The defendants are entitled to know in any event what particular offense or crime they are charged with having conspired or agreed to commit. In some cases the defendants would be entitled to be informed of the specific acts agreed to be performed. Here we find a statement of acts agreed to be done.

* *

As we have seen in considering indictment No. 23,927, it is a crime against the United States, under section 5451 of the Revised Statutes of the United States [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3680], to promise, or offer, or give, or to procure to be promised, offered, or given, any money or thing of any value to any officer of the United States, or to any person acting for or in behalf of the United States in any official function, etc., "with intent to influence his decision or action on any question, matter, cause or proceeding which may at any time. be pending or which may by law be brought before him in his official capacity or to induce him [said officer] to do or omit to do any act in violation of his lawful duty." The doing of the acts, etc., above mentioned, do not constitute an offense against the United States unless done with the intent specified. Intent in some cases may be inferred. A man is presumed to intend the natural or known result of his act. Still an indictment for the commission of a statutory offense, when a particular intent is made a substantial element of the crime, must state the intent. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 558, 23 L. Ed. 588. It is there held: "A crime is made up of acts and intent; and these must be set forth in the indictment with reasonable particularity of time, place, and circumstance.” "The general rule in reference to an indictment is that all the material facts and circumstances embraced in the definition of the offense must be stated, and that, if any essential element of the crime is omitted, such omission cannot be supplied by intendment or implication. The charge must be made directly, and not inferentially, or by way of recital." Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 202, 13 Sup. Ct. 542, 37 L. Ed. 419; United States v. Hess, 124 U. S. 483-486, 8 Sup. Ct. 571, 31 L. Ed. 516.

It is true that the manner or mode of committing the offense is stated in the indictment. Green, in behalf of the company represented by him, is to pay, or the company is to pay, to Beavers a commission of 10 per cent. upon each and every device sold the government through the influence of Beavers while he remains such officer. The International Time Recorder Company is to pay the commission to Beavers; it may be through Green; it may be through some other agency. Beavers agrees to receive it. The meeting of minds is sufficiently charged, as I have already held in considering the indictment charging these same defendants with the crime of having, on the same day, by making this same agreement, conspired to defraud the United States. Beavers does not agree to be active and use his influence in any way to secure the purchase of time recorders. He cannot purchase one. He has not that power. It is not stated that Green and Beavers agreed, or that either proposed, that this agreement for the payment of commissions was to influence the action of Beavers as an officer of the government, or as a person employed to perform an official function in one of the departments, or was made for that purpose, or that either had such a result in mind. Nor was it agreed, or stated, or

understood that such agreement was made for the purpose of inducing Beavers to do or to omit to do any act in violation of his duty. For the intent we are left to surmise, conjecture, and inferDid not Green intend the promise of the money should have the effect named? Did not Beavers fully understand the money was offered, and that it was to be paid for that purpose? Did not Beavers, in assenting to the agreement, understand it was proposed-impliedly consent-that he would use his influence to procure the purchase of devices by the government? This may be, and may not be.

It is evident to any rational mind that under the decisions of the Supreme Court an indictment purporting to charge a conspiracy to "commit an offense against the United States," which is merely the general name of the crime, must state an agreement to do acts which, if done, would constitute a crime or offense against the United States. The acts to be committed or done must be stated, and, if the conspiracy be one to commit a crime, where the acts done constituting the crime must be done with an intent specified in the statute, then the indictment for the conspiracy must allege an agreement not only to do the acts, but to do those acts with the intent, or for the purpose embraced within the intent, specified in the statute creating the offense. The existence of the intent cannot be left to inference. It is as essential to allege the intent as to allege the acts. United States v. Cruikshank et al., 92 U. S. 558, 23 L. Ed. 588. This indictment fails wholly to state facts which, admitted to be true, show the commission of a crime, or probable cause to believe that George E. Green has been guilty of the commission of the crime charged, or of any crime. A careful reading of the testimony given before the commissioner demonstrates that, for reasons already given, there is no evidence, aside from the indictment, even tending to show the commission of the crime charged or of any crime, or probable cause to believe the defendant, George E. Green, guilty of the crime charged, or of any crime.

