the navy was given by the act of July 15, 1870, c. 295, § 3, 16 St. 330, now section 1556 of the Revised Statutes. At the time of the passage of the act of 1883, Mullan was a lieutenant commander, who had served as an officer in the regular navy from September 21, 1860, by continuous service; and, while he held the rank of lieutenant commander, graduated pay was given by statute to officers of that rank and other officers. By the provisions of the act of 1883, he is to be credited with his actual time of service, and is to receive all the benefits of that service in all respects in the same manner as if all of that service had been continuous in the lowest grade having graduated pay held by him since last entering the service. It is contended on the part of the United States that the act of March 3, 1883, applies to officers serving in the regular navy only when their term of service has not been continuous. The view is urged that the expression "since last entering the service" implies that the officer, to be entitled to the benefit of the statute, must have entered the service more than once. But we think that this is an overstrained interpretation. Mullan entered the service once. It was his last entry as well as his first entry. Where an officer has entered the service twice, the second entry is the last entry, and that entry is to be taken in applying the statute to his case; but where an officer has entered the service but once, that entry is to be taken as the last entry, within the meaning of the statute. So, too, the expression, "as if all said service had been continuous," is not to be held to confine the benefits of the statute to a service which has been non-continuous. The expression is satisfied by considering it as an extension of the benefits of the statute to interrupted, non-continuous service, and by crediting the officer with the actual time of such service, as if it had been continuous service. Otherwise, the statute cannot be carried out. It says that "all officers of the navy shall be credited with the actual time they may have served as officers or enlisted men in the regular or volunteer army or navy, or both;" and the benefits of such actual service are to be received where the service has been continuous in the regular navy. The judgment of the court of claims is affirmed. (123 U. S. 182) MATHEWS v. UNITED STATES. AMBASSADORS AND CONSULS-COMPENSATION-REPEAL OF LAWS. The United States appropriation acts, prior to 1883, fixed the salary of the consul at Tangier at $3,000 per annum. For and after that year the appropriation acts fixed it at $2,000. Held, that congress, by making the change, repealed by implication the previous enactments, and that the consul was not entitled to recover the difference for the years of service after 1883. Appeal from the Court of Claims. This suit was brought by the appellant to recover from the United States the balance claimed to be due him on account of salary as consul of the United States at Tangier, in the Barbary states, from July 1, 1882, to June 30, 1886. He entered upon the duties of that office July 19, 1870, was paid at the rate of $3,000 per annum up to June 30, 1882, and thereafter only at the rate of $2,000 per annum. He claims that he was entitled to receive the larger sum during the entire period of his service. The court of claims, being of opinion that the claimant had no cause of action, dismissed the petition. The act of August 18, 1856, regulating the diplomatic and consular systems of the United States, contained this provision "that consuls general, consuls, and commercial agents appointed to the ports and places hereinafter specified in Schedules B and C shall be entitled to compensations for their services, respectively, at the rates per annum hereinafter specified in Schedules B and C. * * Schedule B. (1) Consuls general. * (2) Con suls. * * * Barbary states: Tangier, Tripoli, and Tunis, each three thou11 St. 52, 54. The same provision was carried into the Re sand dollars." vised Statutes, § 1690. The act of June 11, 1874, making appropriations for the diplomatic and consular service for the year ending June 30, 1875, (18 St. 66; Supp. Rev. St. 33,) contained this provision: "That Schedules B and C in section 3 of the act entitled An act to regulate the diplomatic and consular systems of the United States,' approved August 18, 1856, shall, from and after the first day of July next, read as follows: Schedule B. * * * The following consulates shall be divided into seven classes, to be known, respectively, as classes one, two, three, four, five, six, and seven, and the consuls at such consulates shall each be entitled to compensation for their services per annum at the rates respectively specified herein, to-wit: Class one, four thousand dollars. Class two, three thousand five hundred dollars. Class three, three thousand dollars. Class four, two thousand five hundred dollars. Class five, two thousand dollars. Class six, one thousand five hundred dollars. Class seven, one thousand dollars. * * * Class 3. ** * Barbary states: Tripoli, Tunis, Tangier.' The diplomatic and consular appropriation act for the year ending June 30, 1876, (18 St. 322,) appropriated "for consuls general, consuls, vice-consuls, commercial agents, and thirteen consular clerks, $333,200, namely: * * * Class 3, Barbary states: Tripoli, Tunis, Tangier." The effect of this act was to leave the annual salaries of these officers as fixed by the act of June 11, 1874. The appropriation acts for the years ending June 30, 1877, and June 30, 1878, made no change. 