to the Faubourgs, and society had become reorganized, the necessity for a new divorce law became universally felt. On the 31st of March, 1803, a law on divorce was promulgated, on the whole moderate and just, the determinating causes of which were maintained in the case of a limited divorce (separation de corps et de biens), when in 1816 the divorce law itself was abrogated, and which, with some modifications, has been re-enacted by the law of the 19th of July, 1884. By the law of 1803 divorce was granted for the following causes: 1st. Adultery of the wife. which may be re-established as in the law of 1803; and the facultative portion of the last clause, giving judges the option whether or not to convert the decree for a separation de corps et de biens into one of absolute divorce. This will probably be made obligatory. The re-establishment of clause 2 as in the text of the old law is not so absolutely prejudicial to the wife as would at first appear. For while under that law clause 2 gave her no right to demand a divorce for the simple infidelity of her husband, yet it could be obtained under clause 3 for "grievous injury." Although the granting this was left to the discretion of the judge, divorce was usually ac 2d. Adultery of the husband, when he introduced | corded on the ground that marital infidelity on the a concubine in the conjugal domicil. part of the husband was a grievous injury" to the 3d. Condemnation of either party of an infamous wife. crime. Indeed this 3d clause had a general and saving 4th. Excesses, violence and extreme cruelty and effect, for it was applied in cases where clause 4 was injury. 5th. Mutual consent. The last ground for a divorce was a concession to the supporters of the law of 1792, and the more radical element of the populace, but it was so hampered and restricted by the procedure to be followed, that in practice it was very difficult to accomplish. The re-establishment of the monarchy necessarily led to the abrogation of the law upon divorce, and for more than sixty years no serious or lasting effort was made to revive it. Six years ago, however, M. Naquet began his active and energetic propaganda, and in spite of rebuffs, ridicule and the most strenuous opposition, persistently carried out his purpose, and on the 19th of July, 1884, the new divorce law was voted. It is little more than the re-enactment of the divorce law of 1803, but there are two salient features in the new law, one of which evinces the higher esteem and respect accorded to women in France in the present age, and the tendency to constrain men to the same marital obligations and duties as The second ground upon which divorce may be obtained is simply for the adultery of the husband, the restriction when he keeps a concubine in the conjugal domicil being abrogated. women. The clause authorizing divorce by mutual consent is also abolished, and in its stead the following new clause is inserted: "When the divorce a mensa et a thoro (separation de corps et de biens) shall have existed for three years, the judgment decreeing such separation may be converted into a judgment for an absolute divorce." These are the only changes made by the new law. It is open to objections in many respects, and it is questionable whether all of its provisions will be sustained. It is not the law projected by Naquet or voted by the Chambre, but as modified, curtailed and restored by the Conservative Senate. The clauses most condemned are the second, not effectively, but morally true; as although a wife could not obtain a divorce for a mere misdemeanor, yet if the misdemeanor evinced moral degradation or turpitude it would be considered a grievous injury, and a divorce granted on this ground. The facility with which a separation de corps et de biens, or a limited divorce, may be converted, under the new clause in the recent divorce law, into an absolute divorce on a mere ex parte motion, is not the radical change it would appear to Americans, for a limited divorce in France is not a palliative for an absolute divorce, as in New York and else where, granted for causes insufficient to sustain an application for an absolute divorce, but is decreed for identically the same causes. In the law of 1803 it was made co-existent with an absolute divorce, as a concession to the conservative and religious element of the people who regarded marriage as an indissoluble sacrament. The procedure under the new divorce law is pur, posely complicated and slow; the object being that parties to a divorce suit shall have sufficient leisure and opportunity to reflect upon the gravity of the steps they propose to take and the serious nature of the bond they wish to dissolve. More than this, the judicial authority, which in France is much more extended than with us, and has a quasi paternal or patriarchal character, twice intervenes, and the judge in camera, having cited the parties to appear in person before him, admonishes and endeavors to reconcile them. The libel or complaint of the plaintiff, which in France is a simple statement, devoid of the technicalities inherent to such papers with us, is presented by him in person to the judge, and explained and discussed. Should the statement appear sufficiently well founded to warrant a divorce suit, and should the plaintiff remain obdurate to the perfunctory administration of the judge, the latter issues a citation to the defendant, as well as the plaintiff, to appear before him in camera. Here he uses his endeavors to reconcile the parties, going through the patriarchal comedy for the second time. Should it prove unsuccessful, and the plaintiff persist in his