THE military conduct of the war against Mexico, seems to us deserving of more critical examination than it has yet received at the hands of journalism-that power of modern times, which may so truly be called one of the Estates of the republic. We propose in the following pages to consider this matter somewhat in detail. First: as elucidating a deliberate purpose on the part of the administration to bring about a war with Mexico; and, secondly, as illustrating the really martial character of our race. Concerning the original motives of this untoward contest, and the rapid develop ment which has been given to the principles upon which it was undertaken, there does not now seem-out of the immediate sphere of partisan influence, and beyond the circle of that brotherhood of hope, the most rapacious and uncleanest spawn of war-army contractors, and army jobbers, executive printers, and executive parasites, of all degrees-there does not seem, we repeat, any essential difference of opinion. It was, from its inception, a war of aggression and rapacity; a war of the strong, confident in their strength, against the feeble, because they were feeble; a war prompted by the coveting of our neighbor's possessions, and by the consciousness that this covetousness might here be indulged with greater impunity, than would have followed the gratification of the same lawless cupidity in reference to "the whole of Oregon or none," or at an earlier day, in reference to the north-eastern boundary. A very elaborate attempt is indeed made in the message, at the opening of the present session of Congress, to prove that Mexico, and not the United States, commenced the war, that she was the blood-thirsty wolf that muddied the water up stream, for the innocent lamb of the United States, and then threw the blame upon the innocent; and that it was only with reluctance, and after much tribulation and patient suffering, that we, the people of this Model Republic, turned upon our nearest American neighbor with fire and sword-not to conquer her territories, nor extend our own; but, to "conquer peace!" The common sense of mankind, however, revolts at the absurdity; and we shall make it appear, by reference to dates and facts, that our own records bear witness against this weak presidential fiction. The resolutions, inviting the annexation of Texas, passed both houses of Congress, and became the law of the land-at least in the ordinary forms-at the very heel of Mr. Tyler's administration, in March, 1845; and that unhappy Magistrate used the last moments of his most humiliating rule, to transmit these resolutions to the government of Texas, in that form which most aggravated the evils of annexation. Mr. Polk, who succeeded not unworthily Mr. Tyler, fell at once into his footsteps in this matter; and, disregarding the solemn protest of the Mexican minister against annexation as offensive to Mexico, and entailing upon her the necessity of looking upon it as a measure of war, he went forward in the work in a spirit apparently of premeditated and deliberate outrage. At the moment when the measure was consummated by the act of our Congress, the army and the navy of the U. States were in their ordinary force and inactivity, and at their ordinary peace stations, little dreaming of any near occasion for change; for no assurance had been more confident, on the part of the friends of annexation, than that it would be a "bloodless achievement;" and no ridicule more loud or scornful than that heaped upon those "prophets of disaster," as they were called, who foresaw and foretold that, only at the cost of countless lives and countless treasure, could this iniquity be perpetrated. Even as late as December, 1845, in his first annual message to Congress, the President used this emphatic and exulting language respecting annexation, then all complete, except the formal act, soon after passed by Congress, for admitting the new State into the Union. "This accession to our territory has been a bloodless achievement. No arm of force has been raised to produce the result, the sword has had no part in the victory. We have not sought to extend our territorial possessions by conquest, or our republican institutions over a reluctant people. It was the deliberate homage of that people to the great principles of our federative Union." When it shall be seen in the sequel what "bloody instructions had, previously to this date, been given by the President to our commanders, the readers of this Review will agree with us, probably, in thinking the language of this extract most extraordinary indeed. And this brings us to our immediate subject. In the very same message of 2d Dec., 1845, from which we have just quoted, occurs this passage, so apparently contradictory, in spirit and import at least, if not in terms, of the self-gratulation about peaceful annexation: "When orders were given, during the past summer, for concentrating a military force on the western frontier of Texas, our troops were widely dispersed, and in small detachments, occupying posts remote from each other. The prompt and expeditious manner in which an army, embracing more than half of our peace establishment, was drawn together, on an emergency so sudden, reflects great credit on the officers who were intrusted with the execution of these orders, as well