Ad. & E. (N. S.) 218; Wood v. Morewood, 3 Id. 440; Hilton v. Woods, L. R., 4 Eq. 438; Jegon v. Vivian, L. R., 6 Chancery 760. The doctrine of the English courts on this subject is probably as well stated by Lord HATHERLY, in the House of Lords, in the case of Livington v. Rawyards Coal Co., L. R., 5 App. Cas. 33, as anywhere else. He said: "There is no doubt that if a man furtively, and in bad faith, robs his neighbor of his property, and because it is underground is probably for some little time not detected, the court of equity in this country will struggle, or I would rather say, will assert its authority to punish the fraud by fixing the person with the value of the whole of the property which he has so furtively taken, and making him no allowance in respect of what he has so done, as would have been justly made to him if the parties had been working by agreement." But "when once we arrive at the fact that an inadvertence has been the cause of the misfortune, then the simple course is to make every just allowance for outlay on the part of the person who has so acquired the property, and to give back to the owner, so far as is possible under the circumstances of the case, the full value of that which cannot be restored to him in specie." There seems to us to be no doubt that in the case of a wilful trespass the rule as stated above is the law of damages both in England and in this country, though in some of the state courts the milder rule has been applied even to this class of cases. Such are some that are cited from Wisconsin: Singlo v. Schneider, 24 Wis. R. 299; Weymouth v. Railroad Co., 17 Id. 550. On the other hand, the weight of authority in this country as well as in England favors the doctrine that where the trespass is the result of inadvertence or mistake, and the wrong was not intentional, the value of the property when first taken must govern, or if the conversion sued for was after value had been added to it by the work of the defendant, he should be credited with this addition. Winchester v. Craig, 33 Mich. 205, contains a full examination of the authorities on the point: Heard v. James, 49 Miss. 236; Baker v. Wheeler, 8 Wendell 505; Baldwin v. Porter, 12 Conn. 484. While these principles are sufficient to enable us to fix a measure of damages in both classes of torts where the original trespasser is defendant, there remains a third class where a purchaser from him is sued, as in this case, for the conversion of the property to his own use. In such case, if the first taker of the property were guilty of no wilful wrong, the rule can in no case be more stringent against the defendant who purchased of him than against his vendor. But the case before us is one where, by reason of the wilful wrong of the party who committed the trespass, he was liable, under the rule we have supposed to be established, for the value of the timber at Depere the moment before he sold it, and the question to be decided is whether the defendant who purchased it then with no notice that the property belonged to the United States, and with no intention to do wrong, must respond by the same rule of damages as his vendor should if he had been sued. It seems to us that he must. The timber at all stages of the conversion was the property of plaintiff. Its purchase by defendant did not divest the title nor the right of possession. The recovery of any sum whatever is based upon that proposition. This right, at the moment preceding the purchase by defendant at Depere, was perfect, with no right in any one to set up a claim for work and labor bestowed on it by the wrongdoer. It is also plain that by purchase from the wrongdoer defendant did not acquire any better title to the property than his vendor had. It is not a case where an innocent purchaser can defend himself under that plea. If it were, he would be liable to no damages at all, and no recovery could be had. On the contrary, it is a case to which the doctrine of caveat emptor applies, and hence the right of recovery in plaintiff. On what ground then can it be maintained that the right to recover against him should not be just what it was against his vendor the moment before he interfered and acquired possession? If the case were one which concerned additional value placed upon the property by the work or labor of the defendant after he had purchased, the same rule might be applied as in case of the inadvertent trespasser. But here he has added nothing to its value. He acquired possession of property of the United States at Depere, which, at that place, and in its then condition, is worth $850, and he wants to satisfy the claim of the government by the payment of $60. He founds his right to do this, not on the ground that anything he has added to the property has increased its value by the amount of the difference between these two sums, but on the proposition that in purchasing the property, he purchased of the wrongdoer a right to deduct what the labor of the latter had added to its value. If, as in the case of an unintentional trespasser, such right existed, of course defendant would have bought it and stood in his shoes; but, as in the present case, of an intentional trespasser, who had no such right to sell, the defendant could purchase none. Such is the distinction taken in the Roman law as stated in the Institutes of Justinian, Lib. II., Title I., sect. 34. After speaking of a painting by one man on the tablet of another, and holding it to be absurd that the work of an Appelles or Parrhasius should go without compensation to the owner of a worthless tablet, if the painter had possession fairly, he says, as translated by Dr. Cooper: "But if he, or any other, shall have taken away the tablet feloniously, it is evident the owner may prosecute by action of theft." The case of Nesbitt v. St. Paul Lumber Co., 21 Minn. 491, is directly in point here. The Supreme Court of Minnesota says: "The defendant claims that because they (the logs) were enhanced in value by the labor of the original wrongdoer in cutting them, and