reforms, and when he saw what the papers said, he sent me a letter authorizing me to deny it. # # As for the remark that the loss of our American dominions was owing to having given heed to the words of their deputies, I must answer him that, in my opinion, it was because of bad government under the absolute régime. For this reason we require liberties and reforms, so that all may say with pride that they are Spaniards. To-day kingdoms win nothing by force; what is won by kindness is preserved by love. I have done. The colonial minister (Mr. Mosquera) said he rose to address the senate for the first time. Mr. Inclán's doubts had been removed by the minister of state, so he had little to say on that point. He would, however, speak at some length of the proposed reforms for Porto Rico. It was said that reforms would lose the Antilles. If true, the charge was unanswerable. But the premises of the proposition had not been demonstrated. Was the creation of town-councils by restricted suffrage autonomy? Could the loss of the Antilles result therefrom? In no wise. It was said this decree was illegal and infringed the constitution, that for this reason General Baldrich suspended it, and after him General Gomez Pulido did the same, on the ground that the law was harmful. They were ill-informed who said this. The decree was published in 1870, in General Sauz's time. General Baldrich suspended its execution in consequence of a riot. He was asked to give his reasons for doing so, and replied that there was difficulty in finding skilled men to hold office under it, and requested the government to approve his course. I referred the matter to the cabinet council, General Baldrich's reasons seeming to me worthless, and recommended the execution of the law. It was referred to the council of state. I soon afterward ceased to be minister. General Gomez Pelido had nothing to do with the matter, since the decree remained suspended during his term of office. There would be no reform in Cuba until the war was over. In Porto Rico there would be a separation of the civil and the military authority; but this was still under consideration, and the bill was not yet prepared. As for the principal question, that of slavery, the institution was defended by none; its abolition was a question of form and time; the time had come to abolish it in Porto Rico, and the slaves would he emancipated there without loss to their masters. There was much anonymous opposi tion; but when the question was debated in the Cortes they would see what it amounted to. No other reforms than these were proposed for Cuba, Porto Rico, or the Philip pines. Mr. Inclán had seemed worried because the towns were to name their dependents and schoolmasters. But the town-conncils in Porto Rico were not as free as in Spain, since their president was appointed by the government, and the influence of the government would thus be felt. Mr. Inclán had said that a majority of the Porto Ricans were secessionists; let him prove it. Not one in ten was a secessionist. The Porto Ricans know they are not suited for a republic, they have no affinity with Cuba, and they do not desire annexation to the United States. Because two hundred men once got up a riot, were all Porto Ricans secessionists? The province was loyal and firmly united to the mother country. It was said the Cuban rebels would lay down their arms if reforms were given to Porto Rico. He would be glad if the decree could exert such a decisive influence. The rebels had nothing on their side but physical force; Spain had her army and justice. They would not seek independence, but rise to the level of the colonies of other Mr. Saurez Inclán said the colonial minister's remarks impressed him painfully. He had thought Mr. Mosquera would carry out Mr. Ayala's colonial policy, as he had pledged himself to do when he entered the cabinet for the first time." Mr. Mosquera had said that the loss of the American possessions was not owing to reforms. History contradicted him. The American deputies to the Cadiz Cortes were the first to head the insurrection, as also those who begged reforms in 1865 had headed the Cuban revolution. After such terrible experience and disillusionment was it conceivable, that in the year of grace 1872, they should again allow themselves to be hallucinated and taken unawares? The colonial minister replied to Mr. Inclán's assertion that he was pledged to continue Mr. Ayala's colonial policy, and narrated his interviews with that gentleman. He then reverted to the first municipal law of 1870. Mr. Ayala and General Baldrich were executing it, but it was suspended, on account of a riot, during his (Mosqueras) term. He concluded by saying that the government would not be influenced by the filibusters in Madrid any more than by the slave-drivers. The Marquis de Barzanallana obtained the floor, and spoke in reply to Mr. Zorrilla's allusion to the moderado party having been influenced by foreign powers, saying that the moderado cabinet had obeyed no foreign influence in arranging the so called Spanish marriages. He was profoundly pained by Mr. Zorrilla's declaration that it was necessary to follow a different