The case does decide, that where a State is admitted into the Union with a Constitution which fixes a time for holding the election for representatives in Congress, the time thus fixed will be regarded as the proper and legal time, but it does not decide, because it does not involve the question, whether that time can be subsequently changed by the legislature of the State.

§ 112. But the reasoning in Baldwin vs. Trowbridge, whether sound or not, applies, of course, only to elections for representatives in Congress, since it was within the province of the constitutional convention to fix the times and places for holding all other elections; and it would seem quite clear that under the Constitution of Michigan the act in question, in so far as it applied to State elections, was unconstitutional. Where a constitutional provision clearly requires the citizen to vote at the place of his residence, it is certainly not within the power of the legislature to provide that he may vote elsewhere, and that a soldier has no residence in the field or camp, is also a clear proposition. (Chase vs. Miller, 41 Pa., State R., 403. Bourland vs. Hildreth, 26 Cal., 161. Opinion of Judges, 30 Conn., 591. Opinion of Justices, 44 N. H., 633.) In Iowa a statute of this character was held constitutional, upon the ground that a district residence was not required by the Constitution of that State. (Morrison vs. Springer, 15 Iowa, 304.) See also Lehman vs. McBride, 15 Ohio, State R., 573, and Chandler vs. Main, 16 Wis., 343.

§ 113. In the Constitutions of some of the States we find provisions not only fixing the qualifications

of voters, but also fixing the place of voting. Where the Constitution stops with an enumeration of the qualifications of an elector, and does not expressly declare that the elector must vote at the place of his residence, it is competent for the legislature to provide for the reception of votes out of the precinct or county of his residence. [Morrison vs. Springer, supra.] So that the question must turn upon the language employed in the particular constitution to be construed.

§ 114. Those provisions of law which fix the time or place of holding elections, are to be construed as mandatory, and not as merely directory. The reason for this is obvious. Every voter is presumed to know the law, and to be thereby informed as to the time when, and the place where he may deposite his ballot; but, if that time or place be changed without proper authority and due notice, no voter can be held as legally bound to take notice of the change, and it can never be known how many voters have been deceived thereby, unless, indeed, all the persons entitled to vote should actually attend and vote at the illegal place, which might, perhaps, be held as a waiver of all objection thereto, provided the place was within the voting precinct. As to the time of the election, of course the day cannot be changed even by the consent of all the voters, and the general rule is, that if the polls are not kept open for as many hours as the law directs, and if legal voters in numbers sufficient to change the result, or to render it doubtful, are thereby deprived of the privilege of voting, the election must be set aside. A few minutes delay in opening the polls will make no

difference, but several hours delay, may render the election void, and certainly will have that effect if the party complaining of it can show that he has been injured thereby. (Chadwick vs. Melvin, Brightley's Election Cases, 251, 68 Pa. State, 333. Juker vs. Commonwealth, 20 Pa., State R., 484. Dickey vs. Hurlburt, 5 Cal. 343. People vs. Murray, 15 Cal., 321. Knowles vs. Yeates, 31 Cal., 82.)

§ 115. In Chadwick vs. Melvin, supra, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that, to remove the place of election three miles from that designated by law, or from a village to a place a half mile therefrom, and across a considerable stream, or from a designated school house to a vacant house more than half a mile distant therefrom, without authority or any absolutely controlling circumstances, must render the election therein void, and in the course of the opinion Thompson, C. J. says: "A fixed place, it seems to me, is as absolutely requisite according to the election laws, as is the time of voting. The holding of elections at the places fixed by law, is not directory; it is mandatory and cannot be omitted without error. I will not say that in case of the destruction of a designated building on the eve of an election, the election might not be held on the same or contiguous ground as a matter of necessity-necessitas non habet legem. But then the necessity must be absolute; discarding all mere ideas of convenience." [See also Journal of House of Representatives of Pa., 1856, page 204, case of Beck vs. McGhee. Miller vs. English, 1 Zab., (N. F.,) 317. Commonwealth vs. Commissioners, 5 Rawle, 75. Marshall vs. Kerns, 2 Swan, 68. Foster vs. Scarff, 15 Ohio State R., 535.]

The same rule prevails where the place of holding the election is fixed by a court, or by a board or officer, thereunto duly authorized by law. When once legally fixed by proper authority, it can only be changed by proper authority, and in the manner provided by law.

115a. In Illinois it has been held that the removal of the place of holding an election not more than 100 feet from the building designated as the proper place, did not vitiate the poll, it appearing that all the voters knew where the poll was opened, as it was readily seen from the lawful place, and made manifest by the crowd going and returning therefrom. No fraud or improper motive was shown to produce the change nor did any voter complain that he was deprived thereby of an opportunity to vote. [Dale vs. Irwin, 78 Ill., 170.]

§ 116. While it is true, that notice is essential to the validity of an election, it is not always essential that the particular form or manner of giving notice, which may be prescribed, shall be followed. It is essential that the electors should have notice of the time, place and objects of the election. That is, they should have knowledge of them, but an omission to follow the particular mode provided by statute for publishing such notice, may not render the election void, and will not, if the electors have actual notice, and do, in fact, take part in the election. This doctrine was laid down very broadly by the Supreme Court of Iowa, in Dishon vs. Smith [10 Iowa, 212.] The Court in that case say: "The Courts have held that the voice of the people is not to be rejected for a defect or even a want of notice, if they have, in truth, been called upon and have spoken. In the present case, whether there were notices or not, there was an election, and the people of the county voted,

and it is not alleged that any portion of them failed in knowledge of the pendency of the question, or to exercise their franchise."

§ 117. It is doubtless, perfectly true, that where the election has been held at the proper time, and the proper place, and the electors have had notice and participated in it, the want of such notice as the law provides, will not render it void. But if it appear that due notice has not been given, and that a portion of the electors have been thereby deprived of their right to vote, and particularly if the number thus deprived, is sufficient to have changed the result if they had voted on one side or the other,in such a case the election is clearly void.

§ 118. The general rule upon this subject is given by Judge Cooley, as follows: "Where, by the express provision of the statute, the election is to be held after proclamation, or notice, announcing the time or the place, or both, and where no such proclamation has been made, or notice given, the election is void. But where both the time and the place of an election are prescribed by law, every voter has a right to take notice of the law, and to deposit his ballot at the time and place appointed, notwithstanding the officer, whose duty it is to give notice of the election, has failed in that duty. The right to hold the election in such a case, is derived from the law, and not from the notice. And this rule will apply to an election to fill a vacancy, if the same occurs long enough before the election, to have become generally notorious, and if it was in fact generally known." (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 603.)

§ 119. The doctrine, that want of formal notice of an election will not render the election void, unless it appear that the failure to give such notice has, in