1. Where the United States and the Cherokee nation agreed that the latter should emigrate across the Mississippi, and the former pay the expenses thereof, and the Cherokees undertook to conduct the movement entirely by their own agents, a person whose wagons had been hired could not hold the agent who had hired them personally responsible. The owner of the wagons knew that the agent was a public officer, and dealt with him as such. Parks v. Ross, 362. 2. Wherever a contract or engagement, made by a public officer, is connected with a subject fairly within the scope of his authority, it shall be considered to have been made officially and in his public character, unless the contrary appears by satisfactory evidence of an absolute and unqualified engagement to be per- sonally liable. Ibid.
Where a case is brought up by an appeal from a judgment on the common law side of the Circuit Court, instead of by a writ of error, it must be dismissed. Bevins et al. v. Ramsay et al., 185.
Under what circumstances an attorney is not at liberty to purchase a judgment which he himself has been the agent to recover, see Stockton v. Ford, 232. BANKRUPTCY.
1. A decree in bankruptcy, passed, in 1843, by the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, did not pass to the assignee the title to a house and lot in the city of Galveston and State of Texas, which house and lot were the property of the bankrupt. Oakey v. Bennett, 33. 2. Texas was then a foreign State, and whatever difference of opinion there may be with respect to the extra-territorial operation of a bankrupt law upon per- sonal property, there is none as to its operation upon real estate. This court concurs with Sir William Grant, in 14 Vesey, 537, that the validity of every disposition of real estate must depend upon the law of the country in which that estate is situated. Ibid.
3. Besides, the deed made by the assignee in bankruptcy to one of the partics in the present cause was not made conformably with the laws of Texas; and letters of administration upon the estate of the bankrupt had been taken out in Texas before the fact of the bankruptcy was known there; and the credit- ors of the estate in Texas had a better lien upon the property than the assignee
BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES.
See COMMERCIAL LAW.
CHANCERY.
1. Where a deed was executed by an aged woman, the sole surviving executrix of her father, with power under the will to sell, with a view to put an end to a long family litigation in which some judgments had been obtained, and other suits were then existing, and who owned the whole or nearly the whole of the residuary interest of the estate; and the settlement was made with delibera- tion, and under advice of business friends, and the corsideration of the deed
was a sum of money in hand, with a stipulation on the part of the grantee, that he would pay over any surplus which the lands might yield after paying all reasonable expenses and legal claims, this deed cannot be set aside on the ground of fraud. Gratz's Executors et al. v. Cohen et al., 1.
2. The bill below must be dismissed, unless it be so amended as to include all the parties interested, and be confined to a claim for the surplus of the proceeds of the lands, after paying reasonable expenses and legal claims. Ibid.
3. Where a bill in chancery alleges that certain lands were entered in the name of a third person, with a view to cover them from the creditors of the person who had entered them, and this allegation is denied in the answer and not sustained by proof, the bill pro tanto must be dismissed. Mc Coy v. Rhodes,
4. But where the party entered the lands in his own name, and afterwards con- veyed them to this third person, but the deed to the third person was not re- corded until after a judgment had been obtained by a creditor, and recorded in the parish where the land lies, against the party who made the entry, it will not be sufficient merely to set up in the answer that this third person furnished the money with which to purchase the lands. The equity must be proved. Ibid.
5. By the laws of Louisiana, no notarial act concerning immovable property has effect against third persons until it shall have been recorded in the office of the judge of the parish where such property is situated. Therefore, where there was a judgment against the holder of the legal title, rendered in the in- termediate time between the execution of a deed and its being recorded, and the judgment was first recorded, the subsequent recording of the deed could not abrogate the lien of the judgment. Ibid.
6. The forty-seventh and forty-eighth rules of chancery practice explained. Ibid. 7. Under what circumstances a court of equity will hold a purchase from a factor responsible to the principal, see Warner v. Martin, 209.
8. The Constitution of the United States has recognized the distinction between law and equity; and it must be observed in the federal courts, although there is no distinction between them by the laws of a State. Bennett v. But- terworth, 669.
9. Where the record does not show that the case was conducted as a chancery case, it cannot be treated as such.
1. Where a collector received treasury-notes in payment for duties, which were cancelled by him, but afterwards stolen or lost, altered, and then received by him again in payment for other duties, he is responsible to the government for the amount thereof. United States v. Morgan, 154.
2. So also he is responsible, to a certain extent, where treasury-notes were received by him in payment for duties, cancelled, but lost or purloined (without his knowledge or consent), before being placed in the post-office to be returned to the Department. Ibid.
3. And this is so, whether the notes be considered as money or only evidences of debt by the Treasury Department. Ibid.
4. But the extent, above mentioned, to which his responsibility goes is to be meas- ured by a jury, who arc to form their judgment from the danger of the notes getting into circulation again, the delay and inconvenience in obtaining the proper vouchers to settle accounts, the want of evidence at the Department that the notes had been redeemed, or from any other direct consequence of the breach of the collector's bond. Ibid.
