled into a state of delusive security by the prospect of a peace, which she vainly hoped to enjoy, and the mistaken confidence she reposed in a treacherous ally, she was suddenly plunged into the very abyss of ruin."

It is not necessary for our present purpose, that we should attend to other extracts from the official documents in our possess on to prove, that, while Russia is unjustly imputing to Great Britain a deviation from the public principles upon which the allies took up arms against France, she has herself discarded them altogether; and, not satisfied with this crooked policy, she has actually recognized in the most formal manner, the very principles of the enemy which had been the objects of her execration.

Has not the emperor of Russia ratified, at Tilsit, the aggrandizement and power of this very usurped government? Has not he sanctioned the perfidy with which the sanctity of treaties, and the rights of nations, are violated? Is Europe less threatened

with the loss of the integrity of powers, alliance with Russia, since she has concluded a peace with the common disturber? So far from this being possible, we have the authority of the emperor himself, above-cited, for believing, that no compliances, no sacrifices, no means of negociation can exempt a state from the aggressions of France. From the autocrat of all the Russias, the magnanimous Alexander, Europe has been instructed, that the prospect of peace with France is a state of delusive security; that the prospect of the enjoyment of it is a vain hope, and a mistaken confidence reposed in a treacherous power; yet, in the face of all these splendid effusions of public spirit, promulgated to the whole world, not twelve months ago, the emperor Alexander now reproaches the English government for rejecting his proffered mediation to bring about a peace between England and this same perfidious neighbour, in whom he had recently declared no faith could be placed; and what aggravates the intentional insult is, the mixture of meanness and insolence, with which he presumes to dictate to the king of a free, great, and powerful people, never accustomed to receive the law from any power, that he expects he will conclude a peace with " the usurped government" of France, and that he shall not be satisfied until this demand shall have been complied with.

What reasons can the emperor Alexander assign for this sudden change of his politics, and reformation, in the manners of "Buonaparte? Have not the triumphs of this wretch over the arms and integrity of Alexander, ministered to his violence, rapacity, and ambition? Has the least spark of moderation been emitted from his vindictive soul? No on the contrary, at the very moment that Alexander declares to the world, his expectation that his Britannic majesty shall make peace with Buonaparte, this imperial demon authorizes the publication of the grossest personal invectives against the character of our sovereign, and recommends the British nation to demolish every vestige of their ancient freedom and constitutional policy, if they wish to live upon good terms with their neighbours. This, nevertheless, is the precise time, that the cabinet of St. Petersburgh has selected, to censure the British government for rejecting a mediation, which announced the shame, the weakness, the degradation, and the treachery of the power that offered it. In defiance of her lofty pretensions, Russia has concluded a treaty, which has delivered into the hands of France all the nations of the continent, bound and fettered; and now she wishes to impose upon us. the same robe of disgrace in which she will be represented to after-ages. She wishes to convert us into co-partners in her infamy, and to re-establish "the blessings of a general peace" upon the ruins of British freedom and honour. Let her brood over her own shame, and not seek to extenuate her own abjectness by the humiliation of any other power: when the honey-moon of her connection with France shall have passed away, she will assuredly be called upon to fulfil her remaining part of the bloody tragedy which will be performed on the eastern border of Europe.

Her co-operation is of the utmost importance to the ruler of France, at the present epoch; but, when he is ready for action, when he next takes the field, he will advance upon Russia, in a form, and with a vigour, which she will struggle in vain to repel. He will approach her, armed with the ruins of all the rest of the continent, with mountains piled on mountains, and crush her gigantic form, before time. and civilization shall have perfected her shape, and matured her strength.

We have thus seen who is the deserter from the public cause of Europe, and with what justice the policy of England is arraigned for the continuance of the war. It is also a most painful reflection that a legitimate sovereign has been made to depart from the ordinary and dignified mode in which princes were accustomed to discuss their differences, and to adopt not only the political antipathies, but the brutal revolutionary spirit of French murderers and thieves. The emperor of Russia, in this declaration, draws a distinction between the sentiments of the king and his ministers, and an attempt is thus made to create a schism in a country, which, they well know, the confederated world in arms cannot subdue, while its people remain united and true to their sovereign and themselves. The jacobin of the south has made a convert in the north, and from the coincidence of their opinions, it is more than probable, that this Russian declaration was manufactured at Paris, or revised by general Savary at St. Petersburgh.

