that parol evidence was inadmissible to show that the letter was written
as an accommodation to W. in response to an inquiry by the bank at her
request, and not intended as a letter of credit, or authority to draw; and
that the bank could not show by N.'s letter, written subsequently to the
letter of credit, that W. did not have $300 in N.'s hands. Pollock v. Helm
(Miss.), 342, and note, 347.
to vary negotiable paper.] Where an accommodation indorser of a bill
of exchange has been compelled to pay the same, and brings his action
against the drawer and acceptor, they cannot defeat his recovery by proof
that the consideration of the bill was the unfulfilled parol agreement
that the payee would surrender a note held by him against a third per-
Foster v. Clifford (Wis.), 603.
6. Character.] In an action of libel evidence of the plaintiff's good character
is not competent to rebut evidence in justification. McBee v. Fulton (Md.),
466.
6. Negligence, contributory
burden of proof.] A plaintiff, giving evidence
of the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury to himself, is not
bound to negative his own negligence; but if his own proof shows con-
clusive contributory negligence, he is liable to nonsuit, and if his own
proof leaves it doubtful, it is a question for the jury. Prideaux v. City
of Mineral Point (Wis.), 558, and note, 563.
7. Shipping receipt -- "owner's risk."] Plaintiff shipped horses on defend-
ant's railroad, and received therefor a receipt containing the letters “O.
R.," meaning "owner's risk." It was the defendant's custom to carry ani-
mals at owner's risk for a reduced charge. In an action for an injury to
the horses while in defendant's care, the plaintiff put in evidence the
receipt, and testified that he did not see those letters when he took it, but
did not testify that he did not understand their meaning. Held, that the
receipt conclusively showed that the horses were received upon a restricted
liability, the shipper being bound to know the contents of the receipt.
Morrison v. Phillips & Colby Construction Company (Wis.), 599.
& Libel.] In an action of libel for accusing the plaintiff of a criminal
offense, the plaintiff, to rebut evidence in justification, offered record evi-
dence of his acquittal of the offense; held, incompetent. McBee v. Ful
ton (Md.), 466.
9. Warehouse receipt — presumption — title to goods covered by.] Posses-
sion of a warehouse receipt, regularly indorsed, is presumptive evidence
of ownership of the goods described therein, Davis v. Russell (Cal.), 647.
10. Inherent cause of damage to merchandise in action against carrier.] In
an action against a common carrier for damages for refusing to receive
and transport grain, it is competent for the plaintiff to show that such
refusal caused the grain to become heated and spoiled, notwithstanding
the fact that such injury resulted from the inherent nature of the grain
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Morton (Ind.), 682.
11. Privilege of witness from answering as to outlawed offense.] A witness
cannot refuse, on the ground of self-crimination, to answer a question
relating to an offense already barred by the statute of limitations. Cal
houn v. Thompson (Ala.), 754.
Parol evidence to vary bill of lading.] See CARRIER, 118.
Privilege of prisoner as witness] See CRIMINAL LAW, 188.
Parol] See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 511; PARTNERSHIP.
Uncorroborated confession of crime.] See CRIMINAL LAW, 698.
Levy on money in hands of sheriff.] Money collected by an officer on
legal process, while it remains in his hands, is to be regarded as in custo-
dia legis and not the subject of levy or attachment in any form. Thus,
an officer who has collected money on an execution, cannot apply it in
satisfaction of another execution, although the latter is against the party
for whom the money was collected, and both executions are in the offi
cer's hands for collection at the same time. Hardy v. Tilton (Me.), 34,
and note, 35.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
1 Liability of executor for acts of co-executor.] Each of several executors
represents the estate and has the right to receive funds without the concur-
rence of his co-executors. Where there is no evidence to show that parties to
notes due the estate were of doubtful solvency, the executor who had
them in his hand and made no effort to collect them is liable for the
amounts due thereon. Gates v. Whetstone (S. C.), 284.
-] An executor is not liable for money of the estate drawn by his co-
executor out of the hands of the factors of the estate, unless he con-
curred therein directly and actively. Ib.
3. Marriage of executrix.] Whatever control an executrix acquires over the
estate by virtue of her office vests in her husband, on their intermarriage,
to the same extent as held by her. Ib.
Administrators—duty to take letters abroad — negligence.] It is not the
duty of an administrator to take out letters of administration in another
State in all cases where a debt there may be due the intestate; but his
duties, as those of all other trustees, must be determined by the exigen-
cies of each case; and where no attempt of any kind was made to collect
a bond from a solvent non-resident living in an adjoining county in Vir-
ginia, about a day's journey, by private conveyance, from the residence
of the administrator, and where no excuse except the non-residence of the
debtor is given for such delinquency by the administrator, he is guilty of
such negligence as will render him liable for the uncollected portion of
the debt. Williams v. Williams (N. C.), 829.
From execution of partnership assets.] During the continuance of a partner.
ship, the individual members cannot claim several exemption of undi.
vided partnership property taken under legal process for partnership
debts. Giovanni v. First National Bank of Montgomery (Ala.), 723.
From execution] See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 387.
Wharf.] A lease was executed of lands on the shore of the ocean, extend-
ing to low-water mark. The lessee constructed a wharf, extending
from the shore below low-water mark, and resting upon piles. Held,
that the portion of the wharf below low-water mark was not affixed, in-
cident or appurtenant to the demised premises, although attached to the
wharf on the demised premises by nails, bolts and screws, and was not an
"improvement." Coburn v. Ames (Cal.), 634.