policy from the moderados to avoid becoming a second edition of Morocco and Turkey. The moderados had always acted with intelligence and prudence. They did not defend slavery in principle. They wanted to treat the question as its immense importance demanded. They did not wish to imitate Turkey or Morocco, but rather Brazil, or England in her treatment of the Irish question. No policy in America had been more paternal than theirs, and this should be proclaimed to those governments whose policy was to exterminate the native races on their soil; whereas the moderados had lovingly preserved them. He thought the discussion of emancipation premature at that time, and would wait till the bill therefor was presented, and then they would see how to settle the important question of sudden liberty to the slaves at a cost of six hundred million of reals, ($30,000,000.) He concluded by notifying the government to be ready to produce, when called for, all the documents and notes from all the foreign governments relating to the government of the colonies. The president of the council of ministers replied to the Marquis Barzanallana. The government had not originated this debate. Mr. Inclán, with unwonted vehemence, had appeared as an echo of those papers that for twenty days past had been calling the ministers filibusters. Mr. Inclán had spoken of national integrity, of the loss of the Antilles, of diplomatic documents, and had cited nothing. He had said "If we could only see all the documents, if the country could only have overheard all those conversations between the minister of state and the envoys of foreign powers!" What could the government do but protest? The colonial secretary had given explanations respecting the present colonial policy which would quiet the apprehensions of all but the members of the national league. All were agreed on the following points: First. Neither the preceding ministers nor the present sought to do anything in Cuba, either administrative, political, or social, while a single rebel remained in arms. Secondly. The island of Cuba must be both materially and morally pacified before reforms can be thought of, and if this government is not fortunate enough to hold office when that occurs, it will give its successors the same advice. Thirdly. So far as Porto Rico is concerned reforms will go no further than the government has said, namely, the law of ayuntamientos, as already explained by the minister of state, the separation of civil and military authority, which has no more importance than that given to it by those whose sole motive is to cast one more stone at the object of their resentment; and the slavery question, which is the chief, not from its difficulties, for we have shown that it presents none, but from the precedentit establishes, and the government has already declared that it will be no precedent for what may hereafter be done in Cuba. We face the issue resolutely and frankly, for we believe that all that we may accomplish for the country, for liberty, and for the dynasty, would be as naught when compared to the memory that would live after us if we fall before a league, national or liberal, or whatever may be its name, formed to withhold liberty from thirty thousand men whose only crime is that their faces are of another color than ours. Mr. Corvera. Senators, the members of the republican party have waited with great impatience to learn the intentions of the government, and after the rude shock it has just received from one of the minorities in the senate, we cannot remain silent, but must say that we approve the purpose of the government, although we scarcely venture to applaud it, for we are not content with so little, but seek to go further. Since the revolution no event has impressed me so much as to hear proclaimed from the ministerial bench the immediate abolition of slavery. This is a great conquest. My country begins to be just, and the nations who are strong enough to be just have the right to enjoy all the liberties that prepare the way for their happiness in the future. The PRESIDENT. A motion which has been presented will now be read. We pray the senate to declare that it has heard with great pleasure the explanations of the president of the council of ministers respecting the causes and the solution of the recent crisis. "Palace of the senate, December 20, 1872. "Ignacio Rojo Arias, Enlogio Eraso, Saturnino de Vargas Machuca, Tomás Acha, Vicente de Fuenmayor, Cosme Marin y Vallejo, Rafael Primo de Rivera." Mr. Rojo Arias supported the motion. He said it explained itself. Mr. Juarez Inclán had taken upon himself to advocate, in the name of the Spanish nation, opposition ad perpetuum to reforms in the colonies. This proposition was intended to show the chamber and the country that this question to which a false character had been attributed was simply a political issue, and the expression of the pleasure of the senate on seeing that the crises of a radical ministry were purely parliamentary. In other times only those in the secret knew what a crisis was about. As his object now was to obtain the views of the senate, and, through it, of a majority of the coun