in restraint of excessive State power when it appeared, instead of by way of affirmative national regulation. The national restraint, when there was any, was commonly effected by invoking the action of the judicial department of the Government, and by its assistance arresting such State action as appeared to constitute an unauthorized interference with interstate traffic and intercourse. This special intervention, whether in the exercise of an original jurisdiction, as in the Wheeling Bridge case, reported in 13 Howard, 518, or under an appellate authority, as in Ward v. Maryland (12 Wallace, 418), and Welton v. Missouri (91 United States Reports, 275), has been important and useful in a considerable number of cases, but in the nature of things it could not accomplish the purposes of general regulation. On the other hand, the effect was to leave the corporations, into whose hands the internal commerce of the country had principally fallen, to make the law for themselves in many important particulars-the State power being inadequate to complete regulation, and the national power not being put forth for the purpose.

The common law still remained operative, but there were many reasons why it was inadequate for the purposes of complete regulation. One very obvious reason was that the new method of land transportation was wholly unknown to the common law, and was so different from those under which common-law rules had grown up, that doubts and differences of opinion as to the extent to which those rules could be made applicable were inevitable. A highway of which the ownership is in private citizens or corporations who permit no other vehicles but their own to run upon it bears obviously but faint resemblance to the common highway upon which every man may walk or ride or drive his wagon or his carriage. If we undertake to apply to the one the rules which have grown up in regulation of the others, there must necessarily be a considerable period in which the state of the law will, in many important particulars, be uncertain, and while that continues to be the case, those who have the power to act and who must necessarily act by rule and according to some established system, will for all practical purposes make the law, because the rule and the system will be of their establishment.

Such, to a considerable extent, has been the fact regarding the busi ness of transporting persons and property by rail.

Those who have controlled the railroads have not only made rules for the government of their own corporate affairs, but very largely also they have determined at pleasure what should be the terms of their contract relations with others, and others have acquiesced, though oftentimes unwillingly, because they could not with confidence affirm that the law would not compel it, and a test of the question would be diffi cult and expensive. The carriers of the country were thus enabled to determine in great measure what rules should govern the transportation of persons and property; rules which intimately concerned the commercial, industrial, and social life of the people.

The circumstances of railroad development tended to make this indirect and abnormal law-making exceedingly unequal and oftentimes oppressive. When railroads began to be built the demand for participation in their benefi.s went up from every city and hamlet in the land, and the public was impatient of any obstacles to their free construction and of any doubts that might be suggested as to the substantial benefit to flow from any possible line that might be built. Under an imperative popular demand general laws were enacted in many States which enabled projectors of roads to organize at pleasure and select their own

lines, and where there were no such laws the grant of a special charter was almost a matter of course, and the securities against abuse of cor porate powers were little more than nominal. For a long time the promoter of a railway was looked upon as a public benefactor, and laws were passed under which municipal bodies were allowed to give public money or loan public credit in aid of his schemes on an assumption that almost any road would prove reasonably remunerative, but that in any event the indirect advantages which the public would reap must more than compensate for the expenditures.

In time it came to be perceived that these sanguine expectations were delusive. A very large proportion of all the public money invested in railroads was wholly sunk and lost. Many roads were undertaken by parties who were without capital, and who relied upon obtaining it by a sale of bonds to a credulous public. The corporation thus without capital was bankrupt from its inception, and the corporators were very likely to be mere adventurers who would employ their chartered powers in such manner as would most conduce to their personal ends.

It is striking proof of the recklessness of corporate management that 108 roads, representing a mileage of 11,066, are now in the hands of receivers, managing them under the direction of courts, whose attention is thus necessarily withdrawn from the ordinary and more appropriate duties of judicial bodies. So serious has been the evil of bringing worthless schemes into existence and making them the basis for an appropriation of public moneys or for the issue of worthless evidences of debt, that a number of the States have so amended their constitutions as to take from the legislature the power either to lend the credit of the State in aid of corporations proposing to construct railroads, or to authorize municipal bodies to render aid, either in money or credit. State legislation has at the same time been in the direction of making compulsory the actual payment of a bona fide capital before a corporation shall be at liberty to test the credulity of the public by an issue of negotiable securities.