purpose, which he very naturally does (not having begun his suit for the mere pleasure of being lectured by the judge), his statement, and the papers in support thereof, are transmitted by the judge to the attorney-general (or district attorney [procureur general]) (who is always a party to a divorce suit) and the court, the presiding judge of which, after hearing the attorney-general, either accords or refuses to plaintiff the permission to issue a summons. Here then commences the suit proper, the procedure of which may be divided into two phases, the private and the public. The parties, as previously appear before a judge in camera, but this time accompanied by their respective counsel, who state the grounds upon which their clients demand or oppose a divorce, mentioning the proofs they possess and the witnesses they intend to subpoena. Discussions between the parties naturally ensue, and objections are made to the proofs offered and the witnesses to be cited; all of which, with such further observations as the parties may choose to make, are duly recorded by the clerk and signed by the parties. This ends the proceedings in camera, which still partake of the patriarchal character, so inherent in French jurisprudence, which goes upon the assumption that the people at large are children, and ought to be treated as such. Of The procès-verbal or statement thus signed is submitted to the court, which decides whether or not the petition for a divorce is admissible. course in the latter case the suit is dismissed, and the only remedy for the plaintiff is to appeal against the interlocutory judgment. If however the libel or petition is admissible, the public and regular procedure commences. Here the peculiar features incident to French divorce suits end, and the subsequent procedure is necessarily similar in its general characteristics to that of divorce suits in our own States. The judgment however when rendered by the court does not per se dissolve the marriage. The law requires that the dissolution should be publicly pronounced by the civil officer (usually the mayor) of the domicil of the plaintiff. The consequences resulting from a divorce are necessarily, on account of the subordinate position of the wife during marriage and the vested rights which children have in their parents' property, more serious and extensive than in the United States or England. The marital power and authority accorded by the Code to the husband is destroyed, and the woman resumes her position and rights as a feme sole. Both parties have the privilege of remarrying, with the exception that the party convicted of adultery cannot marry his or her accomplice, and the restriction that a woman cannot marry until ten months shall have elapsed since the judgment of divorce. Should the children issued of the marriage be minors, they are intrusted to the care of the party in whose favor the divorce has been pronounced, unless a specific decree of the court order otherwise (C. C. 302). The right of the children to maintenance, education, and the share accorded them in the estate of their father and mother by the Code, subsist and are unchanged by a divorce pronounced between their parents. As to the parties themselves, the property relations existing between them may be modified. Articles 299 and 300, C. C., deprive the party against whom the divorce has been pronounced of all privileges and advantages (from a pecuniary point of view) which he or she had acquired by marriage settlements, or gifts made during the marriage, whereas the party in whose favor the divorce was pronounced is entitled to all the benefits and advantages acquired by marriage settlements or otherwise, even though the stipulation existed that such benefits and advantages should be reciprocal. N. MORTON GRINNELL. April 18, 1876, plaintiff executed and delivered to defendant a chattel mortgage upon, among other things, a mare. The mortgage, which was to run until December 1, 1876, contained the usual clause, “that in case the * * shall at any time deem himself unsafe it shall be lawful for him to take possession," etc. On July 18, 1876, without the consent or authority of the mortgagor, defendant in good faith took possession of said mare, and sold her at public auction. In an action for conversion, held, that defendant was not liable; that said clause vested in him an absolute discretion, the exercise of which did not depend upon the fact whether or not he had reasonable ground for deeming himself insecure. APPEAL from a judgment entered upon the report of a referee in favor of plaintiff. The opinion states the case. D. M. Darrin, for appellant. J. W. & H. J. Dininny, for respondent. HAIGHT, J. This action was brought to recover damages for an alleged conversion of a mare, and for damages resulting to her colt by reason of taking her from it before it was old enough to wean. The defense was justification under a chattel mortgage. On the 1st day of April, 1875, the plaintiff entered into a contract in writing with the defendant, in aud by the terms of which he leased the defendant's farm, in the town of Thurston, Steuben county, for the term of one year, to work upon shares, and in the fall of the year to sow and put in a quantity of winter wheat and rye, and to harvest the same the next summer when the crops should mature. The plaintiff, pursuant to the lease, entered into possession of the farm, and worked the same during the term embraced in the lease. On the 18th day of April, 1876, the parties had an accounting and settlement of their transactions under the lease, whereby it was found and agreed that the plaintiff was indebted to