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(See Book III. $ 8.) Some of those other divisions of nouns, which are the most commonly in use, though not appropriately and exclusively belonging to the Logical system, i. e. to the theory of reasoning, it may be worth while briefly to notice in this place.
Let it be observed then, that a noun expresses the view we take of an object. And its being viewed as an object, i. e. as one, or again as several, depends on our arbitrary choice; e. g. we may consider a troop of cavalry as one object; or we may make any single horse with its rider, or any separate man or horse, or any limb of either, the subject of our thoughts.
1. When then any one object is considered Singular and according to its actual existence, as numerically one, the noun denoting it is called Singular; as, “ this tree,” the “ city of London," 8c. When it is considered as to its nature and character only, as being of such a description as will equally apply to other single objects, the inadequate or incomplete view (see Analytical Outline, $ 6.) thus taken of an individual is expressed by a Common noun ; as
2. When any object is considered as a part Absolate and of a whole, viewed in reference to the whole or to another part, of a more complex object of thought, the noun expressing this view
is called Relative: and to Relative noun is opposed Absolute; as denoting an object considered as a whole, and without reference to anything of which it is a part, or to any other part distinguished from it. Thus, “Father," and “ Son,” “ Rider," “ Commander," 8c., are Relatives, being regarded, each as a part of the complex objects, Father-and-Son, &c.; the same object designated absolutely would be termed a Man, Living-Being, &c.
Nouns are Correlative to each other, which denote objects related to each other, and viewed as to that relation. Thus, though a King is a ruler of men, “King” and “Man” are not correlative, but King and Subject, are.
3. When there are two views which cannot be taken of one single object at the same time, the terms expressing these views are said to be Opposite, or Inconsistent (repugnantia); as, “ black and white;" when both may be taken of the same object at the same time, they are called Consistent, or Compatible (convenientia); as, “ white and cold.” Relative terms are Opposite, only when applied with reference to the same subject; as one may be both Master and Servant, but not at the same time to the same person.
4. When the notion derived from the view taken of any object, is expressed with a reference to, or as in conjunction with, the object
Compatible and Opposite.
that furnished the notion, it is expressed by a Concrete term; as, “ foolish,” or “ fool;" when without any such reference, by an Abstract term ; as, “ folly.”
5. A term which denotes a certain view Positive, of an object as being actually taken of it, is and Negative. called Positive ; as, “ speech,” “a man speaking :” a term denoting that this view might conceivably be taken of the object, but is not, is Privative ; as,
dumbness,” a “man silent," &c.* That which denotes that such a notion is not and could not be formed of the object, is called Negative; as, a “ dumb statue,” a “ lifeless carcase,” &c.
It is to be observed that the same term may be regarded either as Positive, or as Privative or Negative, according to the quality or character which we are referring to in our minds: thus, of “happy” and “ miserable,” we may regard the former as Positive, and the latter (unhappy) as Privative;
* Many Privative epithets are such that by a little ingenuity the application of them may be represented as an absurdity. Thus, Wallis's remark (introduced in this treatise) that a jest is generally a mock-fallacy, i. e. a fallacy not designed to deceive, but so palpable as only to furnish amusement, might be speciously condemned as involving a contradiction: for "the design to deceive," it might be said, “is essential to a fallacy.” In the same way it might be argued that it is absurd to speak of "a dead man;" e.g. "every man is a living creature; nothing dead is a living creature ; therefore no man is dead !"
versá; according as we are thinking of enjoyment or of suffering.
6. A Privative or Negative term is also called Indefinite (infinitum) in respect of its not defining and marking out an object ; in contradistinction to this, the Positive term is called Definite (finitum) because it does thus define or mark out. Thus, “ organized being,”
Cæsar," are called Definite, as marking out, and limiting our view to, one particular class of Beings, or one single person ; "uno ganized,” or “not-Cæsar,” are called Indefinite, as not restricting our view to any class, or individual, but only excluding one, and leaving it undetermined, what other individual the thing so spoken of may be, or what other class it may belong to.
It is to be observed, that the most perfect tion of terins. opposition between nouns exists between any
two which differ only in respectively wanting and having the particle not (either expressly, or in sense) attached to them; as, “ organized,” and “ not-organized,”
corporeal,” and “incorporeal;" for not only is it impossible for both these views to be taken at once of the same thing, but also, it is impossible but that one or other should be applicable to every object; as there is nothing that can be both, so there is nothing that can be neither. Every thing that can be even conceived must be
either “ Cæsar,” or “not-Cæsar;" either “cor-
Such terms may be said to be in contra-
On the other hand, Contrary terms, i. e. Contrary those which, coming under some one class, are the most different of all that belong to that class, as “ wise” and “foolish,” both denoting mental habits, are opposed, but in a different manner: for though both cannot be applied to the same object, there may be other objects to which neither can be applied: nothing can be at once both “ wise” and “ foolish ;" but a stone cannot be either.
The notions expressed by Common terms, we are enabled (as has been remarked in the