try, he would not set forth his own views, but simply urge the senate to take the motion into consideration. The motion was then taken into consideration. The debate being opened thereon, Mr. Calderon Collantes approved it. He regretted that it should be brought up now after a stormy and undignified session. So grave a question ought not to be virtually settled by an incidental proposition like this. Was it prudent for the senate to hastily contract an obligation it might have to retract? He begged that the proposition might be withdrawn, and that the government would lay before the senate all the antecedents that had led to their decision, with all necessary documents, so that the question might be studied in detail and not settled off-hand and as a party measure. All parties felt that the future of the country and the honor of the nation were involved. Personally, he represented no party, and was ready to treat the question, at the proper time, from the elevated sphere of national interests and of right. If obliged to vote against abolition he would not do so because he was a direct or indirect partisan of human servitude, but because the liberty of the blacks might compromise the security of the whites. Mr. Rojo Arias thought Mr. Calderon Collantes could not have heard the motion read; it did not involve a decision on any matter of colonial policy; all were agreed that the discussion of these questions should be deferred. What he asked was that the senate should approve the settlement of the crisis. Mr. Calderon Collantes said he opposed it on this ground too; the crisis had been badly adjusted; three ministers should have left instead of two, and he thought of making an interpellation to learn why General Córdova stayed in the cabinet, when he shared the opinions of those who had resigned. Mr. Rojo Arias insisted on his motion, and thought the course of the minister of war deserved a vote of confidence. Mr. CERVERA. In the name of my friends, I have to state that, as the reforms in Porto Rico were the sole cause of the crisis, and a vote of confidence is now asked for the government, we, who regard the motion now before the senate as a condemnation of slavery in principle, can, under the circumstances, do no less than add our votes to those of the majority. The motion was again read and put to the vote, being carried by 51 votes to 5. Summary of the proceedings in the chamber of deputies, December 20, 1872. The president of the council of ministers regretted he had not been able to come before the chamber that afternoon to explain the crisis, but the prolonged debate in the senate had prevented. But Mr. Mr. Zorrilla proceeded to explain the causes of the crisis in substantially the same words as in his senate speech. (See Appendix C.) Three questions had for some time occupied the cabinet; they all referred to Porto Rico; on the municipal law the cabinet was a unit; on the separation of commands they were also agreed, although nothing had yet been done about it; on the emancipation question they were agreed in principle but divided in form-three being for gradual and five for the immediate abolition of slavery. The latter question was deferred for weighty reasons. Bugallal's interpellation, and the subsequent vote of the chamber, determined the crisis. Two ministers resigned. The King urged their continuance in the cabinet, but as the dissidence could not be overcome their resignations were accepted and successors named in accordance with the opinions of their colleagues and the vote of the chamber. The minister of war shared the views of the two who had resigned, but would remain in the cabinet until important measures pending in his office were disposed of. The new ministers had been identified with the most advanced wing of the radical party since the revolution, and had held office in previous cabinets. The deputies knew what the new cabinet signified, immediate emancipation in Porto Rico; [applause ;] and this not by decree, as had been asserted, but by a parlia mentary law, for they would not infringe any prerogative of the parliament. [Ap plause. What more could the enemies of the measure demand than the liberty of discussing it fully and combatting it openly, instead of merely advocating, without justice or reason, the postponement of a reform demanded by all whose souls swelled with the sentiments of humanity, and who sought that Spain should not become a mark for the jibes and sneers of the nation. [Applause.] The measure must come before the parliament and be treated by men of enlightenment; men who could distinguish between defending an idea and upholding a fact; between advocating justice and following expediency; between defending the revolutionized Spain of 1868 and the traditional Spain of half a century ago. [Good.] It must be brought before congress to demonstrate that nothing was impossible for governments who would take the initiative, for chambers ready to second them, and for men who, loyal and consistent with the records of their whole lives, who had energy and manhood enough to stimulate their weaker associates, and defy their enemies, to say to reactionary Spain, “we will