WHEN We see so close an analogy between the natural body and the body politic, in their gradual advance from infancy to maturity, in their healthy and diseased action, and in their self-preserving power to remedy the evils they may chance to encounter, we are naturally led to extend it still farther, and to suppose that, as the animal body has, by the laws of its structure, a certain term of existence which it cannot transcend, so must political communities have their old age and death, as well as their infancy and manhood. But this is carrying the parallel too far. Governments may be more correctly compared with species than with individuals-while the latter flourish for a time and then pass away, the former have the power of perpetual renovation.

The dissolution of a government, then, not being a necessary condition of its existence, it behoves a people who have one created by themselves and fashioned to their tastes and circumstances, to consider the remote as well as present evils and dangers which they may meet in their progress, that they may devise means of prevention where practicable, and mitigate what they can neither pre

vent nor cure.

Our inducements thus to look ahead are peculiarly strong when we recollect the extraordinary capacities of our country, and the career of glory for which it seems marked out. Its destinies are, in some sort, in the hands of the present generation.

Here, too, the great problem is to be solved, whether man is capable of selfgovernment, or whether those artificial forms which prevail in the old world, and which seem to us adapted to that state of ignorance in which they originated, are necessary in an advanced stage of intel

ligence. Most of us are, indeed, apt to consider that this question has already been settled. Our present government has been tried for half a century, during which our success, when examined by the ordinary tests of good government, has been unexampled. But the rest of the world refuses to abide by this experiment, and they insist that what we claim to be a merit of our political institutions, is due to the peculiar circumstances of our country-that since these are temporary, our government is destined to encounter trials of which it has as yet had no experience.

We are bound, we think, in candor to admit this. The frame of government which has worked admirably in one state of society may be unsuited to another. Let us, then, both as patriots and honest searchers after truth, seriously inquire into the dangers which we are likely to encounter in those changes of condition to which we may look forward, see how far they may be obviated, and what will be the probable extent of the mischief, where they are irremediable.

The dangers which may be supposed most to threaten the success of our great experiment, may be referred to the character of our polity, both as to its complexity and its democracy; to the diversity of feelings and interests in the different States; and to the diversity between classes of the people in the same State. These comprehend all that is or may be peculiar in our government, and all that may occasion its downfall. On each of them we propose to bestow some consideration.

One of the most obvious dangers to which the permanency of our system seems exposed, arises from the complexity of its structure, by which the attributes of sovereignty are so distributed

between the general and State governments, that some of them are exercised by one of these governments exclusively, and some others by both concurrently. This part of our polity has always been viewed by us with peculiar favor, from its enabling us to combine the highest degree of civil freedom with our vast extent of country. In any other system than ours, the two things would be utterly irreconcilable. No single national government could make laws or execute them so as to suit the diverse tastes and circumstances of the several States; and though it could, the power and influence required for those objects would be greater than could be safely trusted. Overcoming, either gradually or by sudden violence, all checks devised for its control, it would finally become despotic. By means, however, of our present system, every State is left free to make all its laws which more nearly touch the individual interests and concerns of man-those which establish rules of property, regulate contracts, define and punish crimes, provide for the preservation of morals, the means of instruction, the facilities of intercourse-and to adapt them to its local circumstances, its usages, its feelings, and its tastes. The functions of the general government are, on the other hand, limited to the subjects of national defence, of foreign intercourse, and two or three minor objects, in which peculiar considerations made uniformity desirable, as in the post-office, coining money, and naturalizing foreigners. We may form some idea of the benignant character of our local legislation by reflecting upon the large proportion of those State laws which have long held an undisturbed place in the State codes, because they were suited to the circumstances of their respective States, and which would never have been enacted by a national legislature.