19 St. 171, 234. But that of June 4, 1878, provides "that the following sums be, and the same are hereby, appropriated for the service of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1879, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated for the object hereinafter expressed, namely: * * * For salaries of consuls, vice-consuls, commercial agents, and thirteen consular clerks, $304,600, namely: * * * Class 3, at $3,000 * Barbary states: Tripoli, Tunis, Tangier.' * * per annum. And the salaries provided in this act for the officers within named, respectively, shall be in full for the annual salaries thereof from and after the first day of July, 1878; and all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed." 20 St. 91, 93, 98. * ** The appropriation act for the year ending June 30, 1880, was the same as that for the previous year. 20 St. 268. Those for the years ending June 30, 1881, and June 30, 1882, also appropriated an aggregate sum for consuls, vice-consuls, and commercial agents, keeping the consul at Tangier in "Class 3, at $3,000 per annum," omitting, however, the provision-first put into the appropriation act for the year ending June 30, 1879, and repeated in the act for the year ending June 30, 1880-to the effect that the salaries for the officers therein respectively provided for "shall be in full for the annual salaries thereof from and after the first day of July, 1878." 21 St. 133, 135, 339, 441. But the act making appropriations for the year ending June 30, 1883, placed the office of consul at Tangier in the fifth class. Congress appropriated by that act "for salaries of consuls, vice-consuls, commercial agents, and thirteen consular clerks, $332,100, namely: * * * Class 5, at $2,000 per annum. * * * Barbary states; Tangier." 22 St. 128, 129, 131. Each of the appropriation acts for subsequent years, covering the period here in question, contained the same 'anguage, keeping the office of consul at Tangier in "Class 5, at $2,000 per annum,' and differing from the former acts only as to the aggregate amount appropriated for consuls, vice-consuls, commercial agents, and consular clerks; except that the act of March 3, 1887, contained the additional clause, that the sums thereby severally appropriated were to be "in full compensation for the diplomatic and consular service of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1888." 22 St. 424; 23 St. 227, 322; 12 St. 480. v.8s.c.-6 Geo. A. King, for appellant. Atty. Gen. Garland and Ed. M. Watson, for appellee. Mr. Justice HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court. There is no foundation for appellant's claim. In U. S. v. Langston, 118 U. S. 389, 394, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1185, we said that "a statute fixing the annual salary of a public officer at a named sum, without limitation as to time, should not be deemed abrogated or suspended by subsequent enactments which merely appropriated a less amount for the services of that officer for particular fiscal years, and which contained no words that expressly, or by clear implication, modified or repealed the previous law." The present case does not come within that rule; for the consular appropriation acts for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1883, 1884, 1885, and 1886, while recognizing the division made by the act of 1874 of consulates into classes, put the office of consul at Tangier in "Class 5, at $2,000 per annum." In other words, during the whole period covered by the claim in suit, the consul at Tangier was in the fifth class, and there was in force an act of congress declaring that consuls of that class should receive $2,000 per annum; in other words, that sum should be in full compensation for his services each year. The only possible object of transferring the office of consul at Tangier from the third to the fifth class was to reduce the annual salary of that officer to the sum fixed for the annual salaries of consuls of the latter class. The error in the argument in behalf of the appellant is that he gives no effect whatever to the words "at $2,000 per annum,' to be found in every appropriation act covering the period in question. But, clearly, those acts, placing this consul in the fifth class, at $2,000 per annum, repealed, by necessary implication, so much of previous enactments, including that of June 11, 1874, as placed the consul at Tangier in the third class, at $3,000 per annum. The argument to the contrary is not at all aided by the circumstance that the diplomatic and consular appropriation act of March 3, 1887, for the first time after the passage of the act of June 11, 1874, expressly declared that the sums thereby appropriated should be "in full compensation" for the services therein mentioned. That act was passed after the decision in Langston's Case, and the words "in full compensation" were introduced therein, out of abundant caution, to preclude any doubt in the future as to the intention of congress. Judgment affirmed. (123 U. S. 227) FINN. UNITED STATES. 1. CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES-LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. Plaintiff's claim against the United States accrued in October, 1863, but was never presented to any executive department of the government until July, 1874, and was not forwarded to the court of claims by the secretary of the treasury until August, 1886. Held, that claimant's right to judgment was barred by Rev. St. U. S. 1069, which provides "That every claim against the United States, cognizable by the court of claims, shall be forever barred unless the statement of the claim be filed in the court, or transmitted to it, under the provisions of this act, (March 3, 1863,) within six years after the claim first accrues." 2. SAME LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-FORCE OF PLEA. The general rule that limitation does not operate by its own force as a bar, but is a defense, and that the party making such a defense must plead the statute if he wishes the benefit of its provisions, has no application to suits in the court of claims against the United States. Appeal from the Court of Claims. The plaintiff seeks judgment in this case against the United States for the sum of $15,678 as the value of certain horses and mules which he claims to kave purchased for, and delivered to, the United States, at their special in stance and request, on or about October 14, 1863. He also asks interest from that date on said sum at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum, until his demand is paid. The claim was never presented to any executive department of the government until July 3, 1874, on which day it was filed in the office of the quartermaster general. That officer decided adversely to it, and transmitted it to the accounting officers of the treasury. It was disallowed by the third auditor of the treasury, June 14, 1879, and in that ruling the second comptroller concurred. But on the twentieth of July, 1886, the second comptroller ordered the case to be opened for newly-discovered evidence produced by the claimant; and, on the thirteenth of August, 1886, the claim, with all the vouchers, papers, proofs, and documents pertaining thereto, was transmitted by the secretary of the treasury to the court of claims, under section 1063 of the Revised Statutes. The petition in the present suit was filed in that court on the thirteenth of October, 1886; and, after a hearing upon the merits, it was dismissed. The government contends here that the judgment should be affirmed, because it appears that the claim was not put in suit by the voluntary action of the claimant, within six years after it first accrued, nor presented at the proper department within six years after suit could have been commenced thereon in the court of claims. The act of February 24, 1855, establishing the court of claims, invested it with authority to "hear and determine all claims founded upon any law of congress, or upon any regulation of an executive department, or upon any contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States, which may be suggested to it by a petition filed therein; and also all claims which may be referred to said court by either house of congress." 10 St. 612, § 1. This act did not authorize judgment to be entered against the United States, nor fix a period within which parties must assert their claims against the government. The court was, however, required to report to congress the cases upon which it acted, stating the material facts established by the evidence, with its opinion thereon. Section 7. But the act of March 3, 1863, (12 St. 765,) enlarged the jurisdiction of the court, and, among other things, provided for an appeal from its final judgment, in certain cases, to this court, and "that in all cases of final judgments by said court, or on appeal by the said supreme court, where the same shall be affirmed in favor of the claimant, the sum due thereby shall be paid out of any general appropriation made by law for the payment and satisfaction of private claims, on presentation to the secretary of the treasury of a copy of said judgment," etc. The tenth section of that act is in these words: "Sec. 10. That every claim against the United States, cognizable by the court of claims, shall be forever barred, unless the petition setting forth a statement of the claim be filed in the court, or transmitted to it under the provisions of this act, within six years after the claim first accrues: provided, that claims which have accrued six years before the passage of this act shall not be barred if the