When roads were built for which the business was inadequate, the managers were likely to seek support by entering upon competition for business which more legitimately belonged to the other roads, and which could only be obtained by offering rates so low that if long continued they must prove destructive. A competitive warfare was thus opened up in which each party endeavored to under bid the other, with little regard to prudential considerations, and freights were in a great many cases carried at a loss, in the hope that in time the power of the rival to continue the strife would be crippled and the field practically left to a victor who could then make its own terms with customers. When the competition was less extreme than this, there was still a great deal of earnest strife for business, some of which was open and with equal offerings of rates and accommodations to all, but very much of which was carried on secretly, and then the very large dealers practically made their own terms, being not only accommodated with side tracks and other special conveniences, but also given what were sometimes spoken of as wholesale rates, or perhaps secret rebates, which reduced the cost to them of transportation very greatly below what smaller dealers in the same line of business were compelled to pay. Such allowances were sufficient of themselves in very many cases to render successful competition, as against those who had them, practically impossible.

The system of making special arrangements with shippers was in many parts of the country not confined to large manufacturers and

dealers, but was extended from person to person under the pressure of alleged business necessity, or because of personal importunity or favor itism, and even in some cases from a desire to relieve individuals from the consequences of previous unfair concessions to rivals in business. The result was that shipments of importance were commonly made under special bargains entered into for the occasion, or to stand until revoked, of which the shipper and the representative of the road were the only parties having knowledge. These arrangements took the form of special rates, rebates, and drawbacks, underbilling, reduced classifi cation, or whatever might be best adapted to keep the transaction from the public; but the public very well understood that private arrangements were to be had if the proper motives were presented. The memorandum-book carried in the pocket of the general freight agent often contained the only record of the rates made to the different patrons of the road, and it was in his power to place a man or a community under an immense obligation by conceding a special rate on one day, and to nullify the effect of it on the next by doing even better by a competitor. The system, if it can be called such, involved a great measure of secrecy, and its necessary conditions were such as to prevent effective efforts to break it down, though the willingness to make the effort was not wanting among intelligent shippers. It was of the last importance to the shipper that he be on good terms with those who made the rates he must pay; to contend against them was sometimes regarded as a species of presumption which was best dealt with by increasing exist ing burdens; and the shipper was cautious about incurring the risk. Nevertheless it was a common observation, even among those who might hope for special favors, that a system of rates, open to all and fair as between localities, would be far preferable to a system of special contracts into which so large a personal element entered or was commonly supposed to enter. Permanence of rates was also seen to be of very high importance to every man engaging in business enterprises, since without it business contracts were lottery ventures. It was also perceived that the absolute sum of the money charges exacted for transportation, if not clearly beyond the bounds of reason, was of inferior importance in comparison with the obtaining of rates that should be open, equal, relatively just as between places, and as steady as in the nature of things was practicab e.

Special favors or rebates to large dealers were not always given be cause of any profit which was anticipated from the business obtained by allowing them; there were other reasons to influence their allow ance. It was early perceived that shares in railroad corporations were an enticing subject for speculation, and that the ease with which the hopes and expectations of buyers and holders could be oper. ted upon pointed out a possible road to speedy wealth for those who should have the management of the roads. For speculative purposes an increase in the volume of business might be as useful as an increase in net returns; for it might easily be made to look to those who knew nothing of its cause like the beginning of great and increasing prosperity to the road. a temporary increase was sometimes worked up for still other reasons: such as to render plausible some demand for an extension of line, or for some other great expenditure, or to assist in making terms in a consolidation, or to strengthen the demand for a larger share in a pool.

Whatever was the motive, the allowance of the special rate or rebate was essentially unjust and corrupting; it wronged the smaller dealer, oftentimes to an extent that was ruinous, and it was very generally accompanied by an allowance of free personal transportation to the

larger dealer, which had the effect to emphasize its evils. There was not the least doubt that had the case been properly brought to a judicial test these transactions would in many cases have been held to be illegal at the common law; but the proof was in general difficult, the remedy doubtful or obscure, and the very resort to a remedy against the party which fixed the rates of transportation at pleasure, as has already been explained, might prove more injurious than the rebate itself. Parties affected by it, therefore, instead of seeking redress in the courts, were more likely to direct their efforts to the securing of similar favors on their own behalf. They acquiesced in the supposition that there must or would be a privileged class in respect to rates, and they endeavored to secure for themselves a place in it.

