from so confused a declaration of the law of Parliament, must have concluded, that their representative had been declared incapable, because he was highly guilty, not because he had been punished. But, even admitting them to have understood it in the other sense, they must then, from the very terms of the vote, have united the idea of his being sent to the Tower with that of his expulsion, and considered his incapacity as the joint effect of both*.

* Addressed to the Printer of the Public Advertiser.

Sir,

May 22, 1771.

Very early in the debate upon the decision of the Middlesex election, it was well observed by Junius, that the House of Commons had not only exceeded their boasted precedent of the expulsion and subsequent incapacitation of Mr. Walpole, but that they had not even adhered to it strictly as far as it went. After convicting Mr. Dyson of giving a talse quotation from the journals, and having explained the purpose which that contemptible fraud was intended to answer, he proceeds to state the vote itself by which Mr. Walpole's supposed incapacity was declared, viz. Resolved, that Robert "Walpole, Esq. having been this session of Parliament "committed a prisoner to the Tower, and expelled this "House for a high breach of trust in the execution of his "office, and notorious corruption when secretary at war, "was and is incapable of being elected a member to serve "in this present Parliament ;" and then observes, that, from the terms of the vote, we have no right to annex the incapa citation to the expulsion only; for that, as the proposition stands, it must arise equally from the expulsion and the commitment to the Tower. I believe, Sir, no man, who knows any thing of dialectics, or who understands English, will dispute the truth and fairness of this construction. But Junius has a great authority to support him, which, to speak with the Duke of Grafton, I accidentally met with this morning in the

I do not mean to give an opinion upon the justice of the proceedings of the House of Com

course of my reading. It contains an admonition, which cannot be repeated too often. Lord Sommers, in his excellent tract upon the Rights of the People, after reciting the votes of the convention of the 28th of January, 1689, viz. "That King James the Second, having endeavoured to sub"vert the constitution of this kingdom, by breaking the "original contract between King and People, and by the "advice of Jesuits, and other wicked persons, having violated "the fundamental laws, and having withdrawn himself out of "this kingdom, hath abdicated the government," &c.---makes this observation upon it; " The word abdicated relates to "all the clauses foregoing, as well as to his deserting the "kingdom, or else they would have been wholly in vain." And that there might be no pretence for confining the abdication merely to the withdrawing, Lord Sommers farther observes, That King James, by refusing to govern us according to that law by which he held the Crown, did implicitly renounce his title to it.

If Junius's construction of the vote against Mr. Walpole be now admitted (and, indeed, I cannot comprehend how it can honestly be disputed) the advocates of the House of Commons must either give up their precedent entirely, or be reduced to the necessity of maintaining one of the grossest absurdities imaginable, viz. " That a commitment to the "Tower is a constituent part of, and contributes half at "least to, the incapacitation of the person who suffers

it."

con

I need not make you any excuse for endeavouring to keep alive the attention of the public to the decision of the Middlesex election. The more I consider it, the more I am vinced, that, as a fact, it is indeed highly injurious to the rights of the people; but that, as a precedent, it is one of the most dangerous that ever was established against those who are to come after us. Yet, I am so far a moderate man, that I verily believe the Majority of the House of Commons, when they passed this dangerous vote, neither understood the question, or knew the consequence of what they were doing. Their motives were rather despicable than criminal, in the extreme. One effect they certainly did not foresee. They are now reduced to such a situation, that if a member

ons with regard to Mr. Walpole; but certainly, if I admitted their censure to be wellfounded, I could no way avoid agreeing with them in the consequence they drew from it. I could never have a doubt, in law or reason, that a man, convicted of a high breach of trust, and of a notorious corruption, in the execution of a public office, was, and ought to be, incapable of sitting in the same parliament. Far from attempting to invalidate that vote, I should have wished that the incapacity declared by it could legally have been continued for ever.

ment returns.

Now, Sir, observe how forcibly the arguThe House of Commons, upon the face of their proceedings, had the strongest motives to declare Mr. Walpole incapable of

of the present House of Commons were to conduct himself ever so improperly, and, in reality, deserve to be sent back to his constituents with a mark of disgrace, they would not dare to expel him because they know that the people, in order to try again the great question of right, or to thwart an odious House of Conmons, would probably overlook his immediate unworthiness, and return the same person to parliament. But, in time, the precedent will gain strength; a future House of Commons will have no such apprehensions; consequently, will not scruple to follow a precedent which they did not establish. The miser himself seidom lives to enjoy the fruit of his extortion, but his heir succeeds to him of course, and takes possession without censure. No man expects him to make restitution; and, no matter for his title, he lives quietly upon the estate.

PHILO JUNIUS.

being re-elected. They thought such a man unworthy to sit among them. To that point they proceeded, and no farther; for they respected the rights of the people, while they asserted their own. They did not infer, from Mr. Walpole's incapacity, that his opponent was duly elected; on the contrary, they declared Mr. Taylor "not duly elected," and the election itself void.

Such, however, is the precedent which my honest friend assures us is strictly in point, to prove, that expulsion of itself, creates an ineapacity of being elected. If it had been so, the present House of Commons should at least have followed strictly the example before them, and should have stated to us, in the same vote, the crimes for which they expelled Mr. Wilkes; whereas they resolve simply, That," having been expelled, he was and is incapable." In this proceeding, I am authorised to affirm, they have neither statute, nor custom, nor reason, nor one single precedent to support them. On the other side, there is, indeed, a precedent so strongly in point, that all the enchanted castles of ministerial magic fall before it. In the year 1698 (a period which the rankest Tory dares not except against) Mr. Wollaston was

expelled, re-elected, and admitted to take his seat in the same parliament. The Ministry have precluded themselves from all objections drawn from the cause of his expulsion; for they affirm, absolutely, that expulsion, of itself, creates the disability. Now, Sir, let sophistry evade, let falsehood assert, and impudence deny; here stands the precedent; a land-mark to direct us through a troubled sea of controversy, con spicuous and unremoved.

I have dwelt the longer upon the discussion of this point, because, in my opinion, it com prehends the whole question. The rest is un worthy of notice. We are enquiring whether incapacity be, or be not, created by expulsion. In the cases of Bedford and Malden, the incapacity of the persons returned was matter of public notoriety, for it was created by act of parliament. But really, Sir, my honest friend's suppositions are as unfavourable to him as his facts. He well knows that the clergy, besides that they are represented in common with their fellow-subjects, have also a separate parliament of their own; that their incapacity to sit in the House of Commons, has been confirmed by repeated decisions of that House; and that the law of parliament, declared by those decisions,