petition be filed in the court, or transmitted as aforesaid, within three years after the passage of this act: and provided further, that the claims of married women first accrued during marriage, of persons under the age of twenty-one years first accruing during minority, and of idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and persons beyond seas at the time the claim accrued, entitled to the claim, shall not be barred if the petition be filed in the court, or transmitted, as aforesaid, within three years after the disability has ceased; but no other disability than those enumerated shall prevent any claim from being barred, nor shall any of the said disabilities operate cumulatively." Rev. St. § 1069. By an act of congress, approved June 25, 1868, (15 St. 76,) it was made lawful "for the head of any executive department, whenever any claim is made upon said department involving disputed facts or controverted questions of law, where the amount in countroversy exceeds three thousand dollars, or where the decision will affect a class of cases, or furnish a precedent for the future action of any executive department in the adjustment of a class of cases, without regard to the amount involved in the particular case, or when any authority, right, privilege, or exemption is claimed or denied under the constitution of the United States, to cause such claim, with all the vouchers, papers, proofs, and documents pertaining thereto, to be transmitted to the court of claims, and the same shall be there proceeded in as if originally commenced by the voluntary action of the claimant. And the secretary of the treasury may, upon the certificate of any auditor or comptroller of the treasury, direct any account, matter, or claim of the character, amount, or class described or limited in this section, to be transmitted, with all the vouchers, papers, documents, and proofs pertaining thereto, to the said court of claims, for trial and adjudication: provided, however, that no case shall be referred by any head of a department unless it belongs to one of the several classes of cases to which, by reason of the subject-matter and character, the said court of claims might, under existing laws, take jurisdiction, on such voluntary action of the claimant. And all the cases mentioned in this section, which shall be transmitted by the head of any executive department, or upon the certificate of any auditor or comptroller, shall be proceeded in as other cases pending in said court, and shall, in all respects, be subject to the same rules and regulations, and appeals from the final judgments or decrees of said court therein to the supreme court of the United States, shall be allowed in the manner now provided by law. The amount of the final judgments or decrees in such cases so transmitted to said court, where rendered in favor of the claimants, shall in all cases be paid out of any specific appropriation applicable to the same, if any such there be; and where no such appropriation exists, the same shall be paid in the same manner as other judgments of said court." Rev. St. §§ 10631065. All these statutory provisions are carried, with but slight change of words, into chapter 21 of title 13 of the Revised Statutes. T. C. Fletcher, for appellant. Sol. Gen. Jenks and Heber J. May, for appellee. Mr. Justice HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court. In U. S. v. Lippitt, 100 U. S. 668, 669, it was held that "limitation is not pleadable in a court of claims against a claim cognizable therein, and which has been referred by the head of an executive department for its judicial determination, provided such claim was presented for settlement at the proper department within six years after it first accrued; that is, within six years after suit could be commenced thereon against the government. Where the claim is of such a character that it may be allowed and settled by an executive department, or may, in the discretion of the head of such department, be referred to the court of claims for final determination, the filing of the petition should relate back to the date when it was first presented at the department for allowance and settlement. In such cases the statement of the facts upon which the claim rests, in the form of a petition, is only another mode of asserting the same demand which had previously, and in due time, been presented at the proper department for settlement." "These views," the court said, "find support in the fact that the act of 1868 describes claims presented at an executive department for settlement, and which belong to the classes specified in its seventh section as cases which may be transmitted to the court of claims. And all the cases mentioned in this section, which shall be transmitted by the head of an executive department or upon the certificate of any auditor or comptroller, shall be proceeded in as other cases pending in said court, and shall, in all respects, be subject to the same rules and regulations,' with right of appeal. The cases thus transmitted for judicial determination |