the expense of transporting them to Anoka, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the enhanced value, that is, that he is not entitled to recover the full value at the time and place of conversion." That was a case, like this, where the defendant was the innocent purchaser of the logs from the wilful wrongdoer, and where, as in this case, the transportation of them to a market was the largest item in their value at the time of conversion by defendant; but the court overruled the proposition and affirmed a judgment for the value at Anoka, the place of sale. To establish any other principle in such a case as this would be very disastrous to the interest of the public in the immense forest lands of the government. It has long been a matter of complaint that the depredations upon these lands are rapidly destroying the finest forests in the world. Unlike the individual owner who, by fencing and vigilant attention, can protect his valuable trees, the government has no adequate defence against this great evil. Its liberality in allowing trees to be cut on its land for mining, agricultural and other specified uses, has been used to screen the lawless depredator who destroys and sells for profit. VOL. XXXI.-86 To hold that when the government finds its own property in hands but one removed from these wilful trespassers, and asserts its right to such property by the slow processes of the law, the holder can set up a claim for the value which has been added to the property by the guilty party in the act of cutting down the trees and removing the timber, is to give encouragement and reward to the wrongdoer, by providing a safe market for what he has stolen, and compensation for the labor he has been compelled to do to make his theft effectual and profitable. We concur with the circuit judge in this case, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.* SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND.5 SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.". ACCORD. Parol Release of Judgment for less Sum than due.-A parol release of a judgment for money, in consideration of the payment of a less sum, is invalid, although such release is indorsed upon the execution issued in the original action: Weber v. Couch, 134 Mass. ACTION. See Tender. AGENT. Contract by Broker-Payment to Broker by Purchaser.-A broker who was not intrusted with the possession of the property, contracted in his own name to sell the same to a vendee, who had no knowledge that the broker was not the real owner but dealt with him as such. The broker notified his principals that he had sold for them, and directed 1 Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions filed during Oct. Term 1882. The cases will probably appear in 7 Otto's Reports. 2 From John Lathrop, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 134 Mass. Rep. 3 From T. K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 77 Mo. Reports. 4 From E. L. De Witt, Esq., Reporter. The cases will probably appear in 38 or 39 Ohio St. Rep. 5 From Arnold Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 14 R. I. Rep. From Edwin T. Palmer, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 55 Vt. Rep. where to ship the property to the purchaser. The owners, without any knowledge that the broker had contracted in his own name, and without any conduct on their part clothing the broker with authority to receive payment for them, or any possession, actual or constructive, of the property, delivered the same to the vendee. Held, payment by the purchaser to the broker, under such circumstances, is not a bar to the right of recovery by the owners: Crosby v. Hill, 38 or 39 Ohio St. BAILMENT. Bank-Deposit of Bonds for safe keeping-Negligence. The plaintiff delivered to the defendant bank $4000 of U. S. bonds and received this writing: "Received of J. D. Whitney four thousand dollars for safe keeping as a special deposit. S. M. Waite, C." Held, that it was a naked deposit without reward; that the defendant would not be liable for the robbery or larceny of the bonds, unless there was complicity or bad faith; that it was answerable only for fraud or for gross negligence; that the law demands good faith, and the same care of the plaintiff's bonds as defendant took of its own of like character: Whitner v. First Nat. Bank of Brattleboro, 55 Vt. The facts that the safe was left open during the transaction of business, that there was no gate in the passage-way from the rear of the banking-room behind the counter and that only one person was left in charge of the bank about noon each day, do not seem so unusual as to be accounted negligence, much less gross negligence: Id. The true test of gross negligence in this case is whether the defendant took the same care of these bonds as it did of its own: Id. BANK, See Bailment, BANKRUPTCY. Discharge-Foreign Creditor.-A debt contracted and payable in Canada by a person resident in this state to a person resident in Canada, is not barred by a discharge under the U. S. Bankrupt Act, when the foreign creditor neither proved his debt in bankruptcy, though provable under the act, nor in any way was a party to the proceedings, nor had personal notice thereof: McDougall v. Page, 55 Vt. BILLS AND NOTES. See Limitations, Statute of. Lost Note-Right of Payee to Sue. The payee of a lost note which is negotiable and payable to him or bearer cannot sustain an action at law to recover the amount; a court of equity alone can give relief: Adams v. Edmunds, 55 Vt. BROKER. See Agent. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Municipal Corporations. Regulation of Commerce-Prohibition of Sale of Oleomargerine.The act prohibiting the manufacture or sale of oleomargerine or any other article in imitation of butter or cheese, is constitutional: State v. Addington, 77 Mo. State enactments which have the effect of regulating commerce between the states are not obnoxious to that provision of the constitution of the United States which declares that "Congress shall have power to reg |