the defendant in the sum of $100, to secure which the plaintiff executed and delivered to the defendant a chattel mortgage upon all his interest in the winter wheat and rye growing upon the farm, and also in one sorrel mare, conditioned that the plaintiff would pay the defendant the sum of $100 and the interest thereon on the 1st day of December, 1876. The mortgage contained the following clause. "That in case the said Arlon M. Vose shall at any time deem himself unsafe it shall be lawful for him to take possession of the said property, and to sell the same at public or private sale previous to the time above mentioned for the payment of said debt, applying the proceeds upon the mortgage after deducting all expenses of sale and keeping said property." On the 17th day of July, 1876, the parties entered into an agreement, in and by the terms of which the plaintiff sold to the defendant his share and interest in the wheat then standing upon the defendant's farm for the sum of $10, and that amount was indorsed upon the mortgage. On the 18th day of July, 1876, the defendant caused the sorrel mare mentioned in the mortgage to be taken from the possession of the plaintiff under and by virtue of the mortgage without his authority or consent, and caused the same to be advertised and sold at public auction. It was for this taking that the plaintiff alleges conversion. The referee has held and decided that under the clause contained in the mortgage, "that in case the said Arlon M. Vose shall deem himself unsafe it shall be lawful for him to take possession," etc., the defendant must prove and establish to the satisfaction of the jury or referee that he deems himself unsafe before he is justified in taking possession of the property, and whether he is actually insecure and unsafe does not rest in the mere whim, caprice, or arbitrary will of the mortgagee, but becomes a question of fact, to be heard and determined like other important questions of fact, and governed by the same rules; that in this case the evidence did not justify the defendant in deeming himself unsafe, and that consequently he had no right to take possession of the mare at the time he did. This question presents the important question in the case for review. The appellant relies upon Huggans v. Fryer, 1 Lans. 276; Roy v. Goings, 96 Ill. 361; S. C., 36 Am. Rep. 151; Farrell v. Hildreth, 38 Barb. 178; Hall v. Sampson, 35 N. Y. 274. In the case of Huggans v. Fryer the mortgage was upon a yoke of oxen, and contained the clause that "if the mortgagee deems himself unsafe it shall be lawful for him to take possession of the property and sell the same at public or private sale previous to the time mentioned for the payment of the debt." In that case, the mortgagee, deeming himself unsafe, took possession of the property before the mortgage came due and sold the same without giving personal notice to the defendant. The question considered upon the appeal was whether or not the sale was illegal and void for want of personal notice to the defendant. It was held that the sale was valid. It does not appear from the case as reported that any evidence was given upon the question as to whether or not the plaintiff was unsafe when he took possession of the property, and that question does not appear to have been argued. The court,in commenting upon the case, says: "The taking possession of the property, and the advertisement of its sale was in strict conformity with the condition that when the mortgagee deemed it unsafe he could sell and apply the proceeds to the payment of the debt." In the case of Farrell v. Hildreth the action was for conversion of a wagon and heifer, which property the plaintiff claimed by virtue of a chattel mortgage executed to him by one John Farrell, containing the dan ger clause. The defendant, as sheriff, levied upon the property by virtue of an execution issued upon a judgment against John Farrell. The plaintiff demanded the property of the sheriff, which was refused, and the property was sold on the execution. The question raised upon the appeal in that case was whether or not at the time of the levy or demand by the plaintiff of the property the mortgagor had an interest in the property liable to be levied upon and sold on execution. The court held that where the mortgagor has retained no other interest in the property than an equity of redemption, such interest is not the subject of levy and sale, and that there was abundant ground for a feeling of insecurity on the part of the mortgagee. The sale was forbidden, and the property demanded; and the jury would have been warranted in finding that the mortgagee felt himself insecure and unsafe. The question as to whether or not it was necessary for the jury to so find does not appear to have been raised or discussed. In the case of Hall v. Sampson the action was for the conversion of a piano-forte, which was claimed by the plaintiff under a chattel mortgage containing the danger clause. The defendant, as sheriff, levied upon the same under an attachment, and the same was subsequently sold upon execution in the attachment suit. The mortgage covered a large amount of household furniture, embracing other articles besides the piano. At the time the piano was attached the mortgage was not due. Subsequently the plaintiff deemed himself insecure, and took possession of the mortgaged property except the piano. At this time he knew the piano had been attached, and his reason for not taking it into his possession with the other property was that it was at a distance of ten miles from his residence, and he had no convenient place to put it. The court held that