as upon the discipline of the army itself. To be in strength to defend the people of Texas, in the event Mexico should commence hostilities with a large army, as she threatened, I authorized the general commanding," &c., &c. 66 "has "No arm of force," says the President, in the opening of this message, been raised to produce this result!" Yet, a few pages further on, he tells us that an army, embracing near the half of our peace establishment," was suddenly drawn together from all points of the Union, and dispatched to the Western frontier of Texas, which Mexico "threatened" to invade. Nay more-the navy, too, was sent to prevent this land invasion! Hear the same message: "Both the Congress and Convention of the people of Texas invited this government to send an army into their territory to protect and defend them against a menaced attack. The moment the terms of annexation, offered by the United States, were accepted by Texas, the latter became so far a part of our country as to make it our duty to afford such protection and defence. I, therefore, deemed it proper, as a precautionary measure, to order a strong squadron to the coasts of Mexico, and to concentrate an efficient military force on the western frontier of Texas. Our army was ordered to take positions in the country between the Nueces and the del Norte, and to repel any invasion of the Texan territory which Our squadron in the Gulf was ordered to might be attempted by the Mexican forces. co-operate with the army. But though our army and navy were placed in a position to defend our own and the rights of Texas, they were ordered to commit no act of hostility against Mexico, unless she declared war, or was herself the aggressor by striking the first blow." been passed on 3d March, 1845-in The resolution of annexation having eighteen days thereafter-although a total change in the personel of the adminis tration had intervened-a new President and new Secretaries-orders were dispatched on 21st March, to General Taylor, at Fort Jessup, in Louisiana, to prepare his command, and hold it in readi ness to be moved into Texas as soon as ordered. On 28th May, and we beg the dates may be attended to, a confidential letter from Mr. Secretary Marcy to General Taylor, directed him by "order of the President to cause the forces now under your command, and those which be may assigned to it, to be put into a position where they may, most promptly and efficiently, act in defence of Texas, in the event it shall become necessary or proper to employ them for that purpose.' As yet Texas had not, in any manner, acceded to annexation: neither by her Congress nor her convention. In the same confidential letter, founding himself on an article in the treaty between the United States and Mexico, whereby each party bound himself to restrain the Indian nations inhabiting the lands on their borders from attacking, in any manner, the citizens of the other; or the Indians residing upon the territories of the other, Mr. Secretary Marcy declares that "the obligations which are due in this respect to Mexico by this treaty, are due, also, to Texas!" How so, unless Texas were a part of Mexico? and if a part of Mexico, how could we annex it in defiance of Mexico? If right fully a part of the United States, it needed no authority from a treaty with Mexico to authorize an American commander to prevent or punish Indian hostilities. This application, therefore, of a treaty with Mexico, to the case of Texas, seems, at least, unfortunate. But it is in truth only introduced to furnish an excuse-which was not lost--for pushing some of the American troops across the upper Red river into Texas, before that country was ours by any sort of title. Events, however, did not seem to march fast enough for the ambitious longings of the Washington cabinet, and on the 15th June, Mr. Bancroft, in the absence of Mr. Marcy, ad interim Secretary of War, writes another confidential, but most extraordinary, dispatch to General Taylor. We give extracts from it: "In anticipation of that event, you will forthwith make a forward movement with the troops under your command, and advance to the mouth of the Sabine, or to such other point on the Gulf of Mexico, or its navigable waters, as in your judgment may be * * most convenient for an embarkation, at the proper time, for the western frontier of Texas. The point of your ultimate destination is the western frontier of Texas, where you will select and occupy, in or near the Rio Grande del Norte, such a site as will consist with the health of your troops, and will be best adapted to repel invasion, and to protect what, in the event of annexation, will be our western border. You will limit yourself to the defence of the territory of Texas, unless Mexico should declare war against the United States. "Your movement to the Gulf of Mexico, and your preparations to embark for the western frontier of Texas, are to be made without delay; but you will not effect a landing on that frontier until you have yourself ascertained the due acceptance, by Texas, of the proffered terms of annex ation." The italics in the above extract are ours-but what "hot haste" is here evinced, to anticipate difficulties! What disregard of the special malediction pronounced by the revealed Word of God upon those "whose feet are swift to shed blood!" Yet the writer of this confidential, stimulating missive, was an expriest!