In our ordinary estimates of the distribution of power between the government of the Union and the several States, we are under an illusion produced by this very excellence of the State governments. Questions relating to the national government generally excite a livelier interest among our citizens than mere local State questions. Yet this is not because they are intrinsically more interesting, but because the others are commonly so regulated as to give general satisfaction. They faithfully reflect the feelings and opinions in each State. Let us only

suppose the improbable fact that a State legislature should make a radical alteration, not called for by public opinion, in the law of descents or in the criminal law. We should find that the sentiments of the community would not be confined, as in our federal politics, to newspaper discussion and occasional public addresses, but that one general burst of indignation would break out in every corner of the State, cause the prompt repeal of the odious law, and consign the faithless representative to lasting ignominy.

Yet this machinery, which produces such admirable results, is liable to disturbance from the delicacy and complexity to which it owes its excellence. For our political engine to perform its destined part, each government must exercise its due portion of power, and no more. If the States appropriate more than their share, the general government cannot discharge its high national functions. If the latter arrogates undue powers the citizen is affected in his dearest interests, and the safeguards of liberty are weakened. In either case, the stability of the system is endangered.

us

The framers of the national government have endeavored to secure against these hazards by a written constitution, in which the powers assigned to it, and thus, virtually, those retained by the States, were, as they hoped, so carefully marked out, as to preclude uncertainty or dispute. But this was, in the nature of things, utterly impracticable. From two causes, inseparable from man, their purpose was unattainable. These are, the impossibility of foreseeing all the cases that may arise, and consequently, of devising rules adapted to such multifarious occasions; and, in the next place, the impossibility of making any constitution that will not admit of different interpretations, both from the inherent uncertainty of language, and the disposition which men have, both purposely and unconsciously, to interpret it according to their passions and interests. Is this a mere speculation of fancy, or does it accord with our actual experience? During the half century that the present form of government has been in operation, how many are the laws passed by the federal legislature which some of the States have regarded as inconsistent with the Constitution, and in some instances, have been tempted openly to resist? There was the law which laid a tax on carriages, that which established

a bank, the sedition law, the law repealing the judiciary act of 1799. Then the power of affording direct protection to manufactures; that of laying an indefinite embargo; the power over the militia of the States, of making roads or canals, of appropriating money to a purpose not specified in the Constitution, of admitting new States not comprehended within the limits of the original territory, the extent of the power of exclusive legislation, and of the jurisdiction of the federal courts, have all been subjects of warm and obstinate dispute, besides many others of minor interest.

Though on several of these questions ambitious politicians, in their struggles for power, and mercenary men, looking only to emolument, have taken sides, without much regard to what was the true meaning of the Constitution, yet it is reasonable to suppose that most of our citizens honestly differed about them, and in the sincerity of their convictions some of the questions have agitated the public mind to its centre, and threatened nothing less than open resistance to authority. Even the sedition law, which has been pronounced unconstitutional by the most unequivocal evidence, was deemed to be clearly constitutional by one of the most honest and acute men we have ever known, and he held and avowed that opinion to the day of his death.*

Nor is the mischief from this source confined to acts of the general government. The States too may assert contested powers, and may even transcend their prescribed powers. But the balance is as effectually destroyed by putting a weight in one scale as in the other. The State legislatures are likely to interpret the Constitution in their favor in all cases that are doubtful, or can be made to appear so; and, in some cases, so as to frustrate salutary powers given to the general government. Thus, many believe that the Constitution meant to prohibit any State from making a paper currency of any kind; and, consequently, that, in creating banks with State capital, whose notes constitute much of the money of the State, and were so intended, they violated this prohibition. So they may pass laws violating the obligation of contracts; refuse obedience to federal laws, passed for regulating the militia, or for pur

poses of revenue. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia, Illinois, Georgia, &c., have all passed laws which have been pronounced unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States; some of which laws have been carried into execution. The questions which have thus arisen may again arise. If the States are right in the power they assert, the General Government has exceeded its authority when it has attempted to restrict that power. If, however, they are wrong, the States are disturbing that equilibrium which they all agreed to establish.

