CHAPTER II

STATE REORGANIZATION UNDER LINCOLN

THE Monroe Doctrine is very flexible and sometimes assumes unexpected shapes; but that it could tend to the restoration of the United States after the Civil War was an unsuspected function. The invasion of Mexico by the French and the inauguration of the empire of Maximilian has had its political and romantic side and, strange to say, it was to have an international effect and bring about the Hampton Roads Conference. Francis P. Blair, in some mysterious way, was the bearer of overtures in which Davis had spoken of a desire for peace for the two countries, North and South, and Lincoln of a desire for peace for our one common country; and, finally, A. H. Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, and John A. Campbell were duly accredited and met President Lincoln and Secretary of State Seward, February 5, 1865, on the River Queen, anchored off Fortress Monroe. Their discussion was informal, but cordial, lasting several hours. As the Confederacy was almost at its last gasp and the Union sure of success, it might be that this boat would prove a messenger of peace on ocean billows. A few days afterward, Lincoln, on request, made a report to Congress in which he set forth the correspondence, but of the interview said only that in effect the conditions were insisted on which had been named for Seward's guidance be'fore the president determined to be present, i. e.: "1. The restoration of the national authority throughout all the

States. 2. No receding by the Executive of the United States on the slavery question from the position assumed thereon in the late annual message to Congress and in preceding documents. 3. No cessation of hostilities short of an end of the war and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the Government." The other party, he says, did not admit that they would ever consent to reunion, and yet, on the other hand, they equally omitted to declare that they never would consent. They favored some other course of action which might or might not lead to reunion, but which Lincoln and Seward thought would amount to an indefinite postponement.

We have a thorough account from "the other party," drawn mainly by John A. Campbell, late a justice of the Supreme Court, a gentleman of the highest standing. He tells us that the excuse for the conference was to see if the two contestants could unite in expulsion of the French from Mexico, inasmuch as its occupation by them was opposed to the Monroe Doctrine and equally threatening to both sides in the American Civil War. Stephens hoped for some result from the proposition, but there seemed to be insuperable obstacles in the way of carrying it out. The hope was that if such a plan was adopted, and the two armies fought side by side against the common enemy, some means might be found finally to adjust their differences.

The discussion took a wide turn, and the upshot of it was that Lincoln would agree to nothing except substantially an unconditional surrender of the Southern people. He, however, repudiated the word submission, as he said he wished nothing humiliating; and so far as he was able, as in the remission of penalties under the confiscation acts, he would deal liberally. The submission would consist only in permitting Federal officers to take charge of custom houses, post offices, and similar places, and proceed with the discharge of their duties. He evidently meant to intimate that he could not guarantee the course of Congress. Granted a restoration of the Union, he would do all in his

power to prevent harshness, but, without defining them, he clearly recognized that there were limits to his power. As commander-in-chief he could make a military convention, but this was not commensurate with the reorganization of the Southern States. He would not even consent to an armistice to discuss further terms. There being therefore no common meeting ground, the conference broke up, in good humor possibly, possibly also in sadness, and, as Lincoln afterward expressed it, ended without result. He probably foresaw the collapse of hostilities, which came within two months afterward, and felt no necessity for fixing terms in advance. He even denied Grant the right to discuss with Lee other than military questions.

The aspiration of the South was plain. The Southern people, whether they be regarded as States or Confederacy, had sought independence; on the other hand, the Northern had sought to restore the Union. The theory, however, upon which the North began the contest was not that prevailing when it ended, and it is instructive to follow the changes both as a matter of history and as an indication of what might be expected. It was an evolution directed by no one man, foreseen by no one man, and yet its steps and purposes are clear enough now that we look backward.

The withdrawal of the Southern members left the new Republican party supreme in House and Senate, and the policy of the North was outlined immediately after the Bull Run disaster in what are called the Crittenden resolutions, as follows:

"Resolved, That the present deplorable civil war has been forced upon the country by the disunionists of the Southern States now in revolt against the constitutional Government and in arms around the capital; that in this national emergency Congress, banishing all feeling of mere passion or resentment, will recollect only its duty to the whole country; that this war is not prosecuted upon our part in any spirit of oppression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of overthrowing or interfering with

the rights or established institutions of those States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and all laws made in pursuance thereof and to preserve the Union, with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired; that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease.'

These were adopted almost unanimously, being opposed only by such extremists as Thaddeus Stevens, an abolitionist and unionist prepared to stop at no terms necessary for success of the Northern arms. If there was to be an evolution, however, it might be an evolution toward this man, who at least had firm convictions and was resolute to make them realities.

Events were to move rapidly. Even that fall, when Congress reassembled in regular session, and an attempt was made to reaffirm these resolutions, Stevens was not alone in opposing them. The result was that they went to the table, and there they ever afterward slept.

The platform upon which the war was begun, however, remained that of President Lincoln. He was unwilling to fix terms in advance which results might show to be improper. He had rather act in accordance with the circumstances surrounding the particular case. Thus, at the outbreak of the war, he or his Cabinet officers, with his assent, were active in preventing by force the secession of Maryland and Missouri. These States were virtually occupied by the United States forces and their legislatures were prevented from acting. Almost the same thing was true also of Kentucky, Lincoln's native State, whose defection, he declared, would make the job on hand too large. Soon the success of the Union arms in western Virginia, and afterward in Tennessee and Louisiana, required some plan of restoration of States to be formulated. What was done now might furnish precedents later.

First in time and probably first in importance was the question in regard to Virginia. Virginia was the most noted of the Southern States, and yet was in a measure divided