--but who, like so many of his prototypes in the French revolution, seemed, in the intoxication of political power, to delight in violating the holy precepts they were trained to inculcate and exemplify. The real Secretary-returned to his post-appears to have had some apprehension lest the fiery zeal of his locum-tenens should lead the commanding officer into indiscretion and, therefore, by a letter, not marked confidential, of 8th July, he thus cautions him-" this department is informed that Mexico has some military establishments on the east side of the Rio Grande, which are, and, for some time have been, in the actual occupancy of her troops. In carrying out the instructions, heretofore received, you will sion, unless an actual war shall exist. be careful to avoid any acts of aggresThe Mexican forces, at the posts in their possession, and which have been so, will not be disturbed, as long as the relations of peace between the United States and Mexico continue." From New Orleans, on 20th July, Gen. Taylor acknowledges the receipt of this last letter from Secretary Marcy: expresses his gratification at receiving such instructions," as they confirm," says he, "my views, previously communicated, in regard to the proper line to be occupied, at present, by our troops; those instructions will be closely followed, and the department may rest assured that I will take no step to interrupt the friendly relations between the United States and Mexico." It no where appears, from any information communicated by the Executive to Congress nor to the public-what these "views previously communicated" by General Taylor, as to " the proper line to be occupied," were, but it is quite fair to infer that if they had been in unison with those of the President, he could not have failed to strengthen himself before the country, by showing that in taking up a position in the disputed territory, he was fortified by the military opinion of the commanding general. That such, however, was not the line indicated by General Taylor, we have evidence, both direct and indirect. Of the latter a specimen is furnished in the very next letter from Secretary Marcy, of 30th July, wherein-acknowledging the receipt of General Taylor's dispatch, as above, from New Orleans, of 20th July he thus seeks to coax General Taylor to advance, against his own better judgment, to the Rio Grande; and at any rate, after affecting to leave the whole discretion with him, peremptorily orders him to occupy a position, with a part of his forces at least, west of the Nueces: (EXTRACT.) "War Department, Washington, 30th July.} He (the President) has not the requisite information in regard to the country, to enable him to give any positive directions as to the position you ought to take, or the movements which it may be expedient to make: these must be governed by circumstances. While avoiding, as you have been instructed to do, all aggressive measures towards Mexico, as long as the relations of peace exist between that republic and the United States, you are expected to occupy, protect, and defend the territory of Texas, to the extent that it has been occupied by the people of Texas. The Rio Grande is claimed to be the boundary between the two countries, and up to this boundary you are to extend your protection, only except ing any posts on the eastern side thereof which are in the actual occupancy of Mexican forces, or Mexican settlements, over which the republic of Texas did not exercise jurisdiction at the time of annexation, that in selecting the establishment for your or shortly before that event. It is expected troops, you will approach as near the boundary line, the Rio Grande, as prudence will dictate. With this view the President desires that your position, for part of your forces at least, should be west of the Nueces." Two things appear to us obvious from this crafty letter. First, that Taylor's views, as to the line to be occupied, did not suit the President; and, Second, that if his line was not to be adopted, Taylor had asked positive and specific instructions as to the line he should occupy. The President, under the plea of insufficient information, shrinks from giving positive instructions, but his cunning scribe of the war department tells the frank General that he is expected to defend all Texas, and that Texas extends to the Rio Grande, save and except the Mexican armed stations, and the Mexican settlements east of it, over which Texas never had even claimed jurisdiction; and, finally, after trying to coax Taylor to assume the responsibility of marching to the Rio Grande, ventures, at last, the positive order that he must cross and encamp, with a part of his force, west of the Nueces. This much must suffice for the indirect proof that Taylor's own judgment was against advancing into the disputed territory. The following extract, from a letter of General Taylor, from the camp at Corpus Christi, on the 30th Oct., is a direct proof in point : “ Before the President's instructions of 30th July reached me, (the cunning letter of Sec. Marcy), I would have preferred a position on the left bank of the river." He, indeed, adds, that the position whence he writes, on the right bank, has more advantages than any on the other, and