On this charge of conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States in connection with the Bundy time recorders, in violation of section 5440 of the Revised Statutes of the United States [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3676], and which charge is based on indictment No. 23,928, filed September 17, 1903, the writ of habeas corpus is sustained, and the defendant is discharged. The motion. for a warrant of removal is denied.

In respect to indictment No. 23,961, filed October 5, 1903, charging a conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of section 5440, Rev. St. U. S. [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3676], in relation to the Doremus stamp-canceling machine, in which George W. Beav-' ers, George E. Green, and Willard D. Doremus are defendants, and indictment No. 23,960, against George E. Green and said Doremus, filed the same day, and charging the bribery or attempted bribery of George W. Beavers, in violation of section 5451, Rev. St. U. S. [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3680], in connection with the sale of said machines to the government, but little need be said. Indictment No. 23,961, and the charge based therein, must be sustained, for the same

reasons indictment No. 23,940 was sustained; the difference being that indictment charged a conspiracy to defraud in relation to the Bundy time recorders. Indictment No. 23,960 must be sustained for the reason that it charges distinctly the offering of money to Beavers and its actual payment in the District of Columbia, with the necessary intent, whereas the bribery indictment before considered and held invalid alleges the offering of checks.

As to indictments No. 23,960 and No. 23,961, and the charges. based thereon, the writs are dismissed, and the defendant remanded. In both these cases the warrants of removal applied for are granted.

It has been suggested that under the decision in Beavers v. Henkel, supra, it has become the duty of commissioners and judges, on the presentation of an indictment found by a grand jury in another district and proof of identity, to direct the removal of the indicted party to that jurisdiction, without presuming to question the validity of the indictment, or taking or hearing evidence offered to establish the innocence of the defendant in the indictment. Some expressions in the opinion in that case might seem to sustain that contention, but it must be remembered that the court there was considering a case where the validity of the indictment itself was not in question. All the court said was on the assumption that the indictment was valid. The question was its effect, or the probative force to be given it on that assumption. A void indictmentthat is, one void on its face, for the reason it does not charge the commission of a crime—is not prima facie evidence to an intelligent court or judge of anything, except that the person who drew it and the grand jury that found it made a mistake. It will be a sad day for the cause of justice when it is decreed by Congress or the courts that a citizen may be removed from Maine to California for trial on a void indictment. That question may be determined by the court where the arrest is made; for it is jurisdictional. The proper way to test the question is by a writ of habeas corpus. That writ cannot be made to serve the purpose of an appeal or of a writ of error, but it is properly used to determine whether a person under arrest is held lawfully. If held by virtue of a void indictment, or a process or warrant issued and based thereon, he is not, of course, in this Republic, lawfully detained and deprived of his liberty. In each of the cases where I have sustained the writ and directed the discharge of the defendant, I have found and hold that there is no evidence, taking the facts stated in the indictment as true, either that the crime alleged has been committed, or that there is probable cause to believe the defendant, Green, guilty of the commission of that or any other crime. He is therefore illegally held and deprived of his liberty.

CARRELL v. MCMURRAY.

(Circuit Court, W. D. Arkansas, Ft. Smith, Division. March 25, 1905.) 1. REFORMATION OF CONTRACT-GROUNDS-MISTAKE OF LAW.

Where a contract as written, through mistake of either fact or law, fails to embody the actual agreement and intention of the parties, a court of equity will reform it to conform to such agreement and intention.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 42, Cent. Dig. Reformation of Instruments, §§ 68-78.]

2. SAME-DEED.

Plaintiff and defendant entered into a parol agreement for the exchange of a farm owned by plaintiff for a store and stock of goods owned by defendant, subject to an examination thereof by plaintiff. By such agreement, as testified by both parties, plaintiff was to retain possession of the farm until the ensuing January and receive the rents for the current year. Plaintiff had a deed drawn, stating the agreement fully to the draftsman; but the latter made no reservation in the deed, being of the opinion that it was not proper or necessary. Defendant also had a written contract drawn, which was signed by the parties and which contained no reference to the rents or time of giving possession, although such terms were stated by defendant to the draftsman. Owing to subsequent occurrences defendant became desirous of repudiating the contract, and demanded its modification, so as to give him immediate possession of the land and the rents, which plaintiff refused, insisting on the agreement as made. Defendant then consulted a lawyer, who, on examining the deed, which defendant had not previously seen, advised him that it carried the right to immediate possession and the rents, and defendant then completed the trade and accepted the deed, without stating the fact of such advice to plaintiff. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to have the deed reformed to embody the actual agreement and understanding of both parties when the contract was made, both on the ground of mistake and of fraud.

