was a course remarkable for the combined daring and wisdom by which all the public acts of that great statesman were characterised. Without irritating Holkar into war, he not only restored the Peshwa to his capital, but brought him, as well as the Guikwar, into a state of dependence on the British. By a masterly political stroke, in fact, supported by the equally masterly military movement of his brother, General Wellesley, the great Marquess cast off from the Peshwa's neck the iron yoke which Scindia, Holkar, and the Bhonsla, had each, as the power of each predominated, fixed upon him; deprived those three powers of the prestige attaching to intimate alliance with the possessor of Poona, and then presented himself ready to meet them, isolated as they were, on the field he had chosen.

The first result of this policy we have already shewn. Scindia and the Bhonsla, shorn of a great portion of their territories and a great portion of their power, had been completely humiliated. But Holkar had been untouched. It is probable, that having tested his superiority over Scindia at Poona, he was not sorry to see him weakened by the British, feeling that he would thus become even an easier prey to his own arms. He himself believed more in sweeping charges of Mahratta cavalry than in the slower attacks of disciplined infantry. But he shewed by his subsequent acts that he felt at this period master of the situation, and that he was waiting only an indication of the result of the war to declare himself.

He was, however, little prepared for the rapid movements of the two English generals. Coel, Delhi, Agra, and Laswarrie on the one side, and Assaye and Argaum on the other, all fought within a period of little more than two months, took him somewhat by surprise, and for a moment he appeared undecided as to his action. Even after peace had been signed with Scindia and the Bhonsla at Surjee Arjengaum, he long hesitated as to whether he should plunder the former, weakened by his losses, or, cementing an alliance with him, turn his arms against the British.

For a moment he seemed inclined to the former course, and it was from a real apprehension of his aggressions, that Scindia made that application for the British contingent, to which reference has been made. But soon other counsels prevailed. Before proceeding against Scindia, he felt that he must either have a guarantee for his own territories from the British, or he must shew himself their master. He tried for both ends about the same time. Whilst the envoy whom he sent to Scindia had instructions to induce that prince to enter into an alliance for the destruction of the British, the agents he accredited to these latter were

commissioned to make demands,* which, if acquiesced in, would have left him free to re-build the Mahratta power on a basis more powerful than before.

But in both these attempts he over-reached himself. Scindia, smarting under the blows, the severity of which he attributed. mainly to the treachery of Holkar, informed the British Government of the overtures thus made to him, although, to maintain Jeswunt Rao in his delusion, he sent a return embassy to his camp, charged with professions of devotion. The letterst which, at the same time, Holkar despatched by the hands of his agents to the British generals, breathed a spirit so haughty, and a confidence in his own power so resolute, whilst, at the same time, his demands were so preposterous, that little doubt was left on the minds of either the Governor General or the Commander-inchief, that he was really bent on war.

We left General Lake encamped at Biana, opposite the pass leading into the dominions of the Rajah of Jyepore. He had taken up this position, because, ever since the conclusion of the war with Scindia, the movements of Holkar had indicated an intention to make an incursion into those territories. Hence, before the receipt of the communications above referred to, he despatched a letter to Holkar warning him of the consequences of making war on any ally of the British nation, and advising him to remain within his own frontier. But Holkar cared little for such advice. Indeed, his first act after the receipt of this letter showed but too clearly, that he had resolved to break altogether with the English. He at once sent for an English adventurer in his service, named Vickers, informed him of his resolution to fight, and asked him as to his willingness to join in a campaign against his own countrymen. On receiving from Vickers a positive refusal, he called up two others, Dodd and Ryan, and put the same question to them. They also having declined, the three were simultaneously beheaded.‡

These were,-(1) leave to collect chout according to the custom of his ancestors, to obtain possession of Etawah and other territories in the Doab, Bundelkuud, and Hurriana, formerly possessed by his ancestors; the guarantee of the country he then possessed; and a treaty similar to that concluded with Scindia.-Thorn's War in India.

In his letter to General Wellesley, he intimated that a war with him would not be without its perils, that countries of many hundred miles should be overrun and plundered, General Lake shall not have leisure to 'breathe for a moment; and calamities shall fall on thousands of human beings by the attacks of my army which overwhelm like the waves of the sea.'

The excuse privately alleged by Holkar was that he had detected these men in correspondence with the British general, and under Tod's head, he affixed a letter which, he pretended, that officer had received from General Lake. Vickers was one of his best officers, and had contributed greatly to the defeat of Scindia at Poona.

D

The heads were then fixed on lances in front of Jeswunt Rao's camp, and a public crier proclaimed that such would be the fate of every European who should fall into the hands of Holkar.

Here,

This barbarous murder,-the discovery about the same time of a correspondence with the Rohillas and Sikhs, having for its object a combination against us,-and the threatening position assumed by the forces of Holkar against Jyepore,-determined General Lake to break up from Biana, and advance into that territory. This resolution he carried out on the 9th February, after having sent back his heavy guns to Agra. He marched thence leisurely to Hindown, and annoyed only by the marau ding propensities of the Mewatties, who lost no opportunity of plundering the baggage carts and murdering all stragglers who fell in their way, arrived there on the 20th. Here he received reinforcements, consisting of the two flank companies of the 22nd regiment, the flank companies of the 1st Europeans, and five companies of the 16th native infantry. too, negotiations were re-opened with Jeswunt Rao. No progress, however, having been made tending to a peaceful result, the army moved on the 8th March from Hindown to Ramgurh. It was here that the British Commander-in-chief received the haughty and defiant letters to which we have already alluded. The agents, who were the bearers of these messages, showed, likewise, by their arrogant language, a spirit not less haughty and self-confident. They openly avowed the connection of their master with the Rohillas and the Raja of Bhurtpore; they stated that a war with Holkar could never be attended with any profit to his opponents, since he was a marauder by profession, and disposed of 150,000 cavalry, at whose head he could inflict terrible injury on our territories, whilst defeat in one place would not prevent his re-appearance in another. They also added that Scindia was with them, and that a powerful French army had already landed on the coast, and was marching to their aid.