not go back a single step!" and to liberal Spain, "within the monarchy and the constitution all manner of triumphs and progress may be realized!" [Applause.] The question of Cuba was completely separated from that of Porto Rico; Cuban reforms were not yet even under consideration. He had before declared, and now he repeated, that this government would attempt nothing, propose nothing for Cuba until, not merely material, but moral peace, was restored. It was unjust to say that reforms in Porto Rico meant reforms in Cuba; and was not only unjust but false to assert that the reforms in Porto Rico would go beyond the declared programme of the government. He said this for the fourth or fifth time, and he hoped for the last time. This cabinet did not ignore the serious difficulties that confronted it, and the hostile attitude of parties not heretofore hostile to the revolution. But these would be overcome as graver difficulties had been. They found the Carlist insurrection in full vigor, and this had since been complicated by the rising of the extremists. It seemed as if chaos and anarchy threatened them. But the government had kept on its steady course. With the Carlists in arms it had presented and passed the Church bill without any increased alarm resulting. Order had been disturbed in many parts of Spain, but the constitutional guarantees had not been suspended. The government was tranquil in the face of these dangers, because it had faith in the strength of its principles, and sought to serve the country; if the country abandoned them they would quit their posts, but not their principles, and fall with honor. The recent conscripts were now in the ranks, although this had seemed an impossibility; the budget was passed, the Church bill voted, and many other reforms; the Carlists dominated, and all public and secret foes confronted with success. How great a triumph for the government and the radical party if to all this it added the emancipation of 30,000 slaves! Mr. Zorrilla then adverted at some length to the question of public order, stating his purpose to reorganize the police and penitentiary systems, to inaugurate reforms in the criminal law, and to adopt other constitutional means to restore and preserve order. He concluded by saying that, with the strength and good will of congress and the Country on the side of the government, that everything was possible in the way of the tranquil development of law and reform; and that one thing alone was completely impossible-that reaction and traditionalism can ever take the place of liberal and democratic principles. [Great applause.] The debate on Mr. Becerra's proposition of 17th (see Appendix A) was continued. Mr. Estebon Collantes opposed it. He wanted the colonial issue fully debated before the holiday recess. The government had initiated the gravest crisis of the century. All desired the integrity of the national domain, did they not? [Cries of yes!] Then cursed be he who failed to hold his word. The government had raised an issue at once political, administrative, social, and commercial. Was all this to be discussed In one night? No; let it be debated for three days, or three months, if need be. This was not a party question. It was about as proper to call the majority filibusters as to speak of Bourbonists and Alfonsists in this issue. Mr. Zorrilla's exposition was simply a sequel to what he had said the other day. He then said three things: that the government took up reforms because it was pledged to do so; that it possessed more data on the subject than the oppositions and the nation; and that the country was deeply agitated, and each day brought forth a calumny or a falsehood. The government was pledged to reform. Was this the only reform promised? How about the abolition of conscription, the reduction of taxes, and economies in the Budget? If these were not realized, why not take time to consider the colonial question coolly? The government possessed more data than the country! This was a very grave self-accusation. Why not begin by laying before the house, as other nations did, all the documents relating to this matter? Why not publish all that had taken place between the United States Government and that of Spain? This would have avoided the circulation of unauthorized documents and rumors. The country was perturbed, and new calumnies arose daily. Was not this liberty one of the conquests of the revolution? His party believed there could be no peace where a government or a monarch could be thus assailed. The radicals called this freedom a boon; let them suffer the penalty. The so-called conquests of the revolution were a calamity, and it was a double calamity to carry them to the colonies. We (the Alfonsists) do not oppose reforms, for we are reformers, nor progress, for we are lovers of progress; we combat reforms which will cause the loss of Cuba and Porto Rico, and afterward of Catalonia, and after that of Castile." These reforms were inopportune from a commercial point of view, as he would subsequently show. The Antilles demanded liberty and reforms. Why not demand of them obligations and duties? They were to be made provinces of Spain? Then