1. Where a bill of exchange had upon it the forged indorsement of the payees, but it had been put into circulation by the drawers with such forged indorsement already upon it, and it was purchased in the market by a bond fide holder, who presented it to the drawee, who accepted and paid it at maturity, and then the drawers failed, the drawee cannot recover back the money which he had paid to the bona fide holder. Hortsman v. Henshaw, 177.
2. Where a merchant, in order to secure himself from loss, took merchandise from a factor, with a knowledge that the factor was about to fail, the principal who consigned that merchandise to the factor may avoid the sale, and reclaim his goods, or hold the merchant accountable for them. Warner v. Murtin, 209.
COMMERCIAL LAW (Continued).
3. And where the purchase was made from the factor's clerk, who had been left by the factor in charge of the business, this was an additional reason for avoid- ing the sale; because a factor cannot delegate his authority without the assent of the principal. Ibid.
4. A factor or agent, who has power to sell the produce of his principal, has no power to affect the property by tortiously pledging it as a security or satisfac- tion for a debt of his own, and it is of no consequence that the pledgee is ignorant of the factor's not being the owner. But if the factor has a lien upon the goods he may pledge them to the amount of his lien. Ibid.
5. Under any of these irregular transfers, a court of equity will compel the holder to give an account of the property which he holds. Ibid.
6. Nor can a factor sell the merchandise of his principal to a creditor of the factor in payment of an antecedent debt. Such a transfer is not a sale in the legal acceptation of that term. Ibid.
7. The power of a factor explained. Ibid.
8. These principles of the common law are sustained by a statute of the State of New York passed in April, 1830 (3 Revised Laws, Appendix, p. 111). Ibid. CONFLICT OF LAWS.
1. A decree in bankruptcy, passed by the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, did not pass to the assignee the title to a house and lot in the city of Galveston and State of Texas, which house and lot were the property of the bankrupt. Oakey v. Bennett, 33.
2. Texas was then a foreign State, and a bankrupt law can have no extra-territo- rial operation upon real estate. Ibid.
3. Besides, the deed made by the assignee in bankruptcy to the claimant was not made conformably with the laws of Texas; and letters of administration upon the estate of the bankrupt had been taken out in Texas before the fact of the bankruptcy was known there; and the creditors of the estate in Texas had a better lien upon the property than the assignee in Louisiana. Ibid. 4. By the laws of Louisiana, no notarial act concerning immovable property has effect against third persons, until it shall have been recorded in the office of the judge of the parish where such property is situated. Therefore, where there was a judgment against the holder of the legal title, rendered in the in- termediate time between the execution of a deed and its being recorded, and the judgment was first recorded, the subsequent recording of the deed could not abrogate the lien of the judgment. McCoy v. Rhodes, 131. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
1. A statute of the State of New York provides, that, where joint debtors are sued and one is brought into court on process, if judgment shall pass for plaintiff, he shall have judgment and execution not only against the party brought into court, but also against other joint debtors named in the original process, in the same manner as if they had all been taken and brought into court by virtue of such process; but it shall not be lawful to issue or execute any such execution against the body or against the sole property of any person not brought into court. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 165.
2. Where a judgment was given in New York against two partners, one of whom resided in Louisiana and was never served with process, and an action was brought against him in Louisiana upon this judgment, a peremptory excep- tion, in the nature of a demurrer, that "the judgment sued upon is not one upon which suit can be brought against the defendant in this court," was well founded. Ibid.,
3. Congress did not intend, by the act of 1790, to declare that a judgment ren- dered in one State against the person of a citizen of another, who had not been served with process or voluntarily made defence, should have such faith and credit in every other State as it had in the courts of the State in which it was rendered. Ibid.
4. Before the admission of Texas into the Union, that State passed many laws upon the subject of head rights to land, the general object of which was to ascertain and secure valid titles, and prevent frauds, by acts of limitation and by the establishment of boards of commissioners to separate the bad from the good titles. League v. De Young et al., 185.
5. In the constitution adopted just before her admission into the Union, there was an article annulling fraudulent certificates, and opening the courts, up to a certain day, to suitors for the investigation of their claims. Ibid.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).
6. It was perfectly competent for the people of Texas to pass these laws and adopt this constitution. Ibid.
7. Moreover, they were all passed before the Constitution of the United States had any operation over Texas, and cannot therefore be in conflict with any of its provisions. Ibid. 8. The legislature of the Territory of Iowa passed a law directing a court to de- cide matters of fact without the intervention of a jury. This was inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States. Webster v. Reid, 437.
When set aside. See CHANCERY.
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE. See EVIDENCE.
ESTATES TAIL.
1. In 1786 the legislature of New York passed a law declaring that "all estates tail shall be, and hereby are, abolished"; and if any person should thereafter become seized in fee tail of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments by virtue of any devise, &c., he should be deemed to have become seized in fee simple absolute. Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 297.
2. This included an estate tail in remainder, as well as one in possession. The courts in New York have so decided, and this court adopts their construction.
3. The remainder-man dying during the lifetime of the life tenant, the latter, being the father, inherited from the son a fee simple absolute. Ibid.
