the Governor of a State by virtue of power conferred upon him to grant the same, relieves the person to whom it is granted, not only from the punishment provided by his sentence, but from all the consequential disabilities of the judgment of conviction, and restores such person to the full enjoyment of his civil rights, including the right to vote. (Wood vs. Fitzgerald, 3 Oregon, 569, 4 Blackstone's Comm. 402, 8 Bacon's Ab. Title Pardon. The People vs. Pease, 3 Johnson's Cases, 333-4. In re Deming, 10 Johnson 233. Perkins vs. Stevens, 24 Pick., 277. Ex parte Garland 4 Wall., 333.)

The constitutional provisions conferring upon the executives of the several States, the pardoning power are generally moddled after, and are analagous to, the provision in the Constitution of the United States which empowers the President "to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.” (Const., Art. 2, Sec. 2.) In construing this provision in ex parte Garland supra, the Supreme Court of the United States, said:

"The power thus conferred is unlimited with the exception stated. It extends to every offense known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. This power of the President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy, reposed in him, cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions. Such being the case,

the inquiry arises as to the effect and operation of a pardon, and on this point all the authorities concur. A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense."

CHAPTER II.

OF THE QUALIFICATIONS, POWERS AND DUTIES OF

ELECTION OFFICERS.

§ 75. In the House of Representatives of the United States there is a conflict of decisions touching the validity of the acts of a person acting as an officer of election, and who is such defacto only, and not de jure. In some of the earlier cases in that body it was held that an election conducted by persons not duly qualified, was void. Thus in Jackson vs. Wayne (Cl. & H., 47) it was held that where the law required three magistrates to preside at an election, a return by three persons, two of whom were not magistrates, was defective. And in McFarland vs.

Culpepper, [Cl. & H. 221,] it was held, without much consideration or discussion, that a failure on the part of election officers to take the required oath vitiates the election, and this ruling was followed in Easton vs. Scott, [Cl. & H., 272,] and in Draper vs. Johnson, ibid., 702. In Howard vs. Cooper the vote of a precinct was thrown out because the election was presided over by but two inspectors, when the statute required three, (1 Bartlett p. 375,) and in Delano vs. Morgan, (2 Bartlett, page 168,) the vote of one township was thrown out, upon the ground that one of the three judges, was a deserter from the union army, and therefore not capable of taking or holding the office.

§ 76. On the contrary, however, the cases of Mullikin vs. Fuller, (1 Bartlett, 176,) Clark vs. Hall, (ibid 215,) Flanders vs. Hahn, (ibid. 443,) and Blair vs. Barrett, (ibid 313,) all seem to recognize the doctrine that, in the absence of fraud, the acts of an officer defacto of an election are valid as to third parties and the public. It is, however, undeniable that prior to the 41st Congress, the weight of authority in the House of Representatives was on the side of Jackson vs. Wayne, and the other cases above cited which followed that ruling down to, and including Delano vs. Morgan.

§ 77. But in the case of Barnes vs. Adams, which arose in the Forty-first Congress, (2 Bartlett, 760,) the question was reviewed at length, and most of the cases arising both in Congress and the Courts, were cited and examined, and the conclusion was reached both by the Committee and by the House, that in order to give validity to the official acts of an

officer of elections, so far as they affect third parties and the public, and in the absence of fraud, it is only necessary that such officer shall have color of authority. It is sufficient if he be an officer defacto, and not a mere usurper. The report in this case, after quoting from numerous decisions, both in the House and in the Courts of this country, continues as follows:

"The question, therefore, regarded in the light of precedent or authority alone, would stand about as follows: The judicial decisions are all to the effect that the acts of officers de facto, so far as they affect third parties or the public, in the absence of fraud, are as valid as those of an officer de jure. The decisions of this House are to some extent conflicting; the point has seldom been presented upon its own merits, separated from questions of fraud; and in the few cases where this seems to have been the case the rulings are not harmonious. In one of the most recent and important cases, (Blair vs. Barrett,) in which there was an exceedingly able report, the doctrine of the courts, as above stated, is recognized and indorsed. The question is therefore a settled question in the courts of the country, and is, so far as this House is concerned, to say the least, an open one."

"Your committee feel constrained to adhere to the law as it exists and is administered in all the courts of the country, not only because of the very great authority by which it is supported, but for the further reason, as stated in the outset, that we believe the rule to be most wise and salutary. The officers of election are chosen of necessity from among all classes of the people; they are numbered in every State by thousands; they are often men unaccus

tomed to the formalities of legal proceedings. Omissions and mistakes in the discharge of their ministe rial duties are almost inevitable. If this House shall establish the doctrine that an election is void because an officer thereof is not in all respects duly qualified, or because the same is not conducted strictly according to law, notwithstanding it may have been a fair and free election, the result will be, very many contests, and, what is worse, injustice will be done in many cases. It will enable those who are so disposed, to seize upon mere technicality in order to defeat the will of the majority."

§ 78. The report of the committee in this case was adopted by the House nem. con. after a full discussion, (Cong. Globe, July 1870, pages 5179 to 5193,) and the doctrine there asserted may now be regarded as the settled law of the House. The same point was decided in the same way, and by the same House, in the case of Eggleston vs. Strader, (2 Bartlett, 897,) and an admirable discussion of the question will be found in the report of the committee in that case made to the House by Mr. Hale of Maine. It is true that the writer of the report in the case of Reid vs. Julian, (2 Bartlett, 822,) asserted the contrary doctrine, but the case was decided independently of that question. It turned upon a question of fact, as to whether fraud was proven, so that this case cannot be regarded as an authority against Barnes vs. Adams, and Eggleston vs. Strader. The doctrine of the latter cases was reaffirmed in the case of Gooding vs. Wilson, 42d Congress.

§ 79. In the Courts of the country the ruling has been uniform, and the validity of the acts of officers