evil habit, which he brings upon himself by his own abuse of his freedom. We believe that the infant comes from the hand of its Creator pure from moral stain. It is innocent, though without personal merit. There are none of its powers and faculties which are not necessary to its well being, or whose natural operation is evil. We believe that God has given to every son and daughter of Adam a law in the sense of right and wrong, which he has implanted within them; that they have the power, and moreover the consciousness of the power to choose between them; and on this sense of power is founded the jurisdiction, and the retribution of conscience. That every moral act of every human being has an effect on his whole future being, for better or worse. We believe that this internal law has more or less light from without, according to circumstances, and like the other powers of man it is capable of more or less improvement. In the darkness of barbarity and heathenism, it has the least opportunity of improvement, and in a community thoroughly imbued with the light and practice of Christianity, the greatest. And we believe, that in a future world every one will be judged according to his character and actions, compared with his opportunities.

Now we ask which of these methods of divine government seems most to bear the stamp of truth? There are four sources of evidence on this subject,―reason, conscience, observation, and the word of God. In the first place, which seems the most

reasonable? Does it commend itself as probable that God would create this world as the first stage of man's existence, a scene of preparation for eternity, and withhold the very power, that of willing and doing good, which alone can render this stage of existence of any use to him? Is it not manifestly inconsistent to say that God has created this as a state of probation to man, and places him in it destitute of that very power which makes him capable of probation, that of willing and choosing right as well as wrong? According to this theory the character which a state of probation is intended to give man the opportunity of forming by his own voluntary actions, is already formed and fixed by the agency of another. His trial is already over before it is begun. His character is already fixed before he has done a single intelligent, voluntary action. Shall God make man for virtue, and then withhold from him those very powers which render virtue and happiness possible and attainable? The tender care of God for man is manifested in ten thousand ways, in the bounties of nature, in the changes of the seasons, in the beauty and grandeur he has poured over all his works, in the relations of society and domestic life, in the power of recovery from sickness and misfortune. But his happiness depends much more upon his power to do right. There is an order of nature, according to which if he regulate his conduct, a harmony arises which contributes infinitely more to his happiness, than all the richness and

variety of nature. That course of conduct is what the understanding perceives as right. Can we ever believe that God has created in the moral nature of man such a repugnance to that right, such an opposition to it, that the soul never chooses it till its own nature is miraculously changed? Such a supposition, while it attributes to God the greatest care of man in little things, imputes to him an entire disregard to his higher interests. Is there any reasonableness in supposing that God would suspend the power of millions of the human race of choosing to do right, a circumstance infinitely more important to their well-being than any other, on a solitary act of a remote ancestor?

But it is said that God miraculously bestows it on some; or rather restores the power to choose that which is good and pleasing to him, to a few. We answer, this only increases the difficulty. The first supposition makes God infinitely unjust. This adds the most revolting partiality. It is utterly impossible from the very nature of the case, that one should merit his regard more than another, for it is impossible, previous to this miraculous change, for any one to will or to do any thing pleasing to God. The selection then must be perfectly arbitrary. Would not that human parent be rendered infamous who should load a part of his children with boundless favours, and condemn the rest to want, and vice, and misery, during their whole lives?

But it may be asked, is it not according to the analogy of the present life? We answer,

no.

Neither virtue nor happiness is the exclusive privilege of any outward condition. Besides, the inequalities of this state of trial may be made up in a state of retribution. Whereas, the distinction between having and not having the power of doing right and what is acceptable to God, is final and eternal. Its effects commence at once, and are in their own nature endless and hopeless. To deny the justice and impartiality of the Deity is to deny his moral perfections. To deny his moral perfections overthrows all religion, and rendering utterly uncertain the principles of the Divine Government, makes all attention to the subject a mere waste of time. We simply ask you, is the doctrine of total depravity reasonable?

Our next source of evidence is consciousness, the moral nature of man. This is a source of evidence of which every one can judge by examining his own mind and consulting his past experience. What is the moral nature of man? It is the faculty which the rational soul possesses, not possessed by the brutes, of perceiving right and wrong, good and evil, and the feeling, the consciousness of power to choose between them. On the conviction and consciousness of possessing these two powers of perceiving and choosing, is founded a third attribute, a sense of merit, worth and desert; or of guilt, blame and self-reproach. I appeal to all who hear me, to say if they do not recognize in themselves all these powers and faculties, and an exercise of them such as I have described. I now ask if you

ever felt such an impotence of will toward that which your understanding perceived to be right that it was impossible for you to choose it? If you had felt thus utterly disabled, as much so as a man in a palsy is to walk, would your conscience afterwards reproach you for not doing what at the time you felt it to be impossible for you to do? Are the agonies of remorse the least mitigated by any consciousness of inability to do what we knew was right? According to this system, the inability existed, nay, was absolutely invincible." Conscience then is a stupendous lie. Remorse is a wanton, unjust, unmerited cruelty. The whole moral nature of man is one vast system of barbarous deception." Man is made wretched by a feeling of liberty which he does not possess. He is just as miserable as if the cause of his wrong doing were in himself, whereas in fact it was in Adam thousands of years ago. But who is the author of this moral nature? God. By whose arrangement is it that we have this consciousness of power and feeling of remorse? God's. Then it follows that millions of the human race are undergoing the torments of remorse, for that for which they are not at all to blame, by the ordination of God. Does not every principle of reason and every sentiment of piety revolt from such a supposition?

Is it not evident then that the moral nature of man is constructed upon the supposition that he is in that state by nature, in which the Westminster divines have described Adam as having been created,