Under the peculiar language of the statute, especially section 14, we have not found the question involved free from doubt. We think, however, that the construction here adopted carries out the intention of the legislature and will work no injustice or hardship to parties interested. The decree of the circuit court will accordingly be reversed and the cause remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views here expressed. Decree reversed. GEORGE PARK JOHNSON V. JEANNETTE E. BUCK et al. Opinion filed February 21, 1906-Rehearing denied April 4, 1906. 1. INFANTS—right of infant to maintain bill to impeach decree. An infant whose rights are prejudiced by a decree may maintain an original bill to impeach the decree during his minority, or within such time after attaining majority as he would have to sue out a writ of error to reverse the decree. 2. WILLS-elements essential to application of rule in Shelly's case. In order that the rule in Shelly's case may be applied there must be a gift or conveyance of a freehold estate to the ancestor, with a limitation, by way of remainder, to his heirs. 3. SAME when rule in Shelly's case does not apply. The rule in Shelly's case does not apply to a will which devises a fee simple estate to a person and his heirs immediately, without purporting to limit a remainder to such heirs. 4. SAME—when limitation upon a fee is valid. A limitation over to certain persons providing the person to whom a fee simple estate has been previously devised shall die before attaining the age of twenty-five years without leaving lawful issue surviving, is valid. 5. SAME when creation of trust is valid. A devise of a fee simple estate to certain named persons and their heirs, followed by a provision that the estate of one of such persons shall vest in the others in trust until he attains the age of twenty-five years, creates a valid trust. 6. EQUITY-power of equity to authorize a conversion of trust property contrary to provisions of a will. Courts of equity have power to authorize the conversion of trust property contrary to the plan of the will where there is a necessity for such conversion in order to preserve the estate; but such a conversion is not justified by the mere fact that the court concludes that some other plan is better than the one outlined in the will. WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. JAMES A. CREIGHTON, Judge, presiding. ROBERT H. PATTON, for plaintiff in error: Where a decree is rendered against a minor, he may, even during his minority, by his next friend, file an original bill in the nature of a bill of review to impeach the decree either for fraud or error appearing upon the face of the record. Gooch v. Green, 102 Ill. 507; Clark v. Shawen, 190 id. 52; Grimes v. Grimes, 143 id. 556. The following cases have held that where words are used in a will which at common law create an estate of inheritance, all subsequent words in the will attempting to limit the estate or the power of disposition are void: Wolfer v. Hemmer, 144 Ill. 554; Lambe v. Drayton, 182 id. 110; Silva v. Hopkinson, 158 id. 389; Burton v. Gagnon, 180 id. 345; Deemer v. Kessinger, 206 id. 62. The first clause of the will of George D. Withey gives all his property to his daughters and George Park Johnson, "and their heirs." Under the rule in Shelly's case, in force in this State, this clause vests an estate in fee simple with absolute power of disposition in the takers. Baker v. Scott, 62 Ill. 86; Vangieson v. Henderson, 150 id. 119; Deemer v. Kessinger, 206 id. 57; Silva v. Hopkinson, 158 id. 388; Wolfer v. Hemmer, 144 id. 554 The only method by which an instrument employing the word "heirs" can be shown not to be within the rule in Shelly's case is by showing that the word was not employed in its strict legal sense. Silva v. Hopkinson, 158 Ill. 389; Carpenter v. VanOlinder, 127 id. 42; Fowler v. Black, 136 id. 375. The rule in Shelly's case is not a rule of interpretation but a rule of property, and it must prevail whenever a devise, by the terms of the will, falls within it, regardless of the otherwise expressed intention of the testator. Deemer v. Kessinger, 206 Ill. 62; Baker v. Scott, 62 id. 86; Carpenter v. VanOlinder, 127 id. 42; Hageman v. Hageman, 129 id. 164; Ewing v. Barnes, 156 id. 61; Wolfer v. Hemmer, 144 id. 554; Silva v. Hopkinson, 158 id. 386. While this court has held in many cases, that where a fee is given by will under and by virtue of the 13th section of the Conveyancing act, the same is limited and modified by subsequent parts of the will, in each of the following of such cases this court has specifically mentioned the fact that the word "heir," or other words of inheritance, are not used, thereby showing a clear distinction between those cases and the one at bar: Turner v. Hause, 199 Ill. 468; Seeger v. Bode, 181 id. 518; Metzen v. Schopp, 202 id. 283; King v. King, 215 id. 100; Gruenewald v. Neu, 215 id. 132. The provisions of the third clause of the will, that the share