1 Arrest fraudulently procured — inducing defendant to come within the
State.] An action is maintainable by one against others, who by fraudu-
lent concert, with intent to cause his arrest and thus compel him to settle
a disputed claim, induce him to leave his home in another State and come
within Massachusetts; and it is no defense to such action that after such
arrest he submitted to the jurisdiction without pleading the illegality of
the arrest. Cook v. Brown (Mass.), 259, and note, 262.
2. Fraudulent conveyance —valid in part.] A deed in trust made to secure
several debts, of which one is feigned and fraudulent and the others valid,
will be sustained for the benefit of the true creditors, but is inoperative as
to the fraudulent claim; provided, that neither the trustee nor the true
creditors have connived at the insertion in the deed of such fraudulent
debt. Morris v. Pearson (N. C.), 315.
On sale of land, misrepresentation of title.] See VENDOR AND PURCHASER,
5, 615.
Bee CONTRACT, 781; NEGLIGENCE, 613; SALE. 615.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.
See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 704.
Of savings deposit-trust.] N. delivered her bank-book of savings deposits,
with an assignment of the deposits to E., upon an oral agreement that E.
should pay her during life such sums as she wanted, and on her death
should pay the balance to N.'s son. In execution of this agreement E.
paid N. money during her life, and the balance remaining at her death he
paid to her son, her executor. Held, that the transaction was a valid gift,
and the son was not liable to account for the money as executor. Davis
v. Ney (Mass.), 272.
1. Whether of payment or for collection — laches.] In an assignment of a bond
and mortgage defendant covenanted, that if in case of foreclosure and
sale of the mortgaged premises a deficiency should occur, he would pay it
on demand. The holder delayed foreclosure for fourteen months after
maturity, during ten months of which time the property was a
sufficient security, but afterward the buildings were destroyed by fire,
reducing the value below the amount of the mortgage debt. Held, (1)
that the guaranty was not one of payment, but the liability of the guaran-
tor depended on the precedent and diligent foreclosure and sale; (2) the
delay was unreasonable and discharged the guarantor. McMurray v.
Noyes (N. Y.), 180.
♣ Letter of credit — advance on faith of.} Defendant, president of a bank,
addressed to W. a letter, stating that she was authorized to draw on N.
for $300, placed with N. by R. for her account, and that any amount
she might wish to draw on N."we will pay you the money for it here,
with usual exchange;" and signed it," Thos E. Helm, Prest." Plaintiff
advanced to W. $150 on her draft on N., on the faith of that letter. Held,
(1) that this was a general letter of credit; (2) that an action could be
maintained by the plaintiff against the bank for the money so advanced.
Pollock v. Helm (Miss.), 342.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 639.
Defective margin — negligence.] A town is not required to render its
roads passable for travelling for the entire width of their located limits,
but only to keep a width thereof in a smooth condition, sufficient to
render the passing over them safe and convenient. A town has the
right, in making or repairing a road, to remove stones and stumps to, and
leave natural obstructions upon the sides of a way; provided the same
are situated so far from the travelled track that persons with teams may
pass without danger of coming in collision with them. Perkins v. In-
habitants of Fayette (Me.), 84.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 619.
IDEM SONANS.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 435.
INDORSEMENT.
See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS,
Guest-leaving horse at inn.] To create the common-law liability of an inn-
keeper the relation of guest and host must exist. Where one leaves his
horse with an innkeeper, with no intention of stopping at the inn himself
but stops at a relative's house, whose guest he is, he is not a guest of the
inn. In such a case, the liability of the landlord is simply that of an or-
dinary bailee for hire. Healey v. Gray (Me.), 80.
INDICTMENT.
Bee CRIMINAL LAW, 340.
Port of infant — note in satisfaction of.] Defendant, an infant, hired a horse
of plaintiff, agreeing not to drive it beyond G. Afterward he returned it,
alleging that it was sick, and got another in its place. He then intended
to drive the latter beyond G., but nothing was said on the subject, and plain-
tiff understood that he was not to drive it beyond G. Defendant drove
the horse beyond G., and so overdrove it that it died. In satisfaction of
the damage, while still under age, he executed his promissory note to
plaintiff. On his becoming of age, plaintiff brought an action thereon.
Held, (1) that defendant took the second horse upon the same conditions as
the first; (2) that by driving it beyond G., he became liable in tort for the
damages; (3) that he was liable on the notes as he would have been on
the original cause of action, and his infancy was no defense. Ray v.
Tubbs (Vt.), 519.
Effect of, on limitation.] ▲ policy of fire insurance provided that no suit
should be maintained thereon unless commenced within twelve months
after loss or damage. To avoid this provision set up in defense to an
action thereon the plaintiff showed that a third person had obtained an
injunction restraining the defendant from paying and the holders from
receiving the loss or damage under the policy. The New York statute of
limitations provides that when the commencement of an action shall be
stayed by injunction, the time of the continuance of the injunction shall
not be part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. Held,
(1) that the injunction did not suspend the operation of the limitation nor
relieve from the forfeiture; (2) that the exception in the statutes does not
apply to limitations by contract, but only to statutory limitations; (3) that
the injunction did not restrain the bringing of an action. Wilkinson v.
First National Fire Ins. Co. (N. Y ), 166.
& To restrain suit in another State.] The parties were citizens of and residents
in Maryland. A debt of less than $100 was due the plaintiff in Maryland,
from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, for wages. The
defendant, having a claim against the plaintiff, was prosecuting an
attachment upou that debt in West Virginia. By the law of Maryland,
such debts for wages were exempt to the amount of $100. Held, that the
plaintiff was entitled to an injunction, restraining the defendant from
prosecuting the attachment in West Virginia. Keyser v. Rice (Md.), 448.
Flouring mill.] See NUISANCE, 278.
1. On mortgaged premises — policy payable to mortgagees — change of title.]
M. was insured on her dwelling-house which was already mortgaged to
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