away with that costly machine, the colonial office; no minister of Polencia or Oviedo or the other provinces was needed. Then why for the colonies? Why not tax them for the home government and give them the conscription? It was said that their climate and soil and surroundings were different. Then if they were not subject to the same duties they were not entitled to the same rights. These reforms were inopportune because anarchy reigned at home. The peninsula was a perfect Babel, and to give the colonies the "revolutionary conquests" which had produced this result at home was simply madness. The municipal law was also inopportune, because the captain general of Porto Rico had been summoned home for explanations and the law would be executed by a subordinate officer. Did Cuba really want the reforms they stood pledged to give her? Did the insurgents seek reforms or independence? There were two parties there, the Spanish element and the secessionists. The latter were in arms; the former defended the integrity of their country. It was said: give liberty to Porto Rico, and the Cuban insurgents will recognize our good faith and lay down their arms, and then we will give them the same concessions as in Porto Rico. But the armed rebels sought reforms only as a means towards autonomy and independence, and they would probably accept them, as in that way they would attain their ends. It was the same as if the Carlists had been told, "To overcome you we will establish absolutism in Madrid, and thus you will see that when you lay down your arms you will have absolutism in the Basque provinces too." This was obvious and conclusive. On the other hand, the volunteers of liberty, the real defenders of our territory against the rebels, are daily more and more dissatisfied with the Spanish government, and are not as active as they would otherwise be in terminating the war, for they realize that when the war is over you will give them reforms, and they do not want reforms; these so-called reforms are a punishment for their virtues; the war will never end; the insurgents will not yield and the volunteers will do nothing; and as you will give no reforms till the insurgents submit, civil war in Cuba will be perpetual under your system. And this proves that you yourselves think that reforms are ill-advised, for if reforms meant peace and prosperity and tranquillity and unity of territory, you would at once establish them in Cuba without waiting for the end of the war.' "Were not reforms in Porto Rico and Cuba inaugurated under General Dulce? What was the result! What did Messrs. Becerra and Martos say? They said those reforms were used by the enemies of Spain in favor of secession and that they repented of having established them. This appears in a conversation said to have been held between Messrs. Becerra and Martos and the representative of the United States at this court. In that conversation it is stated that Mr. Martos said that reforms reacted against the interests of the mother country. If this be untrue, why were not the reforms continued in Cuba?" * * Mr. Collantes then examined the effects of the municipal law. It permitted foreigners to vote, and it might happen that foreigners might predominate, and then Cuba and Porto Rico would be lost through universal suffrage. It permitted duties on articles of consumption introduced into Porto Rico, and that would ruin the commerce of Castile and Catalonia. Thirty years ago the colonies would not buy Spanish flour; they preferred that from the United States. Castile had spent one hundred mil lions in improving its flour mills, and now made the best flour in the world. All of this industry would be ruined by the law of ayuntamientos. He concluded by saying, "Loyal Spaniards, as I have shown, do not wish reforms in Cuba; those who demand them are traitors; and you, with the best intentions, are defending a mistaken solution of the problem." The Minister of Fomento (Mr. Becerra) replied. It was natural for those who thought the revolution of 1868 an evil should oppose reforms. The data possessed by the government relating to the colonies would be made public in due time. It was asked, if reforms be good, why not give them to Cuba? Because reforms demanded by force ought not to be conceded. They did not repent of having given reforms to Cuba, as Mr. Collantes had said; they had nothing to repent of as long as they withheld those reforms. * # * Mr. Collantes had called emancipation an incendiary measure that would spread from Porto Rico to Cuba. How would it spread? Would the freedmen incite the slaves in the other islands to seek their freedom? No. The slave-drivers had made them less than man, than beasts even, for they had neither property nor family. The tiger might nourish her young, but the infant slave was torn from its mother's breast and sold. How then could it spread? Through the slave owners and the press? Impos sible. The insurgents already offered the slaves freedom if they would take up arms. They did not. But a day might come, if the war lasted, when the slaves would realize that they were men with or without reforms, and then would come the real struggle. * |