The Sjoli case, from the facts we have already stated, is clearly here inapplicable, because it falls in the third of the above classes. If it be conceded that general language was used in the opinion in that case which when separated from its context and disassociated from the issues which the case involved, might be considered as here controlling, that result could not be accomplished without a violation of the fundamental rule announced in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 399, so often since reiterated and expounded by this court, to the effect that "General expressions in every opinion are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision." The wisdom of the rule finds apt illustration here when it is considered that not even an intimation was conveyed in the Sjoli case of any intention to overrule the repeated prior decisions of this court concerning the operation and effect of the doctrine of relation upon the approval, by the Secretary of the Interior, of a lawful list of selections. That the general expressions in the Sjoli case are not persuasive here clearly results from the demonstration which we have previously made that to apply them would be in effect to destroy the indemnity provisions of the granting act. Moreover, that serious general injurious consequences would arise from treating the expressions relied upon in the Sjoli case as persuasive is clear, (a) because to do so would result in the overthrow of the uniform rule by which the Land Department has administered land grants from the beginning, a rule continued in force after the decision in the Sjoli case, because of the administrative conclusion that that case should be confined to a like state of facts and not be extended to other and different conditions (25 Opin. Atty. Gen. 632); (b) because of the destructive effect upon rights of property and the infinite confusion which would now arise from extending, under the circumstances stated, the observations in the Sjoli case to the wholly different state of facts presented upon this record. While the foregoing disposes of the main propositions which the case presents, there are additional contentions which it is necessary to pass upon. Irrespective of any question as to the paramount nature of a list of selections, it is contended on behalf of appellee, contrary to the ruling of the Secretary of the Interior: a, that the selection by the railroad company of the tract in controversy was void and it could not lawfully be approved; b, in any event that he was entitled to the land by virtue of the provisions of an act approved July 1, 1898, c. 546, 30 Stat. 620; and, c, the Northern Pacific Railway Company did not succeed to the rights of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company in the land, if any right thereto became vested in the latter company. a. This contention is predicated upon the claim that the selecting company had not sustained a legal loss of the tract in lieu of which the land in controversy was selected, and that if it had sustained the loss the selection was not lawful, because the tract selected was not on the same side of the railroad as the tract lost and was not the nearest unappropriated land to it. These contentions were considered at much length by the Secretary of the Interior in the opinion, copied in the record, affirming the cancellation of the entry of Jones (34 L. D. 105) and were found not to be meritorious. The reasons advanced by the Secretary in support of his rulings upon the legal propositions involved seem to us convincing, and we therefore hold the contentions untenable. Cognate to the contentions just disposed of is a claim made in argument that the filed list of selections was void for the reason that the joint resolution of May 31, 1870, establishing the second indemnity limits, required certain facts to appear in order to entitle the railway company to the land, and that in selecting the land those requisites were not complied with. The claim substantially embodies merely criticisms directed to the form or regularity of the selection list, and is not, in any view, of such a character as to render void the filed list. The matter being within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, we must assume that the facts necessary to establish the right to approve the selections were shown to his satisfaction. b. This contention asserts that complainant is entitled to the land by virtue of certain provisions relating to the Northern Pacific land grant contained in the subdivision entitled, "Surveying the Public Lands," embodied in the Sundry Civil Appropriation Act of July 1, 1898. The provisions are copied in the opinion in Humbird v. Avery, 195 U.S., beginning at page 485, and need not be here repeated. As there said, they "disclose a scheme or plan for the settlement of the disputes arising out of the conflicting rulings in the Land Department in reference to the eastern terminus of the railroad, and its action in reference to the public lands between Duluth and Ashland." It is argued that the Secretary of the Interior erroneously decided that the land could not be claimed under the act of 1898 by Jones or his grantee, because prior to January 1, 1898, Jones had done nothing more than to file his application for the land, and was consequently not a purchaser entitled to the benefits of the statute. In our opinion no error was committed by the Secretary in so deciding. Because we reach this conclusion we must not be considered as intimating any opinion whatever regarding the soundness of the contention made on behalf of the appellants, to the effect that in any event the act of 1898 can have no application to one who purchased land under the timber and stone act. c. It is contended that the Northern Pacific Railway Company, under its charter, had no power to purchase the tract of land here in controversy, and that for various reasons the legal proceedings under which the railway com 219 U. S. HARLAN and DAY, JJ., dissenting. pany asserted it had acquired the rights of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company in the land were ineffective to produce any such result. On this record, however, it is not necessary to pass upon these contentions. As the object of the bill is to seek to charge the defendants as trustees of the land for complainant, plainly, if a valid selection was made, proof that their grantor never acquired title to the land would not establish a right to it in the complainant. It follows that the decree of the Court of Appeals must be reversed and that of the Circuit Court affirmed. And it is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE DAY, dissenting. This case is of sufficient importance to justify a full statement of the facts, as well as the grounds upon which we feel constrained to dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court. By the final decree under review the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit unanimously reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court with directions to give the plaintiff Hoyt, now appellee, the relief asked in his bill. The general object of the suit was to have it adjudged that the present defendants, Weyerhaeuser and Humbird, now appellants, should hold the legal title to certain lands in Minnesota in trust for the plaintiff and be enjoined during the pendency of the cause, from selling, disposing of or removing, or from attempting to create any charge upon, the timber standing or lying upon the premises in question. Many questions have been discussed by counsel. But there is one which seems to require special examination. The facts out of which that question arises may be thus stated: The land in question is the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of section seven, township fifty-four, of HARLAN and DAY, JJ., dissenting. 219 U. S. range fourteen west, principal meridian. It contains forty acres, and is situated in St. Louis County, Minnesota. It is unfit for cultivation, is valuable chiefly for its timber, has no valuable deposit of gold, silver, cinnabar, copper or coal upon it, was at the time mentioned in the record uninhabited, and contained no mining or other improvements. For the purpose of availing himself of the act of Congress relating to the sale of timber land in California, Oregon, Nevada, and Washington Territory, approved June 3, 1878, 20 Stat. 89, c. 151,-which act was amended August 4, 1892, and its benefits extended to all the States, 27 Stat. 348, c. 375,-one Richard B. Jones, a citizen of the United States and admittedly, in all respects, qualified under the laws of the United States to enter land, filed, December 17, 1897, with the Register and Receiver in the Land Office at Duluth a verified written duplicate statement, in due form, indicating his desire to purchase the land in dispute under the homestead laws of the United States. One of these statements was promptly transmitted by the Receiver to the General Land Office at Washington. The Receiver, in conformity with law, at once posted in his office, for the required time, the fact of such application, describing the lands by legal subdivision and furnishing Jones a copy of such notice. That notice was duly published in the newspaper nearest to the land. On the twenty-seventh day of March, 1898, no adverse claim to the land having been filed in the Land Office, the applicant, Jones, after furnishing to the local Register satisfactory proofs of the preliminary facts required by law, paid to the Receiver the full purchase price of the land, together with all fees legally due to those officers. Thereupon he was permitted, December 10, 1898, to enter, and did enter the land, the Receiver executing and delivering to him at the time an official receipt and certificate of purchase. In December, 1898, all the papers and testimony in the matter |