Having detected the ground work of this state paper, I shall next proceed to ano◄

ther part of the accusations preferred against us: and here I shall be very brief, having already descanted, frequently and extensively, upon the shameful and disgusting subject.

The first, gravest, and, from the manner in which it is introduced, the most important charge against England, is the declaration that the emperor Alexander "bas solicited to no purpose our co operation: he did not require that we should unite our own forces with his: he was anxious only that we should make a diversion in their favour." In answer to this charge, if it had been made unconnected with any other circumstance, I should have thought it incumbent upon me to have been silent, and to have placed my hand before my face to conceal the blush of shame which it is cal culated to provoke. But, it is fortunate for us that it is so unjustly and illogically blended with subsequent occurrences wholly independent of it, that we are enabled to distinguish between our guilt, and our prudent policy, Abstractedly considered, the Russian imputation is true; and however discraceful the reflection may be upon the counsels of this country, it would be much more disgraceful not to acknowledge a truth which is felt by every honest man in it. It has ever been my humble opinion, that the real and just causes of our war against France, have been very little understood among us, and, consequently, the best mode of conducting it has been frequently overlooked. In this opinion, I am fortified by the opinion of the French themselves. We have not always been sufficiently sensible, that the war was a war of principles, and that, therefore, its object was repression and not conquest. Whatever could be done by yalour, wherever there was an opportunity for exerting it, we certainly achieved: but that valour was often misdirected.

Hence, when an auxiliary army of 50, or 60,000 Englishmen might have turned the scales of fortune upon the continent, as many of our military were scattered over every quarter of the globe, acting in small detached bodies, so that no impression was made upon the essential strength of France, but merely upon her cominercial outworks. This great political error was early seen through and reproved by Mr. Burke. It would be foreign from the present discussion to enlarge upon this topic; but, as Į know that our operations against the common enemy have often been censured upon that account, by well-informed persons upon the continent, I have availed myself of the present occasion to introduce the suggestion.

Without reverting to a policy, which the most dreadful experience ought to have corrected, we saw lord Grenville, the once-admired enemy of the principles of France, shut his eyes to the obvious necessity of a more vigorous system, and which, when in opposition, he was continually throwing in the teeth of lord Sidmouth's ministry We saw lord Grenville in league with the Foxites, and all the brawlers against a French war, but who were busy in reproaching Mr. Pitt, with a want of proper vigour in the conduct of it, suffer the downfal of the continent to take place during their administration, without stirring an inch to assist the efforts of our friends. Not a single soldier was sent to the continent, either to co-operate with the forces of the allies, or to create a diversion in their behalf, although that boastful ministry pretended that the military genius and strength of the British empire, would revive under their auspices. This is a strong and lamentable fact, which must call for a more serious inquiry than it has yet met with, from the parliament or the country. How can we be surprized at the resentment of the emperor Alexander, when he perceived them distributing the public force in expeditions remote from the grand scene of conflict for the liberties of Europe; when he perceived them loudly braying against acquisitions in which they had no concert, yet sending the flower of our troops to support the very projects which they publicly decried, and keeping at the extremity of the south of Europe, a dispost able force, rivetted to an island where their presence was not wanted? This is a just ground of complaint, if it had come unmixed with representations not less unwarrantable than false. But the lateness of the hour at which I have received this imperial declaration, compels me to postpone, until my next, the consideration of the rest of these charges, when I shall also conclude the remarks I had reserved upon the im Bacy of herishing the idea of a peace, at this time, with France.

POLITICAL LITERATURE.

(Continued from p. 415.)

expences of Asoph ul Dowlah displayed all the follies of puerility; delighted with double-barreled guns; and the value of his colles

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