PREFACE. THIS book is the result of my own self-education in Central Asian affairs. It is not intended for specialists, whose opinions are already fixed, but for the general reader, whether British or Indian. in Although by 1892 I had served for sixteen years trans-Indus and for seven in cis-Indus districts west of Lahore, I had no exact knowledge of the subject, having only read casually a little of its extensive literature. However, like most Panjabi Anglo-Indians, I had my beliefs, though unqualified to hold opinions. I was convinced that our close-border system, varied by occasional purdah - lifting expeditions, conducted on ultra-humanitarian principles, which cause the least possible loss to the enemy at the greatest possible expenditure to ourselves, would never make any lasting impression on our wild hillneighbours, and that the only way to gain their respect was to knock them down first, and then when prostrate to raise them up, and treat them with firm and generous kindness. As for Afghanistan, I was certain that any war with her was money thrown away, our first and long-neglected duty being to strengthen our existing line of frontier with forts, roads, and railways. These works completed, I thought we might advance, if necessity arose, to a few chosen strategic positions in the mountains, the nearer the Indus the better, from which, relying on our concentrated strength, we might look down with unconcern on the chronic troubles of Afghanistan, indifferent alike to her friendship or hostility, to Russia's abstention or interference,-certain in the latter case, from our own experiences, that, did our ponderous rival undertake the Russofication of the Afghans, she would waste her resources in the attempt. In discussions with friends in the Panjab Frontier Force I had little support. Most of them were for action of the advance-to-Herat and fight-it-out-onthe-Oxus kind, I for caution and working out the cost of every eventuality before making a fresh move in a game which had already (1877) cost India many millions sterling. They were soldiers, I a civilian and Revenue officer, hence possibly the divergence in our respective views. When war with Afghanistan was declared in 1878, it was to them a welcome change from hum drum routine to excitement, with possibilities of distinction. To me it appeared the opening scene in a revised version of the "Great Game" drama of 1838-42. At the time, the late Lord Lawrence warned his countrymen that the only possible issue would be a vast expenditure, with no advantages for India commensurate with the outpouring of treasure. The event justified that statesman's forebodings, though he did not live to see the miserable ending of that wasteful war. As time went on, the march of events strengthened my preconceived conclusions. We launched successively three expeditions against the politically unimportant Black Mountain tribes. The two first were of the tender maternal type, and almost beneficial to the hostile tribesmen; the last meant business, but the enemy, knowing the fact, would not show, hence not a shot was fired. The three together produced no results beyond the loss to pauper India of a quarter of a million sterling. At the same time an active policy was being pushed from end to end of our N.W. Frontier; the Gilgit Agency was re-constituted and extended; Hunza-Nagar and Chilas were conquered and annexed-most of the cost being thrown on Kashmir, though incurred for Imperial purposes. In Afghanistan things seemed drifting into a situation analogous to that which preceded the war of 1878-80; the Amir was sullen, almost defiant, and AngloIndian Jingoes were all agog for a new war, whenever His Highness should, like his uncle before him, appeal to Russia for protection. Eventually better counsels prevailed, and for the rest of his reign the Amir should continue our firm friend and ally. What his unstable subjects will do after his death no man can foresee. It was in 1892, before the happy change in our relations with the Amir had, for the time at least, falsified pessimistic anticipations, that I began to collect and read books and parliamentary and other papers on Russia generally, her advance into Central Asia, Afghanistan, and our N.W. Frontier. The result of my studies appears in the following pages. My old belief as to the right mode of dealing with the independent tribes, now wholly within our political frontier, is confirmed; but the grounds for my hasty and presumptuous dogmatism on the larger and more important Indo-Russian question are entirely shaken. The result of my reading has surprised myself, for if ever a man began a political study with strong prepossessions in favour of a particular line of action, and ended it with changed views, I am that man. If those who glance through the following pages come to conclusions similar to mine, and take |