given to the grand-son shall vest in the three daughters in trust, to possess, manage, and control the same, with power to sell and convey, etc., are manifestly conditions imposing restraint upon the absolute power of disposition given under clause 2, and therefore are void. Harris v. Ferguy, 207 Ill. 538. The exercise of the power of a court of equity to convert property held in trust can only be justified by some exigency which makes the action of the court, in a sense, indispensable to the preservation of the interests of the parties in the subject matter of the trust. Johns v. Johns, 172 Ill. 479; Gavin v. Curtin, 171 id. 640. ALBERT SALZENSTEIN, for defendants in error: A bill of review cannot be sustained on the ground that the court decided wrong on a question of fact, nor for wrong inferences of the court on matters of evidence, nor on the ground that the decree which is attacked is not warranted by the evidence. Fellers v. Rainey, 82 Ill. 114; Burgess v. Pope, 92 id. 255; Clement, 14 Ill. 205; v. Moss, 22 id. 363; Turner v. Berry, 3 Gilm. 541; Evans v. The will should be construed as an entirety, having respect to all its parts and giving effect to all of them, if possible. Orr v. Yates, 209 Ill. 222; Morrison v. Schorr, 197 id. 554; Fisher v. Fairbanks, 188 id. 187; Greenwood v. Greenwood, 178 id. 387; Bergan v. Cahill, 55 id. 160. In construing a will the punctuation is not to be regarded, if any change in that respect will effectuate the intention of the testator. Johnson v. Bank, 192 Ill. 541. The circuit court, in the original decree, properly construed the will here involved. 4 Kent's Com. 270; 1 Jarman on Wills, *822-824; 24 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, (2d ed.) 427, 428-431; Siegwald v. Siegwald, 37 Ill. 430; Bergan v. Cahill, 55 id. 160; Friedman v. Steiner, 107 id. 125; Summers v. Smith, 127 id. 645; Healy v. Eastlake, 152 id. 424; Smith v. Kimball, 153 id. 368; Glover v. Condell, 163 id. 536; Strain v. Sweeny, 163 id. 605; Lombard v. Witbeck, 173 id. 396; Koeffler v. Koeffler, 185 id. 261; Johnson v. Bank, 192 id. 541; Becker v. Becker, 206 id. 53; Orr v. Yates, 209 id. 222. Courts of chancery, by virtue of their general jurisdiction over the estates of infants, have full power to authorize the conversion of their real estate into personalty, when it seems to the court to the best interest of the infants to so do. Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227; Gorman v. Mullins, 172 id. 349; Johns v. Johns, id. 472; Williams v. Williams, 204 id. 44; Denegre v. Walker, 214 id. 113; King v. King, 215 id. 100. The rule that a trustee may not purchase at his own sale has no application to a sale made by a third party or officer of court, particularly where the trustee has an interest in the property sold. Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S. 587; Felton v. LeBreton, 92 Cal. 457; Frazer's Exrs. v. Lee, 42 Ala. 25; Lucas v. Firent, 111 Mich. 426; Saltmarch v. Spaulding, 147 Mass. 224; Dillinger v. Kelly, 84 Mo. 561. Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the court: The circuit court of Sangamon county sustained a demurrer to the amended bill of complaint, in the nature of a bill of review, filed by the plaintiff in error, George Park Johnson, by his next friend, against the defendants in error, Jeannette E. Buck, Georgie E. Williams and Minnie J. Ragland, for the purpose of reviewing and setting aside a decree and order of said court made and entered in a suit in which defendants in error were complainants and plaintiff in error was defendant. Plaintiff in error having attained his majority, sued out the writ of error in this case to review the action of the court in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing his bill. The material facts alleged in the amended bill of complaint, to which the demurrer was sustained, are as follows: George D. Withey, of Sangamon county, died September 17, 1899, leaving various pieces of real estate in the city of Springfield, all of which were devised to the parties to this litigation by the following provisions of his will: "Second I give, devise and bequeath all my estate, of every character and wheresoever situate, to my daughters Jeannette E. Buck, Georgie E. Wood and Minnie J. Ragland, and to my grand-son, George Park Johnson, and their heirs, share and share alike. "Third-But it is also my will, that the share above devised and bequeathed to my grand-son, shall vest in my said three daughters and the survivor or survivors of them. "In trust, to possess, manage and control the same, with power to sell and convey, in their discretion, for the education of my said grand-son, during his minority and to and until he attains the full age of twenty-five years; and upon his attaining the said age of twenty-five years, said trustees, shall deliver and pay over to my said grand-son, all and so much of the share of my said estate above devised and bequeathed to and for him, as may remain unexpended; and |