It is easy to see from these examples, stated from memory, and which it would require no great diligence of research to extend, that our written Constitution, however indispensable in organizing the government, and quieting the jealousy of the States, has been as yet very fruitful of controversy, and may be expected to continue so. Yet we must submit to this evil, if we would prescribe a law to the legislature. We could not have had union without a written constitution, and we cannot have such a constitution without differing and disputing about its interpretation.

It is true that most of these questions have passed away with no more serious mischief than the temporary effervescence they produced, and some of them are already forgotten. Yet we cannot confidently pronounce that they will always prove equally innocuous. The oak, which has withstood the storms of a hundred winters, may yield to a more furious hurricane at last. It behoves every good citizen, who wishes to perpetuate the government which secures to us so many blessings, to do what he can to mitigate these dissensions; we cannot hope to be exempt from them altogether. With this view some well-meaning persons offer a notable recipe, which they call strict construction. Yet, so far as we have observed, those who are very rigid in their interpretation of some parts of the Constitution, are equally liberal in construing others; for the great cause in the difference in the interpretation of that instrument is the difference of men's feelings and interests; and, since they differ about the distribution of power between the general and State governments, he who is strict in construing the

powers he wishes to abridge, will be latitudinous in construing those he wishes to enlarge.

. On this point men may be always expected to disagree; but to those who feel no strong bias either way, we would venture to suggest what seems to be the only practical and consistent rule, and that is, to give that construction which seems most obvious to common sense-that which the people, when they ratified the Constitution, may be presumed to have attached to it; and that which they will be likely to give it, when appealed to in the last resort. With this view, philological niceties, ingenious subtleties, and wiredrawn distinctions, such as we often see pressed into the service in constitutional discussions, should be peremptorily rejected. Accommodating ourselves to the rule of action of our ultimate arbiter, we should endeavor to give that interpretation which, without deviating from the words, will best promote the great ends of national security, liberty and prosperity for which the government was created.

Although we cannot confidently pronounce that agitations from this source may never prove more disastrous than they have done, yet there are many circumstances that are well fitted to soothe our apprehensions on this point. In the first place, it may be presumed that the questions concerning the legitimate powers of the general government, which are first in importance, are very likely to have already occurred; and, in whatever way they may have been withdrawn from the forum of the people, they will not probably be revived. What Congress would again enact a sedition law, or lay an indefinite embargo? If, however, some of these questions should be again agitated, or others of equal interest should present themselves, they will be somewhat less likely to inflame the passions of our citizens, from the recollection that similar questions, once deemed vital, have proved comparatively insignificant, or have passed into oblivion. The soldier acquires firmness in battle by being familiarized to danger, and by finding that the hazards of death, which seem at first so imminent, are far less than those of escape. Dangers to the Constitution, like all others, are alarming in proportion as they are new. When the amended Constitution of Virginia was under discussion, and the question whether the slaves should make part of the

basis of representation, threatened to break up the Assembly in confusion, Mr. Madison, who felt as deeply for the public welfare as any member of the body, but was not misled by his fears, coolly remarked to some of the alarmists, "I have been in a convention before." Besides, good and brave men, who watch over the safety of the State, and regard their country's welfare as yet dearer than their own, become both more confident and more skillful in healing these irritations, and in lighting upon some happy compromise, by which the enkindled passions of men are soothed, their jarring interests reconciled, the plighted honor of heated partisanship is saved, and a spirit of mutual conciliation restored to the community.

The opponents of a law deemed unconstitutional are further encouraged to forbearance by the conviction, drawn from many examples, that, if they are clearly right, the peaceful, but efficient remedy of a change of the public agents is at hand; and the more satisfied men are of the truth and justness of their views, the more confidently will they expect this redress, and the more patiently will they await its arrival; just as we find that those injuries which in savage life could be atoned for only by the blood of the aggressor, are, in a state of civilization, quietly left to the avenging power of the laws. And lastly, time will have its accustomed effect of increasing the veneration of our citizens for the Constitution. It will be associated in their minds with every great and glorious act achieved under it, whether civic or military; and with the prospect of national greatness which lies before us. What is now the dim future to us will be the well-defined past to them, and these interesting reminiscences will give new fervor to their love of country, and to all that is connected with it.

