4

3

Bacon was not designed to

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6

supersede the Organon of Aristotle:" this might be regarded as, at least, six different propositions: if the word numbered (1) were in italics, it would leave us at liberty to suppose that Bacon might have designed to supersede by some work of his, the Organon of Aristotle; but not by his own Organon: if No. 2 were in italics, we should understand the author to be contending, that whether or no any other author had composed an Organon with such a design, Bacon at least did not: if No. 3, then we should understand him to maintain that whether Bacon's Organon does or does not supersede Aristotle's, no such design at least was entertained: and so with the rest. Each of these is a distinct Proposition; and though each of them implies the truth of all the rest, (as may easily be seen by examining the example given) one of them may be, in one case, and another, in another, the one which it is important to insist on.

We should consider in each case what Question it is that is proposed, and what answer to it would, in the instance before us, be the most opposite or contrasted to the one to be examined. E. G. "You will find this doctrine in Bacon," may be contrasted, either with, "You will find in Bacon a different

doctrine," or with, "You will find this doctrine in a different author."

And observe, that when a proposition is contrasted with one which has a different predicate, the Predicate is the emphatic word; as "this man is a murderer;" i. e. not one who has slain another accidentally, or in selfdefence: "this man is a murderer," with the Copula for the emphatic word, stands opposed to "he is not a murderer;" a proposition with the same terms, but a different Copula.*

It will often happen that several of the Propositions which are thus stated in a single sentence, may require, each, to be distinctly stated and proved: e. g. the Advocate may have to prove, first the fact, that " John killed Thomas ;" and then, the character of the act, that "the killing was wilful and malicious." See Praxis, at the end of the vol. See also Elements of Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. iii. § 5.

* Thus if any one reads (as many are apt to do) "Thou shalt not steal,"—"Thou shalt not commit adultery," he implies the question to be, whether we are commanded to steal or to forbear: but the question really is, what things are forbidden; and the answer is, "Thou shalt not steal;" "Thou shalt not commit adultery," &c.

The connexion between Logic and correct Delivery is further pointed out in Rhet. App. I.

Strictly speaking, the two cases I have mentioned coincide; for when the "is" or the "not" is emphatic, it becomes properly the Predicate: viz, "the statement of this man's being a murderer, is true," or, "is not true."

Of Hypotheticals.

§ 2.

A hypothetical Proposition is defined to be, two or more categoricals united by a Copula (or conjunction), and the different kinds of hypothetical Propositions are named from their respective conjunctions; viz. conditional, disjunctive, causal, &c.

When a hypothetical Conclusion is inferred from a hypothetical Premiss, so that the force of the Reasoning does not turn on the hypothesis, then the hypothesis (as in Modals) must be considered as part of one of the Terms; so that the Reasoning will be, in effect, categorical: e. g.

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predicate.

Every conqueror is either a hero or a villain: Cæsar was a conqueror; therefore

predicate.

He was either a hero or a villain."

"Whatever comes from God is entitled to reverence;

subject.

If the Scriptures are not wholly false, they must come from God;

If they are not wholly false, they are entitled to reverence."

But when the Reasoning itself rests on the hypothesis (in which way a categorical Conclusion may be drawn from a hypothetical Premiss,) this is what is called a hypothetical

Syllogism; and rules have been devised for ascertaining the validity of such Arguments at once, without bringing them into the categorical form. (And note, that in these Syllogisms the hypothetical Premiss is called the major, and the categorical one the minor.) They are of two kinds, conditional and disjunctive.

Of Conditionals.

§ 3.

A Conditional Proposition has in it an illative force; i. e. it contains two, and only two categorical Propositions, whereof one results from the other (or follows from it,) e. g.

antecedent.

"If the Scriptures are not wholly false,

consequent.

they are entitled to respect."

That from which the other results is called the antecedent; that which results from it, the consequent (consequens ;) and the connexion between the two (expressed by the word "if") the consequence (consequentia.) The natural order is, that the antecedent should come before the consequent; but this is frequently reversed: e. g. "the husbandman is well off if he knows his own advantages;" Virg. Geor. And note, that the truth or falsity of a conditional Proposition depends entirely on the

consequence: e. g. "if Logic is useless, it deserves to be neglected;" here both Antecedent and Consequent are false: yet the whole Proposition is true; i. e. it is true that the Consequent follows from the Antecedent. "If Cromwell was an Englishman, he was an usurper," is just the reverse case: for though it is true that "Cromwell was an Englishman," and also "that he was an usurper," yet it is not true that the latter of these Propositions depends on the former; the whole Proposition, therefore, is false, though both Antecedent and Consequent are true. A Conditional Proposition, in short, may be considered as an assertion of the validity of a certain Argument; since to assert that an argument is valid, is to assert that the Conclusion necessarily results from the Premises, whether those Premises be true or not.

The meaning, then, of a Conditional Proposition is this; that the antecedent being granted, the consequent is granted: which may be considered in two points of view: first, if the Antecedent be true, the Consequent must be true; hence the first rule; the antecedent being granted, the consequent may be inferred; secondly, if the Antecedent were true, the Consequent would be true; hence the second rule; the consequent being denied, the antecedent may be denied; for the Antecedent must in that