Personal discrimination in rates was sometimes made under the plausible pretense of encouraging manufacturers or other industries. It was perhaps made a bargain in the establishment of some new business or in its removal from one place to another that its proprietors should have rates more favorable than were given to the public at large; and this, though really a public wrong, because tending to destroy existing industries in proportion as it unfairly built up others, was generally defended by the parties to it on the ground of public benefit.

Local discriminations, though not at first blush so unjust and offen sive, have nevertheless been exceedingly mischievous, and if some towns have grown, others have withered away under their influence. In some sections of the country if rates were maintained as they were at the time the interstate commerce law took effect, it would have been practically impossible for a new town, however great its natural advantages, to acquire the prosperity and the strength which would make it a rival of the towns which were specially favored in rates; for the rates themselves would establish for it indefinitely a condition of subordination and dependence to "trade centers." The tendency of railroad competition has been to press the rates down and still further down at these trade centers, while the depression at intermediate points has been rather upon business than upon rates. In very many cases it has resulted in the charging of more for a short than for a long haul on the same line in the same direction; and though this has been justified by railroad managers as resulting from the necessities of the situation, it is not to be denied that the necessity has in many cases been artificially created and without sufficient reason.

The inevitable result was that this management of the business had a direct and very decided tendency to strengthen unjustly the strong among the customers and to depress the weak. These were very great evils, and the indirect consequences were even greater and more pernicious than the direct, for they tended to fix in the public mind a belief that injustice and inequality in the employment of public agencies were not condemned by the law, and that success in business was to be sought for in favoritism rather than in legitimate competition and enterprise.

The evils of free transportation of persons were not less conspicuous than those which have been mentioned. This, where it extended beyond the persons engaged in railroad service, was commonly favoritism in a most unjust and offensive form. Free transportation was given not only to secure business but to conciliate the favor of localities and of public bodies; and, while it was often demanded by persons who had, or claimed to have, influence which was capable of being made use of to the prejudice of the railroads, it was also accepted by public officers of all grades and of all varieties of service. In these last cases

the pass system was particularly obnoxious and baneful; for if any re turn was to be made or was expected of public officers, it was of something which was not theirs to give, but which belonged to the public or to constituents. A ticket entitling one to free passage by rail was often more effective in enlisting the assistance and support of the holder than its value in money would have been, and in a great many cases it would be received and availed of when the offer of money, made to accomplish the same end, would have been spurned as a bribe. Much suspicion of public men resulted, which was sometimes just, but also sometimes unjust and cruel; and some deterioration of the moral sense of the community, traceable to this cause, was unavoidable while the abuse continued. The parties most frequently and most largely favored were those possessing large means and having large business interests.

The general fact came to be that in proportion to the distance they were carried those able to pay the most paid the least. One without means had seldom any ground on which to demand free transportation, while with wealth he was likely to have many grounds on which he could make it for the interest of the railroad company to favor him, and he was sometimes favored with free transportation not only for himself and his family but for business agents also, and even sometimes for his customers. The demand for free transportation was often in the nature of blackmail, and was yielded to unwillingly and through fear of damaging consequences from a refusal. But the evils were present as much when it was extorted as when it was freely given.

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These were some of the evils that made interference by national legis lation imperative. But there were others that were of no small impor tance. Rates when there was no competition were sometimes so high as to be oppressive, and when competition existed by lines upon which the public confidently relied to protect them against such a wrong, a consolidation was effected and the high rates perpetuated by that means. In some cases the roads, created as conveniences in transportation, were so managed in respect to business passing or destined to ass over other roads that they constituted hinderances instead of helps, to the great annoyance of travel and to the serious loss of those who intrusted their property to them. Then their rates were changed at pleasure and without public notification; their dealings to a large extent were kept from the public eye, the obligation of publicity not being recognized; and the public were therefore without the means of judging whether their charges for railroad service were reasonable and just or the contrary.

But the publications actually made only increased the difficulties. Railroad rates, difficult enough to be understood by the uninitiated when printed plainly in one general tariff with classification annexed, became mysterious enigmas when several different tariffs were printed, as was the case in some sections; some relating to competitive points and others to what were called local points, and each referring to volu minous and perhaps different classifications, which were printed but not posted, and which were observed or disregarded at will in the rates as published. Such unsystematic and misleading publications naturally led to many overcharges and controversies, and naturally invited and favored special rates and injurious preferences.

These were serious evils; and they not only to some extent blunted the sense of right and wrong among the people and tended to fix an impression upon the public mind that unfair advantages in the competition of business were perfectly admissible when not criminal, but they