the execution of the mortgage vested the plaintiff with title subject to be defeated by the subsequent performance of the condition, that the mortgage specifically defined the circumstances under which the grantee should become entitled to the right of possession, and that this evinces the mutual intent of the parties that until vested in the mortgagee it should remain in the mortgagor. His possessionary right was to terminate on the failure to pay the debt at the time named, or at such earlier time as might be fixed by the election of the mortgagee, if in good faith he should deem himself insecure; that the mortgagor's interest terminated when the plaintiff, finding his debt insecure, exercised his right under the mortgage to treat the condition as broken; that his act in taking possession of the bulk of the property was an assertion of his claiming enforcement of the forfeitFrom that time he had the right of possession as well as the legal title, and the authority of the sheriff ended with the interest of the debtor. ure. Roy v. Goings, supra, was decided in the Supreme Court of Illinois. The rule as stated by that court is, that under a clause in a chattel mortgage, that if the mortgagee shall at any time before the debt becomes due feel himself unsafe or insecure, he shall have the right to take possession of the mortgaged property, the mortgagee has the right to determine the crisis for himself, subject only to the limitation that his judgment of insecurity must be exercised in good faith, upon reasonable grounds or probable cause. That this rule does not require that there should be actual danger, or that the proof should furnish the court at the time of the trial with reasonable grounds to decide that there was actual danger. But it will be sufficient if at the trial it appears that at the time of the taking of possession there was apparent danger, such that a reasonable man might in good faith act upon. That the feeling of insecurity has reference to such feeling as is produced by some subsequent cause, or some cause not in being when the mortgage was executed. In the case of Smith v. Post, 1 Hun, 516, the action was to recover property which had been levied upon by virtue of an execution, and which property had been sold by virtue of a chattel mortgage in favor of the defendant. In this case the General Term of the Third Department held that the provision in the mortgage that in case of default in payment, or in case the mortgagee should at any time deem himself unsafe, he might take possession of the property and sell the same, was for the benefit of the mortgagee, and authorized him to take possession when there was default, or when in his judgment he deemed it best for the safety of his demand. And no proof was required to show that he considered himself unsafe, as the legal presumption would be that such was the fact when possession was taken before it was due. Thomas Mort. 443, states the rule to be that "where there is a clause in the mortgage which authorizes the mortgagee to take possession at any time when he may deem himself unsafe, the mortgagee may take the property away from the mortgagor at any time when he may think it best for his own interest, and if the power contained in the mortgage justifies such a course, he may sell the property and thus bar the equity of redemption even before the debt becomes due." Jones, in his new edition just published on Chattel Mortgages, at section 431, says: "A provision that the mortgagee may take possession whenever he shall deem himself unsafe is for his benefit, and authorizes him to take possession, when in his judgment he deems it best for his safety to do so; and upon his taking possession before default no proof is required to show that he considered himself unsafe, as the legal presumption is that such was the fact. He is made the sole judge of the happening of the contingency upon which he may take possession. It is immaterial whether his apprehensions of loss be well or ill founded. Being entitled to possession of the property for such cause, he may maintain an action for the possession of it against any one who detains it, or trover for the conversion of it. He may moreover take possession without making any previous demand for payment. Such a clause vests in the mortgagee an absolute discretion to take possession of property when he may deem himself insecure, and the exercise of this right does not depend upon the fact that he has reasonable ground for deeming himself insecure. Nor is such a contract a hard and unconscionable one, especially as the right of possession passes with the legal title by force of the mortgage, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary. When the parties have made their own contract the courts will not set them aside and make a new one for them. Such a provision in a mortgage is a contract right, and therefore it cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation. If the mortgagor wishes to retain possession of the property until the mortgagee shall have reasonable grounds to deem himself insecure, he can insert, or have inserted, a stipulation to that effect in the mortgage; or if he wishes to go still further, and retain possession of the property until the mortgagee shall become in fact insecure, he can have a stipulation put into the mortgage to that effect. But if he chooses only to have inserted in the mortgage a clause that he shall have the right to possession of the property until the mortgagee shall deem himself insecure, then he can only retain the property until the mortgagee does in fact deem himself insecure; and he has no right to