The Commander-in-chief contented himself with the dismissal of these envoys from the camp, with advice to Holkar to be more moderate in his demands, and continued his advance. Arriving on the 23rd at Ballaheera, he received a copy of the letter addressed by Jeswunt Rao to General Wellesley.† No further doubt remained on his mind as to the intentions of that chieftain, and learning a few days later that he had actually

Amongst these was an officer of the 15th N. I., Lieutenant Tyson, murdered not far from the outposts.

+ Vide note to page 25.

plundered the territories of the Jyepore Raja, he applied for and obtained the orders of the Government to act against him as an enemy.

On the 16th April, Marquess Wellesley issued instructions to the officers commanding in the Dekkan to co-operate with the movement against Holkar, which the Commanderin-chief had been instructed to make from the side of Hindostan. General Lake, meanwhile, had marched from Ballaheera, and, on the 17th of April, reached Dowsa, about fifty miles from Jyepore. From this place he resolved to detach three native regiments under the command of Colonel Monson to protect that city, and to observe the movements of Jeswunt Rao.

Colonel Monson was a very gallant soldier. He had particularly distinguished himself at the capture of Allygurh, where he led the storming party, and received a severe wound. This wound had not only caused him much suffering, but it had prevented him from taking part in the subsequent actions of the campaign. It was, therefore, to compensate him for his enforced absence from the fields of Delhi and Laswarrie, and to give him a second opportunity of distinction, that the Commander-inchief entrusted to him the command of the detachment destined to bear the first brunt of the encounter with Jeswunt Rao.

The force commanded by Colonel Monson consisted of both battalions of the 12th native infantry, the 2nd battalion 2nd native infantry, a detachment of European artillery, and some native cavalry levies commanded by Lieutenant Lucan and the Baraitch Nawab, with a Mahratta contingent under Bapoojee Scindia, a relation of Dowlut Rao. Pushing on towards Jyepore, Colonel Monson encamped near the city on the 21st, and found Holkar's army occupying a threatening position to the south of it. On the morning of the 23rd, however, Holkar without making any demonstration against the city or the British force, broke up from his encampment and marched to the south. But as it did not appear to be his intention to evacuate the country north of the Chumbul, the Commander-in-chief directed Colonel Monson to continue his advance, he himself following with the bulk of the army. As the British army approached, Holkar still continued to retreat, but it was not apparently until Rampoora, a strong fort in the district of Tonk, had been gallantly stormed by Colonel Don, at the head of a force* detached from the main army, that he abandoned all hopes of maintaining himself on the

This force consisted of five companies of the 8th native infantry; the flank companies of the 2nd battalion 21st native infantry, the 3rd regiment native cavalry, and some guns.

northern bank of the Chumbul. On the fall of that place he retreated precipitately to the south.

Satisfied with the disappearance of the enemy to the southward, and anxious to recruit the European portion of his army, then suffering extremely from the heat, General Lake resolved to postpone any serious operations until after the rainy season. He, accordingly, reinforced Colonel Monson with two native battalions under Lieutenant-Colonel Don, thus raising his numbers to about 4,000 men, and instructed him to cover the Jyepore country, whilst he should move with the main body upon Agra and Cawnpore. There was not the smallest idea that Colonel Monson's force would be attacked. Hitherto, Holkar had shown but one disposition,-to flee, and it was believed that the movement ordered by General Wellesley, and entrusted to Colonel Murray, to march from Guzerat upon Indore,-would effectually prevent Holkar from attempting to recover ground in the north.

To open communications with this force, Colonel Monson, after the departure of the Commander-in-chief, moved on from Kotah, where it was previously encamped, through the Mokundra pass to Sonara. Having detached hence one regiment to take possession of the small but strong fort of Hinglaizghur, he marched on, notwithstanding bad roads and very rainy weather, to the village of Peeplah. Here he received information that Holkar had suddenly retraced his steps, and was encamped with a strong force of all arms on the river Chumbul, some five and twenty miles distant, covering the town of Rampoora,† and guarding the only ford across the river by which it could be approached.

Colonel Monson had with him but three days' provisions, and he had experienced the greatest difficulty in obtaining supplies from the people of the country. He might indeed expect, could he reach Rampoora, to victual his camp, but between him and that place lay the river Chumbul and the numerous army of Holkar. To stay at Peeplah with but three days' supplies, was impossible. To retreat to Hinglaizgurh or to the Mokundra pass before an enemy who had always hitherto fled before him, was not to be thought of. Rumours, too, reached him that the movement of Holkar indicated great infirmity of purpose, inasmuch as he had re-crossed the river, and appeared half-inclined once more to

This movement was made by Colonel Monson on his own authority, and was rather opposed to the general instructions he received from General Lake. The Commander-in-chief, in fact, blamed him for having made it. Not the fort Ramooora previously referred to.