the act above quoted. We are advised of no decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana on the point, and we are therefore remitted to our own construction of the statute.

1. We can find no reason, and counsel suggests none, for the discrimination contended for. The mischief to be remedied by the act covers cases of injuries to the character and reputation, as well as bodily or physical injuries.

2. At common law, libel and slander were classified as injuries to the person, or personal injuries. 3 Blackstone, 119; Cooley on Torts (2d Ed.) 23, 24; Bouvier, Law Dictionary, verbo "Injury."

3. In the construction of the statutes of the United States and of the several states, where the terms "injury to the person" and "personal injuries" have been construed, the great majority of the decisions of the higher courts, and nearly all of the intelligent reasons given, have been to the effect that libel is a personal injury. See McDonald v. Brown, 23 R. I. 546, 51 Atl. 213, 58 L. R. A. 768, 91 Am. St. Rep. 659, and Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 87 Ga. 79, 80, 13 S. E. 250, and cases cited in both; also Sanderson v. Hunt (Ky.) 76 S. W. 179. Many other citations on the same line could be given. The adjudicated cases cited by counsel for plaintiff in error as holding that libel is not a personal injury within the meaning of statutes similar to Act 68 of 1902-to wit, Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342, 359, 16 Am. Rep. 270; Ott v. Great Northern R. Co., 70 Minn. 50, 54, 72 N. W. 833; Calloway v. Laydon, 47 Iowa, 458, 29 Am. Rep. 489; Smith v. Sherman, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 408; State v. Clayborne (Wash.) 45 Pac. 303-are not directly in point, nor abounding in reason useful to us.

4. Judge Lumpkin, in Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., supra, said, and we agree:

"Person' is a broad term, and legally includes, not only the physical body and members, but also every bodily sense and personal attribute, among which is the reputation a man has acquired. Reputation is a sort of right to enjoy the good opinion of others, and is capable of growth and real existence, as an arm or a leg. If it is not to be classed as a personal right, where does it belong? No provision has been made for any middle class of injuries between those to person and those to property, and the great body of wrongs arrange themselves under the one head or the other. Whether viewed from the artificial arrangement of law writers, or the standpoint of common sense, an injury to reputation is an injury to person; and oftentimes an injury of this sort causes far more pain and unhappiness, to say nothing of actual loss in money or property, than any physical injury could possibly occasion."

Counsel for defendant in error contends that this writ is based on frivolous grounds and was sued out for delay, and urges that, under paragraph 2 of rule 30 of this court (90 Fed. clxviii, 31 C. C. A. clxviii), 10 per cent. damages, in addition to interest, should be awarded on the amount of the judgment; but as Act 68 of 1902 has never been construed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and there is some conflict of authorities on the question, we are not disposed to hold that the writ was sued out for delay. Further than this, we say that as malice is the gist of the action of libel, and as the record shows that a full retraction of the publication complained of, so far as the defendant was concerned, was made the next day

after publication, and as no suggestion is made in the record or in the argument of any other malice than that inferred by law from the publication itself, we are more inclined, if it were within our jurisdiction, to cut down the damages than to enhance them. The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

UNITED STATES v. GEORGE MEIER & CO.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. January 6, 1905.)

No. 76.

1. CUSTOMS DUTIES-CLASSIFICATION-FLITTERS-COMPOSITION METAL. The article commercially known as "flitters," produced from the thin sheets which constitute the composition metal of commerce, by a process of manufacture that makes it no longer available for the uses to which composition metal of trade is put, but adapts it for other uses, is not free of duty as "composition metal," under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 2, Free List, par. 533, 30 Stat. 197 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1682), but is dutiable as manufactures of metal under paragraph 193, § 1, Schedule C, of said act (30 Stat. 167 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1645]). 2. SAME-"Manufacture."

Held, that an article which has been advanced through one or more processes into a completed commercial article, known and recognized in trade by a specific and distinctive name other than the name of the material from which it is made, and is put into a completed shape, designed and adapted for a particular use to which the material in its original form is not adapted, is to be deemed a manufacture, although its component materials are unchanged.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

This cause comes here upon appeal from a decision of the Circuit Court, Southern District of New York (128 Fed. 472), reversing a decision of the Board of General Appraisers (G. A. 5150; T. D. 23,752), which had affirmed the collector of the port of New York in the assessment of certain customs duties.