question the grounds upon which the mortgagee entertains such feelings of insecurity. He cannot say to the mortgagee, 'You are unreasonable; you have no right to feel insecure; there are in fact no grounds for such feeling of insecurity.' The only question at all material in such a case is whether the mortgagee does in fact so feel; and if the mortgagee claims that he has such a feeling, and afterward on the trial testifies that at the time he took possession of the property he had such a feeling, and if upon the facts of the case it is possible at all to believe that any person, however timid and fearful he might be, might have had such a feeling, then it should be held that the mortgagee had a right to take possession of the property. Under a clause authorizing the mortgagee to take possession whenever he should deem himself insecure, he is entitled to exercise this right if he has good reason to think, and did think, that he had been overreached in regard to the value of the property." We have thus briefly referred to the principal decisions in our own State and of Illinois, and have given the rule as stated by our recent elementary writers upon the question. There are numerous decisions in other States which we have examined. Whilst there is some conflict in the decisions we are of the opinion that the weight of authority is in accordance with the rule as stated by Jones. In the case under consideration the defendant testifies that at the time he took possession of the mare he did in fact deem himself unsafe. We are of the opinion that there existed reasonable grounds for such feeling. The mortgage was upon the wheat and rye growing upon the defendant's farm. These crops were relied upon in chief to pay the defendant's claim. The crops had substantially failed. The plaintiff, when he examined the crops on the Sunday prior to the sale, reported that he did not believe the crops would pay the expenses of harvesting. He sold his interest in the crops to the defendant for $10. The defendant, when he harvested the crops, realized therefrom but the sum of $39, whilst it cost him 47 to harvest them. The crops having substantially failed, the mare only was left to secure the defendant for the amount still unpaid upon the mortgage. The mare, as the defendant claims, was worth but the sum of $50. Other witnesses corroborated him upon the value of the mare. We think therefore that the evidence establishes the fact that he in good faith believed himself insecure. If so, within all of the anthorities, he would have the right to take possession of the mare under the mortgage. Judgment reversed and new trial ordered before another referee, costs to abide the event. Smith, P. J., Barker and Bradley, JJ., concur on the last ground stated in the opinion. [See 42 Am. Rep. 152; 41 Ohio St. 41; 30 Alb. L. J. 402; ante, 4; 35 Eng. Rep. 708.] STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ACKNOWLEDG- NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT, JUNE TERM, 1884. PARKER V. BUTTERWORTH.* Defendant, a joint maker of a promissory note, in a letter written to the plaintiff, admitted that he signed the note as surety, and added: "It would be impossible for me to pay the note at this time; therefore I shall be a thousand times obliged to thee if thee will allow it to rest until John (the other maker) or I, or both, are in better condition to liquidate it." Held, to be a qualified promise by the defendant to pay when his circumstances had so improved that he had the ability to pay, and that the plaintiff could not make the promise available without affirmative proof of the substantial fulfillment of the condition. *S. C., 46 N. J. Law, 244. A payment on account by one joint promisor will not remove the bar of the statute of limitations as against a co-prom" isor in whose favor the statute had attached when the payment was made. (N the rule to show cause why a verdict for the plaintiff should not be set aside. James M. Stratton and Charles Haight, for the rule. James Steen, contra. The opinion states the case. DEPUE, J. This suit was brought upon a joint and several promissory note made by John H. Woodward | and William L. Butterworth, bearing date June 17, 1867, for the sum of $1,241.46, payable to Deborah Parker and Leah Parker, or the survivor of them, in one year after date. Deborah died in 1874. The suit was in the name of Leah, the survivor, as plaintiff, and Woodward being out of the, jurisdiction of the court, Butterworth alone was made defendant. The action was begun by a summons returnable April 3, 1883. The defense was the statute of limitations. To meet this defense the plaintiff relied (1) on an acknowledgment or promise to pay, contained in a letter written to her by Butterworth, the defendant, bearing | date September 1, 1877, and (2) upon a payment of $100 on the note made June 1, 1882, by Woodward, the other joint maker. By the Limitation Act, as contained in the revision, which went into effect January 1, 1875, it is provided with respect to actions on simple contracts, first, that no acknowledgment or promise by words only shall be deemed sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract, whereby to take any case out of the operation of this act, or to deprive any person of the benefit thereof, unless such acknowledgment or promise shall be made or continued by or in some writing to be signed by the party chargeable thereby;" second, "that where there shall be two or more joint contractors or executors or administrators of any contractor, no such joint contractor, executor or administrator shall lose the benefit of this act so as to be chargeable