v. Phillips, 4 Whart. 399. As to the effect of an express or implied reservation of the surplus to the grantor, in an assignment stipulating for releases, see infra. It is also essential that such an assignment should fix the time within which creditors must make their election. If it fixes no time, within which the release must be executed, it is void: Mayer v. Shields, 59 Miss. 107. The reason of this is obvious. If "no time whatever is specified, the deed necessarily and inevitably works a fraud on creditors. None of them can receive anything until all have made up their minds, and as no time is fixed within which they must do this, the trust can never be wound up, save by the interposition of a court of equity" Id. The assignment is void if it fixes an unreasonable time, within which creditors must elect. What is a reasonable time depends on the circumstances of the case. "It must not be so short as to deprive creditors of a fair opportunity to investigate and determine the question, nor yet so long as to produce unreasonable delay in the application of the property to the liquidation of the debts:" Id. See, also, Gordon v. Cannon, 18 Gratt. 387; Halsey v. Whitney, 4 Mason 206; Henderson v. Bliss, 8 Ind. 100; Pearpoint v. Graham, 4 Wash. C. C. 232. FOURTH. Reservation of Surplus. When will a reservation to the debtor of the surplus remaining after satisfying the purposes of the trust render the assignment void on its face? Where the assignment provides for the payment of all the debts, it is not avoided by a provision for re-assignment of any property or re-payment of any surplus in the hands of the assignee after fulfilling the trust, as this is no more than the law implies without any such provision: Sangston v. Gaither, 3 Md. 40; Wintringham v. Lafoy, 7 Cow. 735; Hempstead v. Johnston, 18 Ark. 123; Lininger v. Raymond, 9 Neb. And there is no distinction in this 40. respect between an assignment by a bank or other corporation and one by an individual: Dana v. Bank of U. S., 5 W. & S. 223. Where an assignment provides for only a part of the creditors, and reserves to the assignor the surplus after the payment of the debts provided for, it is held in New York and a few other states, to render the assignment fraudulent and void on its face, and that it cannot be made good by showing that there would be no surplus after paying the preferred creditors: Goodrich v. Downs, 6 Hill 438; Barney v. Griffin, 2 N. Y. 365; Lansing v. Woodworth, 1 Sandf. Ch. 43; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9; Fairchild v. Hunt, 14 N. J. Eq. 367; Truitt v. Caldwell, 3 Minn. 364; Lill v. Brant, 6 Bradw. 366; Schwab v. Evaus, Id. 466. Thus, where a firm assigned all the firm property and certain real estate of which the partners were tenants in common, and reserved the surplus after payment of the firm debts, the assignment was held void, because of the reservation without providing for payment of the individual debts of the partners: Collomb v. Caldwell, 16 N. Y. 484; Goddard v. Hapgood, 25 Vt. 351: Therasson v. Hickok, 37 Id. 454; though it would have been otherwise if firm property only had been assigned: Collomb v. Caldwell, supra; Bogert v. Haight, 9 Paige 297, 302. But an assignment of a portion of the debtor's property to pay part of his debts, and not expressly providing for distribution of a possible surplus among his other creditors, is not void on its face by reason of the resulting trust in the debtor's favor after the debts specified are paid, unless it is merely colorable and made for the sake of the resulting trust: Wilkes v. Ferris, 5 Johns. 335; Doremus v. Lewis, 8 Barb. 124; contra, Pierson v. Manning, 2 Mich. 445. An assignment of property, insufficient to pay the debts provided for, is not rendered void by the absence of any provision for the application of a surplus to other creditors: Bishop v. Halsey, 3 Abb. Pr. 400; nor by an express reservation according to Andrews v. Ludlow, 22 Mass. 28; Richards v. Levin, 16 Mo. 596. On the other hand, an assignment, to pay specified debts, of a larger amount of property than the trustee is authorized to distribute, is void, because of the resulting trust to the assignor after those debts are paid: Hooper v. Tuckerman, 3 Sandf. 311; Whallon v. Scott, 10 Watts 237. That assignments to pay only part of the assignor's creditors, and expressly reserving the surplus, are not necessarily void, is maintained by the weight of authority, on the ground that the reservation is but the expression of the legal effect of the conveyance, and that creditors can pursue their remedies against the debtor, following the surplus either in his hands or those of the trustee: Perry Ins. Co. v. Foster, 58 Ala. 502; Miller v. Stetson, 32 Id. 161; New Albany, &c., Railroad Co. v. Huff, 19 Ind. 444; Livingston v. Bell, 3 W. & S. 198; Ely v. Hair, 16 B. Mon. 230; Rowland v. Coleman, 45 Ga. 204; Dance v. Seaman, 11 Gratt. 