I.

THE cases here printed were intended to be incorporated with others of a similar kind, which the Reporter, it is well known, has employed himself in collecting at different periods, extending over nearly the whole of his professional life. His first design was that they should form part of the series of Reports commenced by him in 1838; the project of continuing which (although four numbers only have been published, and the last as far back as 1841) has never been abandoned. But as Lord Cottenham's decisions in general are comprehended -which is a material modification of the Reporter's former plan—it is thought more convenient that the volume, the first part of which is now published, should be the commencement of a separate work.

It is probable that some cases will be found in the series, which the experienced practitioner will think of so simple a kind, that they ought to have been omitted. The object, however, which the

Reporter had in view in compiling his former volume (see the short preface to it), sufficiently explains the insertion of the cases liable to that remark. Besides it will be seen, as regards the present Part, that some of those cases are cases in which, plain as they may be thought, the Court below has nevertheless erred, and its judgment has been reversed by the Lord Chancellor; whilst other cases in this and future Parts relate, as it will be found, to points belonging to our unwritten practice. These points are free from difficulty and trite, it is true, to the Chancery barrister, whose name occurs in the volumes of Merivale and Swanston; but they are strange and perplexing to a large proportion of his professional brethren, whose career has commenced at a later period.

Something must be said here respecting the long notes appended to some of the cases. These notes are of two kinds-practical and historical. In the former, the cases are abstracted and classed, in order to exhibit the conflict of decision, should any such exist, and to assist in the preservation of uniformity in future. In the latter, the only object has been to remind the young barrister of some step in the progress and development of a particular

practice or doctrine-not for the purpose of citation -for the history of our principles and procedure can seldom be seasonably, or usefully, introduced in the argument of a cause-but for the purpose of facilitating a safe abridgment. This sort of historical knowledge is indispensable, mainly because it enables its possessor at once to determine what are the topics and the authorities, which are likely to assist the judge, whom he addresses, in coming to a conclusion (any others only serve to encumber his note-book)-and passing over, however reluctantly, Choyce Cases in Chancery," and The Labours of Master William Lambarde," to proceed at once to the decision of Eldon, Redesdale, or Grant, that shows what, after the changes operated by two centuries, is the actual, working, rule of the Court.

66

GROVE END ROAD,

LONG VACATION, 1846.