Note Baer v. United States (C. C.) 130 Fed. 391

D. Frank Lloyd, for the United States.

A. H. Washburn, for appellees.

Before WALLACE, LACOMBE, and TOWNSEND, Circuit Judges.

LACOMBE, Circuit Judge. The importations were under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, 30 Stat. 151 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1626], the relevant paragraphs of which act read as follows:

"Par. 193. Articles or wares not specially provided for in this act, composed wholly or in part of iron, steel, lead, copper, nickel, pewter, zinc, gold, silver, platinum, aluminum, or other metal, and whether partly or wholly manufactured, 45 per centum ad valorem." 30 Stat. 167, c. 11, § 1, Schedule C [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1645].

"Free List, par. 533. Old copper, fit only for manufacture, clipping from new copper, and all composition metal of which copper is a component material of

chief value, not specially provided for in this act." 30 Stat. 197, c. 11, § 1 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1682].

From the undisputed testimony it appears that ingots of composition metal are put through rollers, and further thinned down under a hammer, until they become thin sheets, the "composition metal" of trade; the importer himself testifying that in trade composition metal appears only in fine sheets or leaves. These thin sheets are cut into desired sizes, and from the shearings left over the merchandise in suit is produced. These shearings are first cut into small pieces with the scissors or a machine, and are then placed in a steel box, in which a stamp goes up and down, still further reducing the size of the pieces, although not to the condition of powder. By such process, although scientifically it still remains a composition of copper (chief value) with some other metal or metals, the merchandise is no longer available for the uses to which the composition metal of trade in thin sheets or leaves was put; but it has become adapted to other uses, being employed to sprinkle over the face of surfaces where it is desired to produce a glittering metallic effect. Moreover, it has its own distinctive trade name, being universally known as "flitters."

In Erhardt v. Hahn, 55 Fed. 273, 5 C. C. A. 99, this court referred to the authorities holding that, under the tariff acts, where an article has been advanced through one or more processes into a completed commercial article, known and recognized in trade by a specific and distinctive name other than the name of the material, and is put into a completed shape designed and adapted for a particular use, it is deemed to be a manufacture. The application of this principle is determinative of the case at bar, for, although its component materials are unchanged, processes of manufacture have produced a completed commercial article, known and recognized in trade, not as composition metal, but as flitters, and which is designed and adapted for a particular use, to which the composition metal of trade could not be put until it had first been subjected to such additional processes of manufacture.

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The cases cited by the counsel for the importer are not persuasive to a different conclusion. In Dejonge v. Magone, 159 U. S. 562, 16 Sup. Ct. 119, 40 L. Ed. 260, the importations were of two kinds of paper-one coated, colored, and embossed to imitate leather; the other coated with flock, to imitate velvet. Both kinds were known to the trade when the tariff act was passed as "fancy papers," and were held to be included in the paragraph providing for "paper hangings and paper for screens, paper antiquarian, demy, drawing, note and all other paper." In Grempler v. United States, 107 Fed. 687, 46 C. C. A. 557, this court sustained the Circuit Court in holding that large sheets of composition metal, not available for any purpose until they had been beaten to onesixth of their present thickness and then cut into pieces, had not been transformed into a different article of manufacture from the original ingot of composition metal. In the same case there seems to have been some question as to "clippings," which were also held

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to be composition metal. Apparently these are the shearings referred to supra, but before they have been cut up and beaten into flitters, thus completing the process of manufacture. In United States v. Binney, 82 Fed. 992, 27 C. C. A. 347, this court again affirmed the Circuit Court as to certain steel produced by crushing steel ingots into kernels or grains of different degrees of fineness, and used by stone sawyers. It was known to trade as "Diamond Steel," and was held to be included in a paragraph providing for a long enumeration of steel articles, and concluding with the phrase "steel in all forms and shapes." In Boker v. United States, 97 Fed. 205, 38 C. C. A. 114, the importation comprised certain nickel alloy in the form of rods, sheets, and wire. This court affirmed the Circuit Court, holding the merchandise to be covered by the paragraph providing for "nickel or alloy of any kind in which nickel is the material of chief value," saying:

"It seems clear that the rods and plates are not advanced from the condition of nickel alloy. They are incapable of practical use without being subjected to further manipulation and manufacture. * * Congress, by the

provision for nickel alloy, itself a manufacture, must be presumed to have intended to provide for such alloy in its ordinary commercial forms as known at the passage of the act. The wire, however, is a manufacture of metal, a complete merchantable article, to be used in the construction of rheostats, and dealt in commercially in various sizes adapted to the purposes for which it is wanted."