778; Johnson v. McAllister's Assignee, 30 Mo. 327. "This reservation of the surplus remaining after the payment of the debts secured by the terms of the assignment, is obviously nothing more than a stipulation for the performance of a duty which the law would recognise and enforce without such stipulation; and how it can become a conclusive badge of fraud, is, on principle, difficult to perceive" Floyd v. Smith, 9 Ohio St. 546. The cases are in conflict, without any decided preponderance of authority, as to whether an assignment stipulating for a release is rendered invalid by reason of a reservation to the assignor of the surplus after satisfying the claims of creditors who consent to release the debtor. The doctrine of the principal case, that an express reservation of the surplus in such an assignment avoids it, is supported by the decisions of several states: Hyslop v. Clarke, 14 Johns. 458; Berry v. Riley, 2 Barb. 307; Green v. Trieber, 3 Md. 11; McFarland v. Birdsall, 14 Ind. 126. And it is held that an implied reservation of the surplus, where the assignment makes no disposition of that remaining after paying releasing creditors, vitiates the assignment equally with an express reservation: Malcolm v. Hodges, 8 MJ 418; Bridges v. Hindes, 16 Id. 10: Whedbee v. Stewart, 40 Id. 414. In a recent case in the U. S. District Court for Mississippi, an assignment making a release in full a condition of payment of a certain per cent. of the debt, without providing for a distribution of any surplus among the non-assenting creditors, was held void on its face, although it provided for the payment of all other creditors out of the surplus remaining after paying the specified per cent. of the preferred debts, as it ap peared from the face of the assignment and schedule annexed that nothing would be left to the non-assenting creditors. "The vice of the release demanded cannot be cured by a contingency, which it is apparent from the face of the conveyance, schedule and proof, can never take place:" Seale v. Vaiden, 10 Fed. Rep. 831. That an assignment stipulating for a release is not necessarily void, although it do not direct any surplus which may remain after satisfying the claims of the accepting and releasing creditors to be applied to the payment of other debts, or even though it direct any such surplus to be paid to the debtor himself, is maintained by a number of authorities: Gordon v. Cannon, 18 Gratt. 387; Haven v. Richardson, 5 N. H. 113; Conkling v. Carson, 11 Ill. 503; Finlay v. Dickerson, 29 Id. 9; Todd v. Buckman, 11 Me. 41; Livingston v. Bell, 3 Watts 198; Mechanics' Bank v. Gorman, W. & S. 304; Brown v. Lyon, 17 Ala. 659. In Nightingale v. Harris, 6 R. I. 321, such an assignment was held not vitiated by an implied reservation to the assignor of the surplus, it being shown from the relative value of the property assigned, and the amount of the debts, that no resulting trust could result to the debtor. WAYLAND E. BENJAMIN. Supreme Court of Iowa. GREEN v. WILDING. When the court can pronounce the contract of an infant to be to his prejudice, it is void, and when to his benefit, as for necessaries, it is good; and when the contract is of an uncertain nature, as to benefit or prejudice, it is voidable only at the election of the infant. A conveyance of land by an infant for a money consideration, not shown to have been inadequate, is voidable at the election of the infant within a reasonable time after attaining majority. What is a reasonable time within the meaning of the statute, depends upon the circumstances of each case. Where the only excuse offered for a delay of three or four years in bringing suit to avoid the conveyance of a minor was, that plaintiff was informed by others than those competent to give legal advice, that she could not maintain a suit till her younger brother reached his majority, and she waited three months, after being informed that she could disaffirm her contract, before commencing action. Held, that the act of disaffirmance was not within a reasonable time. APPEAL from Pottawattamie District Court. This was an action in equity to compel the defendant to reconvey to the plaintiff the undivided one-third of certain eighty acres of land. The court dismissed the plaintiff's petition. The plaintiff appealed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Ament & Sims, for appellant. Wright & Baldwin, for appellee. The opinion of the court was delivered by DAY, J.-In 1869, one C. H. Barton died seised of the land in question, leaving his widow, Rebecca Barton, and his children, Charles B. Barton and the plaintiff, his sole legal heirs. On the 19th of February 1872, Rebecca, Ida and Charles Barton, for the consideration of $800, conveyed the land in controversy to the defendant. At the time of this conveyance the plaintiff was thirteen or fourteen years of age, and Charles Barton was younger. No order of court was obtained appointing a guardian of the minors, or directing the sale of the real estate in question. The purchase was made by the defendant at the urgent solicitation of Rebecca Barton, and upon her representation that she could not otherwise maintain, educate and clothe her children. It does not appear but that the price paid was the full value of the land at the time of the purchase. The