suggests, in addition-falling in, apparently, with the spirit which he found to be prevailing with the cabinet-that “one Grande" should be taken possession of, or two suitable points, on or near the Rio concentrated, as "greatly facilitating" the as soon as the entire force under him is settlement of the boundary, if the line of the Rio Grande is determined on as the "ultimatum" of our government. But to resume the regular order of events: On the 6th August, the Adjutant-General notifies General Taylor that the 7th infantry, and three companies of dragoons, are ordered to join him in Texas, for, says the letter," although a state of war with Mexico, or an invasion of Texas by her forces, may not take place, it is, nevertheless, deemed proper and necessary that your forces should be fully equal to meet, with certainty of success, any crisis which may arise in Texas, and which would require you, by force of arms, to carry out the instructions of the government." The letter further calls upon General Taylor to report what auxiliary troops, in case of an emergency, he could rely upon from Texas, and "what additional troops, designating the arms, and what supply and description of ordnance, ordnance stores, and small arms, &c., judging from any information you may possess as to the future exigencies of the public service," he, General Taylor, might deem necessary to be sent into Texas; informing him, at the same time, that 10,000 muskets and 1,000 rifles had already been issued for Texas. Here is another of the cunning devices of politicians to shift the responsibility for all consequences upon the commanding general; and, although it occurs in a dispatch from the office of the adjutantgeneral, yet he writes, as he expressly says, "pursuant to the instructions of the Secretary at War," and we hazard the conjecture with some confidence, that the very paragraph we have printed above in italics, was interlined by the Secretary himself. How could a general in the field, in a region like that of Texas, judge of "future exigencies of the public service," when those exigencies-whatever they might be would be wholly dependent on measures adopted at Washington, over which the general could exercise no control, nor form any judgment as to what they were likely to be. The whole purport of this insidious inquiry strikes us as preparing, in advance, a justification of the administration for any deficiency in adequate supplies of men munitions, in case of the worst; while all the benefit and all the credit of diminished expenditure, arising from not forwarding such supplies-as, knowing their own views, they were bound to dowere to inure to the administration. or On the 23d August, Secretary Marcy writes to the General that the administration has no information, respecting the purposes of Mexico, that could enable them to give him more explicit instructions than heretofore; that, nevertheless, "there is reason to believe Mexico is making efforts to assemble a large army on the frontier of Texas, for the purpose❤ of entering its territory and holding forcible possession of it," and that it is trusted he will "take prompt and efficient steps to meet and repel any such hostile invasion. If Mexico cross the Rio Grande with any considerable force, such a movement must be regarded as an invasion of the United States, and a commencement of hostilities," which," to the utmost extent of all the means you possess, or can command," must be repelled. The sequel of this letter, written three months and a half before the delivery of the President's Message, in which he boasts of the annexation of Texas, as a "bloodless achievement," which “no arm of force was raised" to accomplish, is too significant-both of the expectation, and, we cannot but think, wish of the administration, that some pretext would, or might be found, for drawing the sword, and thus commencing a war of aggrandizement-not to be given entire : "An order has been this day issued for sending one thousand more men into TexWhen the existing orders are carried into as to join those under your command. effect, you will have with you a force of four thousand men of the regular army. We are not enabled to judge what auxiliary force can, upon an emergency, be brought together from Texas, and, as a precautionary measure, you are authorized to accept volunteers from the States of Louisiana and Alabama, and even from Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky. Should Mexico declare war, or commence hostilities by crossing the Rio Grande with lose no time in giving information to the a considerable force, you are instructed to authorities of each of any of the abovementioned States as to the number of volunteers you may want from them respectively. Should you require troops from any of these States, it would be important to have them with the least possible delay. It is not doubted that at least two regiments from New Orleans and one from Mobile could be obtained and expeditiously brought into the field. You will cause it to be description of troops you desire to receive known at these places what number and from them in the contemplated emergency. The authorities of these States will be apprized that you are authorized to receive volunteers from them, and you may calculate that they will promptly join you when |