We are aware that a late intelligent traveller in this country has expressed the opinion that the power of the individual States is increasing, and that of the national government diminishing; and that, in this way, our system carries with it the seeds of its own destruction. Though M. De Tocqueville has shown himself an honest inquirer after truth; though he has examined our institutions more in the spirit of philosophy than any other European traveller, or rather, we may say, he is the only one who has so examined them; and though many of his specula

tions, both favorable and unfavorable, indicate a depth and soundness of reflection remarkable for one of his years, yet some of his most important views manifest that want of accurate knowledge which is to be expected in a stranger. He mistakes accidental and varying circumstances for uniform and permanent results of our social system. Where he is right as to their character, he sometimes mistakes the cause; and he prematurely forms a theory from too small a number of facts. Of this description is the opinion in question. It is probably as yet too soon to decide which power will preponderate in the equilibrium our Constitution meant to establish, but many of our profoundest thinkers believe that the general government is gradually gaining, and the States gradually losing, their relative weights in the system. They believe that every new State added to the confederacy is an additional band to the Union, and gives additional power to the general govern

ment.

It is true that we have seen many instances in which States have disregarded or contravened acts of the federal government; but many of them not being of general moment, and exciting but a transient interest, they have been unnoticed. The play was not worth the candle. It is also true that, where a number of neighboring States combine to oppose important measures of the national government, that government may sometimes find it prudent to temporize, and not attempt to enforce what it believes to be its legitimate authority. This was the case when most of the New England States refused to place their militia under the control of the national Executive. But that case was singular in all its circumstances. It may never again happen that the general government will put the loyalty of so large a portion of the Union to so severe a test as did that embargo; or that equally strong considerations of prudence will prevent the general government from enforcing its authority. Such combinations may be expected to be extremely rare; and though the sympathy of States similarly circumstanced, would seem to be a natural and powerful motive of cooperation, we find that, on these occasions of resistance to the laws of the Union, the other States promptly rally round the national standard to compel obedience. The insurrection in Pennsylvania was put down, not by a standing army, but by the volunteer_militia of other States;

and during the resistance of South Carolina to a tariff which she regarded as unequal, unjust, and unconstitutional, we believe that, in all the neighboring States. though they had the same cause of complaint as herself, and some of them yet greater, there was a majority of the people who disapproved her course, and would not have supported her in the event of an appeal to force. Our government is now in a course of experiment, and the reflecting portion of our citizens, justly appreciating its merits as to civil liberty, and the thousand blessings she brings in her train, watch its movements with unceasing solicitude, and are ready to throw their weight into the scale of the Union or of the States, as time and circumstances shall show is required, and to weaken or strengthen the powers of the component parts-to restrict or retain the executive veto-to

alter or continue the appointing power— to regulate the elections to the federal legislature by the national government, or to leave it to the States, as they think that a weight should be added here, or taken away there, for the proper adjustment of the complex machinery. This conservative power, active, sagacious, unceasing in its vigilance, and, though marked by no badge of office, silently pervading the whole community, seems to have been overlooked, or not sufficiently appreciated by M. De Tocqueville. As to the evil auguries of other European commentators, they are, compared with his, the niaiserie of children, and of spiteful children too. There seems then to be nothing in our frame of government which is inconsistent with its permanency; on the contrary, it is endued with the faculty of correcting those abuses or irregularities which may occasionally arise, and this faculty it will retain as long as the character of the people for intelligence and love of freedom remains unchanged.

But prolific sources of dissension meet our view when we look at the diversity of interests and pursuits among the several States. Some are largely engaged in shipping and foreign commerce, while others are shut out from the ocean. Some are extensively employed in manufactures, others principally in agriculture. Some permit domestic slavery, others prohibit it. Some contain large quantities of the public lands, others, not an acre. Some are in contact with the Indians, others are so separated from them as