in respect or by reason only of any written acknowledgment or promise, and signed by any other or others of them;" third, that "nothing herein contained shall alter or take away or lessen the effect of any payment of any principal or interest made by any person whatsoever;" fourth, "that in actions to be commenced against two or more such joint contractors or executors or administrators, if it shall appear at the trial or otherwise that the plaintiff, though barred by this act as to one or more of such joint contractors or executors or administrators, shall nevertheless be entitled to recover against any other or others of the defendants, by virtue of a new acknowledgment or promise or otherwise, judgment may be given, and with costs allowed for the plaintiff as to such defendant or defendants against whom he shall recover, and for the other defendant or defendants against the plaintiff;" fifth, "that no indorsement or memorandum of any payment, written or made after this act shall go into effect, upon any promissory note, bill of exchange or other writing, by or on behalf of the party to whom such payment shall be made, shall be deemed sufficient proof of such payment so as to take the case out of the operation of this act." Rev., p. 595, 596, §§ 10, 11. These sections are in substance the same as sections 1 and 3 of 9 Geo. IV., ch. 14 The only change they made in the law is with respect to the rules of evidence. Before this statute an acknowledgment or promise to pay, or a payment on account, under some circumstances, would take a case out of the statute of limitations. The new statute simply required that the acknowledgment or promise to have that effect should be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged thereby. It made no alteration in the legal construction or effect of an acknowledgment or promise when proved in the manner prescribed by the statute, and the question whether the document written and signed "amounts to an acknowledgment or promise is no other inquiry than whether the same words, if proved, before the statute was enacted, to have been spoken by the defendant, would have had a similar operation and effect." Haydon v. Williams, 7 Bing. 163; Edwards v. Culley, 4 H. & N. 378; Dickenson v. Hatfield, 5 C. & P. 46; Wood Lim., § 84. The statute has made no change in the law with respect to payment on account, except that the indorsement or memorandum of the payment upon any promissory note, bill of exchange or other writing, written or made after the act went into effect, by the party to whom payment is made, shall not be sufficient proof thereof. Payment, as a fact, must be proved by evidence aliunde. It may be proved by any kind of evidence, written or oral, which otherwise would be competent as proof of a matter of fact in issue; and any payment which would have been sufficient before this statute was passed is still sufficient to remove the bar of the statute of limitations. Merritt v. Day, 9 Vroom, 32; Cleave v. Jones, 6 Exch. 573, 578; Bevan v. Gething, 3 Q. B. 740; Bradley v. James, 13 C. B. 822; First Nat. Bank v. Ballou, 49 N. Y. 155; Wood Lim., § 96. The statute has the words "acknowledgment or promise" and "evidence of a new and continuing contract." The use of these words in the disjunctive in the statement of the law gave rise to a series of opposing authorities, in some of which it was held that the statute of limitations was founded on a mere presumption of payment, and that whatever repelled that presumption was an answer to the statute, and that therefore an acknowledgment of the non-payment of a debt, though accompanied by a conditional promise, or even a refusal to pay, was a sufficient answer to the statute. These cases were overruled by the Court of King's Bench before the act of 9 Geo. IV. was passed, in Tanner v. Smart, 6 B. & C. 603, a case which Baron Parke said put an end to a series of decisions which were a disgrace to the law. Hart v. Prendergast, 14 M. & W. 741. Since the decision in Tanner v. Smart the law in the English courts has been settled on this footing - that from a bare unqualified acknowledgment of a subsisting debt the law will imply a promise to pay which will obviate the bar of the statute, but that if there be in the admission, or on the face of the writing containing such an acknowledgment, any thing to repel the inference of a promise to pay, the rule expressum facit cessare tacitum applies, no promise will be implied, and the acknowledgment will not enable the plaintiff to recover. And if the acknowledgment be coupled. with a promise which is qualified or conditional, neither the acknowledgment nor the promise will be available unless the condition has been performed or the event happened by which the promise is qualified. Smith v. Thorne, 18 Q. B. 134, Hart v. Prendergast, 14 M. & W. 741, 744; Sidwell v. Mason, 2 H. & N. 306, 309, 310; Everett v. Robertson, 1 El. & El 16-19; In re River Steamer Co., L. R., 6 Ch. App. 822-828; Skeet v. Lindsay, L. R., 2 Exch. Div. 314-316; Wood Lim., § 85. The weight of authority in the courts of this country is in accordance with the English doctrine, as will appear in the note of the American editors to Whitcomb v. Whiting, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas. 982; and such has been the course of decision in this State. Belles v. Belles, 7 Hal. 339; Ridgway v. English, 2 Zab. 409, 413, 419; Ex'rs of Conover v. Conover, Saxt. 403. The defendant's letter of September 1, 1877, relied on as an acknowledgment or promise, was written in answer to a letter of the plaintiff, which was not produced in evidence. No part of the defendant's letter, |