§ 531. The committee of elections of the forty-third Congress, held that it was competent and proper for the House to expel a territorial delegate upon proof that he was an actual polygamist. The House took no action upon this report, but there seems to be no reason to doubt the power of the House by a twothirds vote, to expel a member or delegate for this cause. (Case of Geo. Q. Cannon, ibid, 259.)

The power is only limited by the requirement of a two-thirds majority, and the House must judge as to what is a sufficient cause to justify its exercise.

§ 532. Where a class of persons are unlawfully excluded from the right to vote by the regular election officers, their remedy is to offer their ballots and afterwards proceed to contest the validity or result of the election, and if they choose, institute proper proceedings against such officers. They cannot organize independent or "outside" polls, cast their ballots thereat, and have them counted. (Gauze vs. Hodges, same vol. page 291. Ante Sec. 89.)

§ 533. Where a statute authorizes the governor to set aside the resignation of a county and order a new registration, he is not empowered to do the one without the other. He cannot disfranchise a county by setting aside an existing registration and failing or refusing to order a new one. (Ibid.)

§ 534. The Constitution, Article 1, Sec. 3, provides that if vacancies in the United States Senate "happen by resignation or otherwise during the recess of the legislature of a State, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies." In the recent case of Bell, of

New Hampshire, 46th Congress, the Senate considered fully and, it is presumed, finally settled the meaning of the words "happen by resignation or otherwise." It was contended that the authority of the governor to appoint is limited to filling vacancies which happen in a term which had been previously filled by the legislature, and this was the view taken by the majority of the committee. But the report of the minority, which was adopted by the Senate, took the ground that the governor may also fill a vacancy which happens when the legislature has failed to make the election, or the person chosen declines the appointment, as well as when the office, once filled, is vacated by death, resignation, or otherwise. The minority report in this case, submitted by Senator Hoar, of Massachusetts, and which may now be regarded as the law of the Senate, will be found in the Congressional Record of April 3, 1879, and an elaborate discussion is recorded in succeeding pages,

§ 535. Where, just prior to the election, certain voting precincts were abolished, thus leaving large numbers of voters from twenty-five to thirty-five miles from the nearest polls, it was held by the House of Representatives, that votes lost by this means could not be counted as if cast. (Lawrence vs. Sypher, 43d Congress.) The correctness of this ruling is not doubted; but it is believed to be equally clear that if the number of persons who are by such means deprived of the right to vote is so large that if cast they might have changed the result, the election ought to be set aside.

§ 536. In a proper case the Supreme Court of Wisconsin will require the board of state canvassers

to determine in accordance with law which one of the candidates at an election in that State, for the office of representative in the Congress of the United States, is entitled to the certificate of election. This does not contravene the constitutional power of the House to determine its members' right to the office; the court merely deciding whether the return made to such board, of votes cast in a county, should be included in their canvass and statement. Board of State Canvassers, 36 Wis., 498.)

(State vs.

§ 537. The requirements in Taylor's (Wis.,) Stat. 226, Sec. 72, that the board of inspectors shall destroy ballots "found so folded together as to present the appearance of one ballot," does not apply to repetitions of the name of a candidate on a single piece of paper. Such should be counted as a single ballot. (State vs. Pierce, 35 Wis., 93.)

§ 538. It is competent for a State to limit the right of suffrage to male citizens, and to do so is no violation of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, which provides that "no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." It is no defense to an indictment against a female for having voted illegally, that the defendant believed she had a right to vote, and voted in reliance on that belief. (United States vs. Anthony, 11 Blatchf. 200 Minor vs. Happersett, 53 Mo., 58.)

§ 539. Unless specially authorized by statute, a court of chancery will not, upon bill filed under its general power, inquire into the validity of an election. (Moore vs. Hoisington, 31 Ills., 243, and see

17 Ohio State, 271. 15 do, 114. 28 Pa. State, 9. 41 do, 396. 44 Mo., 223. Dickey vs. Reed, 78 Ills. 261.)

§ 540. A constitutional provision that municipal officers shall be elected by the electors of the municipality, or appointed by the authorities thereof, is imperative and cannot be set aside or evaded by the legislature. Its purpose is to secure to such municipalities their right of local self-government, and that right cannot be taken from them without a violation of the constitution, nor can the duty of securing and protecting it be evaded by an indirect attempt to provide another mode of filling such offices. (Bolton vs. Albertson, 55 N. Y., 50.)

§ 541. A minor who is otherwise duly qualified cannot be convicted of illegal voting if he voted under the honest belief induced by information from parents, relatives or acquaintances having knowledge of the time of his birth, that he had attained his majority. (Gordon vs. State, 52 Ala., 208.) But it is clearly the duty of every person who exercises the right to vote to use due diligence in ascertaining the facts as to his qualifications, and he cannot shut his eyes to facts which, by the exercise of such diligence, he might ascertain. The general rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man, applies with all its force to cases of the violation of election laws; but ignorance of facts, if it be not wilful ignorance, may excuse. The true doctrine is, unless otherwise provided by statute, that if the voter is aware of a state of facts which disqualify him under the law, and is ignorant of the law, he may be convicted of the crime of illegal voting. If, however, he is honestly mistaken about a question of fact, as for example, if he honestly believes him

self to be twenty-one years of age when he is not, he may be excused. If he knows he is only twenty years old, but is ignorant of the law, which requires him to be twenty-one years of age, he cannot be excused. And so a person accused of illegal voting may show that he was honestly mistaken about any fact, and that he acted conscientiously, but he cannot show that he did not know the law.

§ 542. The rule, making a certificate of election conclusive of the right to the office, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, is not varied, because a prior incumbent contesting the election is in office, and is authorized to hold until his successor is elected and qualified. (Moulton vs. Reid, 54 Ala., 320.)

§ 543. In a proceeding by mandamus to compel a board of canvassers to count a vote as returned by the officers of election, when it appears that an alteration has been made in a return of the vote, but the canvassers do not know whether it was made before or after the return was delivered to them by the officers of election, the circuit court will inquire and determine what the return as delivered actually was, and will compel them to make the count accordingly. (State vs. Garesche, 65 Mo. 480)

§ 544. The inquiry in a court for the trial of a contested election, is not necessarily limited to the matters presented in the contestor's statement. The contestee may be heard, not merely in denial, but in proof of other matters tending to show his right to the office, notwithstanding the matters alleged in the statement; and these other matters the contestor may also controvert or avoid. (Baker vs. Long, 17 Kan., 341.)