purchase-price was paid to Rebecca Barton. The plaintiff lived with her mother until her marriage, in September 1877. The plaintiff was born in March 1858 or 1859. This action was commenced on the 14th of November 1880, when the plaintiff was either twenty-one years and eight months, or twenty-two years and eight months of age. She assigns as the reason why she did not commence the action sooner, that she was advised by her neighbors and her mother that she could not bring the action until her brother, who is still a minor, became of age. It does not appear that she applied for or received legal advice upon the subject. She commenced the action about three months after she was advised by one McCoid that she could do so. 1. It is insisted that the plaintiff's deed was without consideration, and is, therefore, void. The consideration was paid to the plaintiff's mother, and it is not shown to have been inadequate. The plaintiff resided with her mother until her marriage, and it does not appear but that she received the full benefit of the consideration in her support and education. The rule respecting the contract of an infant is as follows: "That when the court can pronounce the contract to be to the infant's prejudice, it is void, and when to his benefit, as for necessaries, it is good; and when the contract is of an uncertain nature, as to benefit or prejudice, it is voidable only at the election of the infant:" Keane v. Boycott, 2 H. Bl. 511; 2 Kent. Com. 193; Wheaton v. East, 5 Yerg. 41. The case of Swafford v. Ferguson, 31 Am. Rep. 639, s. c. 3 Lea 292, cited and relied upon by appellant, is one in which there was no consideration whatever for the conveyance of the infant. The conveyance in this case, in our opinion, was not void, but voidable at the election of the plaintiff within a reasonable time after attaining majority. See Code, sect. 2238. 2. The only act of disaffirmance which the plaintiff did in the case was the commencement of this suit, which was either four years and eight months or three years and eight months, after she attained her majority. In Wright v. Germain, 21 Iowa 585, it was held that an act of disaffirmance about two years after the plaintiff attained majority was too late, although during the last year of that time he had been in the military service of the United States. In Jones v. Jones, 46 Iowa 466, it was held that an act of disaffirmance about six months after attaining majority, was not, under the circumstances, within a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time within the meaning of the statute, depends upon the circumstances of each case: Jenkins v. Jenkins, 12 Iowa 195. In this case the only excuse offered for the great delay is that the plaintiff was informed by her mother and neighbors that she could not disaffirm the contract until her brother became of age. She, however, did not take legal advice, and she waited at least three months after she was informed that she could disaffirm the contract before she commenced the action. In our opinion the plaintiff's act of disaffirmance was not within a reasonable time. The judgment is affirmed. There has been comparatively little legislation in this country respecting the disability of infants to enter into contracts, and there is great confusion and conflict among the authorities upon the subject. Section 2238 of the Code of Iowa, referred to by the court in the principal case, is as follows: "A minor is bound, not only by contracts for necessaries, but also by his other contracts, unless he disaffirms them within a reasonable time after he attains his majority, and restores to the other party all money or property received by him by virtue of the contract and remaining within his control at any time after attaining his majority." In England, on the other hand, by the statute of 37 and 38 Vict. c. 62, all contracts thenceforth entered into by infants, and which, but for the statute, would have been held voidable, are made absolutely void and incapable of ratification upon arriving at majority. In some of the United States, also, contracts entered into by infants cannot be VOL. XXXI.-35 enforced unless there has been a written ratification after attaining majority. See Thurlow v. Gilmore, 40 Me. 378; stat. of Maine 1845, c. 166; Stern v. Ferman, 4 Met. (Ky.) 309; Booney v. Reardin, 6 Bush 34, 40, holding that the statute does not apply to contracts for necessaries. The purpose of the above quoted section of the Iowa statute is to fix the limit of the duration, and not to prescribe the time of the commencement of the period within which a minor may disaffirm his contract. It is accordingly held that before the lapse of a reasonable time after majority, the contract of a minor may be disaffirmed by him, whether the disaffirmance takes place before or after majority: Childs v. Dobbins, 55 Iowa 205. At the common law the rules as to when an infant may disaffirm his contracts, appears to be that "all executory contracts, which are voidable on the ground of infancy, may be avoided during infancy by the infant as well as afterwards; as when |