In Equity.

J. V. Walker, for complainant.

Brizzolara, Fitzhugh & Wellshear, for defendant.

ROGERS, District Judge. This is a bill of complainant to reform a deed and to enjoin the defendant from the prosecution of a suit at law against the complainant. The complainant, John W. Carrell, owned a farm in Benton county, Ark. He resided at Springdale, a village in that county, and was by occupation a farmer, merchant, and banker. The defendant was a citizen of Memphis, Tenn., and had a store at Cameron, in the Indian Territory. The defendant desired to go out of business at Cameron. The complainant, having learned of this fact, perhaps through Mr. Black (who was a brother-in-law, and a merchant at Cameron), opened correspondence with the defendant at Memphis, proposing to trade him his Benton county farm for the store and goods at Cameron. The correspondence culminated in defendant going to Benton county on the 11th or 12th of July, 1900, to examine the farm. After going over the farm the parties entered into a conditional oral agreement to exchange the farm for the store and outhouses and the goods at Cameron. In the exchange the farm was to be valued at $20 per acre, and the balance due on the goods and

houses at Cameron to be paid for in cash after the goods were invoiced. Indeed, defendant testifies that at that time complainant refused to go to Cameron to examine the goods, unless it was agreed he should have $20 an acre for his land and retain possession of the farm until January 1, 1901, and have the rents for 1900. The reason for retaining possession and the rents is conclusively shown, viz., that complainant's stock of hogs and cattle were on the farm and had to be cared for, and there were also unsettled accounts with complainant's tenants that he wanted to adjust out of that year's rent. There is no dispute about so much of the agreement as is above stated. There is some controversy about the terms of the oral agreement then made as to the properties at Cameron, as will be seen later. Accordingly, on the 13th of July, defendant left for Cameron, and arrived there the same day, and immediately gave directions for the store to be cleaned up, so that the plaintiff (who was expected next day) could look over it to advantage. On the next day, the 14th of July (which was on Saturday), complainant arrived at Cameron. They proceeded at once to look over and invoice the showcases and fixtures. Defendant contends that during the day, while negotiating about the Cameron properties, there was some friction, growing out of a disposition by complainant to embrace things which were not included in the oral agreement made at Springdale on the 12th of July: There were some differences in the valuations of the showcases and fixtures, natural enough between the parties. These differences were, however, adjusted; and beyond this I am unable to find that there was any other friction about the trade until defendant, at his own suggestion, prepared a memorandum in writing of what he claimed was the oral contract at Springdale, and submitted it to complainant. Parts of this memorandum agreement were objected to and stricken out. The paper was then redrafted and signed by the parties. It is as follows:

"This agreement, made and entered into between J. W. Carrell and W. H. McMurray, made this the 14th day of July, witnesseth: That the abovenamed parties agree to the following trade and conditions hereinafter named: That for and in consideration of J. W. Carrell's 486-acre farm, situated about 15 miles east of Springdale, Arkansas, which is valued at $20.00 per acre, amounting to $9,720.00, W. H. McMurray agrees to sell his store building, two frame storerooms situated back of store and stables, also the vacant property on west side of and back of the store and enclosed under barn fence, all of which is valued at $3,000.00. This does not include either of the dwelling houses nor the lots on which they are situated. It is further agreed that the goods in the store shall be furnished at invoice prices to the amount of $6,720.00, which with the above-mentioned $3,000.00 is in full payment for the 486 acres farm land. It is further agreed that said Carrell shall pay W. H. McMurray cash for the balance of goods at the rate of 80 per cent. on the invoice cost of goods. It is further understood by both parties that any goods that are damaged shall be put in at their actual value.

"J. W. Carrell.
"W. H. McMurray."

This agreement I find, after a careful review of the evidence pro and con, embraces the same terms as the oral agreement (as far as it goes) made at Springdale, Ark., July 12th. Defendant at