4. Whilst the remainder-man was yet alive, the life tenant sold the property and conveyed it to the vendee by a deed which, according to its true construction, affirmed the existence of an estate in fee simple in itself. The reasons for this construction stated.
5. Those claiming under him are estopped by this deed. The doctrine of estop- pel explained. Ibid.
The doctrine of estoppel explained. Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 297.
1. How far the acts of a feme covert amount to an acknowledgment of the con- struction of the will of her ancestor, see Weatherhead's Lessee v. Baskerville,
2. Where a will contained the following expressions, viz. "my estate to be equal- ly divided among my children," and also, "my lands and slaves to be equally divided amongst my children"; and had in it also the following clause: "to each of my daughters a small tract of land," - the last clause must be rejected as void and inoperative, and cannot be used for the purpose of showing such an ambiguity as would let in extrinsic testimony to explain the intentions of the testator. Ibid.
3. When such testimony is introduced, it must be of facts unconnected with any general declaration or wishes expressed by a testator for the disposition of his property. Ibid.
4. How far acquiescence by a feme covert is evidence of recognition of a construc- tion of a will. Ibid.
5. A legal partition cannot be presumed, where such partition is, by law, a matter of record. Ibid.
6. The doctrine of presumption as to records explained. Ibid.
7. In some of the States it is the practice, after the evidence for the plaintiff is closed, for the defendant to pray the court to instruct the jury that there is no evidence upon which they can find a verdict for the plaintiff. Parks v. Ross, 362.
8. This is equivalent to a demurrer to the evidence, and such an instruction ought to be given whenever the evidence is not legally sufficient to serve as a foun- dation of a verdict for the plaintiff. Ibid.
9. The act of Congress passed on the 24th of September, 1789 (1 Stat. at Large, 88, 89), provides that ex parte depositions may be taken before a judge of a County Court. Fowler v. Merrill, 375.
10. Where a Probate Court is organized for each county in a State, is a court of record, and has a seal, it is sufficient if a deposition under that act be taken before a judge of the Probate Court. Ibid.
11. A deed made by an officer authorized to sell for taxes, when it shows upon its face that the officer exceeded his authority, is not admissible in evidence. Moore v. Brown, 414.
12. Where a contractor engaged to build a house for a certain sum of money, and the owner of the house, when sued, offered to prove that there were various omissions in the work stipulated to be done, and portions of the work were done in a defective manner, not being as well done as contracted for, and filed a bill of particulars of these omissions and defects by way of set-off, this evi- dence was admissible. Van Buren v. Digges, 461.
13. The old rule, that, where a party shall have been injured, either by a partial failure of consideration for the contract, or by the non-fulfilment of the con- tract, or by breach of warranty, he must be driven to a cross action, has been much relaxed in later times. The case of Withers v. Greene (9 Howard, 213) referred to and reaffirmed. Ibid.
14. Where the contract provided that, if the house were not finished by a certain day, a deduction of ten per cent. from the price should be made, and the defendant offered evidence to prove that this forfeiture was intended by the parties as liquidated damages, the evidence was properly rejected. It would have been irregular in the court to go out of the terms of the contract. Un- less the forfeiture had been expressly adopted by the parties as the measure of injury or compensation, it would have been irregular to receive the evi- dence where the inquiry was into the essential justice and fairness of the acts of the parties. Ibid.
15. Where the defendant offered to prove that certain work which he, the defend- ant, had caused to be done by a third person, was usual and proper, and necessary to the completion of the house, this evidence was properly rejected. He should have proved that it came within the contract. So, also, evidence was inadmissible that the defendant, in presence of the plaintiff, insisted upon its being within the contract; for this would have been making the defendant the judge in his own case. Ibid.
16. Mere acquiescence by the contractor in the defendant's causing certain work to be done by a third person, will not exclude the contractor from the benefit of having further time allowed to finish the house. It was not necessary for him to make a special agreement that further time should be allowed, in consequence of the delay caused by this extra work. Ibid.
17. Where a witness was examined for the plaintiff, and the defendant offered in evidence declarations which he had made of a contradictory character, and then the plaintiff offered to give in evidence others, affirmatory of the first, these last affirmatory declarations were not admissible, being made at a time posterior to that at which he made the contradictory declarations given in evidence by the defendant. Conrad v. Griffey, 480.
1. A statute of the State of New York provides, that, where joint debtors are sued and one is brought into court on process, if judgment shall pass for plaintiff, he shall have judgment and execution not only against the party brought into court, but also against other joint debtors named in the original process, in the same manner as if they had all been taken and brought into court by virtue of such process; but it shall not be lawful to issue or execute any such execution against the body or against the sole property of any person not brought into court. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 165.
2. Where a judgment was given in New York against two partners, one of whom resided in Louisiana and was never served with process, and an action was brought against him in Louisiana upon this judgment, a peremptory excep- tion, in the nature of a demurrer, "that the judgment sued upon is not one upon which suit can be brought against the defendant in this court," was well founded. Ibid.
3. Congress did not intend, by the act of 1790, to declare that a judgment rendered in one State against the person of a citizen of another, who had not been served with process, or voluntarily made defence, should have such faith and
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