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United States v. Leonard, 108 Fed. 42, 47 C. C. A. 181, presents no question of an advance by manufacturing processes beyond first conditions into a new and different article having a distinctive tradename. The opinion of the Circuit Court in Marsching v. U. S., 113 Fed. 1006, contains no indication that the "lame" cut up into minute scales was known commercially as something different from “lame.” That decision therefore has no application here.

The decision of the Circuit Court is reversed, and that of the Board of Appraisers is affirmed.

In re HERRMAN.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. November 21, 1904.)

No. 43.

BANKRUPTCY-CONCEALMENT OF ASSETS-FALSE OATH-DISCHARGE-EVIDENCE. A bankrupt's wife acquired $10,000 from her father, which constituted her sole estate. In bankruptcy proceedings of a firm of which her husband was a member an indebtedness for $6,000 loaned by the wife to the firm was scheduled. Nothing was paid to the creditors of the firm, but almost immediately thereafter the husband again commenced business in the name of his brother, and testified that his wife contributed $10,000 of this business and the brother $2,000. This business was extraordinarily successful, the profits being invested in real estate, etc.; the bankrupt testifying that he managed the business for his wife without charge, drew such funds from the business as he wanted, and, though for the last 30 years he lived in a large and expensive house, he paid nothing to his creditors. He was never discharged under the former bankruptcy proceedings, and thereafter individually filed another petition, in which he scheduled no assets, and old debts amounting to nearly $9,000. Held, that such facts were sufficient to show that the bankrupt owned a substantial interest in the partnership, and that he was guilty of a false oath, precluding a discharge, by swearing to a schedule stating that he had no such property.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

The following is the opinion of the court below:

HOLT, District Judge. This is a motion to confirm a referee's report recommending the discharge of the bankrupt. Two of the objections filed to the discharge are, in substance, that the bankrupt omitted from his schedules of assets an interest in various pieces of real estate and in the stock of the Morris S. Herrman Company. The bankrupt claims that his wife owns this property, and the question is whether he owns it or she. In June, 1869, the bankrupt was married. His wife's father gave to Mrs. Herrman on the day of the wedding $10,000. The bankrupt at that time was a member of the firm of A. B. Herrman & Co., composed of his brother, Adolph B. Herrman, and himself. In February, 1870, the firm of A. B. Herrman & Co. failed, and were adjudicated bankrupts in this court. Their schedules showed debts amounting to about $130,000. Most of these were for merchandise purchased immediately before the failure. Deborah Herrman, the bankrupt's wife, was inserted in the schedules as a creditor for $6,000 for money loaned to the debtors during the year 1869. The assets scheduled amounted nominally to about $15,000, of which a stock in trade at Philadelphia was put in at $8,000, and the remainder was substantially uncollected notes and accounts. The evidence shows that no dividend was declared in the bankrupt's proceedings, and nothing was ever paid to the creditors. A petition for discharge was filed, but it appears never to have been acted on. In 1870, some few months after the adjudication in bankruptcy, a business was begun in New York City under the name of Morris S. Herrman. Morris S. Herrman was a younger brother of the bankrupt, being at that time about 21 years old. The bankrupt claims that Morris S. Herrman and Deborah Herrman, the bankrupt's wife, were partners in the business carried on under the style of Morris S. Herrman, and that he, the bankrupt, Herman Herrman, had no interest in the business. He testifies that Mrs. Herrman put into the business $10,000, and that Morris S. Herrman put originally into the business about $2,000 and subsequently other money, making his contribution about equal to Mrs. Herrman's, and that Morris S. Herrman and Mrs. Herrman thereupon continued to be equal partners. Mrs. Herrman had little knowledge of